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646. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Lusaka, October 4, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 13 AFR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Second Secretary of Embassy Frank Crump on October 11. The source text is an enclosure to airgram A-138 from Lusaka, repeated to Dar-es-Salaam and Pretoria. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Frank Crump, Second Secretary of Embassy Nujoma appealed for the support of the United States in the upcoming United Nations consideration of the South West African problem. He said that the Council created by last spring's Special Session would inform the Assembly of the refusal of the South African government to deal with it. The General Assembly would then have to decide what to do. Nujoma expressed the hope that the issue would be placed before the Security Council for further action, but he did not specify what action he would favor. The Ambassador responded by reviewing the deep and continuous involvement of the United States in innumerable world problems for the past twenty-five years. He concluded that in view of this, and of serious and burdensome commitments elsewhere at the present time, the American people would be unlikely to support an active United States engagement in the South West African issue in the near future. Nujoma emphasized the importance of distinguishing between the various problems in Southern Africa. He said that the issues in South West Africa were quite different from those in Mozambique or Rhodesia and so were the responsibilities. In his opinion the United Nations' obligation to act on the South West African issue was clear and direct. Nujoma thought this distinction should be made very clear, and especially hoped that it would be made clear to President Johnson. The Ambassador said he thought this was well understood. He asked whether Nujoma thought it would be helpful for other governments to discuss South West Africa with the South African government and urge a change in policy. Nujoma said it would be no use for African or Asian countries to do this, but he would be very pleased if the United States and Britain would do so. Nujoma expressed pessimism about the trend of developments in South West Africa. He said that the trials were having the effect of terrorizing the population and that SWAPO, which had active groups in many places in South West Africa as recently as a year ago, now had to go underground. He did not respond directly to the Ambassador's question about the current effectiveness of SWAPO organizational and propaganda efforts in SWA. Asked about the prospects of a successful armed struggle, he said that it would take a very long time, and that in the near future SWAPO would have to rely upon guerrilla tactics, in which small bands of men would attack South African installations, and generally hope to keep the South Africans on edge. Concerning cooperation between SWAPO and other liberation organizations, Nujoma said that each organization would first have to fight its own battles on its own soil. He said that SWAPO tried to be neutral as among the various Angolan liberation organizations but this was not easy. SWAPO sometimes helps Angolan refugees to get to Zambia through Botswana. However when they arrive in Zambia they are given freedom to choose with which organization they would affiliate. He implied that their choices had led some of the Angolan groups to charge that SWAPO was influencing them in one way or another. Mifima said that one of the problems which UNITA faced in Zambia was that many of its members had been in Zambia before independence and that the Zambian government has issued a general directive to the parties not to organize among such people. Mifima said that Savimbi was now in Cairo.
647. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, October 19, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, South Africa, 333--452.1, 1967. Secret. Dear Nick: Attached is a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff/2/ expressing (i) their concern with the drift of U.S. policy toward disengagement with South Africa, (ii) the importance of relaxing restrictions which now prohibit U.S. Navy and MSTS ships from making operational and maintenance stops at South African ports, and (iii) [2 lines of source text not declassified]. /2/JCSM-525-67, September 26; not printed. The JCS comment points to the need, to which we have both previously agreed, for the urgent completion of the interagency review of U.S. policy to South Africa which was started last February. I understand that under present schedule the redraft of the National Policy Paper on Southern Africa circulated last May may not be ready for interagency consideration until mid-December at the earliest,/3/ and that consideration is being given to broadening the paper to include Malawi and Zambia. I would hope that the review could overcome further delays and suggest that we might wish to set a target date of 15 December 1967 for completion of interagency review. If it is unrealistic to expect completion of agency review by that time, I suggest that we take an immediate look at the present interim policy regarding ship stops in South Africa. /3/See Document 409. Sincerely, Paul
648. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)/1/ Washington, November 15, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 4546, South Africa, 333--452.1, 1967. Secret. Dear Paul: Thank you for your letter of October 19/2/ on South Africa and enclosing the JCS comments. /2/Document 647. I have asked our people to move ahead as quickly as possible on the new regional National Policy Paper on Southern Africa,/3/ which is designed to cover situations like those described in the JSC memorandum. A new draft may be available for circulation early next month. Discussion of this paper would clearly be the most useful basis for making decisions on the problems highlighted in the JCS memorandum. /3/See Document 409. As for an immediate look at the interim policy of visits, I doubt that consideration of this aspect of the problem can usefully be separated from the full spectrum of our policy of which it is actually a key element. On the other hand, should operational business require an interim decision regarding a given case in a South African port, I think we should be able to deal with the case in the SIG. Sincerely yours, Nick
