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20. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, May 12, 1964, 7:55 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Bowling, cleared by Jernegan, and approved by Talbot. 834. For Ambassador. UCLA officials are receiving increasing number reports to effect many hundreds Iranian students and sympathizers are planning massive, well-organized and well-financed demonstrations on occasion Shah's participation commencement ceremony. They emphasize their primary concern is with outsiders, not with Iranian UCLA students, whom they believe can be controlled. UCLA now not only has grave doubts that ceremonies can take place with dignity, but is concerned over possible danger to Shah's physical safety. Ceremonies would take place in open field under extremely unfavorable conditions re control of crowds or individuals. Dept is considering approach to Iranian Embassy to effect that since our analysis indicates danger of assassination attempt at Los Angeles ceremony cannot be completely eliminated, we feel Shah should accept cancellation this ceremony and confine his activities to East Coast, including ceremony at American University, where we can be sure of capacity to protect HIM from any possible assassination attempt by misguided student. Do not mention foregoing to Iranian officials. Please telegraph your comments, including your estimate official Iranian reactions to such approach, along with any suggestions you may have as to modifications in approach, should we decide to make it. We would plan to base our approach solely on physical safety factor, even though our principal concern is actually over humiliation Shah might suffer in course of really large, well-organized demonstrations. We are aware that Shah's enemies would exploit cancellation as victory./2/ Ball /2/In telegram 1022 from Tehran, May 13, Holmes responded that the Shah would understand if demonstrations took place despite the efforts of authorities to control them, but would not understand an effort to dissuade him from coming to Los Angeles in the absence of documented and reasoned cause. He pointed out that an April 27 letter from President Kerr had expressed the hope that a small but vocal group of dissident students would not deter the Shah from coming to California. Thus, if the situation had changed since April 27, this would have to be explained with full particulars. (Ibid.)
21. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, May 13, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 30, Iran 1964, V--Visas, 21 Deportation. Confidential. Drafted by Bowling and cleared by James J. Hines in L/SCA. SUBJECT Summary Our relations with the Shah, and hence our national security interests, have been seriously endangered by increasing activity on the part of anti-Shah Iranians in the United States, which may culminate in humiliating and perhaps dangerous demonstrations at the UCLA Commencement in June. The effect of these activities is magnified by Iranian suspicion that the anti-Shah Iranians in the United States are being covertly condoned or even supported by the United States Government. We therefore request that you approach the Attorney General, apprise him of the gravity of the situation, and ask him to take deportation action against an anti-Shah leader in the United States, thus restoring Iranian confidence in United States intentions and, hopefully, dampening the ardor of other agitators. Discussion For the past six years the activities of anti-Shah Iranians in the United States have been a source of serious friction between the United States and Iran. Anti-American and sycophantic elements in the Imperial Court have fanned the Shah's suspicions that important elements in the United States Government are secretly backing these bitterly anti-Shah Iranians, and that their propaganda activities, including demonstrations against the Shah and members of the royal family on visits to the United States, are condoned by the United States. Unfavorable comparisons are drawn with the actions of other governments, such as that of France, which locked up anti-Shah Iranians during the period of the Shah's visit to France. The Iranian tendency to suspect the United States Government of involvement in these activities is compounded by such factors as the following: (a) personal friendships between anti-Shah leaders and prominent Americans, such as Justice Douglas; (b) reception by the Attorney General of a delegation of anti-Shah Iranians and his subsequent cancellation of a stop in Tehran on his first trip to the Far East; and (c) suspension by the Department of Justice of deportation proceedings against anti-Shah Iranians in the United States whose passports had expired and were deemed not renewable by the Iranian Government. In two of the latter cases, suspension was continued even after our Ambassador had, at the request of the Department of Justice, obtained the Shah's personal assurance that he would not prosecute the two if they returned. One of the Shah's top security advisors, who was in the United States a few weeks ago, stated that while the Shah would continue to be annoyed over demonstrations and other anti-regime activities, the real danger to United States-Iran relations was the Shah's growing suspicion that unfriendly elements in the United States were being protected by the United States Government. He begged us to take some symbolic action which would counteract these suspicions. This problem has been exacerbated by recent information, unconfirmed at present, indicating that anti-regime leaders will mount a very large demonstration against the Shah at UCLA in the course of the Shah's June visit. We may have to choose between the grave dangers of suggesting that the Shah cancel his appearance in Los Angeles or risking serious humiliation and possible danger to the Shah. In either case, the possibility of a serious break with the Shah could be greatly reduced by some action which would convince His Majesty that we are not condoning the activities of these elements. Such an action might well also dampen the enthusiasm of other anti-regime Iranians, particularly those without valid passports, and reduce the intensity of such demonstrations as may be held. The immediate pressing of deportation proceedings against Ali Shayegan (see Tab A),/2/ who falsely stated in his visa application that he had never been a member of a communist organization, would appear to be perfectly tailored for the present situation. There is no basis for pity for Shayegan. He informed an NEA officer personally less than a year ago that he intended to dedicate the remainder of his life to the destruction of the Shah. You may remember him as being the most fanatical and anti-Western member of Mosadeq's last cabinet, except for Foreign Minister Fatemi, who was executed. /2/Tab A, a short biography of Ali Shayegan, is not printed. Recommendation That you request the Attorney General to examine the case of Ali Shayegan with the view toward immediate pressing of deportation charges against him if the legal basis therefor exists./3/ /3/The source text bears no indication of Harriman's approval or disapproval. On May 15 Acting Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs Charles Mace sent a memorandum to Raymond Farrell, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, stating that the Department had received "highly disturbing reports" regarding the intentions of anti-regime Iranians to organize demonstrations hostile to the Shah during his visit, which could be highly damaging to U.S. foreign policy and national security. Mace recommended deportation of Ali Shayegan and the extension of warnings to students without valid travel documents to cease their more extreme anti-regime activities or face deportation action. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN)
