 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XXII
Iran Department of State
Washington, DC |  320. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 2, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Visit of Prime Minister Hoveyda of Iran, 12/5-6/68. Secret. Drafted by Eliot; cleared by Rockwell, Chapman, Eddison (AID), Reed (DOD/OASD/ISA), Akins, and Country Director for Saudi Arabia William D. Brewer. SUBJECT
Your Meeting with the Prime Minister of Iran, December 5, 1968, at 12:00 noon Our aim during the Prime Minister's visit will be to assure him, and through him the Shah, that despite the forthcoming change in our Administration, we will wish to maintain our present intimate relationship with Iran. We also wish to give recognition to the important role played by the Shah's advisers, as represented by the Prime Minister, in Iran's domestic progress and international statesmanship. To these ends you might therefore: 1. Tell him of your conviction that the new Administration will have the same regard for Iran and the Shah and the same interest in preserving our close ties as your Administration has had. 2. On Iran's domestic progress: a. Express your admiration for the strides that have been made, in which the Prime Minister has played a major role. b. Indicate your belief that private American enterprise will continue to be attracted by investment opportunities in Iran. c. While referring to our desire to maintain our close military relationship with Iran: (1) express the hope that Iran's military procurement will not impede its spectacular economic development and (2) indicate that any compression of the currently planned five-year military procurement program would have financial and economic implications and would also not seem to be warranted by the military situation. 3. On international issues: a. Take him into your confidence on our view of the situation with respect to Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli problem and Soviet policies in eastern Europe and elsewhere. b. Indicate pleasure concerning the Shah's recent visits to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and confidence that the security of the Persian Gulf area following the British departure in 1971 will be assured by cooperation among the littoral countries. Dean Rusk Attachment POINTS THE PRIME MINISTER MAY RAISE AND
SUGGESTED RESPONSES 1. United States Military Cooperation with Iran The Prime Minister may raise specific problems connected with our military credit sales program for Iran. He may indicate a desire to have our planned five-year program compressed into three years. For example, he may ask that the delivery of the two additional squadrons of F-4 aircraft desired by Iran be advanced from the currently contemplated 1971-72 period to 1971 when British forces are scheduled to leave the Persian Gulf. You might respond that within the bounds set by Congressional authority and appropriations, you expect our military cooperation with Iran will continue. On specific problems, you might say that they are being communicated to us through Ambassador Meyer and that you expect they will be considered during our joint annual review of our military credit sales program this coming spring. You might say that while we understand Iran's concern for the security of the Gulf, Iran's military strength is capable of handling any currently envisaged threat in that area. Any acceleration of presently planned Iranian military procurement or compression of the planned program into less than five years would not only have economic and financial implications but would also not seem to be warranted by the military situation. 2. Oil Matters The Prime Minister may ask assistance for Iran to sell additional oil to the United States under barter arrangements, to sell additional oil products for our Far Eastern Defense forces or even to sell oil directly to a U.S. stockpile. You might respond that sales of oil to the United States are governed by our oil import policy under which import quotas are given to domestic refiners and not to foreign countries. Increased participation in the American market for Iranian oil can best be obtained by Iran's ensuring, in collaboration with the producing companies, that Iranian oil is economically attractive to those American refiners who have import allocations. Likewise, the Department of Defense purchases oil products on the basis of competitive bidding, and if Iranian companies can supply the required quantities at competitive prices, the Department of Defense would be pleased to purchase them. There are no plans at the present time for either civilian or military stockpiling of petroleum or petroleum products in the United States. 321. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 5, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Saunders. Copies were sent to Rostow and Read. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 11:57 a.m. until 12:45 p.m. (Ibid.) PARTICIPANTS
President Lyndon B. Johnson
Prime Minister Hoveyda of Iran
Harold H. Saunders PLACE
