NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
632. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa/1/ Washington, February 12, 1967, 8:09 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR-US. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Clark; cleared by Palmer, Morris, and Coward; and approved by A. Hugh Douglas of S/S-O. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria and Durban, and to DOD. 135747. Ref: Capetown 783./2/ /2/Telegram 783 from Cape Town, February 10, reported that a Military Sea Transport Service ship, the Sword Knot, had been off Durban since February 8 awaiting diplomatic clearance. (Ibid.) 1. Reuters reports Sword Knot Captain Yates stated on radio-telephone interview tonight (Sunday) that he is sailing in to Durban Monday or Tuesday. Reporter quotes Yates as saying he is taking decision himself after waiting five days for diplomatic clearance. 2. MSTS sending Captain urgent orders not to enter Durban until he receives clearance and instructions from Washington. 3. If Emb is in contact or can establish contact with Sword Knot, it should repeat warning to Captain to stand by and not enter Durban unless and until he receives positive instructions through USG channels./3/ /3/Telegram 136558 to Cape Town, February 14, instructed the Embassy to inform the South African Government that, in light of the present intensity of anti-apartheid sentiment generated in the United States by the FDR visit, the U.S. Government might decide not to use the Durban facilities and send the ship to another destination instead. (Ibid.) Telegram 137419 to Cape Town, February 15, reported that the Department of Defense had issued orders to Sword Knot not to enter Durban but to proceed to Mombasa, Kenya. (Ibid.) Rusk
633. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance)/1/ Washington, February 21, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, 092 South Africa. Secret. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary of State and the Director of the National Security Agency. MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT I would appreciate your developing for me on a priority basis an assessment of the minimum DoD requirements for use of Republic of South Africa ports, yards, airfields, real estate, and the like. This assessment should specifically address the following: (1) The use of South African ports and yards for U.S. Naval war ships, other USN ships, and any ships or vessels which DoD components operate directly or under contractual arrangements to satisfy other DoD or NASA requirements; (2) Land-based tracking facilities; (3) Search and rescue arrangements; (4) Any contractual agreements DoD has with the South African Government or with private South African businesses or industries for goods and services provided DoD components in South Africa; and (5) Any other DoD requirements for South African facilities. I would also appreciate your analyzing various alternatives for satisfying the DoD requirements outlined above should South African facilities no longer be available to DoD. I plan to forward your analysis to the Under Secretary of State as part of an over-all review of U.S. policy toward the Republic of South Africa. Cyrus Vance
634. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy (Nitze) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance)/1/ Washington, March 4, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 680.1 South Africa. Secret. SUBJ This is in response to your Memorandum of 21 February 1967/2/ which requested an assessment of DOD requirements of RSA (Republic of South Africa) and an analysis of alternatives for satisfying such requirements should RSA facilities no longer be available to DOD. The analysis at Tab A/3/ identifies the three-way importance of RSA to the Department of the Navy. /2/Document 633. /3/Not printed. First, with respect to ship deployments to seas near southern Africa in support of NASA and NSA mission requirements, RSA ports are extremely useful but not indispensable. Use of these ports enable us to utilize our ships more efficiently than would otherwise be possible. NASA and NSA support ships could be serviced from other ports, but we would be depriving ourselves of an arrangement of proven benefit. Secondly, with regard to fuel for aircraft carrier transits to and from the Pacific theater through the Indian Ocean, RSA ports are convenient but again there are alternatives. We could divert oilers from other important tasks to fuel the carriers at sea or we could eliminate or reduce reliance on oilers by building an austere naval fueling facility on Diego Garcia as previously proposed. Finally, the strategic location and potential wartime value of RSA are of even greater importance to the USN than its obvious short term utility. RSA, with its five major ports, ten major airfields, and technical competence, represents a potential that could, in time of war, be of significant value to the United States. From the naval viewpoint, the use of facilities in RSA would be essential to control of vital sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and Far East should the Suez Canal be denied for any reason. In this connection it should be noted that the UAR has recently limited US military overflights and could bar Suez to US ships in the same manner as it has already barred Israeli ships. All of the above paragraphs are classified Secret. Paul H. Nitze
635. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-191-67 Washington, April 5, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 680.1 South Africa. Secret. SUBJECT 1. (U) Reference is made to a multiple addressed memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 21 February 1967,/2/ subject as above. /2/Document 632. 2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the requirements and analyses forwarded by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and note that these submissions include matters of concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the views on these matters expressed by the Secretaries. 3. (S) Although use of South African facilities is highly desirable, alternative solutions can be found for all current military requirements for facilities or contractual support in the Republic of South Africa. However, resort to alternative solutions would increase costs and result in less efficient use of available manpower, ship, and aircraft assets. 4. (S) Denial of airbase and overflight rights in South Africa would seriously complicate air operations in South African and adjacent areas. Loss of other South African facilities would also reduce the US capability to react to contingency situations in Africa South of the Sahara and in the Middle East. Loss of the tracking station at Pretoria, together with airfield and port rights, would degrade the tracking and telemetry capability for space flights as well as the DOD capability to support space programs. Finally, the use of facilities in the Republic of South Africa, in time of war, would be essential if control of vital sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and Far East is to be maintained. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Cobb signed the original.
636. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, April 15, 1967, 1:39 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Popper on April 13; cleared by Deputy Legal Adviser Carl F. Salans, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen, Palmer, and Clark; and approved by Sisco. Sent to USUN, Ottawa, Rome, Tokyo, and London, and repeated to all African posts. 176137. Subj: South West Africa. 1. This message contains guidelines for use of USUN and Embassies in consultations preceding Special UNGA opening April 21. 2. Our overall objectives re SWA continue to be those set out in Goldberg UNGA statement of October 12, 1966,/2/ Nabrit UNGA statement of October 27,/3/ and Rogers statement in Ad Hoc Committee on January 26, 1967. All three make it clear that US considers South Africa has forfeited its right to continue to administer South West Africa; that consequently UN must discharge responsibilities re SWA; and that these responsibilities include the determination of practical means of administering SWA in interest of inhabitants and above all to enable them to exercise their right of self-determination. UNGA Resolution 2145 (XXI)/4/ conforms quite closely to these objectives. We, together with 113 other UN members, supported it as most comprehensive formula on which overwhelming majority of UNGA could agree. We would like if possible to maintain this broad consensus in Special GA. /2/For text of Ambassador Goldberg's October 12 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 583-585. /3/For text of Representative Nabrit's October 27 statement, see ibid., p. 587. /4/For text of Resolution 2145 (XXI), see ibid., pp. 585-586. 3. Impasse in SWA Committee resulting in Committee's failure to adopt any substantive proposal indicates that it will be very difficult to reach consensus acceptable to us in Special UNGA. Fundamental problem is that Afro-Asian majority tends to regard Resolution 2145 as a decision that UN should assume direct control over SWA and should bring it to independence within short, and definite, period, using enforcement measures in Security Council as required for this purpose. US has not accepted and does not accept this interpretation. In all three U.S. statements, U.S. has repeatedly insisted that approach to problem must be "practical," and SWA Committee was enjoined in GA Res to recommend practical means by which SWA should be administered. In Nabrit statement, we specifically declared that US had undertaken no commitment as to SC action, and stressed our desire for peaceful action for benefit of SWA population. Peaceful implementation must continue to be our objective. 4. Unpopular though it may be in UNGA atmosphere, we must continue to take line that we do not regard Resolution 2145 as in any way committing US or UN to enforcement action. From US standpoint, we could not in present circumstances envisage use of forceful means or mandatory economic sanctions to carry out resolution. Hence, from UN standpoint, a GA resolution which threw SWA problem into SC in hope of Chapter 7 action, particularly while Rhodesian problem hangs in balance, would gravely engage UN prestige and pave way for most serious setback for UN as an instrumentality for dealing with race relations problems in Southern Africa. Accordingly, we shall have to resist extremist proposals which could not be carried out. We shall also have to avoid to extent possible ambiguous compromise proposals which could later be construed as committing UN or US to unrealistic course in SWA. 5. Task for US will be to persuade Afro-Asians that there is a distinction between the pronouncement of objectives and the determination of the pace and means with which these objectives will be pursued. We remain unshaken in our opposition to the practice of apartheid in SWA and in our espousal of the principle of self-determination for its people. But we are convinced that these objectives can best be attained gradually through various types of pressure and dialogue with South Africa, maintained over a period of time. This will be unpalatable doctrine among extremists. Its force would be demonstrated, however, if Afro-Asians persisted in pressing for drastic resolution along lines of African proposal in SWA Committee, at cost of large number of abstentions or negative votes, particularly by those states whose cooperation is most necessary if South Africa is to be brought around. We imagine that this choice between moderation and consensus on the one hand, and divisive extremism on the other, will be the basic issue at Special GA. 6. One relevant consideration is question of relations with South Africa in next phase of SWA problem. Afro-Asians are likely to contend either that any effort toward dialogue with South Africans is fruitless or else that dialogue should be conducted only on ways and means of carrying out Resolution 2145. Though prospects for a successful dialogue are clearly slight, we believe every effort must be made to carry through with it before we contemplate further substantive UNGA recommendations. We do not believe South Africans can realistically be expected at this stage to discuss implementation of GA Resolution 2145, but we do believe that UN and South Africa may conceivably have certain common concerns with respect to advancement of people of SWA and that in search for common ground, new insights may be gained for dealing with problem which will help us to avoid ultimate costly confrontation. 