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594. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 17, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63-10/64. Confidential. Under a long standing US-South African bilateral on peaceful uses of atomic energy, South Africa has imported an Allis-Chalmers experimental reactor which is due to go critical this winter. Under license already issued, a private US supplier will ship the fuel in the next several months. These events will be publicized in South Africa, which will unquestionably kick up a nice propaganda storm elsewhere about US nuclear cooperation with South Africa. AEC apparently feels strongly enough about the integrity of its peaceful uses program that it would be very difficult to cancel the project at this late date. However, I propose to ask AEC to insure, quietly, that there is no fuel shipment or other cause for publicity until December. B.
/2/This option is checked.
595. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, September 22, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63-10/64. Secret. SUBJECT I. Problem On August 31, the South African Air Force informed Lockheed orally that unless a reply was received within three weeks regarding South Africa's proposal to purchase 16 Lockheed P3-A ASW aircraft, South Africa would instead order French Breguet Atlantique planes (which will not be operational until 1966-68). The Lockheed deal would involve $64 million for aircraft delivered over 12 month period, beginning 14 months from order, plus a $30-40 million five-year spare part program, all for cash on delivery. (All this is Lockheed information in meeting with Kitchen at State last week, no information from South Africans.) Kitchen informed Lockheed representatives that any early decision is "extremely doubtful" and they indicated their awareness of the problems. Treasury strongly supports the sale on balance of payments grounds; Commerce agrees and adds considerations of foreign trade and domestic employment. Defense argues that an effective South African anti-submarine warfare capability is essential to maintain control of sea lines of communication around the Cape of Good Hope (British Shackletons now in use are obsolescent). You are familiar with State's views. II. Background A primary consideration is the precise character of US commitments regarding arms embargo on South Africa. On July 16, 1963 in a personal meeting, President Kennedy informed Tanganyikan President Nyerere that "It remained US policy not to export arms to South Africa which could be used to influence racialism at home./2/ He was now considering a further step which would be a unilateral and voluntary refusal by the United States to export any arms to South Africa." In view of necessary consultations President Kennedy "asked President Nyerere to hold what he had said in confidence for the time being," and Nyerere agreed to do so. /2/For a record of Kennedy's meeting with Nyerere, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, Africa, Microfiche Supplement. Pursuant to Presidential decisions Ambassador Stevenson took these steps in the August 1963 UN Security Council debate on South Africa: 1. In a voluntary statement of August 2/3/ announced that the US intended "to bring to an end the sale of military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end of this calendar year." However, he added: /3/For text of Stevenson's remarks on August 2, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 683-689. "The Council should be aware that in announcing this policy the United States as a nation with many responsibilities in many parts of the world, naturally reserves the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security. If the interests of the world community require the provision of equipment for use in the common defense effort, we would naturally feel able to do so without violating the spirit and intent of this resolution." 2. Voted for a Chapter VI (non-mandatory) UN Security Council Resolution of August 7/4/ which "Solemnly calls upon all states to cease forthwith sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa." In an accompanying explanation of his vote he referred back to his speech and said "It will be recalled that we naturally reserve the right to interpret this policy in light of any future requirements for the common defense effort in assuring maintenance of international peace and security." /4/For text of Security Council Resolution 181 (1963), see ibid., pp. 689-690. In spite of the careful language the US position was widely understood as, de facto, a complete arms embargo. When Stevenson reported the understanding of several key Africans that the US "strategic exception" clause would apply only in the event that "world-wide conflict occurred," the Department specifically rejected this interpretation. It advised Stevenson that "if in our judgment of world-wide strategic picture, US national interest requires cooperation with South Africa in common defense, the provision to South Africa of, for example, ASW equipment, we (as power with world-wide responsibilities, the efficient exercise of which is also in interest of all Africans) reserve right to make that judgment and provide such equipment." (Dept. 317 to USUN, attached.)