The President's Oval Office The President welcomed the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister extended the Shah's greetings. The Shah had asked him to express his hope that the President and Mrs. Johnson would have an opportunity to visit Iran again soon. The Prime Minister went on to express appreciation that the "American Government under your leadership" had always extended the support Iran needed. He felt Iran is on the right track and "things seem bright." "What we need is peace in the world; we have stability at home." There are no problems between Iran and the U.S. We have been good friends. The U.S. has supported Iran's development, and the time has come to broaden economic relations between the two countries. He hoped that more US firms would come to work in Iran. "Development is not only government-to-government business but concerns the peoples of our countries as well. Iran has all the facilities for investment of capital and feels that if private firms make money, Iran makes money." The President said that is a very enlightened viewpoint. As a result, he felt development will come more rapidly. He said he did not know any country--and he has been in dozens--where the leadership has been wiser or more effective. "Some people talk about development. Some people do it." The Prime Minister said that if Iran continues at its present speed, it will double GNP in seven years. Iran is even reaching the point where it could begin to think about assisting its neighbors. The President said that Iran could be a constructive force for peace. The Prime Minister said that the state of the world compels Iran to responsible leadership. Irresponsible leadership could lead to war. Iran must provide its people the insurance that military strength gives. Iran has to modernize its forces. The Iranian taxpayer expects this kind of security. But equally important, the defense of an area should be the burden of the people of the area. Iran has no interest in attacking anyone. Iran understands that the British have to leave the Persian Gulf. "I don't say we appreciate it, but we understand it. Now it is up to the people of the Persian Gulf, and their understanding and cooperation can provide stability there." One of the problems is that some of the regimes on the other side of the Gulf are unstable. He mentioned principally Iraq but also Syria and the UAR. He said "we have to look for peace and count on it. We have to build the monument of peace." This is the policy the Shah has followed. The Prime Minister continued, saying that relations between Iran and the U.S. have developed nicely. Never in my four years as Prime Minister has there been any serious problem with the U.S. We have been real friends--not only in days of happiness but in difficult days. He is happy that Iran does not need any more grant aid but he is thankful for continuing US support with Iran's military development and for the presence of the US military mission in Iran. The Prime Minister hoped that the seventh tranche in the military sales program could be signed as soon as possible. That includes two squadrons of Phantoms. The area is more and more filled with armament and one never knows whose hand is on the trigger. The Prime Minister said we usually have an economic review before signing new military sales agreements. "I have many people with me and they will be happy to sit down in the Pentagon and have this review." He specifically mentioned Iran's need for more technicians "on levels 7 and 9." Iran is preparing its own manpower and needs this help. The Prime Minister recalled that the Shah had raised the question of oil during his last visit. Arrangements are progressing and Iran knows that a new oil import quota for it is out of the question but hopes that maybe something can be worked out within the existing quota. He mentioned that South Africa was stock-piling oil in its old empty coal mines. He would like to raise this possibility with the US Government in hopes that the US might buy from Iran for this purpose. Iran would also like to sell more JP-4 fuel for the US Navy and is ready to make certain concessions on price. The President said that our people will be "happy and willing to explore" all these matters while the Prime Minister is here. The President said further that, while he will be in Government only a short time longer and could not speak for the next administration, he believed that U.S. interests are such that a close relationship between the U.S. and Iran will continue. He understood that President-elect Nixon had already sent a message to the Shah saying this. "We want to do all we can to help." The President further said that we planned to continue our role in Iran's military development as far as Congress will permit. The President said he had always been concerned that Iran's military expenses not become so great as to undercut economic development. The Prime Minister said, "There I can assure you that they are balanced." The Prime Minister said Iran understands the importance of keeping these things in balance. Disarmament is the ultimate key to these problems and Iran would be happy to disarm tomorrow if that were possible. The President said that we were trying to work along these lines with the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said that the cost of one plane could build three hospitals. But, he asked rhetorically, "What is the use of the hospitals if you do not have the planes to protect them?" The President said that we cannot change our oil import policy but we would certainly consider the purchase of Iranian products wherever their prices are competitive. We favor whatever barter arrangements Iran can work out with the private U.S. companies and hope that Iran can increase its opportunities that way. The President said that there may be a time when the U.S. will not be in the same position it is now on oil and we may have to do what South Africa is doing. We are fortunate to have friends like Iran. [Comment: The implication was friends who have oil if we need it some day.]