22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, May 14, 1964, 6:48 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Bowling on May 13, cleared by Walsh and in draft by Towsley and Haddad, and approved by Bowling. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE for POLAD Tampa. 842. Embtel 1018. Joint State/AID/Defense message. We regret apparent misunderstanding re Deptels 774 and 826/2/ and Embtel 988./3/ Our authorization to you to discuss modernization requirements (Deptel 774) remains in effect. Caution contained in FYI portion para 3 of Deptel 678/4/ against any commitment re grants or credits also remains in effect. /2/In telegram 1018 from Tehran, May 11 (ibid.), Holmes stated that he was puzzled by the apparent contradiction between telegram 774 (Document 16), which had authorized him to discuss with the Shah a reasonable modernization program without regard to financing, and telegram 826, May 8 (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-IRAN), which cast doubts regarding U.S. ability to provide replacement equipment for M-47 tanks and C-47 aircraft, regardless of payment considerations. /3/Dated April 30; see footnotes 2 and 5, Document 19. /4/Document 11. Dept did not intend in Deptel 826 raise doubts as to US ability sell for cash tanks or transport aircraft to Iran in future. Discussions as to desirable timing and types of modernization, do not, we feel, imply necessity of commitment at present to supply particular type at particular time, as per second and third proposals contained Embtel 988. Specific commitments for grant MAP in FY 66 and beyond are simply not possible, though results of your discussions in terms of what would be technically feasible and desirable should be most useful. Specific commitments regardless of payment considerations fall within this category. FYI. We hope to be able to satisfy Shah re tank modernization through offer of sale to be made in course his visit here. C-130's or other comparable types transport aircraft will be available for sale, and there remains of course possibility some types of transport aircraft and other modernization items under future grant MAP. End FYI. Ball
23. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 34-64 Washington, May 20, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the USIB on May 20. IRAN Conclusions A. It remains uncertain whether modernization in Iran will proceed relatively peacefully or whether violence and revolution are in store. The Shah's reform effort has already helped to stimulate and shape the forces which must eventually, in one way or another, bring basic changes to Iranian society. Already the strength of the landlord class has been somewhat impaired, the gratitude of the peasants has been enlisted and their expectations aroused, and a new and growing managerial class seems to be acquiring increased responsibilities. However, the Shah, supported by the armed forces, still dominates Iranian political life and seems likely to do so for some time to come. With the self-confidence he has acquired from the relative success of his reform measures thus far, he will probably continue to move forward, though with occasional pauses, like the present one in his land reform program. (Paras. 5, 9, 26-27) B. Iran is emerging only slowly from a recession which began in 1961 as the result of ineptly applied anti-inflationary measures and the consequent loss of business confidence. The latter was further set back by the uncertainties engendered by the reform measures. But the resources of the country are adequate to sustain a vigorous economic development, and the outlook for ample and growing oil revenues is promising. Within the next few years, Iran will probably be able to overcome the current slowdown and return to a fairly rapid rate of growth. (Paras. 15-16, 18) C. The reduction in tensions which followed normalization of relations with the Soviet Union in September 1962 has continued, but relations are not likely to become significantly more intimate over the next few years. Though the Shah sees a need to appear more independent of the US, the outlook is for satisfactory US-Iranian relations for at least a considerable time to come. Iran is less dependent than in the past on US economic aid, but in the military and security field continues to rely on US assistance. (Paras. 31-35) Discussion I. Iran's Problems 1. In many respects Iran resembles other backward states ruled by traditional elites and confronted by the many pressures for radical change generated through wider contact with the modern world. There has been a continuing possibility that sooner or later the entire structure of the government and the society would either have to revolutionize itself or be overturned by self-appointed revolutionaries. At one point Mossadeq seemed on the verge of accomplishing such a revolution. Yet his regime collapsed, and the post-Mossadeq era has not seen a resurgence of revolutionary forces. Change has come, but it has been neither radical nor cataclysmic. The social and governmental institutions have been stretched but not rent asunder. 2. The explanation seems to rest in large part with the character of the Shah and the kind of role he has come to play, not only as a symbol but as an active national leader. He has long been aware of the pressures for change and has at various times taken a number of steps toward reform, though none was vigorously pressed. He eventually came to the view that such a slow pace of reform--as exemplified by distribution of crown land to peasants--would not be sufficient to maintain the regime over the long run. By the late 1950's agitation for reform seemed to be evoking a growing popular response; the country was beset with major economic difficulties; and the Shah was vulnerable to charges of reaction which not only offered his external enemies wide scope for attack but also distressed his foreign friends and supporters. In this setting, the government's rigging of the 1961 elections again returned a parliament (Majlis) composed of the traditional elite and created a dangerous situation. In May 1961 the Shah felt it necessary to bring in Prime Minister Amini with a broad mandate for change. Amini's reform measures provided some temporary relief, but they began to alienate the conservative elite without attracting any support from the National Front opposition. 3. Recognizing that Amini's measures were not alleviating opposition to the regime, the Shah allowed his government to fall in July 1962. At this juncture, the Shah evidently came to the conclusion that he must himself take responsibility for a more basic attack on Iran's problems. If this meant radical changes, he was prepared to make them. He also hoped by such measures to take the wind out of the opposition's sails and to broaden his own base of political support. To this end he proposed a six-point program, which was approved in a referendum in January 1963. Land reform, toward which some steps had been taken by the Amini government, was the main plank in this program and rapidly became the focus of popular attention./2/ /2/The six-point program also included profit sharing for workers, eradication of illiteracy, electoral reform, nationalization of forests, and the sale of government enterprises. The granting of suffrage to women, though not specifically one of the six points, was widely heralded as an essential part of the Shah's reform program. [Footnote in the source text.] 4. Under the management of the dynamic and ambitious Minister of Agriculture, Arsanjani, the land reform program initially moved very rapidly. But, when Arsanjani seemed to be pressing the land reform too rapidly and to be using it to establish an independent political position, the Shah forced him to resign. Thereafter the pace of land reform was slowed considerably. The government found it difficult to provide agricultural credits and the trained managers for rural cooperatives both of which were necessary for the success of the program. In September 1963, the government publicly claimed that the first phase of the program--expropriation of the largest landholdings--had been completed./3/ Some preparatory work is now going on for the second phase of the reform program, which is to involve roughly 25,000 of the villages held by one or more landlords, but it is not clear whether or when a decision to proceed with it will be made. /3/Of the approximately 50,000 villages in Iran, about 10,000 were owned by large landowners--those who owned more than one village. By 23 September 1963 all or parts of more than 8,000 of these villages had been purchased by the government at a cost of $62.2 million. Legal complications had delayed the takeover of the remaining 2,000 villages in this category. Of the villages acquired by the government, about 6,400 had been distributed to 271,000 families, comprising roughly ten percent of the agricultural population. [Footnote in the source text.] 5. The reform program has not yet brought about a basic change in Iranian society or reduced the Shah's domination of political life. However, the Shah may have set in train a process of change which could have far-reaching consequences. Already the strength of the landlord class has been somewhat impaired, the gratitude of the peasants has been enlisted and their expectations aroused, and a new and growing managerial class seems to be acquiring increased responsibilities. Nevertheless, the Shah's regime continues to depend essentially on the army and security forces which have received important favors in return for their loyalty. Much of the urban middle class remains disaffected. The "Thousand Families," though deprived of much of their land, are still wealthy, and many remain entrenched in the Shah's entourage. Finally, the peasantry is not organized and has demonstrated little political consciousness. 