/5/ /5/Not attached. Telegram 317 to USUN, August 3, 1963, is in Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S AFR/UN. In USUN's 404 and 816 (attached)/6/ Stevenson states his definitive case against any arms sales including submarines, arguing that the US "strategic exception" statement "seemed clearly intended to convey and did convey to all concerned idea that we did not regard such requirements to exist presently and reservation would apply only in changed world circumstances . . . . to enter now into new contracts even for such strategic materials as submarines would in the eyes of the world directly controvert our announced policy as publicly understood." /6/Not attached. Telegram 404 from USUN, August 9, 1963, is ibid., FT 18 S AFR; telegram 816 from USUN, September 13, 1963 is ibid., FT 18 S AFR-US. In applying the arms embargo State (Alex Johnson) subsequently determined, and it was announced, that after completing outstanding contracts, or further commitments to South Africa presently involved only spare parts for C-130s already sold (approved by President September 18). At the same time (Bundy-Rusk memo of September 20) the President agreed to permit continued discussion of submarine sales to South Africa but with "no implied commitment to sell" and an understanding that "The US can make no decision before the end of this year regarding sales and any eventual decision will be taken in the light of circumstances at the time the question is considered, under our policy stated in the UN Security Council in August."/7/ During the past year (presumably on the basis of indicated South African interest) North American, Northrop, Grumman, Douglas, and others have inquired informally about US Government attitude on sales of Naval bombers, jet trainers, helicopter engines, etc.; there have been indications of South African interest in anti-submarine warfare gear. From these indications, it seems likely that there is a possible market, within the limits of the "strategic exception" clause, of perhaps $3-4 hundred million in military sales to South Africa over the next five years. However, all of these possible sales have been turned down or shelved not only under the terms of policy as outlined above, but pursuant to NSAM 295: /7/Bundy's memorandum to Rusk announcing the President's decision (dated September 23, not September 20) is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, p. 649. "2. Existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa will be continued. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines or any variations in existing policy will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments, including those in the South West Africa-ICJ problem." III. Discussion While the "strategic exception" clause provides us legal justification for a Lockheed sale, there would be a considerable emotional reaction against the US--in Africa and Asia, a lot of propaganda, as well as criticism by American liberal and negro groups and many newspapers. Because the African nations have interests of their own to protect, they won't break with us on this issue. But their emotions some times out run their reason. We might, for example, lose the Chirep issue in the General Assembly in November on just this one point--or some base or overflight rights. Certainly, for what it is worth, we will lose an enormous amount of respect and good will in Africa and our "deal" with the South Africans will probably be tied to our supposed deal on Tshombe and the Congo. Next year, we may find ourselves in a serious impasse with the South Africans over the World Court decision on South West Africa. We are doing a number of things against that eventuality, (under NSAM 295, the only point at which President Johnson has ever considered the South African problem) mostly directed at being able to have as much freedom of action and as few hostages to South Africa as possible if and when that happens. To get involved in a long term aircraft contract would run exactly counter to that policy. McNamara and Rusk have agreed, like Stevenson, that "It will be difficult to justify to world public opinion, particularly Africa, what will be claimed to be an abrogation of US policy enunciated in the Security Council" (regarding submarine sales but also applicable here). (September 16, 1963 memorandum to the President.)