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240. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 1, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Akins on November 3. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Hushang Ansary, Ambassador of Iran After greetings Mr. Solomon opened by saying our long-standing friendship with Iran made it possible to discuss problems which arise between us in a completely frank manner (the Ambassador concurred) and frankly, the Iranian requests to the U.S. Government both here and in Tehran to insure greatly increased petroleum exports from Iran had caused us considerable difficulty. The Department and the U.S. Government had considerable sympathy for Iran's aspirations and great admiration for its plans for development but this did not mean we were able to translate this sympathy and admiration into pressures on the American companies in the Consortium to comply with the Iranian wishes. Mr. Solomon said that there should be no confusion about the relationship between American companies operating abroad and the Department of State. We give advice to companies before they go into a country, if they ask for it; we especially want our views known in cases where the companies ask for U.S. Government assistance. But once a company is in a country it is on its own. There are certainly some disadvantages to this but on balance we believe that they are far outweighed by the advantages in our free system where companies act according to their commercial interests rather than in following instruction from the U.S. Government. The host countries can therefore look on local branches of American firms as good citizens, not as tools of U.S. foreign policy. It is very important to recognize both the very limited nature of U.S. influence over private firms and the reluctance, or even inability of the U.S. Government to set commercial policies of these firms abroad. Venezuela for example has tried for eight years to get special consideration for its oil exports. While the case is not comparable to the Iranian requests there are some similarities. Venezuela is one of our best friends in the Hemisphere and we have a common problem with Castro but nonetheless, we have consistently refused to permit these important political factors to influence our purely commercial policy toward Venezuelan oil. If the State Department should try to influence companies to favor Iran or any other country, the reaction from companies operating elsewhere and from Congress would be immediate and hostile. We can tell the American companies in the Consortium of the Iranian approaches to us and we can give them our views on the importance of Iran, as we have done repeatedly, but in spite of our warm friendship for Iran we cannot do more and Iran should not think that these mild interventions will outweigh the companies' own purely commercial interests. There are many complex factors, which the companies have to consider. The comparative cost of oil in Iran and elsewhere is extremely important. And all of the American companies have interests in other oil producing countries which must be protected. (Incidentally it seems to us that it is in the interest of both Iran and the United States for such moderate Arab nations in the area as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to be strengthened.) We are very interested in the Consortium activities and note with pleasure that it has shown its willingness to see that Iran gets its fair share of the Middle East offtake, but given the vagaries of the oil industry, it is impossible to make long-term commitments for offtake from Iran for the next five years or even through 1970. We can also understand why the companies in the Consortium are disturbed by the Iranian desire to revise or even discard the 1966 offtake agreement only ten months after it had been concluded to the apparent satisfaction of all parties. As the Ambassador himself has noted, the continuing Iranian pressure on the Consortium to use all production facilities to their capacity has caused it to be reluctant to enlarge facilities until they are actually needed. This does not seem in the interest of anyone, as surplus capacity in Iran is necessary if Iran is to increase production rapidly during any future oil crisis. Finally, the Consortium has a vast marketing network which is extremely important to Iran especially during times of a surplus of world oil production. We would hope that the amicable relationship between the Consortium and the Government of Iran, which has proven so profitable to Iran, would continue uninterrupted. The Ambassador said the points were well made but he feared that the companies were ignoring other important considerations. Iran believes that its special position warrants special treatment; Iran has a development program which increases the wealth and the stability of Iran and thereby benefits the West and the Western oil companies. Iran is particularly disturbed at the increase in production of certain small Arab countries who are given far more money than they can use and who then give or lend this surplus capital to men like Nasser. The Iranians