6. One aspect of social change in Iran which holds considerable significance for the future has been the rise of the technically trained managerial and administrative class who now have reached the upper levels of the bureaucracy in substantial numbers. This new breed of foreign-educated intellectual first became prominent in the late 1950's in the Plan Organization which, being independent of the traditional bureaucracy, provided quick advancement. They are now gradually being distributed throughout the bureaucracy. While many are not enthusiastic about the Shah's style of government, they are sympathetic with much of his reform program and are helping to implement it. II. Political Situation 7. Despite the Shah's authoritarian rule, he has generally felt the need for a facade of representative government. In September 1963, after two years of ruling without parliament, he again held elections. Like their predecessors, these elections were rigged; the contending political parties were again cliques attached to certain personalities and not representative of broader population groups. But this time the elections were used by the Shah significantly to increase the number of government officials--including many associated with the land reform program--in the Majlis and to greatly reduce the representatives of the landlord class. 8. In constituting his most recent cabinet, that of Hasan Ali Mansur in March 1964, the Shah once again turned to the managerial and administrative class. Although Mansur's experience in government affairs is limited, he has a reputation for being a capable administrator. In 1959 he became head of the Progressive Center, a group of pro-government technicians, businessmen, and intellectuals which formed the nucleus of the New Iran Party, founded at the Shah's behest in 1963. Though this party now has about 140 of the 189 deputies in the Majlis, it is an artificial creation without a popular base. The Role of the Military 9. Although the reform program in theory threatens the senior officers who have a vested interest in the status quo, thus far they do not seem to have suffered or to be particularly concerned. Some of the middle-grade and junior officers probably share the outlook of the nationalist opposition, but the government is constantly screening the officer corps, and dissent within the military does not appear to be growing. We believe that the overwhelming majority of the officer corps are loyal to the Shah. 10. The Shah continues to rely on the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) not only to design strategy for neutralizing the opposition but to organize political support for the government as well. SAVAK has not, however, been able to forestall periodic outbursts of open defiance of the government. On occasion the police and gendarmery have not been able to handle civil disturbances, and have had to call in the military. In these actions, the armed forces have generally performed creditably, and we believe that they can successfully cope with any likely disorders. The Opposition 11. The opposition has been seriously disorganized and weakened by the Shah's tactics. The leaders of the loosely organized National Front (the remnants of ex-Prime Minister Mossadeq's organization) have been unwilling to support the reform program, since their real objective is not so much benefits for the population at large as it is power for themselves. Yet when they have combined with the conservatives to criticize the Shah's program, they have forfeited popular support. The government has been alert to exploit this dilemma. Moreover, by keeping many of the National Front leaders in detention until just before the elections, the government effectively stifled their chances. As a result of these vicissitudes, the party's political chief has resigned and it is in serious disarray. The danger that extreme and irresponsible elements will gain control is growing. 12. The conservative forces, which until recently supported the Shah, are now largely disaffected. The religious hierarchy in particular sees the reform program as striking at its power and interests. The mullahs have taken the lead and played a major role in agitation against the government which led to widespread popular demonstrations in June 1963. The government's vigorous suppression of these demonstrations and its continuing strong pressure against religious dissidents has severely weakened this segment of the opposition. Furthermore, the mullahs have for some time been hampered by their inability to agree on an overall leader, and their disunity and confusion have been compounded by the government's tactics of alternately arresting and releasing the leading religious figures. While some of the larger landlords have accommodated to the reform program, many of them remain apprehensive and a source of opposition to further development of the program. 13. The Tudeh (Communist) Party has been effectively suppressed. Its main leadership is either in exile or in jail. The party has not made appreciable headway in Iran in recent years and is heavily penetrated by the security forces. Although the discord within the National Front may provide the Tudeh with increased opportunities for infiltration, it appears now to have little chance of coming to dominate the movement. 14. Tribal dissidence remains a potential rather than a present threat to the regime. The Iranian Kurds have yet to overcome their traditional tribal rivalries and lack any widely accepted local leader. Moreover, they have no very serious grievance, and the government is taking some steps to extend to the Kurdish areas the benefits of economic development and to integrate them in greater degree into national life. The Iranian Kurds are unlikely to create serious problems for the government unless Iraqi Kurds win a large measure of autonomy or unless the USSR makes a determined attempt to incite a separatist movement. Neither of these developments now seems likely. While tribal disorders may occur in other parts of Iran, such conflicts are easy to contain and isolate, and it would be extremely difficult for the diverse tribal groupings to coordinate action against the regime. Though there is almost certainly some Egyptian or Iraqi intrigue among the Khuzistan Arabs, they are unarmed, sunk in poverty and apathy, and therefore constitute no threat at present. III. Economic Trends 15. Iran's natural resources are capable of supporting extensive economic development. Arable land is more than adequate to support the growing population, and irrigation projects are increasing agricultural productivity and bringing new land under cultivation. Favored by good weather, total agricultural production in 1963 increased some nine percent over that of the previous year. Iran's most important asset, however, is its booming oil industry, which is largely insulated from the vagaries of Iran's domestic economy. The government's rapidly rising revenues from this source are sufficient to provide a solid base for a broad development program, even allowing for continued mismanagement and corruption. 