/2/ /2/All brackets are in the source text. The President said that in the years left to him he hoped he could return to Iran. He remembered the warm welcome he had received there and expressed the deep affection he felt for the Iranian people. He expected to be busy in the next couple of years with his library but he expected that he and Mrs. Johnson would have time to travel. He hoped that the Prime Minister would tell His Majesty the Shah that the President recalls the "gorgeous" reception the Johnsons had received on their last visit to Tehran and he is looking forward to seeing Iran again and to going out in the countryside and seeing how Iran's land reform program has gone. The Prime Minister said he hoped the President would keep his promise and "come and see us." The people of Iran have "the greatest regard for your courage." He spoke of how the people in Iran had watched the March 31 speech on television and felt "a great deal of tension" [comment: presumably over the thought that the President would leave office]. He spoke of the President's great responsibilities for the peace of the world and how greatly Iranians had appreciated his handling of those responsibilities. The President said he had made every effort not to expand the war in Southeast Asia by involving the USSR or Communist China. At the same time, he could not stand by and let aggression go unopposed. The only US objective is to see the people of the area determine their own future. The US will come home as soon as that is possible. We don't want to change governments or destroy North Vietnam or kill another person. The President said people from all over the US would be coming to the dinner for the Prime Minister tonight. This was the next to last official visit during his Administration and it turns out that the last two--Iran and Kuwait--are with neighbors and good friends. The conversation turned again to the Iranian economy. The President asked about Iran's agricultural and land development. The Prime Minister said the Shah is never satisfied with Iran's achievements. The President referred to his remarks at the arrival ceremony and said that the key to development is the human process he had described there--the distribution of the land and education and, above all, giving the father the hope that his son's life can be just a little bit richer than his own. Once you get human beings involved this way, you have something very exciting going. The President promised to review his conversation with the Prime Minister with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford later in the day and would encourage them to be as helpful as possible. The Prime Minister returned to the question of peace and stability in his part of the world. He mentioned a disturbing report that the Iraqis are trying to develop a capacity to wage germ warfare. The Soviets had refused help, but the Iraqis are approaching Bulgaria now. The thought of germ warfare in the hands of such an unstable government made him shudder. The President asked what the population of Iran is now, and the Prime Minister replied, "close to 26 million" with a 2.7% growth rate. He said his government had launched a highly successful family planning program without fanfare--"we have done it without talking about it, without fuss." The problem is not that they don't want more Iranians, he said, but they want better balance in the population since 48% of the population is now ages 0-14. The President asked about fertilizer use. The Prime Minister said Iran is building new plants, one with Allied Chemical. Iran in a recent six-month program had demonstrated the capacity to increase its rice crop from 2-1/2 tons per hectare to 4-1/2 tons. When the Prime Minister mentioned Allied Chemical, the President checked and said that Mr. John Connor of Allied would be at the dinner tonight. The President described a new liquid feed Allied had developed that the President had tried on his Ranch. The Prime Minister, picking up the President's description of the liquid feed, said Iran is now trying to develop protein products from oil. He cited the problem of land erosion that arises when animals are allowed to overgraze on the grasslands and agreed with the President that it is important to find other means of feeding until the grass is established. The President commented that fertilizing these lands to get grass started is expensive, but the results justify the expense. He gave an example of his experience in starting grass on some of his own eroded land in Texas. The President then said that it had been called to his attention in connection with the recent monetary crisis that Iran had not yet ratified the Special Drawing Rights Amendment to the IMF. The President pointed out that the amendment would not go into effect until 67 countries with 80% of the votes had ratified it. The US had been among the first to ratify. He very much hoped Iran would ratify in the near future. The Prime Minister took a piece of paper out of his pocket, made a note and said he would look into it. The Prime Minister said further that the recent monetary crisis had been distressing. He told the