7. More time would be useful in working through the possibilities of a dialogue. Time might also help in exploring limits to which UN should go in seeking truly effective action in SWA situation. Optimum outcome of Special GA, from our standpoint would therefore be procedural resolution which, while permitting further study, in effect puts matter over to 22nd GA. 8. We recognize this result likely be attained, if at all, only after consideration of substantive texts. In this regard, US should make clear from outset where it stands on ground covered in resolutions considered by SWA Committee. We were unable to accept either African resolution or Latin American resolution in that Committee; indeed, we felt that in reaching agreement with Italians and Canadians on our own proposal, we went about as far as we could go in direction of Committee majority. We would not wish to be jockeyed much further toward African position by pressures at Special Session. Without excluding minor changes, we should resist further compromising our existing position solely for the sake of broad agreement. We should also be wary of signing on to subtle, implied commitments like those in Latin American proposal which edge us toward immediate establishment of administrative machinery in SWA and a UN commitment to immediate implementation. Accordingly, we should use the leverage we have--ability to maintain through our agreement the broadest consensus--to prevent erosion of points covered in Italian-Canadian-US Resolution. 9. Specifically, we would hope to avoid adoption of following points likely to figure in any African-Asia proposal. (a) Request for Security Council action (b) Proposals to establish in SWA, over South African opposition, a system of UN administration (c) A take-it-or-leave-it proposal to South Africa to negotiate for implementation of Resolution 2145 (d) A directive to a UN Council to promulgate laws and regulations for SWA, or to establish a constituent assembly in SWA (e) A decision or recommendation that a UN police force be established for SWA 10. We can accept the following points in a resolution (a) General reiteration of Resolution 2145 as continuing objective of UN for South Africa (b) Appointment of a UN Special Representative or High Commissioner, and/or a UN Council or Committee, to exercise UN functions re SWA (Question of representation of US on Council should be left open for time being.) (c) Planning, study and liaison functions for Special Representative or Council (d) Language permitting contact by UN agents or UN members with South Africa for purposes indicated in preceding paragraphs (e) Recommendations to Specialized Agencies and member states re appropriate measures of assistance by them (f) Provision for further substantive discussion at 22nd GA (g) Reference to disapproval of action described in South African statement on Ovamboland which appears to contradict para. 7 Res 2145. 11. Discuss soonest with friendly delegations and report reaction. Rusk
637. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, April 28, 1967, 8:47 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by IO/UNP Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Donald McHenry; cleared by Brown of UNP and Clark; and approved by Sisco. Also sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria, London, Rome, and Ottawa. 179410. Subj: South West Africa: Dialogue. Ref: Dept's 153195;/2/ Capetown's 1081, 1079./3/ /2/Dated March 10. (Ibid., POL 19 SW AFR) /3/Both dated April 20. (Ibid., POL 19 SW AFR/UN) 1. After handing Asst. Sec. Sisco Aide-Memoire, April 20, 1967 (reported septel),/4/ Amb. Taswell recounted South Africa's legal position re GA res on SWA and practical problems involved in implementation of the resolution. He then called attention to and laid heavy stress on following para of aide-memoire: "The South African Government is willing to discuss with any other genuinely interested government the problem of development in South West Africa provided that government is prepared in good faith to make a constructive contribution to such discussions and is not solely looking for ways and means of implementing the recent General Assembly resolution." /4/Telegram 179411 to USUN, April 20. (Ibid.) 2. Sisco noted and Ambassador Taswell confirmed that the formulation contained above para meant discussions without preconditions and did not exclude discussion of the implementation of recent UN resolution. 