consider it ironic that the Western oil companies are willing to increase production and therefore royalties and taxes to these small countries which are, quite directly, financing a man who is committed to their destruction and to wiping out all Western influence in the Middle East. Such a policy can only aggravate the instability of the area. Iran believes that there is more than short-term economic profit to be considered and the oil companies should look once again at what Iran is doing with its income and compare it with actions of the small Arab countries. Mr. Solomon said U.S. has investments abroad valued at about $71 billion. The world-wide investment in oil is of course important but it is only a minority of the total. American companies operating abroad act according to their own economic interests as they see them and none serves as a tool of the U.S. Government. Mr. Solomon then said that the American oil companies have important investments in the small Arab countries the Ambassador referred to and if any of the local rulers thought that the American parent companies were shifting their emphasis from the Arab world to Iran--particularly if they suspected it was at U.S. Government instigation--they would certainly retaliate against the American firms. We must also be aware of the danger that general, undiscriminating pressure frequently results in a reaction quite the opposite from that which is intended. The Ambassador concluded by saying that it was clear that the Consortium could not make firm commitments for the next five years; Iran had not asked for this but only for an agreement in principle to increase production. The next development plan, starting in March of 1986, is based on a large income from the exploitation of oil and Iran must have this money. The problems might start even before the new development plan; the Ambassador had just been informed that because the increase in oil earnings was less than expected, Iran would probably have deficit of $110 million this year. A short discussion of Iran's economic development followed. The Ambassador said Iran had a 9.5 percent growth in GNP last year and expected to have 11 percent this year--and all with a price inflation of only 0.5%. Mr. Solomon commented that oil had made all this possible. The Ambassador agreed, said that income from oil now runs about $700 million per year and provides about 70-75% of Iran's foreign exchange earnings. But this does not mean that more money is not needed. After leaving Mr. Solomon's office, Ambassador Ansary commented on Mr. Solomon's lucid presentation of the U.S. position and said it was important that it be understood in Tehran. While it is possible to explain some things in letters or telegrams some of the more subtle points may be lost. He said he thought he should return to Tehran to explain the U.S. position directly to his government before the Iranian position hardens to the point where retreat might be impossible.
241. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 3, 1967, 1015Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-IRAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE. 1965. 1. Today's Wireless Bulletin reports Senate-House conferees have finally reached agreement on foreign aid legislation. Report says conferees agreed Defense Department's overseas arms sales program should end next June 30. 2. As Dept knows, military credit sales issue is key factor in our current relationship with Iran. President promised Shah in August that administration continues desire supply equipment to Iran but definitive determination depended on Congressional deliberations then taking place. 3. Since my return, Shah has three times stated he is awaiting conclusion of Congressional deliberations. He made clear his strong desire to maintain American orientation his military establishment but if there is uncertainty he will purchase elsewhere. 4. Having provided Iran with most of its military establishment via grant aid, Shah cannot understand USG's unwillingness to provide arms via credit sales now that Iran is in position to pay. Acquiring arms from elsewhere increases costs and decreases efficiency of Iran's military establishment. Thus Shah's incomprehension tends toward resentment. 5. Realize it may be difficult to sort out where conference committee agreement leaves us as far as arms sales to Iran are concerned. However, we need to have as soon as possible position to take with Shah. 6. Was there any hope that by June 30, 1968 other avenues might be devised which would permit credit sales to Iran on terms not too unattractive? Would language of legislation permit credit sales to Iran if we determine that Iran is not an underdeveloped country, a determination USG has already made as far as imposing interest equalization tax is concerned? Are there avenues other than that which Congress is terminating as of June 30, 1968 which might be opened for maintaining our relationship with Iran? 7. Needless to say, our first reaction here is that Congress has dealt a crippling blow to our relations with Iran. Tragically, it comes at a time when after Shah's Washington visit and Iran's own remarkable progress relations between our two countries are at a high. Blow also comes at time when it seems to us USG should be preserving friendships with countries like Iran. Aside from friendship, we have at stake number of facilities vital to our national security. 8. Since this is number one problem for Iran and since Shah raised it with President, Dept should not rule out possibility of direct message from President to Shah explaining state of play. Hopefully message could contain some assurance that all hope is not lost for continuing mutually beneficial military cooperation between our two countries. Meyer