President that President DeGaulle, whom the Prime Minister had just seen in Paris on the way to Washington, had been grateful for the President's message at the height of the franc crisis. The Prime Minister had asked President DeGaulle what he thought the results of his monetary reform program would be, and DeGaulle had declined to predict. The President explained how he had come to send the message to DeGaulle, saying that it was a word of encouragement at a difficult time for DeGaulle and not a recommendation or endorsement of his program. Once DeGaulle had crossed the bridge of decision, the President felt our role was to help him succeed rather than to make life difficult for him. The President then invited Mr. Walt Rostow to bring in Dr. Henry Kissinger to meet the Prime Minister. The President informed Dr. Kissinger that he had told the Prime Minister that he felt close relations would continue to exist between the US and Iran in the new administration. The President cited President-elect Nixon's message to the Shah saying this. Dr. Kissinger said that he had "spoken to Mr. Nixon about Iran yesterday" and he could reiterate Mr. Nixon's earlier words to the Shah today in behalf of the President-elect. The President told the Prime Minister that Dr. Kissinger had served both Republican and Democratic Presidents faithfully and well and that the US is fortunate and proud to have men of his stature who lend their great abilities to the Government regardless of partisan positions. The President then told the Prime Minister that he would be talking further with him this evening and would be glad to take up any further issues that might emerge in the course of the Prime Minister's discussion here. Comment: The discussion flowed easily. The Prime Minister was relaxed, informal, responsive and friendly. The President spoke with warmth and good feeling about his past and present relations with the Shah and other Iranian leaders. They had no trouble keeping the conversation moving, and one could only judge the meeting thoroughly satisfactory on both sides. Harold H. Saunders/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Saunders signed the original. 322. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 6, 1968, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Eliot and approved in S on December 11. The source text is labeled "Part 3 of 4." The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT
U.S. Military Sales Program for Iran PARTICIPANTS H.E. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran
H.E. Hushang Ansary, Iranian Ambassador
H.E. Mehdi Samii, Managing Director, Plan Organization, Iran The Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
The Hon. Armin H. Meyer, American Ambassador to Iran
Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Country Director for Iran, NEA The Prime Minister asked the new Managing Director of the Plan Organization, former Central Bank Governor Mehdi Samii, to join the discussion and to raise certain matters connected with our military sales program for Iran. He explained that Mr. Samii would, in his new job, continue to be responsible for military credit negotiations with the United States. Mr. Samii said that Iran needs to place orders for the additional two squadrons of F-4 aircraft it desires in order to have these squadrons delivered by the end of 1971 when the British forces leave the Persian Gulf. A problem arises, however, because the planning ceiling of $100 million for the FY 1969 (seventh) credit tranche will not be sufficient to cover the F-4's and other requirements. He asked if there could be some flexibility, for example exceeding in this year the planning ceiling. As an alternative, he mentioned the possibility of spreading out the credit requirements. (Comment: Here he was clearly referring to what we would term "incremental funding.") In addition to the F-4's, he mentioned the need to fund 100 additional Sheridan tanks, 200 recoilless guns and communications equipment in the seventh tranche. Mr. Samii also said that we have informed Iran that after FY 1969 it must purchase all the ammunition previously supplied on a grant basis despite the fact that the 1966 amendment to our 1964 Memorandum of Understanding extended our grant program an additional two years. Ambassador Meyer and Mr. Eliot stated that the 1966 amendment of the 1964 Understanding extended the credit but not the grant program beyond FY 1969. The Secretary said that he recognizes that it is necessary to think ahead but that our Congressional requirements make it necessary for us to plan on an annual basis. He said that if Iran wishes to increase the size of a tranche, we would have to ascertain whether the understanding between us would be firm over a number of years, so that we wouldn't find ourselves being asked to increase later tranches and hence being asked to increase the total program. Mr. Samii said that if we can reach an agreement on a total program, there would be no need to increase the size of later tranches. The Secretary said that some of this may be easier for us in later years after the end of the war in Vietnam. He stressed that there is one serious aspect of the matter that must be kept in mind. Although we of course do not wish to infringe on the sovereignty of Iran, our ability to obtain the resources we need for this program depends on our examining the relationship between Iran's military and development