649. Letter From Senator Robert F. Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 15, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. No classification marking. Sent to Under Secretary Katzenbach with a covering memorandum from Kennedy to Katzenbach that reads: "Dear Nick: I understand you know something about this. I hope you can get the State Department to do something. Best, Bob." Dear Mr. Secretary: Later this month or next month proceedings will commence in Pretoria in the trial of Eliaser Tuhadeleni and some 36 other citizens of Southwest Africa who are charged by the Republic of South Africa under the Terrorism Act enacted by that nation on June 21, 1967. As matters now stand, it is my information that this trial could culminate in capital sentences, and that a mass hanging may take place. This would not only be morally unacceptable, but I strongly believe it would also involve great potential danger both in the near future and in the long run to the political stability of that part of Africa and to broad American interests there and in the rest of Africa. In any event, there can be no question but that a great and irretrievable injustice will be done if the course of events is not changed. As I am sure you are aware, the acts charged against the defendants in this proceeding all occurred before the law making them criminal had been enacted. In fact, it is an inescapable conclusion that the Act was passed in June 1967 solely for the purpose of making criminal action taken by the defendants between June 27, 1962, which is "deemed" to be the effective date of the Act, and June 21, 1967, which was the date of its enactment. The charging of a capital offense for acts which were not even criminal at the time they were done is, of course, completely contrary to the entire history of western law in both common law and civil law countries in recent centuries. It is particularly indefensible when the acts made criminal in this ex post facto fashion include acts of an essentially political nature, as is the case in the Terrorism Act of 1967 in South Africa. Among other things, it makes unlawful actions (even though taken before the statute was passed) which "had or was likely to have had" any of a number of results, including a result "to embarrass the administration of the affairs of the State." Furthermore, it puts the burden of proof on the defendant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not, by whatever act he took, intend the result described. In addition, the statute expressly defines the territory over which jurisdiction is asserted to include the territory of Southwest Africa. This is done despite the virtually unanimous revocation by the United Nations before the Act was passed, of the mandate which the Republic of South Africa formerly exercised over Southwest Africa. Accordingly, it seems plain that if the revocation of the mandate by the United Nations, which the United States fully supported, is to have any real effect, the Republic of South Africa cannot have the capacity to rely upon the Terrorism Act of 1967 to prosecute inhabitants of Southwest Africa. This is wholly apart from the fact that simply the recitation of the history of the Terrorism Act of 1967, and of its provisions, chose it to be in violation of the obligation that the Republic of South Africa had towards the inhabitants of Southwest Africa under the Mandate Agreement prior to its revocation. I understand that informal consideration is being given to the possibility of a General Assembly resolution which would submit to the International Court of Justice the question of the capacity of the Republic of South Africa to prosecute inhabitants of Southwest Africa in the manner I have described. I most earnestly urge that you give the most thoughtful consideration to the role the United States might play in these events, and to supporting as vigorously as possible any such action in the United Nations. I am enclosing a copy of the Terrorism Act./2/ /2/Not attached. Sincerely, Robert F. Kennedy/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
650. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, November 28, 1967, 0113Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by McHenry and Martin Jacobs of IO/UNP; cleared by Clark, Runyon, Gley-steen, and Philip B. Heymann of U (info only); and approved by Popper. Repeated to Pretoria. 75384. Subj: South West Africa. 1. As indicated in report of SWA Council, Afro-Asians and LAs can be expected in forthcoming plenary debate press for Security Council action to implement GA injunction that SWA Council take over SWA. South African actions implementing Odendaal recommendations, trial of 36 South West Africans under Terrorism Act, and SAG refusal to communicate with SWA Council will serve to increase pressures for strong UN action. Nevertheless, in keeping with guidance contained in SWA position paper Dept continues to oppose coercive measures as impractical and sees little possibility that any resolution on implementation GA Res 2145 which US could support could be adopted. 2. It likely that current trial of 36 South West Africans under the Terrorism Act will play large part in GA considerations. As Mission aware, Joel Carlson, defense attorney of 36 South West Africans, proposed during recent US visit that friendly Governments introduce Res (septel), in current UNGA referring questions on legality Terrorism Act and trial to International Court of Justice./2/ Dual purpose of Res would be to exert international pressure on SAG to mitigate sentences of those now being tried, and over longer term, strengthen legal case against continued SA administration of SWA. /2/The text of the proposed resolution was transmitted in telegram 75385 to Pretoria, November 28. (Ibid.)
3. Carlson has worked out with Professor Richard Falk of Princeton a model Res, which they have shown or discussed with US, UK, Swedish, Ethiopian and other representatives to UN, as well as members UNSec. Falk told DeptOffs that he has made effort canvass as many African Dels as possible to promote support for Res. Dept unaware African reactions but understands that Ethiopians have undertaken to discuss Res with other ASAF Dels. 4. Dept has original Carlson/Falk draft under study and is not now prepared take decision on its utility. We fully cognizant chances GA adoption this approach are marginal and we would not wish US to be identified as sponsor. Our preliminary reaction is that Res is not harmful to our interests and might have some merit if properly handled. Although some may look on it as a legal substitute for direct political action, it need not conflict with political actions in UN re replacement South African administration. Appears, however, that extensive changes original text Res may be desirable to attract necessary wide support in UNGA and to guard against repeat unhelpful ICJ opinion as in 1966. From this standpoint, it regrettable that Carlson/Falk's broad exploration may already have involved Dels and others who may not be helpful. We understand, for example, that Reddy (UNSec) favorably disposed toward ICJ referral but by SC rather than UNGA. 5. Dept would be particularly interested in information regarding African reactions Carlson/Falk model Res. Suggest Mission undertake discreet consultations with UK and Swedish Missions to ascertain their views and any info they may have re ASAFs./3/ Rusk /3/On December 16, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 2324 (XXII), co-sponsored by the United States and 72 other countries, calling on South Africa to discontinue the "illegal" trial of the 37 South West Africans. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 270-271.
651. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, December 20, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 S AFR. Secret. SUBJECT I held a meeting of all the interested parties. The basic problem is that we adhere to a more restrictive interpretation of the Security Council Resolution than most other countries, while France openly ignores it. At the same time, any change in policy on this sensitive subject--perhaps even a change to bring our interpretation closer to that of the U.K., which Foy's new guidelines/2/ propose--might stir up another swarm of hornets, and editorials. /2/Kohler's proposed modifications dealt mainly with the question of the extent to which the very restrictive U.S. policy on direct shipments from the United States to South Africa was also applied to U.S.-origin components in equipment shipped by third countries whose policy was less restrictive. He recommended that the United States not apply the embargo in cases where the U.S. components were non-weapons in nature and were included in third-country equipment. His views were set forth in a draft memorandum to Rusk, filed with a December 14 covering memorandum from Katzenbach to Under Secretary Rostow asking for the latter's views. (Ibid.) The immediate source of poison in the situation is the unresolved conflict over Southwest Africa, from which spring the terrorist trials, and the resultant outcry. I remain of the view that we should try (and try urgently) to work out an understanding with South Africa about these territories, based (a) on de facto recognition on their part of a U.N. interest in the territories, (b) asserted through a carefully chosen U.N. Committee that would allow South African administration, subject to reporting and advice. Only such an agreement could change the political atmosphere, and permit a rational disposition of issues like those before us. At the meeting, AF and IO argued (1) that any change in our present policy would have disastrous political repercussions in Africa and at home; (2) that any change would also be the wrong signal to the South Africans. At the moment, the South Africans are firmer than ever in enforcing apartheid, and are under severe criticism from us and others for their terrorist trials, their toughening position on Southwest Africa, etc. IO is also concerned about the adverse effect any change would have on our ability to obtain African votes on other issues before the UN. The other bureaus concerned (E, EUR and G/PM) feel that some minor adjustments in the policy guidelines are needed to reduce conflicts with third countries who wish to sell South Africa some items with American components. Those items are not military, but might be used for some military purposes. Communications equipment is a case in point. In each instance the conflict arises because our construction of the Security Council Resolution is more severe than that of the third country concerned. The changes recommended by Foy would not call into question our fidelity to the Resolution, or to interpretations given in the past by Adlai or Arthur. They would bring our interpretation nearer to that of the United Kingdom, and should help minimize the kind of conflict represented by the file. Even if the new guidelines are adopted, our policy under the Security Council Resolution would continue to be more stringent than that of any other country. I conclude that while there might be some fall out if we adopt these guidelines, they are sensible, and the fall out would be more than balanced by advantages. I also recommend that we attempt to block the sale of the Italian Piaggio aircraft and the French (Mystere) aircraft to the South African Government. This position, I think, is indicated even under the Kohler guidelines, although such transactions would be permissible under the British regulations. I am impressed by the difference between an executive jet aircraft like the Mystere and slower planes which might be used for military purposes along South Africa's borders. However, if we allowed the French plane with U.S. engines to be sold we would have trouble with our own manufacturers and with the British as well. I believe it would be impossible to make a convincing case for the Mystere sale based on distinctions between different types of unarmed civilian aircraft. It would be a paradox, to say the least, to approve the French transaction now, after we had said "No" to our own manufacturers and to the British. This recommendation illustrates why I think we should go beyond the Kohler guidelines if the political climate can be changed enough to let us examine the problem rationally. Disparate standards, especially between us and the British, are causing increasing difficulty with our own domestic manufacturers and with European governments. The British feel that within the terms of the embargo, they can supply civilian aircraft such as the Beagle 206 for use in air/sea rescue, maritime reconnaissance and communications. Thus far, they have been prohibited from doing so because the planes had U.S. motors. The South African Government has now gone to the Italian Piaggio firm for similar planes. Although the Piaggio plane has U.S. components, it is not clear that we can block the sale legally, although we may (or may not) be able to persuade them to go along on political grounds. The South Africans may well make the plane themselves, or buy it from the French. The net result is that the U.S. balance of payments suffers, the British balance of payments suffers, we create friction with our European allies and give de Gaulle another chance to say that you cannot do business with the United States without ending up having the United States dominating your foreign policies. The result is the normal consequence of boycott and embargo plans--frustration all around, and a failure of sanctions. I think we must begin to move towards a more realistic application of the arms embargo and to attempt over time to bring our practice more in line with the present British one. I agree with Arthur that we should not change our basic policy in the present political climate, and not give the South Africans a political "victory", at least until the Southwest Africa problem can be moved. But standing pat is not in our interest either. The present policy is not working. The South Africans are getting the equipment they need. And their policies are hardening, not softening. The trial of the Southwest African terrorists is an important signal in this respect. Before the Middle East war intervened, it had been agreed that Arthur or someone make a trip to South Africa and attempt to work out a modus vivendi with them on the status of Southwest Africa. Some discussion of the arms embargo policy would be useful in this context and a proposal to loosen our guidelines further--that is beyond the Kohler formula which I recommend we adopt now--might well help them take a more forthcoming attitude. I propose that we consider permitting civilian-type U.S. aircraft or engines to be shipped to the South African Air Force when we are assured that they are destined for such use as VIP transport or unarmed marine patrol if we can get some positive movement from the South Africans or Southwest Africa. I think we should do this before the South African position becomes more fixed than it is now.
652. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, January 17, 1968, 1852Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 S AFR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by McHenry and Jacobs on December 5, 1967; cleared by Irving Cheslaw of EUR/ BMI, Deputy Legal Adviser Murray J. Belman, Seymour S. Goodman of E, Burns of Commerce, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley, Rush W. Taylor of EUR/AIS, Gleysteen, and Clark; and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to Pretoria and Rome, and repeated to Johannesburg, Ottawa, Paris, and USUN. 99988. Subj: Light Aircraft Sales to South Africa. 1. Dept has reviewed all aspects problem of sale of light aircraft and components to SA, keeping in mind our desire to maintain even-handed application of US arms embargo policy as it affects third countries. Consistent with our (a) original denial of Cessna aircraft to SA Air Force, (b) subsequent efforts resulting in prevention of sale of Beagles and Mysteres, which contain US origin components and were intended in part as substitute for Cessnas and (c) reaffirmation of Cessna denial, we have decided as follows: 2. For Rome--Emb should inquire with appropriate Italian officials re status of alleged SA efforts to obtain Piaggio and other light aircraft. Emb should explain basis US concern results from our earlier denial Cessna aircraft which destined for SA military to be used in part for police purposes and, therefore, sale inconsistent with US implementation of UNSC arms embargo against SA. US informed all parties including SAG, British, French and American manufacturers, that US would have no objection to the sale of US aircraft or aircraft containing US components provided the aircraft were (a) of civilian type, (b) registered and operated by a civilian entity, (c) not flown by active duty military personnel and (d) were to be utilized only for civilian purposes such as transport of government and other officials. Because of failure to meet these criteria, US took position that in event Beagle or Mystere sale consummated and subsequent application made for license to export US made engines or spares for these items for South African military, US would be obliged to deny such application. Further, U.S. would be obliged to scrutinize closely and subsequent application for license to export to Piaggio of U.S. made engines and spare parts. 3. GOI will understand that in light history of this situation, which we believe known to Italian manufacturers, sale of Piaggio and Italian light aircraft containing US origin engines and components would constitute circumvention US efforts to implement UNSC arms embargo and would give unfair competitive advantage to Italian manufacturers, thus creating difficulties for US in relations with British, French and US manufacturers. 4. Drawing on above, Emb should discourage Italian aircraft sales containing U.S. origin engines and components for use by South African military. 5. For Pretoria--US will inform SAG in letter to Muller, to be handed to Taswell shortly, that US will make no change in policy respecting light aircraft sale to SA including specifically the Mysteres. FYI: This decision taken apart from current high level Dept review of broad policy question involving sales by third countries. End FYI. 6. For London--Stonehouse (British MinEc) being informed above actions in reply to letter reported London 4171./2/ /2/Dated November 24, 1967. (Ibid., AV 12-2 S AFR) Rusk
653. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa/1/ Washington, February 10, 1968, 2230Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Clark; cleared by Palmer, Donald F. Herr of U, and Runyon; and approved by Clark. Sent to Cape Town and Pretoria, and repeated to London, Ottawa, and USUN. 113604. Subject: Trial of 37. Ref: 113548./2/ /2/Telegram 113548 to Cape Town, February 10, transmitted the text of the aide- memoire, which stated that the U.S. Government considered that the South African Government had no right to apply these Acts and other similar legislation to the inhabitants of South West Africa and therefore was obligated to release and repatriate those South West Africans who had been held under this legislation, including those recently sentenced at Pretoria. (Ibid) 1. Following based on uncleared memcon (Noforn). Under Secretary called in Amb Taswell 11:30 AM Feb 10 and handed him Terrorism Trial Aide-Memoire (text reftel). In doing so Mr. Katzenbach noted that we reiterate points made previously and relate them now to recent sentencing. He said that he was unimpressed by SAG bringing in common law at this late date, an unusual legal procedure. 2. After reading document Taswell said that certain aspects of Act, such as retroactive provisions and placing onus on accused to prove innocence, "go against the grain" and are unfortunate. While South Africa doesn't like to do such things, they are compelled to take such measures because of the kind of people they are dealing with--murderers, terrorists, people with no respect for law. He claimed that the accused were part of organized movements originating in Zambia, Tanzania, Algeria and elsewhere and that SAG had to take steps to protect South Africa. If it didn't, it would be subject to severe criticism at home. Taswell asserted that his government had "seen what was happening in other parts of the world" and it was determined to stamp out such possibilities in its own country. If SAG took strong action now it might have salutary effect on others contemplating similar moves. Anyone so inclined will know he must face consequences. 3. Taswell observed that he and Under Secretary had discussed before and continue to disagree as to whether SAG has right to conduct trial and take other actions vis--vis SWA. He said Mandate Agreement gives SAG right to administer Territory as integral part of SA and asserted SAG believes it carrying out "spirit" of mandate. He promised to pass Aide-Memoire to his Government, "but didn't think they would do anything about it." Court has acted and sentences will be carried out. 4. Pointing out certain phrases in text such as "gravest concern" and "outraged",/3/ Taswell commented that they are beginning to lose significance through repeated use and he was unable to gauge just how strongly US really felt on this matter. Under Secretary replied: "This churns me up about as much as anything I have run into in quite a while." Mere fact that one may be dealing with some people "who are not very nice" does not justify any government disregarding accepted legal practices. Noting recent news photos of executions, Taswell remarked that people have been summarily shot in VietNam and there is no great protest. The Under Secretary replied that the US had in several meetings protested the action to which Taswell referred. Taswell asked if the US had put its protest in writing; if so he would like to have a copy. The Under Secretary said that he had given the Ambassador his assurance that the US had protested such actions. The Ambassador could repeat that assurance to his Government. /3/The aide-memoire states that the United States viewed "with gravest concern" the outcome of the Pretoria trial. It does not, however, use the phrase "outraged." 