NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
310. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 22, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, BG 16 TEHRAN. Top Secret. Drafted by Eliot and cleared by Handley and in draft by Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research George C. Denny, Jr. SUBJECT Background NSAM 348,/2/ approved by the President in May 1966, authorized the construction of a facility [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which could be used in the event our Peshawar facility became unavailable. In accordance with the NSAM, we are about to begin the construction of a warehouse [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. /2/For text of NSAM No. 348, see footnote 2, Document 146. On August 19, Mr. Helms wrote you a letter (Tab B)/3/ suggesting that it might be inadvisable in terms of our relations with the Shah and our overall intelligence interests in Iran to proceed with the facility as planned. The main issue to be resolved is the political advisability of proceeding with the plan. In addition there are some questions about how much intelligence effort in Iran is needed to substitute for Peshawar. Mr. Helms suggests that construction of the facility be suspended until a review of the issues has been completed and suggests that I coordinate this review. I am having an inter-agency meeting on the matter today. /3/Not attached. A typed notation on Rusk's reply to Helms (Tab A) reads: "Sensitive incoming letter retained by INR/Richard Curl." Recommendation That you sign the attached reply (Tab A)/4/ to Mr. Helms indicating that you have asked me to coordinate action on this matter. /4/Attached but not printed. Rusk wrote Helms that he agreed that it would be useful for all concerned to review these plans once again, and that Battle should coordinate action on this matter.
311. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, September 17, 1968, 1600Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow. 6606. Subject: Shah's USSR Visit. Summary. Shah himself is aware there may be some adverse public reaction in West to his Moscow visit./2/ However, he believes visit ultimately will benefit Iran and free world causes. Certainly he is under no illusions as to Soviet aims. /2/On September 5 Ambassador Ansary informed Under Secretary Rostow of the Shah's decision to make a visit to the Soviet Union beginning September 24. (State Department Activities Report, September 6; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State, Department of, President's Evening Reading, Vol. IX) 1. Shah and I 17th discussed at length his forthcoming U.S.S.R. visit. He said developments in Czechoslovakia had caused him to consider in depth pros and cons of proceeding with trip as scheduled. He had concluded life must go on. He noted USG announced continued support for NPT and had indicated contacts with Soviets would continue. It clear Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia not going to be reversed by outside powers and canceling his visit would certainly not do it. Meanwhile, he hoped his speaking frankly to "those damned people" might do a little good. 2. Providing him with President's speeches re U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations and following other suggestions from Dept, I urged Shah to convey to Soviets his own views re detente and bridge-building, re Czech invasion, re Viet Nam, re Arab-Israel situation, etc. He promised to report to us his impressions re all these subjects, as well as re state of play inside Kremlin leadership. 3. Re Arab-Israel situation, Shah said he had been encouraged by his talks with King Hussein but this was offset by report that Arab FornMins had decided on military rather than political action. Nasser's speech had conciliatory note but current Arab arms and propaganda build-up very disturbing. Shah reiterated his view that Israeli demand for direct negotiations unwise. He also recalled Kosygin's telling him that Arab arms supplies had been replenished after June disaster. Shah said he now questions assumption that Soviets will or can control irrational Arab action, i.e. early resumption of hostilities with Israel. 4. Shah said he also haunted by another remark by Kosygin i.e., Western powers are organizing for world war. Shah realizes this is nonsense but fears Soviets as is typical may be projecting their own intentions. Shah noted reports that Soviets have virtually closed ballistic missile gap and that they may feel desperate in their efforts to hold Commie Bloc together. If Kosygin reiterates suggestion that West, particularly Germans, are bent on war, Shah said only response he can think of is that there is no imaginable reason why West should invite mass destruction. I ventured suggestion that when Kosygin made that remark he undoubtedly preoccupied how Kremlin was going to bring Czechs in line and might have been concerned that military move by Soviets would precipitate world conflict; thus accusing West was smokescreen. Shah agreed this might be explanation. 