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10. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Affairs (Sloan) to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command (Adams)/1/ Washington, March 24, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 091.3 Iran, 24 March 64. Secret. Drafted by Colonel M.R. Preble of ISA/NESA. Dear General Adams: The Shah of Iran in a letter of 7 January 1964 (Enclosure 1)/2/ expressed dissatisfaction with the present Five-Year Military Assistance Program. He went into considerable detail explaining the ever increasing Arab threat and used this as a basis for requiring more and better military equipment. He suggested that the President appoint someone to discuss with him urgent matters of interest to Iran and the United States. /2/Attached to the source text; see Document 2. The President in his reply (Enclosure 2)/3/ indicated that the basic factors that led to the Five-Year Military Plan have not significantly changed and that we have not seen any major change in the Arab situation. /3/Attached to the source text; see Document 8. The President informed the Shah that Ambassador Holmes and General Eckhardt were ready to discuss the full range of his political and military problems and that you would be coming to Iran and would be glad to join them in discussing the questions raised in his letter. In your discussions with the Shah you should: a. Avoid making any statement to the Shah which could be interpreted as a U.S. commitment of future grant military assistance. b. Advise the Shah that the U.S. will continue to assist Iran in planning for the improvement and modernization of its military establishment. c. Explain to the Shah that the amount of future Grant Aid to Iran will depend upon congressional action and that the trend is to reduce grant aid and shift to cash and credit sales. d. Volunteer to review Iranian requirements developed by the Iranians in coordination with the Country Team. e. Reiterate the U.S. evaluation of the Arab threat. The Department of State has prepared a political evaluation of the situation in the Middle East as it affects the Iranian military policy. This together with a Defense Intelligence Agency evaluation,/4/ which will be forwarded separately, may be used at your discretion in your discussion with the Shah. /4/The Department of State evaluation was not found. A copy of the Defense Intelligence Agency evaluation entitled "The Capabilities of Arab Countries Singly or in Concert to Threaten the Security of Iran" is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 092 Iran, 25 March 1964. The DIA estimate concluded that only Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were expected to possess organized forces capable of significant military action against Iran during the next 3 years, and that current circumstances made concerted military action against Iran unlikely. Please submit a report of any impressions you may have after you talk with the Shah and any recommendations you may consider appropriate concerning our future policy toward Iran. Sincerely, Frank K. Sloan/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Sloan signed the original.
11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, March 25, 1964, 7:48 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Bowling; cleared in draft by Wheeler, Hirschberg (AID/PC/MAD), Colonel Preble, George L. Warren (G/PM), and Padelford; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA and repeated to CINCEUR, Paris TOPOL (by pouch), Moscow, Ankara, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD Tampa. 678. Following is outline of principal points which may be used by CINCMEAFSA and by Embassy Tehran as basic guidance in any discussions with Shah which may develop concerning present and future shape of MAP, along with other aspects basic Iranian military policy. These points neither all-inclusive nor detailed. They may be filled out and supplemented by drawing on previous communications and general information available to U.S.G. representatives. Shah, not U.S.G., should take initiative in opening subject, and US side should, under ordinary circumstances, counter initiatives the Shah can be expected to undertake. 1. U.S. is satisfied with the Five-Year Military Plan and with way it is being implemented on both sides. 2. Far from doubting validity of assumptions and principles of the plan, US is confirmed in its belief that they continue essentially valid. Iranian military capacity is being improved steadily. Iran's military capacity as compared with that of Iraq and Afghanistan is also continuing to increase. 3. As Shah knows, our military assistance appropriations have been drastically reduced and future of such appropriations is uncertain. Despite shortages of funds and pressing needs from areas such as Vietnam, U.S. has managed to continue essential elements of the Five-Year Program as concerns MAP. We hope continue do so though we are aware we have had to ask Iran to take over certain support functions (viz. follow-on spares) which had earlier been a U.S. contribution under MAP. 4. We do not know whether there will be a military assistance program beyond FY 1967, when the Five-Year Plan terminates. If there is one, and if adequate funds are appropriated, U.S. would hope to continue its relationship of military cooperation with Iran. In view of Iran's rapidly improving financial condition, it will probably be necessary for the U.S.G.-financed grant MAP portion of such a future program to be for only a portion of the total, and for Iran to cover the remainder with its own foreign exchange resources. The proportion of MAP grant to the total would probably have to be reduced year by year. US materiel would be available for sale to Iran under this program. Depending on Iran's overall financial condition and on other demands on Iran's foreign exchange, credit terms for such sales might be available. FYI. In your presentation of post-FY 67 MAP possibilities, you should take great care not to use language that may be construed as constituting any commitment on our part for any grants or credits in that period. End FYI. 5. We cannot discuss the specifics of such a program, but we are beginning to study the problem and will be able to talk about it in greater detail later. 6. If Shah is unaffected by U.S.G. arguments and continues to express a determination to buy additional equipment immediately, U.S.G. representatives should, after repeating all the arguments previously used as to equal importance of economic development and social reform in preserving national security, and after defending adequacy and effectiveness of the current plan, inform Shah that: (a) Certain types of purchases by Iran which would in our opinion result in a net reduction of Iranian military capacity through grossly irrational employment of material and human resources cannot be agreed by the U.S. under any circumstances, and would be regarded by the U.S. as a cause for releasing the US from its obligations under the Five-Year Plan. (b) Other types of purchases which we feel would have a net positive effect on Iranian military capacity and which would not in themselves cripple Iran's economic development program could be accepted as additional to the present Five-Year Plan, and the U.S. could sell such equipment for cash. (c) Iran should prepare a study with accompanying rationale which we could discuss together in light of the principles set forth above. Rusk
12. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 6, 1964, 4:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad and Karachi. 882. Ayatollah Khomeini, at first imprisoned and later under house detention in connection 1963 Moharam riots and widely regarded as leading contender for position of Shia paramount leader, was released April 5 and returned to religious center of Qom. Press giving minimum play. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports (1) millahs flocking to Qom from all over Iran to "kiss hands", and (2) one tank battalion concentrated Qom outskirts as precautionary measure. No info whether Khomeini reached agreement with govt regarding any restriction on his future activities. Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] contacts with good connections in religious community view release as victory for Khomeini but also as wise policy decision by regime in preparation for Moharam, period of deep mourning starting May 13. Request Baghdad and Karachi report any clerical reaction Khomeini's release. Holmes
13. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 8, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad and Karachi. 890. Embtel 882./2/ Further background on release of Khomeini, obtained from Prime Minister: /2/Document 12. 1. Govt made clear to Khomeini that if he engages in political activities, he will be re-arrested. Khomeini allegedly promised behave. 2. Mansur allowed it to be understood he had had difficulty persuading Shah that Khomeini should be freed. 3. PM felt it was desirable free Khomeini now, rather than just before Moharam, because later release might be interpreted as due to fear of rioting similar to last year's. 4. Govt has "taken steps" with other leading mullahs, notably Milani, Qomi and Shariat-Madari, to prevent Khomeini's position being strengthened as result his release. Holmes
14. Memorandum From Commander John J. Shanahan to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/ Washington, April 11, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Robert W. Komer Files, Iran, November 1963-December 1964. No classification marking. SUBJECT 1. General Adams held a rather extensive conversation with the Shah of Iran during his current visit to the MEAFSA area. 2. A number of significant points contained in the attached tabs/2/ follow: /2/Attached to the source text are April 6 cables from General Paul D. Adams, Commander in Chief, U.S. STRIKE Command, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to Major General Perry B. Griffith, Chief of Military Assistance, STRICOM, reporting on his April 5 audience with the Shah in Tehran. a. The Shah states that the situation in the Middle East has deteriorated since November. He cites: (1) Pak-Indian relations. b. The Shah expressed hope that the April meetings in Washington would make useful progress; felt CENTO was not accomplishing much in a military way because of Pak attitude and US not being a member. Gen. Adams expressed confidence that meetings would be productive and US interest was intense in seeing that CENTO succeeds. c. Shah stated Iran has more to fear from Soviet-supported Arabs than from Soviets. d. Shah described Iran's future as bright because of current development of vast resources, and the social and economic reforms that are being implemented. He estimated the country's income from oil by 1970 would reach $1,200 million annually. Accordingly, Iran, the Shah pointed out, should play an increasingly important role in US strategic planning. e. The Shah expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of his military defenses. (I suggest that up to this point it was all a build-up.) (1) Defense of oil-rich Khuzistan and the port of Bandar Abbas has been neglected. Gen. Adams agreed to study plans for the defense of these areas. (2) Need to continue the modernization program. (3) He is prepared to purchase weapons insofar as the economy will permit. (4) Desires a replacement for his rifles, wants more BARs and MGs in order to replace the non-standard artillery. (5) His artillery battalions have only 2 batteries of 4 guns each. Gen. Adams agreed there should be 3 batteries per battalion. (6) The M-47 tank was rapidly becoming non-supportable and should be replaced with the M-60. Gen. Adams pointed out that he felt sure the US would make available a lightweight tank in the near future, and therefore it might not be wise to expend sizeable amounts on the M-60 and find it out of date. The Shah agreed that perhaps it would only be necessary to replace the M-47 with the M-60 in 2 battalions. Gen. Adams agreed to attempt to determine the dates these conversions could take place. (Tab B, Gen. Adams has directed that this info be available upon his return from the current trip.) (7) The Shah expressed approval of the F-5 but also pointed out that his F-86's should be replaced with something superior to the F-5. The C-47's must also be replaced by C-130's. (8) The Shah also felt our air section of the MAAG should be increased, and headed by a Brig. General. Gen. Adams said he would see what could be done. (A BG as head of the MAAG air section has been recommended by the JCS.) (9) The Shah restated the requirement for an additional airborne battalion. 3. There is little doubt but that Gen. Hedjazi will raise much of the foregoing while he is here. The Shah will do likewise during his visit in June. It seems we should try to draw Gen. Adams into the Washington conversations with Gen. H. as much as is possible. This appears especially true since Gen. Adams will have Gen. H. at his headquarters on 26-27 April. J.J.S./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears the typed initials of Commander John J. Shanahan, member of the JCS Chairman's staff group.
15. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 15, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-IRAN. Confidential. No time of transmission appears on the source text. Repeated to Ankara, Moscow, Paris for TOPOL, CINCSTRIKE for POLAD, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, and CINCEUR. 922. Re Deptel 678./2/ During Operation DELAWAR I had two hour after dinner conversation alone with Shah. /2/Document 11. He went over his discussion with General Adams of April 5 and then referred to statement in President's letter of March 19 that future military programs could be discussed with me. He then outlined his concept of modernization of Iranian armed forces, giving the same reasons for the need of improvement as he has expounded previously, although there was less note of urgency than he had previously expressed. Although Shah did not say it in so many words, I had the feeling that he has to some degree, at least, come to recognize that possibility of aggression in Persian Gulf area or against Khuzistan is less immediate than he had previously maintained. This does not mean that he has changed his view about Arab ambitions but he seems now to feel that he has more time to prepare himself for defense against it. Criticism of our policy toward Nasser was totally absent. Shah then gave me a series of papers which set forth existing equipment shortages and additional equipment which he desires, some of it on a relatively short term basis and some having to do with long term replacement of items which will become unsupportable, such as tanks and F-86 aircraft. On question of aircraft replacement, Shah volunteered statement that he realized perfectly well that it would be some time before Iranian air force could absorb and efficiently operate and maintain any additional aircraft beyond F5As. He added, however, that every effort should be made to improve and expand Iranian capabilities in this connection. Shah said that he realized the difficulties of our position in furnishing equipment on a grant basis over and above that envisaged in five year program. He pointed out the improvement in Iran's revenues and foreign exchange position and said that what he wanted was to work out a modernization program which would not be extravagant and which would not hamper Iran's economic development program; this should be done without reference to whether the equipment would be furnished by grant from the US or by purchase from Iranian funds. He hoped that purchases could be arranged on an installment basis. I replied that US could make no commitment for the furnishing of military equipment on a grant basis beyond that envisaged in the five year plan. I then described to him the difficulty of sales of military equipment on credit because under our system there were no public funds available from which such sales could be financed, reminding him that the manufacturer in every case had to be paid in cash. Shah then wondered whether or not credit terms could be arranged with American manufacturers. I replied that this might be looked into at some subsequent time. The series of papers which Shah handed me were part in Persian and part in English and constitute only a list [of] Iranian views of requirements. There is one document in Persian, not yet translated, which apparently contains some rationale with respect to these requirements. Shah admitted that these papers did not constitute a comprehensive approach to the problem, particularly as no attempt at phasing had been made. He made one or two oral statements with respect to time factors which will be reported when we have had a chance to study the character and magnitude of equipment requirements set forth. I told the Shah that I would ask the MAAG staff to examine the various lists which he had sent me and that after a clearer picture of magnitude, phasing, etc., emerged, discussions might be held with Iranian staff. The Shah readily agreed to this and said that he was sorry the presentation had not been more orderly, expressing the hope that the work could begin without delay as he wished to make as much progress as possible before his visit to Washington in June. I am refraining from any substantive comment on the Shah's proposals until we are able to examine them here, including getting some idea of cost. In light of Shah's proposal that a modernization program be discussed without reference to which party should bear costs, I should appreciate confirmation my authority to proceed. Holmes
16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, April 17, 1964, 6:18 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Tiger; cleared in draft by Towsley, Preble, and Padelford, and in substance by Victor H. Skiles (AID/PC), and Warren; and approved by Bracken. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 774. Re Embtel 922./2/ Joint State-AID-Defense message. /2/Document 15. 1. We gratified with handling of conversation reported reftel and believe Shah's present approach provides basis for proceeding with constructive discussion of military modernization program of reasonable content and proportions. You authorized proceed discussions, as outlined reftel, without reference to which party should bear costs. 2. We share Shah's hope that material he presented will permit sufficient early discussion with Iranian staff so that general outlines of feasible long-term program, including time-phasing, might be apparent before Shah's talk in Washington. We assume he understands, however, that we would not be able in that time to reach final position on any program, except possibly as regards sales of U.S. equipment for short-term expansion and replacement programs mentioned in third para reftel. 3. We particularly concerned to develop reasonable and flexible criteria for assuring that program would "not hamper Iran's economic development program." To this end we would be interested in examining economic indicators worked out by GOI or Country Team which would permit assessment proposed programs from this standpoint in light of Iran's enhanced economic prospects. 4. Information re availability of credits for sales to Iran will be sent by separate message. Ball