5. Noting press report that USUN Del has stated US would wish associate itself with any initiative to bring matter of trial before SC again, Taswell said that he hadn't heard of us taking Vietnamese executions to the Security Council. Mr. Katzenbach observed that there was a difference between the whole situation in VietNam and in SWA and between actions taken in the heat of the moment outside the law in actual fighting or in an insurgency situation, reprehensible as they might be, and the actions of a government which passes laws and takes actions through its courts which denigrate the meaning of law. Taswell asked if US wanted SA to wait until they had insurgency and "situation was so bad" that they could act without fear of censure. Mr. Katzenbach reiterated his distinction and asserted that in his opinion it was greater crime to do such things in court than in heat of moment. He said that continuation of SAG's present actions would lead to corruption of its legal system. He could not understand why SA was willing to pay such a high price. 6. Later Taswell asked Deptoff if Emb Cape Town would be furnishing copy Aide-Memoire to DFA. He was told such was intent, although time delivery might be affected by fact that it was already Saturday night in SA. Rusk
654. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa/1/ Washington, March 9, 1968, 2112Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S AFR-US. Secret. Drafted by Palmer and Clark; cleared by Van Dyke in the Vice President's Office, Runyon, and Jacobs; and approved by Palmer. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to USUN and Johannesburg. 127749. Ref: Embtel 705/2/ and Jo'burg 328./3/ For Ambassador from Palmer. /2/In telegram 705 from Cape Town, February 28, Rountree reported that a wide segment of the white population of South Africa was concerned that recent statements by Vice President Humphrey in support of "one man-one vote" indicated that U.S. policy was now directed toward early implementation of that concept, which was opposed by virtually all white South Africans; even the Progressive Party favored a gradual extension of the franchise to non-whites. (Ibid.) /3/Not found. 1. Vice President's recent statements on Southern African issues,/4/ including reference "one man-one vote", intended as strong, authoritative high level reaffirmation oft-repeated basic principles US policy, foreign and domestic, consistently emphasized by US leaders from time of Thomas Jefferson. As with all such fundamental principles, we believe they are timeless in their validity and that mankind will be the better off the earlier they are realized. This speaks for continued pressure to achieve their earliest possible acceptance. For US to appear to qualify application of principle on question of timing would undermine confidence in US attachment to principle itself. /4/For text of the Vice President's January 6 speech in Addis Ababa, see Department of State Bulletin, January 29, 1968, pp. 129-133. 2. At same time, there is nothing in Vice President's remarks which precludes an orderly, phased, transitional program to achieve these objectives. His statements of principle should be read in full context his Addis and other speeches: "Important question for today is--in what direction are we going?" He sets no timetable; nor does he presume to prescribe any specific form that realization of these principles should assume in SA. Neither are his remarks at variance with position US has consistently taken in UN and elsewhere in emphasizing our support for orderly transition and peaceful solution to SA problems. We must, however, as VP has done never let South Africans forget imperatives of objectives. South Africans, in their own conscience or their own guilt, may place various connotations on this, and even rationalize their rejection of the principles involved by rejecting the timing. But timing will be determined by a complex of international and internal events and we should not ourselves seek unilaterally to define or interpret what it should be. For those liberal minded South Africans who themselves share our hopes for all inhabitants of the area, we can only trust that they take the trouble to analyze and understand US statements in correct context and fullest implications. For the less liberal, we can only hope that determined and tempered reiteration of world principles will persuade them to start moving in direction Vice President's suggestions. 3. Comment on paras 5 and 6 follow septel. Rusk
655. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa/1/ Washington, March 28, 1968, 2336Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Runyon; cleared by Clark, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Herbert K. Reis, Brown of UNP, and Francis J. Seider of U; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Thomas H.E. Quimby. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to London, Pretoria, Johannesburg, and USUN. 138195. Terrorism Act Trials. Refs: State 85072,/2/ 113548,/3/ 113604,/4/ 115154,/5/ 130909 (notal)./6/ /2/Telegram 85072 to Cape Town, December 15, 1967, transmitted the text of an aide-memoire. (Ibid., POL 29 SW AFR/UN) /3/Telegram 113548 to Cape Town, February 10, transmitted the text of an aide-memoire; see footnote 2, Document 653. /4/Document 653. /5/Dated February 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR) /6/Dated March 15. (Ibid.) 1. As consequence latest Security Council resolution SWA,/7/ USG called upon to make further effort re Terrorism Act and trials. Pursuant resolution UK recently instructed Embassy Cape Town make dmarche its behalf. Accordingly, Embassy requested deliver aide-memoire (para 4) at appropriate level Dept ForAffrs. /7/Security Council Resolution 246 adopted unanimously on March 14 demanded that South Africa "forthwith release and repatriate the South-West Africans concerned." For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 8, 1968, p. 477. 2. If Embassy does not have texts accompanying speeches Goldberg and Abram, it may in its discretion arrange subsequent delivery texts (copies by unclassified airpouch Thursday March 28 Registry No. 1273812 via Pretoria addressed Hooper) or delay delivery aide-memoire for their arrival. 