/8/ /8/See footnote 2, ibid. In spite of these considerations a case can be made for the sale to South Africa. They are trying to buy, largely for internal political reasons, respectability and membership in the Western alliance club, and that is about all they really want for their money. Likewise, it can be argued that we can have more influence on the South Africans by dealing with them than by isolating them. Furthermore, all we are doing on something like an embargo on ASW weapons and the like is making irrational political concessions to the black Africans; there will be no end to their demands so we can't win at this game anyhow. And this South African Government--and its problems--will be with us for a good many years to come. On balance of payments, not only does Lockheed sale open the way to other sales to South Africa; Lockheed argues with some cogency that it strengthens their chance of several hundred million dollars of additional sales of P3-A to other countries, particularly by limiting the French Atlantique's cost competitiveness outside NATO area. Regarding Defense considerations, it should be noted that at the time of the Security Council problem in August 1963 Secretary McNamara thought that South Africa's strategic importance was less then that of the Portuguese Azores and did not override foreign policy considerations. This is a pretty complicated issue and I don't think we should try to strike the balance on these considerations now. I don't think, however, that a decision as significant as the Lockheed sale should be taken whimsically, and without regard to its impact on an overall policy. I don't think we really have such a policy now in spite of all the discussion of the past year. All I am really arguing, therefore, is that we should hold the problem open until November so that we have real freedom of decision at that time. I would therefore recommend that we: (a) Advise Lockheed that we cannot approve a sale at this time but that, without any commitment, their best chance is to give us time to deal with the problem at a later date; and that, in the meantime, we will try to keep the question open with the South Africans. (b) Request State and Defense, pursuant to the above, to explore South African interest and perhaps, to buy time, send experts to South Africa to discuss the matter (we have had no communication with the South African Government on this transaction). (c) Try to get a real high-level agreement over the next several months as to what the policy of this Administration is going to be on the question of South Africa. B.
596. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, September 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63-10/64. Secret. Further to the Lockheed-South Africa problem-- 1. I should, and did not, make clear that the problem of avoiding trouble through November involves the UN General Assembly session as well as the US election. If there is public disclosure of a Lockheed sale to South Africa before or during the General Assembly the reactions there will be pretty messy, both rhetorically and in possible practical consequences--i.e. US ability to marshal votes on issues of interest to it, such as the Article 19 case. I doubt that a decision now to approve the sale could really be held from disclosure till after the UNGA. 2. You should realize that in the eyes of almost all the world this sale associates us with the British, French and Portuguese as helping the South Africans--and the rest of the world includes, with varying degrees of intensity, everyone from NATO partners like Norway, through Latin America to the Afro-Asians. I don't want to overstate the practical significance of this, but its symbolic and emotional impact does count for something--the racism issue is, in the long run, a real one in coping with the Chicoms. 3. If we are going to spend a policy counter like this (and I am quite willing to consider it) let's wait and do so in a context that serves some policy purpose, not just balance of payments. B.
597. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 20, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Cables and Memos, Vol. I, 11/63-10/64. Secret. This memorandum confirms my assessment last week that the sale of P-3A aircraft to South Africa is a political decision. While providing these aircraft would improve South Africa's anti-submarine capabilities around the Cape of Good Hope, I do not consider this essential to our national defense. Similarly, if South Africa should deny us the use of its facilities for missile and satellite tracking, our needs could be met by obtaining the use of facilities in other countries in the area. Robert S. McNamara
598. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, November 30, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63-10/64. Secret. Prepared by McGeorge Bundy. Copies were sent to Rusk and McNamara. SUBJECT In accordance with the President's decision, I have informed Mr. Vernon Johnson of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation that the United States Government is not able at this time to give its approval for the sale of P-3 aircraft to South Africa. I made it clear to Mr. Johnson that this decision implied no judgment on either side of any possible future consideration of this question, and I gave him no time limit on the present judgment. I did, however, make it clear that I had no reason to suppose that there would be a different judgment in the next few weeks or months. McG.B.
599. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/64-9/66. Secret. SUBJECT Mac-- It looks as though this problem is under control. Harriman has talked with Foreign Minister Muller and plans to talk further with him this afternoon along the following lines: (1) For obvious reasons we wish to delay shipment a reasonable time--about two to three months--but we will honor our contractual obligation to supply the fuel. (2) We expect the publicity on our shipment will be minimized. (3) We wish to apply IAEA safeguards to the South African nuclear program and we would like to do this even before the present agreement expires in 1967. (The present agreement provides that IAEA controls will be accepted at the end of the agreement or the agreement will not be extended.) Harriman seems confident that Muller will go long with at least the first two points, which will get us past our immediate political problem. Harriman had also been considering the possibility of having the UK supply the enriched uranium. Following a meeting this morning, he has discarded this idea. This note covers both Bob's activities and mine./2/ /2/A notation in Bundy's handwriting in the margin reads: "Good." CEJ
Washington, January 18, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, South Africa. Secret; Noforn. The preface states that Part One of this paper is a comprehensive, authoritative, and approved statement of U.S. policy toward South Africa, and that all agencies and bureaus with major responsibilities affecting U.S. relations with South Africa participated in drafting it and concurred in the strategy and courses of action it sets forth. Secretary Rusk approved and signed the paper on January 18. [Here follow the preface and table of contents.] NATIONAL POLICY PAPER--SOUTH AFRICA PART ONE--US POLICY I. The Problem South Africa's worsening racial situation and increasingly isolated international position pose complicated problems for US foreign policy. The probable long-range effects on US security interests of the Nationalist Government's repressive apartheid policy in South and South-West Africa require that every reasonable effort be made to improve the situation there and to mitigate its repercussions abroad. At this moment, Verwoerd's regime appears to be both strong and secure. It seems impervious to change, despite a wide variety of international pressures for its reform or redirection. It now appears likely that the issue over the mandatory status of South-West Africa may soon bring about the first major confrontation looming between the world community and South Africa. This confrontation also has serious implications for the authority of the UN, the International Court of Justice. It will bring into sharp focus the potential danger for unilateral action by Communist countries which could jeopardize our long-term interests in Africa. A workable, but not necessarily satisfactory, resolution of the South-West African problem, while extremely difficult to achieve, might produce some political realignment in South Africa during the course of which Western pressures might be brought to bear with some hope of success. By mid-1965 the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on South Africa's obligations as Mandatory over South-West Africa is likely to bring into sharp focus the issue of South Africa's responsibility to the UN for its administration of the Territory and the question whether apartheid (separate development) is compatible with the best interests of South-West Africa's inhabitants. Whether South Africa complies with the Court judgment, resists it, or gives up the Territory, the issues for the US are important. There will be wide support at home and abroad for the authority of the ICJ in its judgment on a contentious proceeding. Inevitably the United States and other major powers will be faced with a major international issue involving both race relations and the future welfare of peoples of a dependent territory. Early in 1964, it became apparent that implementation by South Africa of the recommendations of the Governmental Odendaal Commission regarding South-West Africa could lead to a crisis in the US Security Council involving possible collective measures to uphold a restraining order of the ICJ. Under the Odendaal Commission's recommendations, measures of economic development would have accompanied the creation of racially defined homelands and tightened control of native affairs by the South African Government. The Commission's premises were frankly those of the apartheid policies of the present SAG and would have intensified apartheid in South-West Africa. Similarly, the Commission rejected the possibility of United Nations supervision, as called for repeatedly by the UN backed by earlier Advisory Opinions of the ICJ. Viewing such action by the SAG as highly prejudicial to their rights as applicants in a contentious proceeding before the ICJ, Ethiopia and Liberia considered seeking a restraining order from that Court. In this proceeding, applicants, as former League of Nations members, are seeking a judgment establishing that South Africa's administration of South-West Africa violates its obligations under the Mandate for South-West Africa conferred on it by the League. The plaintiffs might have succeeded in obtaining a restraining order and could have asked the Security Council for measures to enforce it. (Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, they