17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, April 21, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 U.S.-IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Padelford and Cain in International Logistics Negotiations in DOD/ISA; cleared in substance by Tiger, Skiles, and Towsley and in draft by Preble; and approved by Bracken. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD Tampa. 785. Re Deptel 774;/2/ Embtel 922./3/ Joint State-AID-Defense message. While future plans for Iran not sufficiently finalized to allow making any commitment re credit at this time, there are available several sources of credit for military sales without new Congressional appropriation being required. These sources include the MAP reimbursement account (Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act) and utilization of Defense stocks (Section 507(a) of the FAA). Also, the dependable undertaking method of payment (Section 507(b) of the FAA), while not credit, may be utilized for procurement of materials. In line with USG policy of gradually shifting MAP recipient countries to a reimbursement basis, GOI would be legitimate claimant for credit during period current five-year plan for spare parts, reimbursement items, etc. For deliveries after FY 67, assuming continued rate of balanced economic growth for Iran, we see no reason at present why Iran should not be a legitimate claimant for larger amounts of credit for military purchases. We should keep credit possibilities in mind in reaching our conclusions about a financially feasible modernization program. /2/Document 16. /3/Document 15. Rusk
18. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 25, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to London, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Karachi, and Kuwait. 967. While Mansur during first weeks in office has rightly concentrated on economic matters, one major political problem that has arisen to plague him and Shah is how to deal with the recently released Ayatollah Khomeini. As we see it, following factors bear on situation. 1. Although idea of releasing Khomeini prior to Moharam period originated with previous govt and although ultimate decision was made by Shah, it was Mansur and Pakravan who seem to have precipitated the problem by urging the Shah to let Khomeini go. Mansur thus has certain responsibility for outcome. 2. Khomeini's latest activities and notably his speech of April 15 (reported NIT-6441) place govt in dilemma. If he is permitted to go on agitating, this will involve loss of prestige to regime and can snowball into serious trouble; but if he is re-arrested, especially during sensitive period just before and during Moharam, this could also cause serious trouble. 3. There is little reason to doubt that regime is able to control or, if necessary, beat down any manifestations during Moharam period, starting evening May 12. Determination shown by regime during Moharam riots last year is in itself an important factor discouraging repetition of disorders. 4. One of most interesting features of Khomeini's statements is his appeal for constitutional govt, which intrigues National Front which otherwise has little reason to sympathize with Mullahs. Speech also attacked arms expenditures, relations with Israel, featured xenophobic themes (including claim that govt is "giving away our resources to foreigners") and by implication attacked the Shah himself and the entire reform program. We understand tapes of April 15 speech are circulating in Tehran opposition circles and National Front elements are now considering cooperating with Mullahs. 5. Although there are signs that economy is picking up, the social background of urban unemployment and misery, especially in Tehran's south side, is essentially unchanged from last year. In bazaar, Khomeini has continued to have many sympathizers, and as far as we can tell his prestige has, if anything, increased in that quarter since his release. 6. Govt is playing this very carefully so far. Warnings have been sent to Khomeini, and we have no information of political statements by him since April 5 although he made it clear on that occasion that he intends to ignore the warnings. April 23, religious holiday, saw usual large crowds in Qom (estimated by one source at 50,000) and substantial numbers came to "Kisyrand," but it is possible that Khomeini has subsided at least for a while. We understand, however, that recording of his April 15 speech was played at Qom mosque on April 24. Our tentative conclusion is that, if Khomeini persists, Shah is most likely to order his re-arrest prior to Moharam; that govt is capable of controlling or countering any possible demonstrations stirred up by Khomeini (or his arrest); but that showdown may be postponed until after the holiday period. Will submit another estimate as we come closer to Moharam. Holmes
19. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, May 5, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-IRAN. Secret. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 1008. State pass Defense. Re Embtels 988/2/ and 922;/3/ Deptel 744./4/ I had long conversation with Shah aboard aircraft carrier Bon Homme Richard evening of May 2. I took position and presented arguments as outlined Embtel 988./5/ /2/Telegram 988 from Tehran, April 30, commented on the list of Iranian military requirements that the Shah had given to Holmes during the meeting described in telegram 922. (Ibid.) /3/Document 15. /4/Dated April 10. (Department of State, Central Files, CENTO 3 US (WA)) /5/In telegram 988 Holmes reported that he planned to discuss the Shah's military inventory problems with him, emphasize the value the United States attached to Iran's position and role in the area, and say that Iran's needs after FY 1966 would be given serious consideration for military assistance grants--at a reduced level--commensurate with the availability of U.S. funds and Iran's financial position. During conversation, it transpired that Shah had not had opportunity to read or study equipment list which he had handed me in reftel. He immediately disassociated himself from any desire for a full-scale armored division of the usual type in Khuzistan and indicated that he had no plans for an additional armored brigade and an additional infantry brigade in the area. This will make a substantial difference in cost in money and personnel which the first analysis of the papers handed to me in reftel revealed. The paper which ARMISH/MAAG is to present and discuss with Iranian staff is being revised accordingly. Copies of this revision will be sent to CINCSTRIKE and to Department. He again forcefully stated his determination to build a force capable of defending Khuzistan against any local threat or of stemming a major threat until assistance could be forthcoming. His concept is to convert the eighth division into a unit of three battalions of tanks, three battalions of armored infantry with armored personnel carriers, an armored cavalry unit and normal artillery plus one battery of eight-inch howitzers. Shah also alluded to need for airlift for two parachute battalions to provide for rapid reinforcement of area. In process of stressing urgency of his desire for more tanks, he emphasized his need to know availability date of M-60 tanks and price and approximate date of availability of projected Sheridan tank equipped with Shillelagh missile (ARMISH/MAAG is seeking this information through CINCSTRIKE). Shah made great point of vital importance of Khuzistan to Iran emphasizing that this province contains Iran's huge oil reserves and refineries and that other developments, including Dez Dam with electric power, will make Khuzistan thriving industrial region of future. He expressed determination to see that there would be sufficient defensive power on ground to preserve this vital area for Iran. He conceded that he could not describe the immediate military threat but was persuaded that if proper defensive measure is not taken that threat would develop within two years' time. Shah is very optimistic about increase in oil revenue. Iran's decision to accept consortium's recent offer will, in his opinion, result in revenues this year amounting to 500 million dollars. Discovery of additional large oil reserve makes it certain that Iran will be able to increase its production consistently over foreseeable future. Shah believes that with completion of pipe line and products terminal at Bandar Ma'shur, the cost of production per barrel will be reduced from 26 cents to 32 cents and pointed out that half of this savings will redound to Iran's revenues. He expressed confidence that by 1970 oil royalties from consortium and from other sources, such as PanAm, will amount to a billion 200 million dollars and a modest portion of this income can appropriately be devoted to defense of area whence it comes. He readily agreed that these military expenditures should not be greater than required for a safe minimum defense and felt that this could be achieved without impairing economic development in light of very substantial anticipated increased revenue from oil. The foregoing will probably be the basis of what the Shah will have to say to the President on June 5. He asked how far he should go in discussing these matters with the President and I replied by saying that only one period of probably an hour's duration had been arranged for conversation with President and that there would certainly be no opportunity for "negotiations." I felt certain the President would be glad to hear of his preoccupations but I felt that the discussions would be in general terms over a broad range of subjects of mutual interest to Iran and the US. I reminded the Shah of the brief and informal character of his visit and that the meeting with the President had developed only incidentally after his acceptance of the invitation to open the art exhibition and to speak at UCLA. The Shah seemed to accept this as reasonable. I took this opportunity of telling him that the Department had not felt it necessary for me to be in Washington at the time of his visit. I shall expect to discuss military requirements with the Shah at greater length before his departure for the US and hope to be able later to report more specifically on his position. Holmes [Continue with the next documents] |