3. Asst. Sec. Sisco welcomed Taswell's confirmation and recalled that in earlier approach he had urged conversations along these lines as the only means of achieving common objective of peaceful solution. He also welcomed South African Prime Minister Muller's affirmation that South Africa recognized an international status for SWA and the right of the people to self-determination. (Capetown's 1079) Mr. Sisco stated that US, of course, did not agree with South Africa's definition of self-determination but that it was not necessary to agree on substantive points of this kind prior to unconditional discussions. What was important was that unconditional talks begin in effort to find a peaceful solution to SWA problem. 4. Sisco then stated that the US viewed with concern stories reported in South African newspapers re proposed dialogue. (Capetown's 1081) In US view such stories were injurious to establishment of a dialogue since they in effect publicly laid down conditions for discussions and would place US and others in very difficult position publicly. Minister Botha replied that South Africa had had inquiries in Washington prior to appearance of stories in Capetown. Taswell denied government responsibility pointing out stories were in opposition press. He could understand US concern but because stories appeared in opposition press he did not attach much importance to them. He said he would seek clarification from his Govt. 5. Sisco stated US would study the aide-memoire and would make prompt reply. Rusk
638. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 73-67 Washington, May 4, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the source text, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 4. SOUTH AFRICA The Problem To estimate developments in South African domestic and foreign policy over the next five years. Conclusions A. South Africa's economy is strong and growing. The white population is united in its support for white dominance. The government is competent and the security forces exceptionally effective. Non-whites are denied political and other rights, though they have some share in the economic prosperity. Most of the Bantus accept such economic benefits and modern amenities as are available, resigning themselves to the government's repressive policies./2/ (Paras. 6-8) /2/Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that "resigning themselves" is not sufficiently descriptive of African reaction and prefers "cowed and politically inactive as the result of the government's repressive policies." [Footnote in the source text.] B. The present South African Government, under Prime Minister Vorster, has made some effort to promote good relations with neighboring black African states. Its hopes of improving relations with tropical black African states are unlikely to be realized. It is likely to maintain its current support of the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. (Paras. 30, 32-33) C. We believe it highly unlikely that South Africa will voluntarily give up South-West Africa or accept UN supervision of the territory. We further believe that any attempt forcibly to dislodge South Africa's hold on the territory would require a major military effort, probably including significant participation by the US. (Paras. 28-29) D. South Africa especially wants to improve relations with the US and, if possible, to obtain some expression of US approval for its attempts to appear more flexible. It will probably permit the US to use present space and tracking installations at least during the period of this estimate, provided the US does not participate in significant sanctions against South Africa. We believe, however, that the whites will hold steadfastly to their policy of white dominance and that significant changes in South Africa's policies either in response to domestic developments or external pressures are highly unlikely in the next five years. (Paras. 37-38)/3/ /3/Rear Adm. Eugene B. Fluckey, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believes the economic, labor, and domestic conditions are overly drawn in the estimate, and that South Africa's foreign policy is more influenced by its relationship with other African states, and its desire to maintain buffer states in their present status quo, than is indicated in the estimate. He also believes the current situation, and the prospects for South Africa's future--in particular with regard to distribution of the products of the economy, political stability, and easement of domestic difficulties--to be better than stated in the estimate. [Footnote in the source text.] [Here follows the body of the paper.]
639. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow)/1/ Washington, May 11, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Elizabeth Ann Brown. SUBJECT Since I understand that you are lunching today with the South African Ambassador, I thought it might be helpful for you to have a current rundown of the situation in New York and of where we stand on our efforts to initiate a dialogue with South Africa on South West Africa. You may recall my comments at a recent staff meeting to the effect that there were indications the South Africans were trying to drive a wedge between Washington and New York, or at least to see whether there are not some differences in approach between Washington and New York, which South Africa can exploit, on how to achieve the objectives of General Assembly Resolution 2145 (attached)/2/ for which we voted last October. I know you recognize how important it is for all of us to speak with one voice at this particular juncture when we are seeking to negotiate a satisfactory resolution in New York which will keep all doors open. /2/See footnote 4, Document 636; not printed. The current situation in New York is very fluid. The Afro-Asians have tabled an extreme resolution looking toward immediate UN takeover in South West Africa and calling for necessary implementing action by the Security Council in the event South Africa defies the UN. The Soviet bloc have told them they cannot support this. The Latin Americans have been discussing possible amendments with the Afro-Asians which would stress the necessity for dialogue and which would leave implicit the threat of possible enforcement action by the Security Council. We have been working with Canada, Italy and the UK on a proposal of our own which would provide for a UN Council and a UN representative to continue the efforts to find practical ways to achieve the objectives of Resolution 2145. The Afro-Asians describe our proposal as involving new delays in the desired UN take-over in South West Africa. However, discussions are continuing since the Afro-Asians appreciate the desirability of maintaining as much unanimity as possible in support of the objectives of Resolution 2145. The Scandinavians also have been working on a proposal setting up a UN body to follow through on Resolution 2145. A Possible Dialogue with South Africa on South West Africa. Just before the Special Session convened the South African Ambassador in Washington delivered an aide-memoire, which was subsequently handed to all diplomatic representatives in Pretoria and circulated at the UN, which expressed South Africa's willingness "to discuss with any other genuinely interested Government the problems of development in South West Africa provided that Government is prepared in good faith to make a constructive contribution to such discussion and is not solely looking for ways and means of implementing the recent General Assembly Resolution." The Ambassador confirmed that this language meant discussions without preconditions and did not exclude discussion of the implementation of GA Resolution 2145. Just before the Special GA convened Ambassador Goldberg suggested to UK Foreign Secretary Brown the possibility of exploring prospects for a dialogue at a London meeting between the two of them and South African Foreign Minister Muller. Brown was favorably disposed but believed any such effort should be deferred until after the Special UNGA took action. Consequently we have deliberately not responded to the aide-memoire since so much necessarily depends upon the outcome of the Special Session./3/ /3/On May 19, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 2248 (S-V) by a vote of 85 to 2 (Portugal and South Africa), with 30 abstentions (including the United States). It established an 11-member U.N. Council for South West Africa, responsible to the General Assembly, to administer the Territory until independence. The Council was to be based in South West Africa and was requested to contact South Africa immediately to arrange for transfer of the Territory. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 264-266.
640. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 21, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Coward on July 11. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS On June 21, 1967 the participants met to review the Guidelines the USG follows in implementing the UN Arms Embargo for the Republic of South Africa. Focus was principally upon the matter of licensing U.S. componentry for export to "third" countries for installation in end-times destined for South Africa. Decision was taken to amend the January 7, 1964 Guidelines/2/ to provide for such licensing, providing the component was neither a weapon nor an element thereof. In implementing the foregoing, it was agreed that previous actions, such as that in the Beagle-Cessna case, would not be affected. /2/A copy of the January 7, 1964, Guidelines is attached to a January 21, 1964, memorandum from Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to the Secretary. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 295) It was noted that foregoing modification might attract attention (perhaps in the Congress) at some future date and thus a contingency justification statement should be prepared. The central theme of this paper to be that this step is an interpretation, rather than a change in policy, which will permit the Guidelines to be more consistent with a comprehensive global economic policy. In reviewing the difficulties encountered in implementing the UN Arms Embargo, Mr. Kohler pointed out that to make the latter truly effective, it was necessary for the major supplying nations to agree on a single interpretation. Although aware of the lack of success of efforts to date, he stated that a new initiative was called for and thus would welcome ideas regarding new tactics which might be pursued. Finally, participants were enjoined to keep the Guidelines, particularly the specific items restricted from licensing such as those included in the Munitions List, under constant review to ensure reasonableness and consistency. G/PM is currently modifying the Guidelines.
641. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 10, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. V, 6/66-1/69. Limited Official Use. SUBJECT The Department of State has requested your approval in principle of the renewal of our present agreement with South Africa on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which will expire on August 21, 1967 unless renewed. AEC agrees with the conclusion of the Department of State that on balance it would be in our interest to renew the agreement. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has somewhat reluctantly come to the same conclusion. In addition, Ambassador Goldberg has been consulted and recognizes the importance of the reasons that have led the State Department to favor renewal. The attached State Department memorandum outlines the pros and cons and the extent to which the State Department has consulted members of Congress and others who will be affected. I recommend that you authorize the State Department to proceed with the renewal of the agreement. If you agree, I will sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State. It's a tough decision; but, on balance, necessary, I believe./2/ /2/Rostow wrote this sentence by hand.
/3/This option is checked. Walt
642. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Foreign Minister Muller/1/ Washington, August 26, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL S AFR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Clark and cleared by Coward, Gleysteen, Charles H. Gustafson of L/AF, Byron B. Morton of SCI, and Palmer. Dear Mr. Minister: Thank you for the reiteration in your recent letter/2/ of the Prime Minister's statement regarding the importance of relationships between our two countries. We too very much hope that our differences can be re- solved and cooperation strengthened in as many spheres as possible. /2/Foreign Minister Muller's letter of June 1 to Secretary Rusk reiterated a statement made by the Prime Minister in a February 17 speech. (Ibid.) I also appreciated receiving your explanation regarding the intended role and control of the nine Cessna 411 and three Mystere 20 aircraft which your Government seeks to purchase. However, our support of the UN arms embargo requires that we take all practical steps to avoid association with any sales of equipment which by virtue of its capability or ownership could be readily utilized for purposes contrary to the intent of the embargo. In keeping with this policy, I regret that our position with regard to the Cessnas cannot be altered. Our view on the Mysteres, in which a third government is involved, is still under review and I shall have to defer a final answer until a later date. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk
On September 13, 1967, Ambassador Goldberg summarized for the National Security Council the major issues facing the United States in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly session. Goldberg forcefully stated his view, which he acknowledged did not prevail in the administration, that U.S. dealings with South Africa were over-extensive and did not advance the national security of the United States. The Ambassador urged disengagement from South Africa, saying that current U.S. dealings with South Africa provided no diplomatic benefit and would hurt U.S. relations with other African states. He predicted that, in the future, U.S. business leaders would ask for a more liberal policy in Africa because U.S. investments in Africa were many times larger than U.S. holdings in South Africa. He also argued that military gains from U.S. relations with South Africa were becoming less and less meaningful. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4. Tab 57, 9/13/67, Major Issues of the 22nd UN General Assembly, Secret; Sensitive)
644. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 21, 1967, 6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Lesotho (Basutoland), Vol. I, 8/66-5/68. No classification marking. SUBJECT /2/No record of this conversation has been found. This is a short, informal office call. No lunch or dinner is involved. Nick Katzenbach's general briefing memorandum is at Tab A./3/ State's suggested talking points are at Tab B. Biographic information on Jonathan is at Tab C. /3/None of the tabs is printed. Jonathan is the first Prime Minister of Lesotho (Les-soo-too), a tiny independent enclave completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. Lesotho is firmly aligned with the West and generally votes with us in the UN except where it would involve trouble with South Africa, which could bankrupt her overnight at will. We have a few very small AID projects in Lesotho ($43, 000 worth), plus about $100,000 in scholarship grants to her university. We also help with food through the World Food Program. Except for small amounts of PL 480, we can't do more as long as the Congress keeps enacting strict limits on the number of aided countries. Jonathan will want to tell you about the problems of a country of blacks in the middle of apartheid. He knows that we can't help much under present circumstances, but he will ask you to remember him if and when conditions change. He will also tell you about his speech to the General Assembly on Monday in which he will call for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. (His line is strictly pro-talks. He doesn't lecture us; he urges both sides to find a way to the table.) In addition to a general discussion of Vietnam, you may wish to make some of the following points: --We know it must be terribly difficult to live with the fact of economic dependence on South Africa, but we hope that Lesotho can carry on necessary trade and economic cooperation while maintaining her in- dependence and freedom of expression. We completely understand the necessity for Jonathan to temper his foreign policy in order to deal with the economic realities of his position. --Our direct help to Lesotho will be limited to food for the foreseeable future. We will try to be as generous as possible. --We will continue to keep Lesotho's interests in mind in using our influence in the World Bank and other international aid institutions. --We congratulate Lesotho on its first anniversary of independence (October 4). She has already taken her place at the UN and elsewhere in the community of responsible nations. W.W. Rostow/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
645. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 30, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 S AFR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Peter F. Krogh of S/S on October 6, and approved in S on October 16. The meeting took place in Secretary Rusk's office. The source text is marked "Part 6 of 8 parts." The other parts are ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS South Africa: United States: The Secretary asked Muller to what extent his government acknowledged an international interest in SWA. Muller said that SWA has a separate international status, that its administration was undertaken by S.A. in trust under the League, and that S.A. was carrying out its responsibilities under that trust. With respect to international status, Muller said that the SAG had never, for example, enjoined UN debate of SWA on the basis of Article 2(7) of the Charter. After making this statement, Muller was not sure it was correct, but the Secretary said that it seemed to him to be the correct position whether or not the SAG had been practicing it. Muller went on to say that the Secretary was aware of the SAG reaction to the Resolution terminating the mandate and once again urged the Secretary to take a look at the progress being made in SWA. Paraphrasing a line from the SWA Survey 1967, Muller said that if we realized how closely SWA was linked to S.A., we would see how unrealistic it was to take the administration of SWA out of SAG hands. The Secretary then asked Muller if he didn't see any basis for S.A. administration of SWA that would be acceptable to the UN. Muller replied that they were hopeful that once it was understood how much progress was being made under SAG administration the existing administrative arrangement would become acceptable to the UN. Muller concluded that there was really very little he could add to this subject which was not already in his letter to Thant. The Secretary then asked if Muller expected very many S.A. whites to move to SWA. Muller said that he did not expect any such movement either way nor could he see any reason for it unless, for example, some new mines were opened up in SWA. The Secretary said that he wanted to study the Survey more carefully. Muller asked that the Secretary pay particular attention to the political section of the Survey. The Secretary asked Muller how many non-whites in SWA went on to higher education. Both Muller and Taswell said they did not know. Muller did say that great progress was being made in education which would be apparent to any visitor to SWA. The Secretary asked if the S.A. invitation to Ambassadors to visit SWA included other diplomatic personnel. Muller said that initially the invitation had been extended only to Ambassadors and Consuls General and that now that several Ambassadors, including the Dutch and British, had visited SWA it would be unfair to them to permit sub-Ambassadorial representatives from other countries to visit SWA. Hence the SAG had turned down the USG request to send someone other than its Ambassador. The Secretary told Muller that the SAG would be better off if it created the impression that SWA was there for all to see. Muller replied that his government did not like "busy bodies" and furthermore that they deny visas to anyone even visiting the Republic whom they felt had ulterior motives. The Secretary suggested that such restrictive policies did not win friends for South Africa. Muller said his government wasn't getting credit for the progress it was making anyway and that as a consequence there was a hardening and toughening of the SAG attitude toward the outside world. The Secretary pursued the subject by telling Muller that if people were simply told of progress and could not see it freely for themselves, they would not feel that they were being adequately informed. Muller said that his government's attitude was hardening, and implied that his tougher view was particularly addressed to the U.S. He referred, as he had in the previous bilateral talk, to the Goldberg speech and contrasted it to the more accommodating speeches of the Soviets, Europeans, and Latin Americans. He said the Goldberg speech had "worried" the SAG. Muller said that he hoped the Secretary would visit S.A. The Secretary replied that he had tried to plan a trip to Africa several times but could not figure out a way to go without inadvertently offending some countries. Muller said that there had been recent visits to S.A. by ministers from the governments of Germany, Belgium and Japan. Muller complained that even Mr. Palmer had not visited South Africa. Mr. Palmer replied that he had visited South Africa twice, in 1941 and 1958 and hoped to do so again. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