expenditures. The Secretary said he understood the Government of Iran would be supplying us with some figures. Mr. Samii expressed the hope that we could advance the timing of our review of the economic factors. Hopefully, reports now being prepared by the IBRD and the IMF could serve as a basis. The Central Bank of Iran would also supply some data. All this information should become available in December. Ambassador Meyer said that the economic review has usually taken place in the spring. He said that there are two important problems to be considered. One is whether incremental funding is possible. The other is whether the fourth squadron of F-4's is really needed by the end of 1971. He asked whether delivery of the fourth squadron could be put off a year. This would assist solution not only of financial but also of manpower problems. The Secretary said that it would be useful if the economic figures could be made available as soon as possible so that he could brief his successor. He doubted it would be possible to have formal negotiations within the next few weeks but said he would like to discuss the matter with his successor. Mr. Samii said that the annual economic review has become a normal thing. The reports due from the IBRD and the IMF in December and January will cover the economic situation pretty thoroughly. In response to Ambassador Meyer's remarks, he said that he did not believe that delivery of the fourth squadron of F-4's could be postponed because once the British leave the Persian Gulf, Iran had to be ready for anything. Mr. Rockwell interjected that there was nothing four squadrons could do that three couldn't do at that time. Mr. Samii reiterated that the fourth squadron was not just for "window dressing." The Prime Minister added that Iran must be able to have teeth available. Ambassador Ansary then mentioned that the Iranian Air Force also has a requirement for additional technicians at higher levels and asked if they could be made available. He said that the requirement is for more than the 50 the USAF has already made available and perhaps goes as high as 221. These technicians would supervise and train Iranians in maintaining F-4's. The Secretary said that we will look into this matter. He said that it presented no great problem in principle but posed a practical problem. He concluded this part of the discussion by saying that our military people on both sides might wish to review the military contingencies to see how many squadrons of F-4's are really needed. 323. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 6, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot on December 8 and approved in S on December 12. The source text is labeled "Part 4 of 4." SUBJECT
Oil Matters PARTICIPANTS H.E. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran
H.E. Hushang Ansary, Ambassador of Iran
H.E. Mehdi Samii, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran
Dr. Reza Fallah, Director, National Iranian Oil Company The Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
The Hon. Armin H. Meyer, American Ambassador to Iran
Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Country Director for Iran, NEA The Prime Minister asked Dr. Fallah to join the meeting for a discussion of oil matters. He said that Iran has no problems in the current year with the Oil Consortium but that it hopes for one billion dollars in oil revenues next year. (Comment: presumably the Iranian year beginning March 21, 1969.) The member companies of the Consortium are considering this request, but have not yet responded. Last year, he said, the Shah told the companies that if they could not meet Iran's requirements, Iran would find its own markets. He decried what he described as the companies' policy of supporting such states as Abu Dhabi and Kuwait that either have no useful way to employ their oil revenues or use them to support radical Arabs. The Prime Minister went on to say that Iran is now looking at the American market. One way to sell oil to the United States would be through the present American quota system, using the proceeds to purchase American goods. Iran might possibly buy into an American firm having an import quota. In any case, the Prime Minister said, two aspects of this situation deserved special mention. One is the fact that the United States needs additional oil reserves. Iran has entered into a contract with another country (comment: South Africa; see below) desirous of stockpiling oil and has asked a private firm for a study on a similar possible contract with the United States. Iran would give this study to the United States Government for its consideration. Iran could use the proceeds from such sales to the United States to buy American products. The second aspect of the matter was possible sales of petroleum products to the Department of Defense. Dr. Fallah said that sales to the Department of Defense pose a problem because DOD purchases on the basis of public tender. The Secretary asked if Dr. Fallah meant that Iran could not meet the price competition. Dr. Fallah said that the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) would act as the Consortium's agent. The Prime Minister said that the NIOC would find a market for the Consortium. The NIOC would make no money as an agent, but Iran would profit through the taxes the Consortium would pay on higher production. Dr. Fallah said that Iran desires a three-year contract with