3. Suggest that in oral presentation stress be laid on (1) humanitarian concern USG as indicated paragraphs concerning SW Africans particularly affected by Terrorism Act; (2) distinction common to all aide-memoires between USG general long-run position on SAG legal rights and duties (in short, 2145 v. SAG views) and USG special concern legislation such as Terrorism Act exceeds what is necessary or permissible on any view of where responsibility lies for maintenance of law and order; (3) degree to which continued imprisonment of SW Africans under Terrorism Act creates obstacle to efforts from any quarter toward moderation in treatment this and other issues existing or arising between SAG and members international community. 4. Text of Aide-Memoire: Reference is made to aide-memoires of December 16, 1967 and February 10, 1968 to which the replies of the Government of South Africa are awaited with interest. The United States Government transmits to the Government of South Africa with the present aide-memoire copies of statements made by Ambassador Goldberg on March 14, 1968 and February 16, 1968/8/ in the course of consideration by the United Nations Security Council of the question of South West Africa, and especially the trials, convictions and sentences flowing from charges under the Terrorism Act (No. 83 of 1967), together with a statement made on February 9, 1968 by the United States Representative, Mr. Morris Abram, in the United Nations Human Rights Commission on the same matter. These statements reaffirm positions taken earlier by the United States Government and explain the basis of its support of the most recent resolution of the United Nations Security Council, No. 246 of 1968 (March 14, 1968). /8/For text of Goldberg's statements on February 16 and March 14, see ibid., pp. 474-477. The United States Government has considered carefully the information and views presented by the Government of South Africa in its reply to the Secretary General of the United Nations, dated February 15, 1968 and published as United Nations Document A/7045/Add.9. The United States Government cannot consider that reply as a sufficient response to the various resolutions of the United Nations Organs, supported by the United States Government, or the aide-memoires referred to above. Since the Terrorism Act stands for all to read, the reply cannot, and does not seek to deny that the Act includes the principal elements (retroactivity, indefinite detention, conditions of detention, presumptions, definitions, place of trial, etc.) toward which attention has been directed in previous aide-memoires and in debates at the United Nations. Rather, the reply argues that the provisions are reasonable, especially since the threat of "terrorism" requires measures to "supplement the traditional rules and procedures." Yet, the reply also states that "the main charge against the accused in the trial instituted in 1967 under the Terrorism Act comprised activities such as conspiracy to murder, armed robbery, arson, possession of firearms, firing on the police and violently resisting arrest--all with the object of endangering law and order." In the view of the Government of the United States, a highly developed system of law like South Africa's suffices, without "supplement," to deal with such offenses. The United States Government considers that this view finds support in the debates in Parliament when the Terrorism Act was considered, the judgment and statements of Judge Ludorf concerning sentencing in State v. Eliaser Tuhadeleni et al. and available reporting on the matter. The United States Government has especially taken account of ordinary laws, including the common law, normally related to the protection of life and property in the Territory. It has sought also to take account of the efficacy of the Courts and the capabilities of the authorities in illegal occupation of South West Africa. On the basis of all the available evidence, it is forced to conclude that provisions such as those of the Terrorism Act are redundant as well as inadmissible, and that attempts to justify them as matters of dire necessity fail on two grounds: (a) the facts do not show that the Courts and authorities require such extraordinary provisions, and (b) those provisions are themselves a contradiction of the pursuit of law and order, in that they violate the rights of the people of South West Africa and depart from civilized legal process as it has evolved western and other legal traditions. Of continuing interest and urgent importance is the question of the well-being of South West Africans particularly affected by the Terrorism Act and other comparable legislation. There are those individuals who have been released. From the scant information available in the public press it would appear that Jason D. Mutumbulua, Johannes G. Otto and Immanuel G.N. Machuirili have been released and that Gabriel Mbindi and a number of others who have been detained in police custody as potential witnesses or accused may also have been released. The United States Government requests such facts as the Government of South Africa may have concerning the welfare and whereabouts of these persons. The United States Government would welcome any suggestions as to how best contact may be established with such persons, so that a proper humanitarian response--official and unofficial--may be forthcoming. As to those who are now serving sentences under the Terrorism Act, the United States Government specifically requests of the Government of South Africa that, above and beyond such restricted rights to visit as may currently be accorded under the prison regulations, cooperation be extended to the United States and other interested parties so that arrangements may be made for visits, especially by persons of legal, medical, educational and religious qualification, as may be appropriate to each individual case. As to those who remain under detention under the Terrorism Act or similar legislation, the United States Government renews requests made in prior aide-memoires, adding of course, its special concern that there should be no further trials of inhabitants of South West Africa under such legislation. In this connection it has particularly in mind a recent announcement by the Attorney General of the Transvaal of another such trial. The United States Government continues to urge upon the Government of South Africa the wisdom of reconsidering its position in the matter of the application of legislation such as the Terrorism Act in the context of the entire problem of South West Africa. Noting the dangerous division between the Government of South Africa and the international community, the United States Government invites the Government of South Africa at this time to seek to preserve a chance for easing this division. It urges that the Government of South Africa suspend implementation of unilaterally conceived plans, such as have been elaborated in the Report of the Odendaal Commission, and come to the conference table to reach agreement on appropriate courses of action. In particular, the United States Government believes that an atmosphere conducive to constructive consideration of the complex problems of South West Africa can best be achieved if the Government of South Africa would cease the application of South West Africa of legislation such as the Terrorism Act. This would of course entail an end to the detention, trial or imprisonment of South West Africans pursuant to that Act. The United States Government would appreciate a direct reply from the Government of South Africa to the detailed observations, recommendations and requests embodied in the present and past aide-memoires on this matter. End of Aide-Memoire. 