16. Since 1961 Iran has been plagued by a recession which has resulted in considerable unemployment, unused productive capacity, and an unfavorable climate for investment. For a number of years prior to 1961, rising oil revenues, large foreign loans, and good harvests stimulated a high rate of economic activity. Gross National Product (GNP) was rising by nearly six percent annually, and by 1961 annual investment had risen to about 18 percent of GNP. The number of banks and factories doubled, and a start was made toward modernizing the government's economic institutions and practices. By 1960, however, the attempt to carry out such an ambitious--and largely uncoordinated--effort led to serious inflationary pressures, a speculative construction boom, and a sharp decline in foreign exchange reserves. This obliged the government to replace its expansionary policies with a series of anti-inflationary measures, which frightened the business community and proved to be more difficult to rescind than to impose. 17. More recently, the government has been seeking to revive the domestic economy through attempts to increase expenditures under the Third Plan (1962-1968), stimulate private industry, and expand exports. Credit has been made cheaper and more readily available and a trade agreement has been concluded with the Common Market. However, the expansionary effect of such policies has been small, due at least in part to the political uncertainties engendered by the Shah's simultaneous effort to launch his reform program. 18. The advent of the Mansur government and the slowing of the reform program have apparently begun to restore business confidence. Although administrative difficulties continue to prevent the government from rapidly increasing public investment under the Plan, a modest rise has been achieved in recent months. Nevertheless, many problems remain, and we do not foresee a strong business recovery in the immediate future. Iran's underlying economic strength, however, will probably enable it to overcome these difficulties and within the next few years return to a more rapid rate of growth. Oil 19. One of the basic reasons for Iran's favorable prospects is its booming oil industry, which provided the government with about $380 million in revenues in 1963, an amount likely to increase by at least 8 to 10 percent annually for the next several years. Since the disastrous experience with nationalizing the oil industry during the Mossadeq era, the Iranian Government has dealt with the oil consortium through negotiations rather than threats. Though the government periodically voices complaints against the consortium's exploration and development programs, the rapid rise of oil production and revenues in Iran and the development of several new deposits have largely allayed these criticisms. Iran will doubtless desire greater oil revenues than in fact it receives, but it will probably continue to take a more realistic attitude than the more extreme members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),/4/ who are interested in gaining greater control of levels of oil production and prices. It is possible that Iran might leave OPEC over this issue; if so, it would probably expect the companies to increase their proportionate offtake of Iranian oil. /4/The members of OPEC are: Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, and Indonesia. [Footnote in the source text.] Long-Range Planning 20. The concept of comprehensive economic development planning has not yet gained a firm foothold in Iran. The Third Plan, as originally drawn up by the Plan Organization, showed early promise of breaking through the traditional hostility toward planned investment. After the fall of the Amini government, however, the impetus toward meaningful planning was largely lost. Anti-planning elements wielded strong influence in the Alam government and succeeded in weakening the Plan Organization and decentralizing responsibility for project formulation and implementation. Consequently, the Third Plan reflects the constant bureaucratic bickering as to how plan resources should be allocated. 21. Under the Mansur government the outlook for the Third Plan has improved somewhat. Relatively few projects without some intrinsic economic merit are contemplated. Even the "make-work" projects in the program have utility for combatting recession and urban employment. The plan also promises support for land reform and rural development. Thanks to the rising oil income and good prospects for foreign loans and credits, the financing of the Third Plan should not be a serious problem. Even so, the Plan Organization is passing through a period of transformation and is unlikely for some time to have sufficient authority and competence to give effective direction to Iran's development. Thus, the Third Plan, which is supposed to increase development expenditures more than two and a half times, will probably fall considerably short of its goals. Agriculture and Land Reform 22. Thus far the land reform program has had no discernible effect on agricultural production. Any disruptive effect has been more than offset by good weather conditions over the past two years, and total agricultural production may register a further increase this year. A relatively small proportion of the land has been distributed to date, and most of the government cooperatives which are to play an essential role in agricultural management have been formed only on paper. The future of the agricultural sector of the economy will depend in large measure on how successfully these cooperatives fulfill their functions, particularly the management of Iran's complicated irrigation system which has been the traditional task of the landlords. If these management responsibilities are in fact well performed, and if government plans to provide financial and technical assistance are carried out, agricultural production is likely to increase. IV. The Domestic Outlook 23. The Shah apparently feels the need for a breathing spell in his reform efforts in order to consolidate recent gains. The pace of land reform has outstripped the government's administrative capacities, and little new land is likely to be transferred in the near future. Yet it is unlikely that awareness of this fact will arouse significant disappointment among the peasantry, who have yet to display any political initiative of their own. In any event, there is no ready vehicle for them to express their feelings, as the Shah has effectively prevented the emergence of any mass leaders. While it does not seem likely that the peasants will become an active force in political life in the near future, it is possible that the Shah has fostered the beginnings of a social transformation in the countryside. 24. The National Front opposition appears to have no great prospects at present. Its various leaders will certainly interpret any slowdown of the reform program as confirming their suspicions that the Shah intends no basic reform of Iranian society. Yet they show no signs of being able to overcome the factionalism that has prevented their movement from exerting effective opposition or of developing a positive program of its own. Moreover, even with the slowing of reform, the nationalists are unlikely to be very successful in inducing the technicians, who recognize that the regime must modernize to survive in the long run, to risk their government positions by joining the opposition. Pressures for change, stimulated in part by the reform program itself, will probably grow and bring periodic turbulence. We do not believe, however, that any of the opposition groups singly or in combination, will be able to pose a serious challenge to the regime for the next few years, mainly because of the reliability and efficiency of the security apparatus. In short, the Shah's prospects for retaining control for the foreseeable future are good. 25. In the past the Shah has been unwilling to permit any political personality to consolidate independent power, and Mansur is unlikely to be an exception. His government, however, may be able to provide the administrative and technical talent that the Shah feels is vital to carry out the reform program. In the end he may, like other Prime Ministers, be a convenient scapegoat, should political and economic frustrations build up again to the point of demonstrations or open unrest. Tactics such as these have drawn fire away from the monarchy in the past, and we believe they are likely to succeed again. Longer Term Outlook 26. Though it seems quite likely that change will continue to be evolutionary for a number of years, it remains uncertain whether Iran will make the ultimate transition to modern life without experiencing a violent revolution. The odds are not as hopeless as they have sometimes appeared when the regime has been faced with crisis. For some years to come it is likely that Iran will pass through a period of consolidation in an effort to assimilate recent changes. During this time the bureaucracy will probably come increasingly to be dominated by the new class of technicians, who offer the best hope for bridging the gap between the paternal administration of the Shah and disaffected middle class elements. 