DOD, but the latter won't go beyond six months. This and not price is the problem. The Prime Minister said that Dr. Fallah would be talking with DOD officials. The Secretary said that we can be sympathetic provided that the price is right, but we do not want to subsidize the seller. Dr. Fallah said that on the other aspect of the Iranian plan to sell oil to the United States, Iran believes that it is in the US interest to buy inexpensive Iranian oil. The Secretary asked how such purchases would be financed. He said that he couldn't imagine the Congress financing an oil stockpile. Dr. Fallah said that at some time in the future, the United States, like South Africa, might finance a stockpile. Iran could provide credit for that part of the sale whose proceeds would go to Iran. The Secretary said that from the standpoint of national resources policy there was some logic in the Iranian proposal. But to translate the proposal into financial and political terms would be difficult. He asked if such a proposition might not be more attractive for Western Europe. Dr. Fallah replied that Western Europe is already a market for Iranian oil. The Secretary commented that in our case, the proposal would appear to hurt our own producers who wouldn't trust their government to keep the stockpile locked up. Dr. Fallah said that the major American companies would like the proposal. The Secretary said he was interested in the subject and would give it more thought, but there are political and financial problems. Dr. Fallah said that Alaskan finds are not the permanent answer to American oil needs and added that the Iranian proposal would not hurt the American balance of payments. The Secretary repeated that the proposal is politically very difficult. He asked that Iran provide us with its studies informally and that future discussions be on an informal basis. 324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, December 9, 1968, 2212Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot on December 7, cleared by Saunders, and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 284246. Subject: Hoveyda Visit. 1. Summary. Hoveyda's December 3-4 visit to New York and December 5-6 visit to Washington eminently successful in further improving climate our relations with Iran. It provided us with opportunity give recognition Iranians in addition to Shah who playing important role in their country's development. We also conveyed to Hoveyda fact that our desires for close ties with Iran transcend partisan American considerations. For his part, Hoveyda's warm and frank personality made excellent impression on Americans he met. Principal substantive discussions were on Mideast problems and Iranian desires speed up military purchases from US and sell oil to US market. 2. During course his New York and Washington visits Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda had half-hour meeting with President, hour and half meeting with Secretary, in addition formal dinner at White House and lunch at Dept. Hoveyda greatly pleased by special attention of President who attended Iranian Embassy reception in Washington. He also met in New York with Ambassador Murphy and while with President had brief discussion with President-elect's newly appointed foreign policy assistant Henry Kissinger. At private social occasions he was guest of David Rockefeller in New York, with Governor Rockefeller present, and of Senator Percy in Washington. At National Press Club speech in Washington and off-the-record appearances before Council on Foreign Relations in New York and Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs Hoveyda stressed Iran's internal progress and stability and pointed to importance for peace and stability of Middle East of a strong Iran. Press coverage was moderate but favorable. No student or other demonstrations. 3. In substantive discussions Hoveyda reviewed full range of Iranian policies toward its neighbors along familiar lines. We provided him with our current views on Arab-Israeli and Vietnam problems. Hoveyda pressed for speedy completion arrangements for next increment our military sales credit, stressing need place orders for additional two squadrons of F-4's so as to meet desired 1971 delivery date. In this connection he also mentioned Iranian need for more USAF technicians. Further discussions these subjects will be held in Washington December 13-16 with PlanOrg Managing Director Samii. In addition discussions with oil companies in New York (septel), Hoveyda in Washington discussed possibilities for Iranian sales of oil to US and of oil products to DOD. Discussions these possibilities were inconclusive. Memcons follow. Rusk 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, December 18, 1968, 2346Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Eliot, cleared by Meyer (draft) and Leonhart, and approved by Rockwell. 289317. For Charge. If you are questioned about fact President-elect did not receive Prime Minister Hoveyda but subsequently received Israeli Defense Minister Dayan and the Amir of Kuwait, you should say that you have no information on this subject. If pressed for explanation by high-level Iranian officials, you can suggest they await return of Ambassador Meyer who you are certain will be in a position to discuss this matter with the Prime Minister./2/ /2/Printed from an unsigned copy. [end of document] Volume XXII Index | Historian's Office | State Department | 