5. For London and USUN: Embassy and USUN may inform UK this latest dmarche and show them text on strictly confidential basis when advised delivery by Embassy Cape Town./9/ /9/In telegram 938 from Cape Town, April 2, Rountree reported that he delivered the aide-memoire to Foreign Secretary Fourie that morning. Fourie said he would have to study the document, but emphasized that the passages in it stating or implying the illegality of the South African presence in South West Africa could not and never would be accepted by the South African Government. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR) Rusk
656. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa/1/ Washington, April 11, 1968, 2009Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 SW AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell on April 9; cleared by Clark, Gleysteen, Runyon, and Palmer; and approved by Thomas O. Enders of M. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to USUN, Pretoria, Durban, Johannesburg, and Port Elizabeth. 145178. Subj: SWA and UN. 1. Amb. Taswell delivered to Under Secy. Rostow April 9 two communications from SAG to UN SYG on Terrorism Trial and SAG willingness receive representative of SYG, and copy of parliamentary bill authorizing SAG proceed with steps toward Bantustans in SWA. 2. Ambassador specified SAG not willing discuss release of prisoners with SYG's representative, but he would be allowed look over conditions in Territory. Ambassador gave usual arguments for SA distrust of UN and for methods of repressing terrorism and separating groups in SWA. SAG would continue to govern in spirit of mandate, he said. Under Secy. welcomed SAG's willingness receive UN representative. 3. Ambassador agreed with Under Secy. retroactive character Terrorism Act regrettable but refused accept argument usual principles of justice should be followed in Ovamboland. He repeated references to street executions in Saigon and Israeli crossing of frontiers as actions making SAG look moderate. 4. He rejected view war situation not analogous with situation in Ovamboland on ground SAG wanted nip any unrest stimulated from abroad before could develop. 5. Under Secy. agreed to study documents and comment if appropriate. Rusk
657. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/ Washington, April 17, 1968, 0012Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Campbell and Runyon on April 16; cleared by Clark, Richard W. Bogosian of NEA, Brown of UNP, Edward W. Holmes of AFSE, ARA Country Director for Brazil Jack B. Kubisch, Joseph Godson in EUR, and John T. Dreyfuss of ARA; and approved by Palmer. Sent also to Blantyre, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Brussels, Canberra, The Hague, Helsinki, London, Madrid, Ottawa, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, and Vienna. Repeated to Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and USUN. 148039. Subj: SWA: Homelands Legislation. Ref: Cape Town 1018 (being repeated action addressees)./2/ /2/Telegram 1018 from Cape Town, April 12, reported a South African memorandum sent to all diplomatic missions concerning a bill tabled in Parliament to establish separate ethnic homelands in South West Africa. (Ibid.) 1. Dept preparing strong protest for prompt delivery to SAG against proposed legislation (see reftel) as clear violation SA's international obligations toward inhabitants and UN and highly injurious to well-being of inhabitants. Such an approach would avoid problem of "rigid new prescriptions for SWA's future," which Embassy flagged. Since SAG has delivered Bill and memo defending SAG action to US and all other diplomatic missions at Cape Town, Dept believes response necessary and appropriate. 2. Addressees requested approach host governments at high level in spirit of para 9 reftel. US hopes in this way encourage widespread reaction of disapproval, which would be conveyed directly to SAG, of this application extreme SA apartheid to international territory. We cannot afford to miss opportunity, however slight, for approach which might cause government have second thoughts. Bilateral representations could reinforce criticisms of parliamentary opposition and help cut ground from under familiar SAG theme that UN resolutions, which likely come in reconvened GA, are merely product African emotionalism and general political expediency. 3. SAG holds door open to dialogue--whether as matter lip service or genuine concern international opinion or both--and members inter- national community should not hesitate speak up. Basic premise, as Dept sees it, consistent with 1950 Advisory Opinion and GARes 2145, is direct UN responsibility, which almost all members of international community recognize. Complementary premise is continuing obligation of SAG as illegal occupant SWA to respect rights of inhabitants. At present juncture members international community must continue demand through bilateral representations that SAG respect rights of inhabitants. Such action is necessary and proper prelude to any GA consideration and will complement longer term efforts to bring SAG negotiate with UN as responsible agency of international community on modalities of SAG peaceful withdrawal from SWA./3/ /3/On May 3, Assistant Secretary Palmer delivered an aide-memoire protesting the proposed South West Africa homelands legislation to Ambassador Taswell. (Telegram 158297 to Athens, May 3, ibid.) Telegram 1318 from Cape Town, May 17, reported that the South African House of Assembly had passed the homelands bill on May 16 and that adoption by the Senate was expected the following week. (Ibid.) Rusk
658. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 19, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. III, Memos and Miscellaneous, 10/66-9/68. Confidential.