27. As in the past, the Shah will continue to dictate the pace of these developments. It is not certain that he will continue to push the reform program energetically, although he seems now to see it as a design for social and economic advance to which he has a personal commitment. His tendency in the past, however, has been to use reform as a palliative when pressed, and he may draw back once more. Nevertheless, the Shah does appear convinced that his "White Revolution"has thus far been a notable success, and his self-confidence has clearly been enhanced. Hence the chances now seem good that he will continue to move forward, though with some pauses and even retreats along the way. 28. Even if he persists, the success of the Shah's initiative for evolutionary reform will depend in the long run on whether it evokes a response in the country sufficient to be translated into broadened political support for the regime. It is too soon yet to say that this will happen, though if reform is pressed and enlarged in scope, it is not unreasonable to believe that new and more constructive political formations will eventually appear. The test would then be whether the Shah would be willing to share power with the political forces he would have called into being. On this will depend also his ability to attract and hold the first-class talent so badly needed for the tasks of development. In any case, it seems clear that the Shah's reform effort has already helped to stimulate and shape the forces which must eventually, in one way or another, bring basic changes to Iranian society. 29. It is a basic weakness of Iran that the present equilibrium depends almost exclusively on the Shah. The modernization that has taken place to date has been largely administrative and economic, and little has been done to create political institutions that would survive the death of the Shah. Hence, should assassination or any other event remove him, the monarchy as an institution would be endangered. The 44-year-old Shah has not allowed any other figures to develop power in their own right, and the bureaucracy and the parliament, though somewhat more respected than in the past, have as yet no independent stature. Hence the military would almost immediately be drawn into the political arena. A successor government, if controlled by the senior officers, would probably, without attempting to reverse the Shah's programs, pursue a generally more conservative course. However, if younger officers gain a dominant voice, the government might reflect the more radical outlook of the nationalist opposition. In any event, conditions would be so disturbed that any successor regime would probably find it difficult to consolidate power, and a prolonged period of instability would probably ensue. V. Foreign Policy 30. Iran's strongly pro-Western orientation represents primarily the will of the Shah. He is supported in this by the bureaucracy, and in particular the military establishment. On the other hand, many of the intellectuals would prefer a neutral course between East and West; indeed, this would be the foreign policy which any National Front government would strive to adopt. Relations with the U.S.S.R. 31. The most important development in Iran's foreign relations in recent years has been the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union since September 1962. At that time, Moscow accepted the Shah's pledge not to permit the establishment of missile bases on his soil and shelved its policy of open diplomatic and propaganda pressures to overthrow his regime. Thus, without detracting from his Western ties, the Shah was able to end the strong Soviet pressure which had kept tension high for many years. Soviet acceptance of this gesture may indicate recognition, at least for the near term, of the ineffectiveness of subversive efforts against the regime. 32. Yet neither the Shah nor the Kremlin has sought to do much more than reduce tensions. After an initial flurry of sympathetic articles in the Tehran press, the Iranian Government intervened to reduce the volume and emphasis of pro-Soviet publicity. For their part, the Soviets have not come forth with the expected proposals for large-scale economic projects, though they have provided a $38.8 million 10-year credit for Iran. Communist propaganda beamed by clandestine radio stations outside Iran still criticizes the regime. 33. The Shah will probably welcome continued improvement in Soviet relations and may even pay increasing lip service to "nonalignment." In any case, it will be difficult for him to reject the friendship of a powerful neighbor that claims to have changed its attitude and whose conduct is correct. A policy of accommodation will also serve to some extent to appease the neutralist and xenophobic sentiments of Iranians who believe their country is overcommitted to the West. It would also counter the Shah's concern that, with signs of a developing East-West detente, the U.S. might lose interest in supporting and defending Iran against increased Soviet influence. Nevertheless, Iranian fears of Soviet designs remain alive and will probably serve to check any significant danger to Iran's Western orientation for the period of this estimate. Relations with the U.S. 34. Iran's relationship with the U.S. appears to be undergoing a subtle change. Though the American alliance remains the cornerstone of Iran's foreign policy, the Shah, for reasons of domestic politics and international prestige, sees a need to appear more independent. At the same time, the rise of oil revenues, improving agricultural output, and the availability of credits from other free world sources and the Soviet Bloc have reduced Iran's dependence on US economic assistance. Accordingly US influence on economic development is decreasing. 35. The same cannot be said of the security field, where Iran remains heavily dependent on US assistance. The Shah was heartened by a US-Iranian exercise which brought sizable numbers of American troops to Iran. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The five-year US military aid plan has alleviated to some degree the Shah's dissatisfaction with US military support. Thus we foresee a period of relative calm in US military relations with Iran, probably until near the end of the military aid plan in 1967. Regional Relations 36. The CENTO alliance is important to Iran as a formal defense link to the West and because it provides an additional claim on the US for aid. This does not mean that Iran is fully satisfied with the alliance. It has been irritated by the refusal of the US and the UK to consider alleged threats from non-Communist regional states as falling within the purview of the alliance and has suspected the US at times of having only a lukewarm interest in this pact. Iran's dissatisfaction with CENTO's economic achievements was greatly alleviated by the recent decision of the US to finance the Turkey-Iran rail link. Under the circumstances, Iran can be expected to continue to be cooperative in CENTO, although not without criticisms of specific aspects of the alliance. 37. The Shah's chief regional concern is his fear that Nasser is actively plotting to overthrow his regime, working through Iraq and the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. Though Nasser has recently made some overtures to improve relations, the Shah remains wary. In fact, he is likely to pursue a more active policy to counter UAR activities directed at the Persian Gulf. Relations with Afghanistan have improved markedly since Iran served as mediator in the Afghanistan-Pakistan dispute, and prospects for the future here are good.
24. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Holmes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Tehran, May 20, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Top Secret; Official-Informal. Dear Dean: Next week I shall be sending a telegram/2/ assessing the local situation and the Shah's attitudes, which I hope will be useful to the President and you in discussions with him. There is one important subject which cannot be included because of the circulation such messages receive. /2/See Document 27. A seldom discussed but vital element in our relationship with Iran is the agreement of the Shah which permits us to continue a series of U.S. technical intelligence operations in various parts of Iran. For the most part, the nature of many of these activities is such that they cannot be concealed from the public, and it is only through the Shah's approval, and in certain instances through direct Iranian participation, that we are able to continue these activities. More specifically, the activities include: a) The establishment and maintenance of [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. These activities require the presence of upwards of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] civilian and service personnel, plus dependents. b) The establishment and maintenance of [1 line of source text not declassified] facilities. c) The Customs-free importation of technical and other logistic support required for the above activities. d) The Shah has also given personal approval for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] intelligence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operations [3 lines of source text not declassified]. I should rather not specify the precise objectives or results obtained from these activities which, I am told, are of critical value to us. However, John McCone could inform you of how important they are to our national security. My point in raising this sensitive matter with you at this time is to make certain that at the top level of our Government, on the eve of the Shah's visit to Washington, there is realization of this particular benefit which we derive from our relationship with the Shah, and of the fact that he, having personally assumed full responsibility for supporting and protecting these activities, has never sought a quid pro quo for them or tried to blackmail us because of them. We should not allow a situation to develop where the Shah would be tempted to resort to such practice. The importance of these facilities in Iran would become even greater if by any unhappy chance, owing to policy changes in Pakistan, we should be deprived of similar facilities in that country. For these and other reasons our relationship with the Shah and with Iran is an important one and I very much hope it will be possible for us to show a flexible attitude during the Shah's visit to Washington, particularly in relation to his desires for continuing U.S. assistance in the modernization of his military establishment. I should be grateful if you would show this letter to the President./3/ /3/On June 12 Secretary Rusk thanked Holmes for his timely letter and noted that it seemed to him that the U.S. Government has been sufficiently flexible regarding the Shah's military modernization and security problems and sufficiently understanding of his economic concerns to obviate the likelihood that he would be tempted to use the intelligence facilities as a basis for undue pressure in the near future. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN) With warm regards, Sincerely yours, Julius
25. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ SVW-B/4 Washington, May 27, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Shah's Visit, 6/5/64. Confidential. Drafted by Tiger and cleared by Bowling, Towsley, Spain, and Jernegan.
SHAH OF IRAN THE IRANIAN REFORM PROGRAM Shortly after Vice President Johnson's visit to Iran in August 1962, the Shah personally assumed leadership of a program of reforms, some of which had been launched by the Amini Government before its fall in mid-1962. In the absence of Parliament, the Shah in January 1963 put to a referendum and won overwhelming endorsement for a six-point reform program, the most significant elements of which were land reform and an Education Corps modelled on our Peace Corps. Subsequently, other elements have been added to the original program, most notably enfranchisement of women and a Health Corps. While the execution of the program has been spotty, certain aspects have gained considerable momentum and give the impression that some fundamental changes are at last under way in the long-static Iranian society. An election in the Fall of 1963, although carefully controlled by the Shah and barred to the opposition, nevertheless avoided the more blatant rigging of earlier elections. It brought into being a pro-reform Parliament and ended an unconstitutional parliamentary interregnum of more than two years. In March 1964 the Shah appointed a new Government of younger technocrat elements headed by Hasan Ali Mansur, who is concentrating on certain key administrative reforms (budget, civil service) and on attempts to spur a business revival through an increased level of public investments and economic policies favorable to private business. In espousing basic reforms the Shah alienated the landlords and conservative clergy which had formed the principal base of his support, but failed to overcome the pre-existing opposition of the pro-Mosadeqist "nationalists." While these externally disparate elements have not in most instances joined forces, the conservative groups were powerful enough in the summer of 1963 to incite severe rioting in Tehran and other cities. This was suppressed without great difficulty by the Shah's military and security forces, and a threatened repetition of the rioting this summer has so far been forestalled by precautionary measures. These military and security forces have a high degree of reliability and increasing technical capability. Their methods can be vigorous when necessary and they are feared by some elements of the population. However, they have not been used by the regime to institute an atmosphere of widespread repression, even against the conservative opponents of reform. The Shah is clearly exhilarated by the initial progress of his reform program, particularly his own success in having overcome his dependence on the anti-reform elements in Iranian society. Although he is undoubtedly sincere in espousing the reforms as an essential feature (along with economic development) of the modernization of his country, he is also acutely conscious of the effect of the reforms on world opinion, particularly in the U.S. In describing the reforms to foreigners, he is apt to exaggerate greatly their success and to confuse promise with fulfillment. We thus find it necessary from time to time, while expressing appreciation for his reform efforts, to remind him that we see them as only a beginning. In order to avoid the appearance of patronizing him, we have couched such strictures in terms of comparisons with the United States, where, in spite of the maturity of economic and institutional development, there remain grave areas of concern, such as poverty and race relations.
26. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Affairs (Sloan)/1/ Washington, May 28, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 333 Iran--28 May 1964. Confidential. Dear Frank: In the course of the Shah's unofficial visit to the United States, he will talk with the President for an hour on June 5. This talk will be followed by a White House luncheon for the Shah. Briefing papers for the President are being prepared in this bureau of the Department of State, and several of these will be forwarded to ISA shortly for clearance. All of the subjects except one which we expect to come up are non-operational, and we expect no difficulties in obtaining clearances on those portions of the briefing materials dealing with general political and economic affairs or with Persian Gulf problems. The enclosed drafts,/2/ which are to be incorporated in the Talking Paper and Background Paper, respectively, deal with military assistance, which, as you know from recent messages from Tehran and from CINCMEAFSA, constitutes the critical item which will largely determine the long-term results of the Shah's meeting with the President. /2/Not printed. We feel that it is vital for the President to be able to indicate clearly to the Shah that his problems of military equipment are being sympathetically considered at the highest levels of the United States Government. As a minimum, we feel that the President must be able to make a concrete offer to the Shah responsive to the Shah's current primary concern--the replacement during the next few years of aging M-47 tanks. We are aware that there is some division of opinion in the Department of Defense as to the relative value of the M-48A3 and the M-60 tanks for supply to Iran. We feel quite certain, however, that the Shah greatly prefers the M-60, and that the President's offer should emphasize the availability of the M-60. We are further aware that there is some difference of opinion as to whether or not the still-experimental Sheridan might be made a part of any commitment to supply tanks to Iran in the future. We are assuming that the stage of development of this tank is such that no such commitment may be made, despite the Shah's known interest in that vehicle./3/ /3/On June 3 Sloan responded to Jernegan noting that there were so many variables regarding the Sheridan that it was premature to discuss its being furnished under either sale or grant. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 333 Iran--28 May 1964) We would hope that ISA might be able to provide technical tab papers on these tanks and a summary table outlining the current Five-Year MAP Plan for Iran. Members of your staff have indicated informally to members of my staff that the possibility of a substantial proportion of M-60's being supplied under grant MAP is completely out of the question. We have therefore confined the offer in our draft to one of sale only. However, the Shah, at the time of agreement on the current Five-Year Plan, specifically made reservations in respect to the adequacy of the proposed tank component, and we informed him that we would review this element of the Plan later. Furthermore, we note that thirty grant M-60's for Iran have been included in CINCSTRIKE's MAP submission for FY 66 as a non-commitment item, and that the submission is within the current EUCOM MAP ceiling for FY 64-69. I would therefore appreciate your reviewing the problem to make certain that it will not be possible for the President to combine his sale offer with a commitment to supply thirty M-60's under grant MAP before the end of 1967. Should this be possible, the beneficial effect on our military and political objectives of the President's talk with the Shah would be greatly increased./4/ /4/In his response Sloan pointed out that since no other country had received M-60 tanks as grant aid, the Department of Defense did not want to establish a precedent; therefore, it recommended that they be sold as planned. I am aware that the problem of tank production and supply is at present a delicate one, and that it will not be easy for DOD to make firm and quick decisions. Nevertheless, we feel it is imperative that the President be able to talk to the Shah in specific terms. In addition to the obvious broad political effects of this talk, we are convinced that it may prove to be a major fork in the road determining whether or not we are to continue to maintain our position as the primary source of equipment and military influence in Iran. The Shah's political and financial position is such that he is now capable of shopping in world markets for military equipment. We believe he will do so unless we continue to retain his confidence in us as his primary source of supply. I would appreciate your clearance and/or comments on the enclosed draft segments of the President's briefing papers. Sincerely yours, Jack
27. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, May 28, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. 1090. For the Secy from the Amb. The fol summary statement on the Shah and his current concerns may be helpful in connection with the preparations for his forthcoming visit. As I shall not be present, I am submitting this statement, which represents the views of the Country Team, and recommend that it be also submitted to the Pres. When the Shah was last in Wash in April 1962, he was in a depressed and insecure mood and needed to be reassured that we thought he was on the right track with his reform program, that we admired his steadfastness in the face of Sov threats and blandishments, and that he had our continuing political and military support. He has changed a good deal since that time. Now he is in a buoyant mood, convinced (with some justification) that his internal program is a success, that his regime is secure, and that he has managed the foreign affairs of his country wisely. But he is gravely disturbed by recent trends in the Arab world. He still requires reassurance that we are with him, that we admire him, and that we understand his current concerns. In foreign affairs, the Shah continues to stand squarely with the free world and considers his country the only stable ally we have between Suez and the Sea of Japan. Although he has "normalized" his relations with the Sov Union, he continues staunchly anti-Communist and in fact is sometimes inclined to suspect us of going too far in the direction of a detente. Last year he was acutely worried by talk of a possible non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries and felt that this could force him into an unwanted accommodation with the Sov Union; but we managed to convince him that those worries were unfounded. Today his principal concern in foreign and military affairs is with Arab (and especially Nasser's) designs on the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzistan which is inhabited by about one million Iranian Arabs. He recognizes that the UAR does not at present have the capability to make serious trouble for him in Khuzistan, but he sees a long-term trend of British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf area and has been especially disturbed by the recent political and military agreements between the UAR and Iraq. At present he is more concerned with the Arab threat than with the threat of Sov expansionism. Persistently misreading our policy, he is inclined to feel--as many of our allies do--that we are too friendly toward neutralists like Nasser, whom he likes to picture as a Sov tool. On the internal scene, the Shah's control of his country is, if anything, still tighter than it was two years ago. He has recently called in a new team of younger people to run his govt, and that new Cabinet (under Hasan Ali Mansur) is pushing forward with a number of much-needed reforms, including civil service reform, a much-needed new approach to budgeting, and a general overhaul of the administrative machinery. There are also indications that the Mansur govt is managing to gain the confidence of the business community and thus to bring about a much-needed recovery of the private sector. The Shah is probably unwilling to face the fact that in the cities, and particularly among the intelligentsia, his regime has yet to generate enthusiastic support. He continues unable to delegate authority and is probably convinced that past American advice to that effect was proved wrong by events. Perennially, our problem with the Shah has been to keep his military program in balance with his vitally important programs for social and economic reform. Our five-year program of military assistance, agreed in 1962, has been highly successful in maintaining this balance. Recently he has become concerned with the replacement of items (especially the M-47 tank, but also the F-86 and C-47 aircraft), which will soon become unsupportable, and wanted to discuss what will happen after expiration of the five-year program. In repeated and intensive discussions with him, we have tried here during the past weeks to bring his current requests down to the level where they are reasonable both from the military and from the economic-political points of view, and it now appears that we have had some measure of success; but there is no doubt that the recent UAR-Iraq agreement has made him view the replacement program with even greater urgency. Especially the tank problem is now his central military preoccupation. Iran's attitude toward U.S. military aid is changing as the country's financial position is improving. A reasonable transition of our MAP from grant aid to a mixture of U.S. grant assistance, extension of credit, and sales for cash--within the limits of a new, jointly arrived, reasonable program--is now the crucial requirement of our continued close relations with Iran. It would be desirable that the conversation between the President and the Shah not dwell exclusively on military matters. The Shah regards himself as a world statesman and will be flattered by a discussion of world affairs. It would also be useful to remind the Shah in the course of the conversation that, while we will continue to help him in meeting his military problems, we consider his economic and social development programs of fundamental importance for the long-term stability of his country. While much has been done, a great deal more still remains to be done. Since the Shah is currently inclined to be overly optimistic about Iran's future oil income, the President might make the desired point by discussing the problem all national leaders have in allocating scarce resources and by expressing the thought that estimates of future resources are often over-optimistic and that there is no end to the competition between conflicting requirements, so that there is always need for a careful establishment of priorities. The Shah is a genuine friend of the U.S. He has turned to us for advice on most important problems and cooperates with us in many fields, including some highly classified ones that are of great importance to us. His popular image abroad and at home has improved since he launched his reform program. His current preoccupation with military problems in the Persian Gulf has some justification. We hope that he will feel that he has gained the personal understanding of the President for those problems and particularly that the President understands the need for certain more modern types of equipment for his armed forces, within the framework of a new agreed, long-term program that is being worked out./2/ /2/In telegram 906, June 4, Rusk thanked the Ambassador for his telegram, saying that it had proved invaluable in preparing for the Shah's visit, and that it had been submitted to the President as Holmes had recommended. (Ibid.) Holmes