242. Letter From the Shah of Iran to President Johnson/1/ Tehran, November 15, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran, 9/1/67-12/31/67. No classification marking. The letter was delivered to the Department of State by the Iranian Embassy on November 21, according to telegram 74044 to Tehran, November 23, which transmitted the text. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (U.S.) IRAN) Dear Mr. President, It is now almost three months since I had the pleasure of visiting you and your country, and I am still under the very vivid impression of your hospitality and your warm and friendly reception. I also have the best recollection of our talks and I am happy to witness the very close bonds of friendship, understanding and mutual good will which exist between our two countries. As you know, Mr. President, we are planning for the next five years a development program, starting in March, 1968, which will bring further great progress in our economic life. We hope to achieve an annual nine percent increase in our Gross National Product, and we would be delighted to welcome any American firms or private individual participation in our projects, especially in the fields of petrochemicals and agriculture. I remember with pleasure having discussed with you the further development of our agriculture and the great interest you showed in the possibilities in this domain. This would allow us to develop the agricultural resources of our country more fully, and to provide sufficient fertilizers for the production of more food and thus contribute to forestall and eliminate the danger of hunger and famine, which is one of the key problems threatening the world at large today. We are also waiting for the America team to study water conservation, and the desalination plan, in Iran, which constitute an essential part of our development programme. We very much expect the American Oil Companies to try to export the maximum oil they can from our country, with the full knowledge that the stability of Iran helps the maintenance of stability in the whole area, which, in turn, guarantees their oil exports from the other countries in this region as well. Your personal interest in this respect, Mr. President, would be greatly appreciated by us. As for our military needs, we see modern, and sometimes very sophisticated weapons, pouring into some of our neighbouring countries, which compels us to take appropriate military preparedness measures. We have revised the organization of our armed forces and set ourselves a new five year plan. Since 1964 we have entered into two credit agreements with your country, each for two hundred million dollars, and also obtained credits for approximately three hundred million dollars from other sources. A rough estimate of the requirements over the next five years of military equipment for carrying out the new plan for our armed forces organization is in the order of 800 million dollars. Although our Air Force, as planned for the future, is still weak in the number of aircraft, we hope that by getting the best and most modern equipment, and by having good and efficient pilots and maintenance, it would carry out the very heavy duty imposed upon it. I wish the day will come when all of us will only have to think of building schools, hospitals, and homes for old people, and other essentials of civilization. We are certainly working towards that end; but before that day comes we have no other choice but to guarantee the security and independence of our sacred land and nation. Such are the needs of my country. We would like to buy our needs in your country if your Government could offer the necessary credit arrangements. I would be most grateful, Mr. President, if you would provide all we need, or at least tell us what we can expect, as we must, in the cases mentioned above, put in our orders now. Considering the encouraging results already obtained in all branches of our economy, I lay great store in this our next five year development plan, which has been carefully drawn up in order to raise further the standard of living of the individual in my country. I still recall with pleasure the kind words you uttered, in your address of welcome during my recent visit to Washington, concerning the progress that we, in Iran, have achieved in terms of economic prosperity. It is our firm intention to strive further in this respect. Hoping, Mr. President, that you will give these matters your considerate attention, I express to you my heartfelt good wishes for your welfare and happiness, and success in your noble task. I seize this opportunity to convey, on behalf of the Empress and myself, our kindest regards to Mrs. Johnson. Sincerely, M.R. Pahlavi
243. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 15, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, 9/1/67-12/31/67. Secret; Exdis. SUBJECT Governor Harriman will stop off to see the Shah in connection with his visit to Pakistan to help dedicate the Mangla Dam. Since there has been a minor misunderstanding with the Shah over the proposal for talks on Vietnam he mentioned during his visit here, we felt it would be useful to make a special point of the fact that Governor Harriman is coming on your behalf. While we don't think his idea is a starter, we don't want to be the ones to kill it; he might as well find out for himself how tough this game is. The following message should serve that purpose: Your Imperial Majesty: I am very pleased that you are able to receive Governor Harriman in Tehran on November 22. His visit will come just three months after our pleasant and useful talks here, and I look forward to hearing his report when he returns. I have asked the Governor to inform you fully of our views and the present possibilities for bringing about a peaceful solution in Vietnam. Once again, I want you to know how much we value your constructive position on this as on so many other international problems. Sincerely, Walt Approve/2/ /2/This option is checked. Telegram 70589 to Tehran, November 17, transmitted the message to the Embassy for delivery to the Shah. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN)
244. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division of the Plans Directorate, Central Intelligence Agency (Critchfield) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/ Washington, November 16, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 80-R 01580R, DCI Files, 10/209--Middle East Crisis. Secret. Sent via the Deputy Director for Plans. Attached to a December 5 note from Helms to the President that reads: "I thought you would be interested to read the highlights of a conversation which one of our senior officers recently had with the Shah of Iran. This officer deals with the Shah in the context of our intelligence assets located in Iran." SUBJECT 1. This memorandum is for your information. 2. A fortnight after his coronation, the Shah was in a relaxed but sober mood reflecting confidence in his domestic program, his role as a leader in the Middle East and his relations with the Great Powers--a confidence mixed with concern and some anxiety about obvious elements in the Middle East situation which continue to threaten his own ambitions for the area. 3. Although priorities in Iranian foreign policy now rest on his decision to develop regional strengths that will give the Middle East nations a common capability to contain and live with the threat of Soviet pressures, his policy rests on the premise that his special and primary relationship with the United States can be preserved a few years more. Strengthened relations with Pakistan and Turkey remain the basis of his regional policy; as CENTO fades, other military and economic arrangements in which the US and the UK play no direct role are expanding. He has found it necessary to give Ayub "virtually an ultimatum" to get his foreign affairs in order; he sees Pakistan gradually turning more to the West, placing more confidence on regional security arrangements, being less dependent on the Great Powers and emphasizing Islamic rather than radical Afro-Asian associations. 4. The Shah's relations with the Arab-Israel world remain complicated. In the Cold War context his sympathies lie entirely with Israel; the defeat of the radical Arabs in June dramatically served Iran's interest. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Denial of the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the lower end of the Red Sea Basin to the Soviet Union and the radical Arabs is the strategic goal that constitutes the basis for this relationship. Arms captured by the Israelis in June are now finding their way via Iran into friendly Arab hands in the Yemen. The expansion of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, the appearance of "Red Beret Russian Marines" and the military implications of the Elath sinking were all on the [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] agenda. 5. Overtly, the Shah continues to associate Iran with the Arab, but more particularly the Islamic, cause in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict. He told me that during April 1967 he had advised Hussein to give vigorous armed response to any repetition by Israel of the 13 November 1966 raid on Samu in Jordan's West Bank; this action was essential, in the Shah's view, to Hussein's survival. Since the war, the Israelis have approached the Shah seeking his assistance in mediation efforts with Jordan; the Shah declined because he did not feel that Hussein and moderate forces in Jordan could survive reaction in the Arab world to a unilateral Jordan role. While the Shah has reservations about Hussein's judgement, he argues that Hussein's survival is vital to Iranian and American interests. 