5. Noting how Sovs will seek maximum exploitation his visit to restore their image, I urged Shah to avoid Commie lingo which characterized Kosygin visit communiqué, e.g., "atmosphere of friendship," "together with other peace-loving countries," similarity of views re European security, belief of signatories in "non-interference," etc. Shah showed clear desire to avoid playing this Soviet game to extent possible. Re European security, he did, however, reiterate his belief in nuclear-free zones, e.g., Central Europe (he believes we also do not wish Germans to have nuclear weapons), as well as for Mideast countries ("those crazy Arabs"). 6. In discussing value of neighborly relations (within limits) with Soviets, Shah noted such relations forestall Soviet clamor against Iran's building up military strength in interest of Persian Gulf security. This opened opportunity to suggest that it is not necessary to punch US in nose when target is USSR, e.g. Hoveyda's statements and DPA quotations of Shah that Americans will not be permitted to replace British colonialism in Iran and in Gulf area. Shah agreed it preferable to refer to other powers in general. 7. Opportunity was also afforded to point out that real Soviet aim, as is so clear from Soviet broadcasts, is ouster of U.S. presence and driving USG back into isolationism. Shah agreed, saying Soviets would then have free hand. He added that his own regime is equally target of clandestine broadcasts but agreed with my view that Soviets are "cultivating the land" for day when Shah's firm hand is no longer at tiller. 8. Comment: My impression is that Shah realizes there may be raised eyebrows in West re his USSR visit, but he hopes to prove that visit ultimately is to free world benefit. FornMin Zahedi tells me no other Cabinet minister except himself will accompany the Shah, thus limiting scope for Soviet propaganda exploitation. Ali Khani, Minister of Economy, was originally scheduled to go to expand economic cooperation further. Also Toufanian who is arms purchaser has been eliminated from entourage. Meyer
312. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, October 19, 1968, 0755Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Secret; Limdis. 1735. Iranian Arms Procurement. 1. In course of two-hour discussion 18th, Shah made clear that just as Iran is launching $10 billion fourth five-year plan in economic field Iran is also projecting five-year military program at only fraction economic plan's cost. Naturally, he said, he wishes to maintain American orientation of his military establishment but if present Congressional discussions restrict credit sales to Iran he intends to purchase elsewhere. He hopes at least, he said, to keep Iran Air Force American-oriented. 2. Without any taint of blackmail, Shah reported Soviets are almost daily manifesting eagerness to expand arms sales program begun year ago, with repayment in natural gas. Shah frankly acknowledged Soviet purpose is to wean Iran away from Americans. My impression is that Shah is well aware not only of Soviet purposes but of inferiority of Soviet equipment. 3. Shah noted French also are eagerly making sales pitches. Their aircraft are high quality, he said, but their other wares are exorbitant (probably referring to helicopters and tanks). 4. Shah expressed his conviction that USG after Viet-Nam not likely to come to Iran's support in case of trouble. He also reiterated his long-held view that Iran must take care of itself and that Iran itself is in better position to ascertain its military requirements than outsiders. He noted that five-year military plan is being worked out with ARMISH/MAAG. 5. Once again Shah referred to size of Turkish establishment, almost four-fold that of Iran and heavily supported with MAP grant funds. He said it is difficult to understand American hesitation to sell arms to credit worthy country like Iran which has almost entirely American-oriented military establishment. 6. Shah expressed great concern over influx of Soviet arms to Arab neighbors. He said UAR Air Force been 80 percent replenished. Syrians have been re-equipped beyond pre-hostility capacity, and Iraqis too receiving abundant arms including Sukhoy bombers. 7. I did my best to urge Shah to keep military expenditures to minimum, noting wastefulness of Arab military build-up and lesson taught by Israelis that equipment is much less important than quality of personnel. 8. I also explained in detail present state of play in Congressional Conference Committee re military credit sales. Shah said he willing to wait another month but if it develops that procurement from U.S. is not feasible we should not be surprised if he places orders elsewhere. Meyer