28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, May 28, 1964, 1:41 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-IRAN. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Tiger; cleared in substance by Colonel Taylor and by Komer; and approved by Jernegan. 889. Embtel 1065./2/ Recognize Shah currently concerned with security situation (Arab threat) and preoccupied with details military modernization but hope he aware that it would be counterproductive to devote hour with President mostly these subjects, particularly technical discussion merits various kinds military equipment. President keenly interested progress Shah's reforms, especially land reform, education and health corps, women's emancipation, administrative reform, etc., and in measures to stimulate Iranian economy. To omit or downgrade these subjects would risk giving impression one-sided preoccupation military-security affairs. /2/Dated May 25. (Ibid.) We hope you will find opportunity before Shah leaves to intimate this need for balance in meeting with President. You may wish to refer to opportunity for discussion military problems Iranian Embassy tea June 6 (at which we hope McNaughton, Sloan, and Generals Woods and Adams will be present) and to make it clear again that we expect details concerning timing and equipment content modernization program to be worked out in continuing Tehran discussions with you and General Eckhardt, not during Washington visit. Ball
29. Current Intelligence Memorandum/1/ OCI No. 1582/64 Washington, May 30, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 79-T00430A, Current Intelligence Memoranda, May 1964. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. SUBJECT 1. The Shah of Iran is due to arrive in Washington on 4 June to open a "7,000 Years of Persian Art" exhibit at the National Gallery. Although he is on an unofficial visit, he is scheduled to see the President, as well as other top officials. The Shah is also scheduled to receive honorary degrees from American University and from the University of California at Berkeley before he leaves the country about 13 June. He has visited the US on four previous occasions, unofficially in 1954-55 and 1958, and officially in 1949 and 1962. The principal problem anticipated during this trip is hostile demonstrations by Iranian students, particularly in California. Such demonstrations against the Iranian Government have been a perennial problem in this country, and a number of sizable ones occurred in Europe during the Shah's visit to Austria and Italy last winter. 2. The Shah's short title is His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Now age 44, he is an intelligent and personable individual, fluent in English and French, with a taste for sports--tennis, riding, skiing, flying--and an interest in art and literature as well as in attractive women. He has been married three times: to the sister of ex-king Farouk (1939); to the well-known Soraya, the daughter of a minor tribal chief and a German national (1951); and to the present Queen, Farah, who comes from an old Azerbaijan family (1959). The long-desired heir, Prince Reza, was born in 1960. The Shah has two daughters, one born last year and one by his first wife. 3. The Shah has been on the throne, ruling most of the time as well as reigning, since 1941, when his father was ousted by the Allies. The father was an army officer who seized the throne to found the Pahlavi dynasty. The Shah's beginning and finishing education was military; in between he spent four years in schools in Switzerland. His interest in the army and in military affairs generally is thus a product of his educational background as well as of a preoccupation with Iran's security problems. 4. The Shah's family has not been among his assets. His father was disliked and feared, his twin sister leads an uninhibited personal life allegedly engaging in such doubtful business enterprises as opium smuggling and his half-brothers have generally been kept in obscurity. The political philosophy of many of the Shah's court intimates appears to be late eighteenth century Bourbon. 5. From this background, the Shah has emerged, particularly in the past ten years, as a sensitive, often moody, but nonetheless able proponent of the modernization of his country--under his direction. Since the overthrow of the Mossadeq regime in 1953 he has operated largely as a dictator, with a thin facade of parliamentary democratic procedures. He has confronted, with some considerable skill, a situation in which a rising middle class has agitated restlessly for greater political power and accelerated economic and social change, while vested interests--landed aristocracy, obscurantist clergy, and tribal chieftains--have venomously opposed all attempts at reform. 6. The present phase of the Shah's reform program began in earnest two years ago. Its main points are the redistribution of land, electoral reform including the enfranchisement of women, profit sharing among industrial workers, the nationalization of forests, the formation of a literacy corps, and provision for the compensation of expropriated landlords. Land reform is the key aspect of the program, and substantial progress has been made. There are indications, however, that the program will soon be temporarily slowed to allow the administrative apparatus--surveys, etc.--to catch up. The new cabinet, under Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur, is pledged to undertake administrative reforms to consolidate the achievements of the "white revolution." The hyper-skeptical Iranian public, however, is likely to view this development as an indication that the vested interests have gained a round. 7. The Shah's opponents are able to unite only on the issue of his "dictatorial and unconstitutional" methods of governing. The principal opposition vehicle is a National Front, whose core comes from the upper and middle classes. However, the development of a unified opposition is handicapped not only by the disparity of views among its elements--which run from the Muslim mullahs to the Communist Tudeh Party, heavily infiltrated by the government's security organs--but also by the basic appeal that the land reform program has made in an overwhelmingly peasant country. The opposition has been placed in the position of trying to oppose the Shah while avoiding opposition to a popular program with which he is personally identified. There are in fact some signs that younger members of the middle class, who are now taking up their "class positions" in the government bureaucracy, are rallying to the government, at least in the sense that they seem to be working diligently to make the Shah's program a success. 8. This tendency is not evident, however, among the students in the U.S. who are likely to cause trouble during his visit. Iranian young people who study abroad are almost invariably from the upper class, particularly those in the US. Many oppose the Shah because of family memories of past cruelties committed by his father. Others are genuinely disturbed by the "dictatorship," by the omnipresence of the security police, and probably by their own sense of frustration over the slowness with which Iranian society seems able to change. At the same time, there is evidence that many Iranian student leaders in Europe and in the US are supported in part with funds from Communist sources and/or have become ideologically attached to left-wing movements. 9. The Shah calls his foreign policy "positive nationalism." Its basic pro-Western orientation is a reflection of his personal position rather than of any widespread popular sentiment. Many Iranian intellectuals in fact would prefer a neutralist position, and oppose Iran's membership in CENTO and its 1959 mutual defense pact with the US. Iran's heavy dependence on US aid since World War II is currently undergoing a subtle change as the country's oil revenues improve its financial position. The Shah nonetheless continues to complain that US military aid is insufficient; recent US-Iranian military exercises in southwestern Iran appear to have confirmed in the Shah's mind the strategic importance of Iran to the West as well as reassured him of US support. 10. The Shah's relations with the U.S.S.R. are diplomatically correct at the moment. Soviet propaganda against him has slackened since Moscow accepted his 1962 pledge not to allow foreign missile bases on Iranian territory. Soviet President Brezhnev visited Iran last year, and the U.S.S.R. extended a ten-year credit of $38.8 million to finance a project to harness the Aras River, which forms the Iranian-Soviet frontier in northwestern Iran. [Continue with the next documents] |