SUBJECT Attached is a memo from Nick Katzenbach/2/ recommending that you approve an amendment to the 1947 U.S.-South African Air Transport Agreement. /2/Not printed. The amendment will: --enable the South African airlines to fly to the U.S. for the first time. They probably would open service to New York near the end of the year--at the earliest. (South Africa was given rights to serve the U.S. in the original agreement, but the routes were not defined. Up to now, they did not wish to exercise their rights.) --give U.S. airlines additional routes to South Africa. The overall agreement and the new route exchange is a very good economic bargain for the U.S. TWA is completely satisfied with the amendment; and Pan American has not objected. The CAB recommends approval. The only problem is political. The UN General Assembly in 1962 passed a resolution, without U.S. support, requesting member governments to refuse landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft. We may, therefore, receive some criticism in the UN from African states, and from domestic critics of South Africa. On the other hand, neither we nor any other industrial country apply commercial sanctions to South Africa. At present the South African airline flies to the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Australia and other industrial countries. Checks on the Hill did not turn up any opposition to the amendment. In fact, most of the sentiment was favorable. I concur in State's recommendation that you approve this amendment. Walt Approve/3/ /3/This option is checked.
Washington, May 23, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, South Africa 463. Secret; Exdis. Prepared by the Special Assistant and Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group in the Office of the Under Secretary, Arthur A. Hartman. ANNEX A TO THE CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION AND DECISIONS /2/The Chairman's Summary is not attached. A copy is in Department of State, SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Records of Action, SIG/RA: #39--May 24, 1968--Chairman's Summary of Discussion and Decisions at the 38th SIG Meeting. III. South Africa Ship Visit The Chairman/3/ asked General Johnson to introduce the problem which had been posed by General Wheeler's memorandum./4/ /3/Under Secretary Katzenbach served as SIG Chairman. /4/Not attached. A copy of JCS Memorandum CM-3332-68 is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, SIG Memorandums, SIG/MEMO: #69--5/21/68--JCS Request for Consideration of Ship Stop in South Africa. A record of the Department of State pre-SIG meeting on May 23 is ibid., SIG Documents, SIG/DOC: #27--5/23/68--South African Ship Visit. General Johnson explained the background of the proposal to permit the carrier Intrepid to stop at a South African port for refueling en route from Atlantic to Pacific waters. He cited the inability of the UK to provide a tanker for refueling at sea as they had done on three previous trips, and referred to the progressive deterioration of the capacity of the US Atlantic fleet in this regard as a result of the transfer of men and ships to the Pacific to support our efforts in Vietnam. Ordering a US oiler to proceed solely for the purpose of refueling the Intrepid at sea would mean a special 42-day round trip at an estimated cost or roughly $336,000. The succeeding discussion centered on the question of whether the estimate could be considered a true additional cost, since the US Navy oiler would be on operational exercises in any case, and the relationship of our policy towards South Africa to a decision on a problem of this type. The Chairman stated that he felt that if we desired to change our policy towards South Africa, we should do so by means of a formal statement and be prepared to take the necessary consequences--not by taking an ad hoc decision on an operational matter. Furthermore, the Chairman said, he was by no means persuaded that the South African Government would accept a visit on the terms we would be likely to propose, i.e., only for refueling with no liberty for the crew. Finally, such a highly visible call at a South African port by a US carrier in the middle of July would almost certainly have serious repercussions for us at home. Mr. Walt Rostow added that without doubt there would also be complications for us in the UN, where we were attempting to secure the support of African nations for the NPT. The Chairman agreed, but reiterated that the possible domestic effect of the visit in mid-summer was the decisive factor in his mind. Mr. Earle stated that he believed Mr. Clifford would agree with that view, and questioned whether the matter should be referred to the IRG/AF for consideration. The Chairman summed up the discussion by stating that, despite his sympathy for the Navy's problem in the case of the Intrepid, he felt that a visit to South African port this summer would be ill advised, and the possible dollar costs of arranging refueling at sea were not a factor of sufficient importance to cause him to reverse his decision. The proposal for the visit of the Intrepid therefore was disapproved. The Chairman requested that all members exercise special care to avoid publicity on this decision. A.A. Hartman Staff Director end of document Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
