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230. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, August 23, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Chrons, Aug.-Dec. 1967. Secret. Copies were sent to DDCI, DD/P, and Chief, NE. SUBJECT 1. The undersigned met with the Shah of Iran over breakfast from 9:05 to 10:00 o'clock this morning in the upstairs study of Blair House. There was no one else present. 2. After initial pleasantries, the undersigned expressed appreciation for the Shah's assistance in establishing and operating the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] installations in Iran and went into some detail on the value of the take and what it meant to American understanding of [2 lines of source text not declassified]. The Shah was clearly interested in hearing these details and asked several questions. 3. We then discussed the Iranian students in the United States, and the undersigned gave the Shah his personal assurance that we were not financing these students and that we would not under any circumstances. The Shah mentioned why he had at one time been concerned, but then readily admitted that in the current context we could have no motive for doing this. I repeated to him, and stated that I had said the same thing to the President, that we had nothing to do with these students, except to try to keep an eye on them in the interest of informing the Iranians of their activities. 4. The next topic of discussion was the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. After hearing an expression of thanks for this endeavor, the Shah said that he had felt for some time that the Agency should [1 line of source text not declassified]. The undersigned replied that we would look into this matter. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] 5. There was considerable discussion of the Arab-Israeli war with particular reference to Israeli tactics, the weaknesses of the Egyptian armed forces, and the phenomenon of Soviet miscalculation and misassessment. The Shah said that he had never dreamed the Israelis could win the war as rapidly as they did. He was obviously impressed when the undersigned told him that the President had been given estimates from this Agency before the war began, stating, within reasonable limits, exactly what happened. 6. There followed some discussion of the Shah's talk with the President last evening which would not be an appropriate part of this memorandum. He then discussed this theory of arms purchases, his plan for the Iranian air force, and his general philosophy about the military position of Iran. To the extent that the recipients of this memorandum are interested in these points, the undersigned would be glad to present them orally. 7. The meeting ended with a rather lengthy dissertation by the Shah on his view of Iran in the world today, what he is trying to do with his people, and where he would like to end up a few years hence in terms of his country's health and social well-being. Before the undersigned took his leave, he gave the Shah an Agency study entitled "The Outlook for Communist China". The Shah seemed pleased to receive this piece of paper, understood its sensitivity, and promised to guard it with care. 8. Ambassador Ansari greeted the undersigned at Blair House and also saw him to the door after the meeting. Richard Helms/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
231. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 23, 1967, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 68 D 475, Visit of the Shah of Iran, August 22-24, 1967, Vol. II, Admin. & Sub. Misc., Press Release & Memcons, V-39-B. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot and approved in S on August 30. The meeting took place at Blair House. This memorandum is Part V of V; memoranda of the other parts of the conversation are ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS H.I.M. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran The Secretary The Shah said that he had met with oil company officials in New York and had indicated to them that they should support countries which are stable and reliable and that they merely caused trouble by giving so much to small desert countries such as Kuwait. He hoped the companies would agree. Commenting on Arab oil policies, he said it was ridiculous for any Arab to believe that the West could really be hurt by an Arab oil embargo. Iranian, Venezuelan and American oil are available. The West could stand an oil embargo for a couple of years, but the Arab countries could not. Agreeing, the Secretary commented that he has found it useful to suggest to our moderate Arab friends that they make this point. The Shah said he has been doing the same thing. The Secretary said the Arab countries would not only hurt themselves in the short run by imposing an oil embargo, but they might cause the West to turn away from Middle East oil and substitute nuclear power on a crash basis. The Shah mentioned plans for an oil pipeline across Turkey to the Mediterranean, for a gas pipeline from Iran to Trieste and for an oil import terminal in Yugoslavia to supply Eastern Europe. On the latter point, he said that the Eastern European market for oil is of course a limited one. As for gas, he said that he would much prefer to use Iranian gas to make petrochemical products, especially fertilizers, for Iran and for export. He had urged the oil companies to interest themselves and others in this possibility. In the meantime, however, Iran was making plans to export gas, and it seemed desirable to have customers in addition to the Soviet Union.
232. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)/1/ Washington, August 23, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Files of Harold Saunders, Visit, Shah of Iran, Aug. 22-24, 1967. Confidential. SUBJECT The Air Force has developed what I believe is an ingenious proposal for meeting the Shah's request to the President for additional pilot training for his Air Force. As you know, the Shah asked for a total of 75 spaces for FY 68, but Major General Jablonsky, the US MAAG Chief in Iran, has assured us that the program he has worked out with the Iranian Supreme Commander's Staff (which calls for only 60 pilot spaces per year) is perfectly adequate. (Copy attached.)/2/ /2/Not printed. The FY 68 jet pilot training program for Iran currently is programmed at 29 spaces, 24 grant and 5 sales. The Air Force has agreed to make 15 more spaces available for FY 68 (recouped from Australia and Saudi Arabia), and proposes to train 16 additional Iranian pilots in its basic T-28 (propeller-driven) program for 9 months and to send USAF instructor pilots to Iran thereafter to give the 16 transition training to jets in country. General Jablonsky thinks this arrangement would be satisfactory to Iran (the Shah learned to fly jets in this manner) and believes that the 60 pilots thus trained in FY 68 would meet the Shah's needs. 24 spaces would be grant aid and 36 FMS. This does not solve the need for additional spaces in future years, which turns on other OSD decisions now pending. I recommend, however, that you reply to the White House that DOD proposes to handle Iran's FY 68 pilot training requirement in this manner and that the foregoing proposal be discussed with the Shah during his visit. Paul C. Warnke
233. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 23, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Visit of Shah (con't.), Aug. 22-24, 1967. Secret.
SUBJECT /2/The President held a second private meeting with the Shah in his office from 5:34 p.m. to 5:50 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found, but see Document 236. Following this meeting, a joint statement was released to the press; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book II, pp. 806-807. Secretary Rusk discussed the Middle East, Soviet objectives there, Soviet-Iranian relations, Pakistan and Vietnam. However, they mainly talked about the past in the Middle East. You might want to look to the future. We understand the Shah may raise the following with you: 1. Future arms purchases. He will be coming straight from tea with Senator Fulbright so should understand Congress' mood. Secretary Nitze feels the best you can say right now is that you want to continue our close military relationship but you hesitate to make firm promises while Congressional action is uncertain. 2. Private investment. You can say we'll encourage it. Governor Harriman's dinner tonight with business leaders will be a good chance for the Shah to argue his own case. 3. Desalting. We understand he just wants to discuss general prospects. All you need do is state your strong desire to have a breakthrough. In this connection, you might want to suggest adding a paragraph on water to your joint press release (see attached note)./3/ /3/Not attached to the source text. Beyond these, unless you have something you feel is left over from your talk yesterday, I recommend only these points: 1. Defense Department will substantially meet his yesterday's request for additional jet pilot training in FY 1968 through a combination of U.S. training and final training in Iran. (Nitze programmed for 60 trainees this morning--the Shah's Commander told our military mission this was the number needed--but would raise to 75 if Iran requires.) 2. You think one of the most serious questions in the Middle East is how other leaders can be brought around to following his constructive example. How can we help the Middle East to begin acting like a region? Hal
234. Memorandum From Julius C. Holmes of the Special State-Defense Study Group to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow)/1/ SDG-67-054 Washington, August 24, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 68 D 475, Visit of the Shah of Iran, August 22-24, 1967, Vol. II. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Dear Gene: In compliance with your request I am furnishing you hereby an account of my conversation with the Shah of Iran this morning. The Shah received the Board of Governors of the Iranian-American Society of which I am a member. As this short reception was terminating the Shah asked me to stay behind as he wanted to have a word with me. He went straight to the point and said that he had had reports that I had been engaged in a Middle East study and that it included a recommendation for a naval force in the Indian Ocean. The Shah did not indicate the source of his information. I replied that in fact I had been engaged in a long range policy study for the entire area of the Middle East and that the study included a recommendation that the establishment of such a force be examined as to feasibility, cost, etc. I reminded the Shah of the several conversations we had had in 1964 prior to the visit of the Concord Squadron (I took him to the Gulf of Oman where he spent a day and night witnessing weapons displays aboard Bon Homme Richard). The Shah said that he hoped that such a force would be established and asked what part Iran could play in it. I said that the plans as to composition etc. were not made; but that personally I assumed that if such a force were established that one of its missions would be support for U.K., U.S. and Iranian naval forces in the Persian Gulf and that again, speaking personally, I presumed that Iranian ships might take part in exercises. The Shah said that that was fine and that although, at the present moment, he had no ships capable of forming a part of such a force that he expected to in the near future and hoped that Iranian participation would be considered. He asked to be kept informed as to progress and any future decisions. I concluded this part of our conversation by reminding the Shah again that the proposal was just that and that it had not been staffed out nor had any decisions been made. Julius
235. Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 24, 1967, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Files of Harold Saunders, Visit, Shah of Iran, Aug. 22-24, 1967. No classification marking. Drafted on August 30 at 11 a.m. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates it was seen by the President. I met privately with the Shah of Iran on Thursday, August 24, 1967, at 1:00 p.m. The conversation lasted 45 minutes, with no staff present. The Shah told me he was extremely impressed by the President's sincerity and firm grasp. He believed the President when he said, "When a man gives his pledge, that pledge must be kept." He was very pleased with his two private meetings with you. He was deeply touched when you personally escorted him into a meeting that was going on with legislators, and was delighted when Mrs. Johnson came over to sit beside him. The meetings with the President were exactly what he had been looking for. The Shah said his prime purpose was to explain to the President what he has been trying to accomplish in his own country and in the Middle East, and was pleased that the President understood so clearly. He assured me of his support of your position in the Near East. The strategic position of Iran as he understands it is that the USSR is attacking Iran and the Middle East by using Nasser to throw the United Kingdom out of the Red Sea, the South Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Nasser has seized the Yemen and has the strongest clandestine apparatus present within Aden and the South Arabian Federation. If Nasser and the USSR succeed in controlling the entrances of both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, Iran could be cut off. "It is for these reasons that Nasser must be defeated. This is the primary strategic threat to Iran." The Shah does not believe the United States fully appreciates this threat. He strongly urged that the United States continue to work with the moderates in the Arab world. He considers himself in Iran as the major counterweight in the Far East to Syria, Algeria, and the UAR, and a reliable associate of the United States. He was anxious that the United States understand his need to maintain his defensive position. Therefore, he went into detail about his defensive forces. He is proud that Iran is now paying for its own defense. He explained that his reliance upon the USSR for military equipment is on a very low level and that Iran is getting much more from the USSR than it is giving. He is fully aware of the danger of Soviet infiltration as a result of this influx of military equipment, and he has therefore very greatly strengthened his intelligence and security system. On the current situation in the Middle East, the Shah said he had been impressed by Israel's Great Victory. He now worried about the appearance of arrogance he detected in Israel's behavior. As for the Israelis, he stressed their need to be magnanimous and not arrogant. He was especially anxious that the Israelis move on the refugee problem. If they do not follow such a general line, he feels that Nasser will be able to unify the Arabs once again. He feels that he has a good relationship with the Israelis and wants to continue to be of help on their problem with the Arab states. He specifically indicated that Iran and Tunisia could work together for this purpose. The Shah spoke quite frankly about Ayub Khan. He said he had spoken "very firmly" to Ayub about Ayub's overdependence on Communist China. He has told Ayub that the best friend of the Paks is the United States and he warned against a Pakistani relationship with Russia, as well as Communist China. Concerning the Persian Gulf, the Shah said that as the United Kingdom gradually leaves the Persian Gulf area, the only Free World partners able to fill that vacuum are Iran and Saudi Arabia. He hopes that he can come ever closer to the President in meeting this extremely dangerous situation. In all these matters I was careful to listen sympathetically, but to confine my remarks to generalities.
236. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 25, 1967, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Visit of Shah of Iran, 8/22-24/67. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT You will be pleased to know that the Shah left extremely happy. Your taking him over to the East Room Wednesday made a big impression. Ambassador Meyer asked me to thank you. In Walt's absence, he has suggested that I send you this memo to make sure we issue any instructions that need to be given. We also want to be sure Ambassador Meyer is able to handle effectively any misinterpretations the Shah may have taken away. 1. Pilot Training. Secretary Nitze has arranged jet training for 60 Iranian pilots. He will enter 44 in regular advance jet training school here in the U.S. The rest will go through basic propeller training here and transition to jets under U.S. instructors in Iran. Mr. Nitze has so far arranged for 60, instead of the 75 the Shah mentioned, because our chief of military mission in Tehran understands from the Shah's Supreme Commander that this is the number required this year. I would propose offering the above program to the Iranians with the understanding that Defense will go to 75 if that turns out to be the number needed. Is this consistent with your promise to the Shah? Yes. I only promised to meet his need/2/ /2/This option is checked on the source text. 2. Future Military Aid. We suggested saying only that you want to continue our military relationship beyond current agreements but can't make any promises until we know what limits Congress has set. Did you go any further than this? Yes. I said we'd do everything possible to meet his needs/2/ 3. Middle East Settlement. Did the Shah indicate his intention to play any specific role in pressing Hussein to come to terms with Israel? Yes 4. Oil. We expected the Shah to ask that you urge U.S. oil companies to increase their oil offtake from Iran. Did you give him any encouragement to expect a better response from them? Yes. I said we'd talk to them /3/This option is checked on the source text. 5. Vietnam. The Shah is considering collecting a small group of responsible countries to hasten a peaceful solution in Vietnam. Secretary Rusk recommended that you simply offer to be open handed and frank in dealing with such a group. Did your discussions with the Shah go beyond this? Yes. I asked him to press this Hal