6. The Shah is relaxed about the expansion of French influence in Middle East oil and arms. The Shah takes a positive view of the prospect of some standardization of aircraft--Mirage in the short run--in Pakistan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and possibly other Arab countries. However, he is emphatic in his view that the Turkish and Iranian Air Forces must be based on US equipment and doctrine. This was one of two points raised by the Shah in comparatively strong language. The other dealt with the attacks on the President concerning his Vietnam policy. 7. We had examined the likelihood that Moscow, sooner or later, would have to take a hard look at Khrushchev's policy of providing armed support for "just wars of national liberation". In four areas of the world--Southeast Asia, the Arab Near East, Africa and the Western Hemisphere, the Soviets had gained no favorable decision, had suffered several disasters and had seen the price of the game rising steadily. I had said that I thought the time for a Soviet reappraisal of Khrushchev's policy might come after President Johnson was re-elected. A decision by the Soviets to write off the Vietnam War--following the disaster which struck them in the Middle East in June 1967--could, I said, mark the turning point in Soviet policy. In this case, President Johnson would emerge in history as "one of our greatest Presidents". With some vigor the Shah interrupted and corrected my statement--"he will emerge as the greatest President of the United States; the toughness and courage demonstrated by him in sticking to his position when under attack from all those in the US and abroad who oppose his Vietnam policy is inspiring to all of us who know that he is right". 8. The Shah feels that trade with and aid from the Soviet Union is entirely compatible with his basic policy of seeking to build a strong Middle East bloc of nations which will have normal relations with the industrially developed powers, including Russia and all of Europe. He seems confident that a combination of economic and social progress in Iran and an effective and sharply oriented intelligence and security effort keeping track of the Soviets in Iran will limit the dangers of expanding trade and relations with the Soviets to a tolerable level. In this task, he desires to retain his special relationship with the United States. I assured him that in intelligence matters, the United States benefits as much as if not more than Iran in this close cooperation. 9. I saw the Shah alone; the foregoing represents only the highlights of a lengthy conversation. James H. Critchfield/2/ /2/Signed and initialed for Critchfield in an unidentified hand.
245. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rockwell) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/ Washington, November 17, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, Gov. Harriman's Trip, Nov. 1967, Vol. VI, Briefing Book. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. SUBJECT The principal matters affecting our bilateral relations with Iran which are likely to arise during your meeting with the Shah are our military credit program, oil, and private American investment in Iran. The following are talking points on these subjects: 1. Military Credit Program (Tab A)/2/ /2/Attached but not printed. a. Although the Congressional situation is not yet entirely clear, we intend to do all we can to meet our military credit commitments to Iran and are continuing to attempt to persuade the Congress of the importance of our making military credits available to Iran. b. Congressional action so far would probably permit us to make available the next $50 million credit tranche, subject to the usual joint annual economic review. c. For the future, we are first going to have to feel our way with Congress during an election year. In this process this Administration like its four predecessors will remain dedicated to the principle of collective security for the free nations of the world. As we proceed, we ask for patience and understanding from our friends and partners in this effort. 2. Oil (Tab B) a. The U.S. Government cannot dictate the commercial policy of private American firms. b. The American companies of the Consortium have always taken their commitments to the GOI seriously and we have every reason to believe that they will see that Iran gets its fair share of the Middle East increase in production. They have important interests in other countries of the area, and they and we believe that the moderate Arab countries deserve support. c. We hope that Iran will continue to deal with the oil companies within its policy of reasonableness that has paid such high dividends to the GOI in the past. 3. Investment (Tab C) a. We very much appreciate the Shah's kindness to Messrs. Ball, McCloy and Connor during the Coronation. b. We are pleased to note the Shah's continued interest in obtaining American investment and hope that the steps being taken by the Development and Resources Corporation and by such people as Mr. Ball will lead to the desired results. We will continue to do all we can to assist such efforts.
246. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 20, 1967, 1330Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-6 USSR-IRAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA and Moscow. 2210. Augmentation of Soviet-Iranian Arms Deal. 1. From Iranian General Staff, ARMISH/MAAG Chief Jablonsky has received confirmation that Iranians have agreed to 40 million ruble extension of Soviet-Iranian arms deal. Equipment purchased consists of 2200 Zil jeeps for gendarmerie, 200 wheeled APCs, 300 track APCs, 40 tank transporters and five mobile maintenance shops. In training field, about dozen Iranians will go to USSR for brief period to learn how to man mobile maintenance shops. 2. While there was a certain amount of inevitability in this development, given much-publicized Congressional curtailing of US arms sales and attractiveness of getting Soviet equipment "for nothing," i.e., in exchange for Iranian natural gas until now flared, haste with which Iranians have moved is disturbing. As recently as October 19, Shah gave impression (Tehran 1735)/2/ that significant purchases elsewhere were being held in abeyance pending the outcome of Congressional deliberations. /2/Dated October 19. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 U.S.-IRAN) 3. Via Jablonsky-Toufanian channel, we have already given indication that timing of this new procurement from Soviets can only multiply problems which USG has been having with Congress on whole question of military programs abroad. I am seeing Alam tomorrow and speaking more in sorrow than anger I intend to stress how difficult it is to understand why Iran would take such inopportune action when there really no urgency for such add-on military equipment from Soviets. I intend also to note unfortunate damage this causes Shah's image which has reached an all-time high in US pursuant to HIM's recent visit. I will also note disappointment and trouble this causes for those who have been Shah's and Iran's closest friends. 4. In this post-coronation period, there is certain amount of intoxication apparent in Iranian attitude. Therefore, in taking line mentioned in foregoing para we must be careful to avoid implying Iran is not fully sovereign, etc. Furthermore, we see little chance of deal being recalled and, therefore, must consider it within framework of our actual future relationship with Iran, including specifically limitations on our capability for maintaining special position we previously enjoyed in supplying military equipment. 5. It is our hope that foregoing attitude will commend itself to our Washington colleagues. This subject may or may not arise during Governor Harriman's forthcoming visit but if it does the above line would seem to us to be most appropriate./3/ /3/Telegram 72956 to Tehran, November 22, concurred with the Embassy attitude expressed in telegram 2210 and approved use of this line if the subject arose during Harriman's visit. (Ibid.) 6. As Dept will recall, when first Soviet-Iranian arms deal was negotiated, news which we had received in confidence from Iranians appeared short time later on front page of New York Times. It is our earnest hope that similar leakage will not occur this time. It is for that reason that this telegram is being slugged Exdis. Meyer
247. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 21, 1967, 1240Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) IRAN. Limited Official Use. 2223. Following letter addressed to Secretary of State from Prime Minister may be used if Secretary wishes, at lunch planned November 29 mark close-out of AID-Iran. We not aware if Ambassador Ansary has received copy of letter but Dept. might wish consider consulting with him concerning its use. "The official termination of the American AID programme in Iran affords me this welcome opportunity to extend to you, along with my very warm personal regards, the sincere thanks and appreciation of the Iranian people." "The period through which we have been the grateful recipients of your aid stands as an example of the highly successful and cordial cooperation which has always characterized the enriching association of Iran with your great country." "Today, as we stand on the threshold of our fourth economic development plan, we wish to strengthen our productive economic and commercial relations with the United States. Iran's fourth plan will offer new opportunities to your private sector to participate in the economic progress which we can justifiably expect. American private investors, with their great technical resources and managerial effectiveness, can do much to contribute to our self-sustaining economic development. I hope you will extend a cordial invitation to the American private sector to examine carefully the opportunities which Iran offers and to explore further cooperative ventures mutually beneficial to both countries." We plan release letter here only as part of story of phase-out ceremonies in Washington. Meyer
248. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 22, 1967, 1535Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Rawalpindi, and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA. 2250. Iranian Military Procurement. 1. During conversation with Harriman 22nd, Shah said he is writing letter to President re number subjects such as oil, American investment in Iran, and Iran's desire to continue military procurement from the United States. He described letter as follow-up to intimate discussions held with President in August. 2. Re military, Harriman indicated legislative situation is still murky. He said we hope that we may be able to proceed with next $50 million tranche but what will happen after next June 30 is "in the lap of the gods." 3. Shah said just as Iran is projecting five-year economic program it is also planning five-year military program. Question is, therefore, important whether U.S. will be in position to continue military supplying during that period. He noted since 1964 he has purchased $400 million from U.S. (including two tranches still not negotiated) and $300 [million] elsewhere. Program over upcoming five-year period, he noted, is being planned at expenditure rate less than past three-year span. Harriman stressed importance of giving priority to economic development. 4. Once again Shah emphasized his unqualified preference to maintaining relationship with US in military field. Above all, he wants to keep air force American oriented. 5. Key question, Shah said, is procurement of tanks. He would like additional M-60's and Sheridans so that his total tank force eventually will reach just over one thousand. When challenged re need for so many tanks, Shah said his military is emphasizing mobility, will in fact have fewer divisions, and in any case his goal is merely to place Iran "in balance" with its neighbors. He noted proposed tank complement is only three-fourths what Turks have. 6. If US unable to supply Sheridans, Shah said he will seek British tanks, i.e. Vickers. He was obviously annoyed that his hopes for tank factory in Iran to supply Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other countries has fallen through. His impression is that British are to build Vickers factory in Pakistan, but I expressed doubt such deal been consummated. Shah showed some interest in possibility up-grading M-47 tanks but was totally unimpressed with seven-ton British CVRT tanks (Tehran 2193),/2/ primarily because he wants tanks with 105 mm guns. /2/Dated November 19. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 IRAN) 7. For first time, Shah mentioned possibility of Soviet tanks, if appropriate deal cannot be made with U.S., British or other Western countries. Later when asked whether Soviets have quoted any tank prices, Shah answered in negative and gave as reason that Iranians have deliberately avoided encouraging Soviets in this sphere. After some thought, he added that GOI would hesitate long time before it would take such dramatic step. 8. To Harriman's question whether any M-47 tanks have gone from Iran to Pakistan, Shah responded negatively but indicated Iran willing to sell up to 100 but this would depend on USG approval. Meyer
249. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, November 26, 1967, 1515Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 U.S./HARRIMAN. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA. 2248. Russia and Mideast. 1. During course of nearly three-hour discussion with Shah 22nd, Governor Harriman inquired re state of Iran-U.S.S.R. relations. Shah said as long as Soviets behave themselves relations will continue good. He revealed Kosygin will be visiting Iran, probably in January. 2. Shah said when his arms purchaser General Toufanian was in USSR Soviets fell all over themselves to be gracious. They openly declared that Iranians were with them "in the front trenches," i.e. threatened by ChiComs. To Harriman's request re quality Soviet military equipment, Shah said trucks are satisfactory although they burn more gas than American trucks and some of them have been having trouble with jammed pistons. 3. Re Mideast generally, Harriman expressed view that while there are areas where U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation is feasible, e.g., non-proliferation and China, there are other areas such as Mideast where this not true. Shah stressed view Soviets intent on trouble-making and keeping Mideast pot boiling. This clear from their rearmament of radical Arab states. 4. This afforded Shah opportunity harp on theme that Soviet objectives being facilitated by moderate Arab states who are oil producers, i.e. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, keeping Nasser afloat via financial subsidies. Asked whether these are dependable sources of UAR revenue, Shah said if Nasser cannot get hostage money from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait he will intensify his endeavors to "swallow them up." 5. Harriman stressed importance of securing passage of meaningful resolution at UNSC, e.g., British resolution, which could serve as base for stabilizing Mideast situation. Three times during conversation, Harriman urged Shah to impress on King Faisal need for giving solid support to moderate course which King Hussein is pursuing. 6. Shah noted he has consistently encouraged King Hussein as well as Saudis to follow moderate course since hostilities against Israel are highly counter-productive. 7. In Shah's view Faisal is progressive leader worthy of encouragement and support even though Saudi Kingdom is still "archaic." Saudi-Iranian relations are good, except for median line problem in Persian Gulf. Re this issue, Shah outlined Iranian position in terms similar to those reported in A-266/2/ (following). He expressed hope that two countries and two American oil companies could work out some sort of joint venture solution. /2/Dated November 22. (Ibid., POL 32IRAN-SAUD) 8. Asked by Harrison re British MinState Robert's' recent visit, Shah said affirmation that British will stay in Gulf area was welcome. At same time, he said, clearly British cannot remain there permanently. For this reason, Iran is determined to continue to build up its own military strength so that it will be "in balance" with that of other states in area. It also accounts for Iran's desire to develop closer and cooperative relationships with various Gulf riparian states. Meyer [Continue with the next documents] |