313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, October 30, 1968, 2059Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Eliot; cleared by Schwartz (OASD/ISA/NESA), and in draft by Reed, Alne (ISA/ILN), Lewis D. Junior (G/PM), and Director of the AID Office of Near Eastern Affairs John Eddison; and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 263948. Joint State/Defense message. Subject: Iranian Military Sales. 1. State and Defense have reviewed problems posed by (a) order deadline of December 1968 for 10 C-130 aircraft desired by Iran and (b) Iranian desire have third and fourth squadrons of F-4's delivered by end 1971. 2. Under existing policy, we see no choice except to include C-130 aircraft in sixth (FY 1968) tranche. We cannot permit GOI order these aircraft in expectation credit funds will be forthcoming because decision on credit comes only after annual review. Cash purchase of this magnitude also must await annual review or special authorization. Including C-130's in sixth tranche can be accomplished by reducing number of Sheridans to 16 at $10 million. We reluctant postpone purchase of M-60 tanks because this would undoubtedly lose present favorable price. 3. In order deliver two additional F-4 squadrons to Iran by end 1971, two possible funding programs suggest themselves: (a) ordering all 32 aircraft plus long-lead support items at cost of $100 million in FY 1969 tranche and balance of support items ($30 million) in FY 1970 tranche. This would absorb all of planned credit in seventh (FY 1969) tranche. (b) Ordering long-lead items and AGE for all 32 aircraft ($24.5 million) in FY 1968 (sixth tranche), rest of third squadron ($41.8 million) in FY 1969 (seventh tranche), and rest of fourth squadron ($63.7 million) in FY 1970 (eighth tranche). 4. Our present policy, however, precludes our adopting either of these suggestions. Under present policy, we cannot commit ourselves to more than one year's financing each year following annual review. Funding of F-4's per para 3 above implies commitment to future year funding because first increment would fund only part of equipment needed for a squadron and implies obligation continue funding in future. In addition, suggestion (a) would preempt entire seventh tranche and postpone funding of other items, such as NIMCOMS, Sheridans, Persian Gulf defense items as recommended by Richmond report and other items which have high priority for Iranians. Suggestion (b) would require postponing items from sixth tranche in addition to Sheridans or decision sell C-130's for cash; the latter being unacceptable under current policy as mentioned in para 2 above. 5. Another possibility would be raising planning ceiling for FY 1969 program above $100 million. This would require policy change, including Congressional consultations, and might in any case not be possible given present limitations on credit availabilities. 6. In absence compelling political justification we are reluctant undertake steps to alter present policy. We note in this connection recent sharp decline in Iranian foreign exchange reserves. We question desirability change in policy so soon after Shah's USSR trip. In any case, policy reconsideration could not be undertaken without reviewing political factors and completing economic study, which would have to take into account forthcoming IBRD and IMF reports. 7. Another alternative is of course to postpone delivery fourth squadron. Under this alternative, third squadron could be funded in seventh tranche and fourth in eighth tranche, and additional funds would be available in both tranches for other high priority items even if ceiling remained at $100 million each year. Principal difficulty with this alternative, in addition postponement delivery of fourth squadron until 1972, would be fact fourth squadron could cost an additional $4-$10 million. 8. Embassy/MAAG comments requested on following points: (a) Political, economic and financial factors involved in possible change of policy to permit incremental financing of F-4's, increase in $100 million ceiling, or substantial cash purchases in FY 1969. (b) Timing of annual review preceding seventh (FY 1969) tranche. When does Embassy believe economic data will be available? (c) Impact on Iran's force structure and political-economic factors involved in postponement delivery fourth F-4 squadron to 1972. (d) Substitution of C-130's for Sheridans (except 16) in sixth tranche. Rusk
314. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, November 7, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran. Secret. A copy was sent to Zwick in the Bureau of the Budget. SUBJECT In your memorandum of May 2, 1968,/2/ you outlined the President's understanding, in approving the FY 1968 military credit sales program for Iran, that State, Defense, and AID would go ahead with further in-house economic and military studies in order to provide the best possible estimates of military credit requirements for the FY 1970 budget and the basis for our joint review with the Iranians next year. As you suggested, we have been in touch with the Bureau of the Budget on this matter. /2/Not printed. (Ibid., NSC Files of Harold Saunders, Iran Military, 1/1/68-1/20/69) The requested reviews have now been completed and are enclosed for your information./3/ Our review revealed many political and military reasons for continuing to plan on the basis of $100 million in annual U.S. military credits to Iran. However, the economic study points out several problem areas for the future and recommends that these be kept under review. Our recommendation is, therefore, that the FY 1970 budget estimate for military credit sales to Iran should be set at $100 million, up to half of which might be from commercial credit funds as indicated in the attached report of the financial study group. The final figure would be subject to the results of the annual military, economic and political review to take place during FY 1970. /3/Attached to the source text but not printed. John P. Walsh/4/ /4/Walsh signed for Read.
315. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hart) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)/1/ Washington, November 19, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Eliot and cleared by Rockwell. SUBJECT Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda of Iran will be in the United States on an official visit beginning Tuesday, December 3, 1968. He has expressed a desire to call on President-elect Nixon./2/ /2/A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Nixon will NOT see. RHoudek." The Prime Minister met Mr. Nixon in Tehran on April 22, 1967 when they were both guests at a dinner at the home of the Iranian Foreign Minister. During that visit, Mr. Nixon also had lunch with the Shah. NEA strongly recommends that the President-elect receive the Prime Minister. Our interests in Iran would be well served by such an indication that the new Administration will want to maintain our close ties with Iran. These interests include our ability to influence an increasingly powerful Iran to play a constructive role in the Middle East and Persian Gulf and our ability to retain certain strategic intelligence facilities whose importance is increasing as our facilities in Pakistan are being closed down. Should the President-elect not see the Prime Minister the Shah is likely to be concerned that the new Administration may not want to continue our present intimate relationship with Iran. The Prime Minister will be in New York on December 4, in Washington December 5 and 6, in Florida December 7 and 8 and in Los Angeles December 9-11 and would be available for a meeting with the President-elect on any of those dates.
316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, November 21, 1968, 0443Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Files of Harold Saunders, Visit of Amir Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran, December 4-5, 1968. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Robert G. Houdek of the Executive Secretariat Staff, and approved by Ambassador William Leonhart in S/NL. Another copy of this document is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 U.S./NIXON. 275285. 1. Embassy requested deliver following message from President-elect to Shah of Iran: "Your Imperial Majesty: I thank you for your congratulations and your good wishes on the occasion of my election to the office of President of the United States. In view of the close relations between our two countries, I am especially grateful for your kind words and your expression of continuing support for our mutual efforts for peace and for better lives for all mankind." "On my part, I assure Your Majesty that I will continue to do all in my power to forward and strengthen the close ties between our two governments and people. I remember with pleasure your wonderful hospitality to me in Tehran in April 1967 and have continued to follow with admiration your country's progress at home and constructive statesmanship internationally. Thank you again for your message." "Sincerely yours, Richard M. Nixon." 2. Following FYI is text of message to President-elect from Shah: Begin text: Excellency, I take great pleasure in expressing my sincere congratulations and those of my people on Your Excellency's election to the high office of U.S. President. I sincerely wish you success in discharging your critical responsibilities as a President and in our ever-increasing mutual efforts toward world peace and the freedom and happiness of mankind. I strongly hope that the long-standing friendship and cordiality which has always existed between Iran and the United States on the basis of cooperation, mutual belief, and goodwill will further strengthen and expand in the future. With my best greetings. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. End text. Rusk
317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, November 23, 1968, 0037Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN-U.S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Rockwell on November 22 and approved by Rusk. 276775. 1. At Ansary's request Secretary received him alone November 21. Following points were covered. A. Ansary said Shah understands U.S. providing Turkey with M-60 tanks in place of M-47s to go to Pakistan. Shah wanted to know why Iran could not get M-60 replacements for its own older models. Secretary said he did not think M-60s were involved but he would pass request to his colleagues. (FYI. Plan is for U.S. to provide Turkey with rehab M-48s in place of M-47s which would go to Pakistan. End FYI.) B. Shah wanted us to know he making every effort eliminate outstanding problems between Iran and Afghanistan. C. Ansary made two suggestions about oil which he said Prime Minister would raise during his visit to U.S. First, was that US buy Iranian oil for Vietnam and sequester proceeds which could be used for Iranian arms purchase in this country. Second, was that US should buy Iranian oil for stockpiling. Secretary said he would ask his colleagues consider latter suggestion which he had not heard of before. D. Ambassador said Shah was concerned lest U.S. in order maintain a certain balance give undue support to Saudi Arabia. Secretary probed without much success for what was behind this suggestion but got impression Shah feels that undue American support for Saudi Arabia would create problems of prestige in the Middle East for Iran. Net impression Secretary received was that Shah rather hoping that US will pick Iran as its "chosen instrument" in the Middle East. Rusk