237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, August 26, 1967, 0159Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Eliot on August 24, cleared in draft by Meyer and by Saunders, and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to London, Ankara, Rawalpindi, and Tel Aviv. 27532. Subject: Shah's Washington Visit. 1. Shah's August 22-24 visit to Washington was eminently successful in convincing him that U.S. regards him as true friend whose constructive and progressive leadership we greatly admire and whose counsel we highly value. On three public occasions President spoke of Iran's progress and Shah's leadership in glowing terms. Public praise was bestowed by others as well. Shah is unquestionably delighted and refreshed by his visit and found his reception here surpassing his greatest expectations. On his side, he made plain his desire to lead his people into twentieth century, to maintain Iran's independence, and to retain close ties with U.S. In public statements he several times stated his admiration for President Johnson and the inspiration he and Iranian people receive from the President's devotion to American ideals which Iran shares. 2. Shah had two long and cordial private talks with President Johnson. He also had hour-long meetings with the Vice President and with Secretary Rusk. He had friendly meeting with Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which Senators were hospitable in every respect and in which he made clear he would obtain arms elsewhere if U.S. unable meet Iran's needs. His meetings and dinner with American businessmen gave him opportunity describe Iran's economic progress and goals, and he received warm response, some proposals and considerable adulation from businessmen whose firms already operating in Iran. 3. Talks with U.S. officials involved no negotiations but were thorough exchanges of views on matters of common concern in the world and on domestic goals, problems and achievements of both countries. Shah raised question of training for jet pilots and received assurance his needs would be met. Joint press release following second meeting with President included statement that two countries will cooperate in studying development of Iranian water resources. In response to suggestion by Secretary Rusk, Shah indicated he would look into establishing fellowships for American students in Iranian universities. 4. Press coverage of visit included especially thorough reports on arrival and White House dinner. Other aspects highlighted were Shah's interest in Iran-U.S. military relationship, Shah's views on Middle East situation and student demonstrations. 5. Student demonstrations, which resulted in some scuffling with police and a few arrests, involved at different times number of students varying between 10 and 50 and some anti-Shah and anti-CIA placards and leaflets. Demonstrators were kept well away from Shah except on couple of occasions when they managed to throw leaflets at his caravan. Shah and his party took demonstrations in stride and they certainly did not mar success of visit in any way despite tendency of press to give them more attention than they deserved. Rusk
238. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-11962/67 Washington, October 4, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Iran 091.3 MAAG, 4 Oct 67. Confidential. SUBJECT I have just approved the broadening of ARMISH/MAAG Iran's role to include advising the Iranian ground forces on the organization, deployment, doctrine and use of anti-aircraft guns recently purchased from the U.S.S.R. The Shah requested such advice earlier this month, and the Country Team, Stricom and State have strongly endorsed the move as a way to minimize the Soviet presence and influence in Iran. Should additional U.S. personnel be required to discharge these new responsibilities, the Iranians are prepared to underwrite the cost of their services. We plan to inform selected Congressional leaders of this program and the rationale for its adoption at an appropriate time. Paul C. Warnke
239. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ RNA-46 Washington, October 9, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential. SUBJECT By constitutional amendment Iran has provided for a Regency Council to assist the Crown Prince should he succeed to the throne before he is 20. Coronation of the Shah and Empress Farah will take place on October 26. This paper takes a brief look at the history of the Pahlavi Dynasty and analyzes the succession arrangements as they now stand. Abstract Reza Shah the Great was crowned the first King of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1926 and remained on the throne for 15 years until the British forced him into exile and his son Mohamed Reza became Shah. The formal coronation has never taken place, although the present Shah has ruled for just over 26 years. His first two marriages produced no male heir, but a son was born to the Shah and Queen Farah in 1960. Although succession was thus assured, the Shah did not see fit to provide for a Regency Council until he had stabilized the monarch's position and had found a trusted person who could serve as Regent without constituting at the same time a potential rival. Empress Farah's warm personality has proved a definite asset to the Shah's social modernization program, particularly in regard to women's rights, and for the last year she has filled an increasingly official role during various trips inside Iran. On September 7 a Constituent Assembly approved changes in the Iranian Constitution which provide that she will serve as Regent for the Crown Prince in case he assumes the throne before he is 20. The Shah will crown himself and then Empress Farah in splendid ceremony on October 26, his birthday, with Crown Prince Reza Cyrus Ali looking on in implicit emphasis of the planned continuation of the Pahlavi Dynasty. [Here follows the body of the paper.] [Continue with the next documents] |