318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot on November 22, cleared by Leonhart, and approved by Rockwell. Washington, November 24, 1968, 0042Z. 277012. Subject: Hoveyda and President-elect. Please inform PriMin that President-elect will not be able meet with him during his US visit next month. President-elect hopes that PriMin will understand that during next few weeks he must devote his full time and attention to preparing for his administration. He has therefore decided that he will not be able to receive any foreign visitors in this period. You may tell PriMin that President-elect remembers with pleasure his talks with the PriMin in Tehran in April 1967, that he has warm admiration for the PriMin and for his role in Iran's great progress in recent years, that he looks forward to strengthening the already close ties between our two countries and that he very much regrets not being able to meet with the PriMin in December. Rusk
319. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 24, 1968, 0745Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE. 7433. Subject: Military Sales to Iran. Summary. Shah's complaint about projected delay in delivery of Sheridan tanks has been seized as opportunity for trying to divert him from virtual obsession with date of Dec. 31, 1971. That is date when British will have withdrawn from Persian Gulf. In effect Shah is trying to compress 5-year military purchasing into intervening three years. Specifically, case was made for deferring delivery schedule of fourth F-4 squadron. Shah was non-committal except to attach hope to oil barter deals with GM and other American companies. 1. After noting 16 Sheridans included in sixth tranche, Shah 23rd expressed concern that additional Sheridans not projected for delivery until 1972 or later. Suggesting General Twitchell more familiar with technical aspects such as two-year lead time, I said Shah's question, however, raises broader issue of future program projection. 2. Describing as understandable his keen interest in end of 1971 target date (when British will have withdrawn from Gulf), I said in effect he is trying to compress five-year military program into three years. This in turn is incompatible with our projected $100 million annual credit availability. Shah agreed this is problem, adding if choices have to be made his air force and navy needs must come first. 3. I said I wondered whether precise date of December 31, 1971, is all that critical. Iran's military strength is obviously capable of handling any currently envisaged threat in Gulf area. Moreover, if threat arises it will probably be as result of ferment of several years after British leave. 4. Thus I questioned whether having both third and fourth F-4 squadrons on hand by end of 1971 is really necessary. Shah himself had observed at Lavan Island that Iran's international prestige has soared as result of news that Iran has Phantoms. As Kuss had said, their chief value is deterrence through "eye impact". It seemed to me that essentially this objective can be served as well by three squadrons as by four by the end of 1971. 5. I told Shah I not questioning military value of four squadrons but merely whether their delivery might not be spaced out so as to give us elbow room to include in future tranches, if they are approved, other items which are important to five-year program. Meanwhile, we would be keeping options open for such things as possibly acquiring rehab F-4's after Viet Nam conflict ceases. 6. Shah's response tended to center on his confidence that oil barter deal with US companies may come to fruition. He obviously places great hope in Jim Zand's proposals for exchanges with General Motors, adding that one of attractive aspects is GM will give sizeable discounts on hardware it sells. In short, he has vaguely in mind getting Sheridans via barter deals which he contends would be incremental to normal Iranian imports from US. 7. In addition to financial bind, I told Shah there is always problem of human resources. He readily agreed, commenting this is point with which he cannot argue. I pointed out still to arrive are 155 M-60 tanks whose payment included in sixth tranche. According to General Twitchell, I said, absorption capability of ground forces for tank is already over-strained. Shah indicated agreement but did not necessarily agree to translate this into lengthy delay in receipt of Sheridans. 8. In concluding general argument for easing up pressure to crowd as much hardware as possible in before end of 1971, I told Shah he should take long-view. USG has treated him well in past and all indicators are good for future. FMS legislation has been passed. Thanks to deliberations re FMS, our Congressional friends, as reflected in several personal letters I have received, are now more fully conscious of Shah's fine leadership as well as Iran's needs. Furthermore, his good friend, from whom only previous day he had received warm telegram, will be in White House. In a sense, I said, when USG made tough decision to let Iran buy Phantoms (first foreign release except for Britain), it was political decision. We betting on Shah to continue to exercise, as Nixon said in his telegram, "constructive statesmanship internationally". 9. Comment: While all the points were made, discussion was not as neat and articulate as reported above, for Shah kept interrupting and going off on tangents. Therefore, it was a no-decision affair. But in my view ground has been prepared and perhaps seed planted. I pointed out that with sixth tranche out of way we now have time to ponder these things while undertaking next annual review and determining seventh tranche next June. Shah corrected me to say F-4 order must be placed by May. Meyer [Continue with the next documents] |