could have obtained majority support in the Security Council for measures to enforce the Court Order.) To forestall this development, and permit the case to proceed to a judgment on the merits, probably by mid-1965, without intervening crisis, the United States, in concern with the UK sought to dissuade the SAG from immediate implementation of controversial elements of the Odendaal plan. This effort succeeded, and, at present, the SAG is holding back, so that applicants have not felt constrained to seek a restraining order from the Court. It is our best estimate that the ICJ will decide the case before it by mid-1965 and that its decision will be unfavorable to South Africa's contentions respecting its asserted freedom from legal obligations under the Mandate, freedom to apply apartheid in South-West Africa and freedom from UN supervision. As the gap between South Africa's actions and world opinion widens, the dilemma of balancing conflicting US interests is becoming more difficult and potentially hazardous. South Africa's Nationalist Government is increasingly repressive in applying its apartheid doctrine, despite the actuality of economic integration. By constraint and legal restriction it is inhibiting the press, perverting news media and curbing academic freedom. It is arming heavily to defend its way of life. In the process it is employing increasingly repressive measures and eroding personal rights. Both the trend in the UN and the immediate thrust of US domestic policy are running strongly counter to South Africa's practices of racial segregation and domination. Many countries, particularly Afro-Asian, are increasingly insistent that effective international action be taken respecting South-West Africa and apartheid in the Republic--this in light of the fact that South Africa has completely disregarded over thirty UN resolutions condemning South African policies. With the recent creation of the Organization of African Unity, determination to help resistance movements in Southern Africa and to embarrass countries friendly to South Africa in gathering momentum. With a population of 3 million Whites as opposed to 11 million Blacks, 1.5 million Coloureds (mulattoes) and .5 million Asians (mainly Indians), the ratio of Whites to non-Whites in South Africa is 1 to 4 as compared with a ratio of 9 Whites to 1 Black in the US. Thus, the problem of integration in South Africa is far more knotty than in the US. Until now the White populace has been divided by the hostile feelings of the Boer War with 55% Afrikaner and 45% of British and foreign extraction. The English-speaking Whites have become increasingly receptive to Afrikaner racist theories in the face of internal and external pressures. Although liberal elements in South Africa and the world at large have made efforts to soften South Africa's hard line on racial attitudes, no real softening has yet been achieved. In its main effort to placate world opinion and to curtail, artificially, the ratio of Blacks to Whites, the South African Government has recently introduced the concept of "Bantustan." This idea embodies the eventual creation of a series of scattered Black African tribal states in a confederal or "Commonwealth" system, but with South Africa retaining central direction for several decades to come. Thus far, the idea envisions assignment of 13% of South Africa's land (470,000 square miles) to 70% of its population. The plan lacks administrative infra-structure, essential development capital, and clear-cut promises of eventual autonomy or independence. It fails to resolve the problem of the urban African. It is even criticized by right-wing Nationalists as "giving too much to the Kaffirs." Thus far, in the Transkei, the South African Government has shown little evidence of good faith in giving the territory adequate economic backing or progressive movement toward actual autonomy. Yet, by its very vagueness, the Transkei (or other Bantustans yet to be created) may be awakening new political and social desires among South Africa's Blacks, could unleash forces South Africa may not be able to control. Given the gravity of the South African problem, it will be important to watch the development of the Bantustan concept in the possibility that, over the long term, it or a variant thereof could help to provide a solution. South Africa has a growing, effective military establishment and a highly efficient police-security system. The Republic possesses a modern air force, an expanding army and an organization of home guard volunteers referred to as "Commandos", and a small, efficient navy. South Africa could field a force of 200,000 men within ninety days. She possesses armed might superior to any existing military combination of nations of the African Continent today, She is swiftly increasing her production of armaments and is seeking complete economic and military self-sufficiency. South Africa's economic base is broad and her trading position strong. Her only basic shortages are petroleum products, some automotive and airplane parts, wheat, cotton and rubber. She is heavily depend-ent on foreign flag shipping. She is seeking to overcome her deficiencies by producing motor fuel from coal, by expanding storage and refinery facilities, by establishment of an elaborate new petrochemical complex, and by expanding domestic wheat and cotton production. She is also expanding production of essential strategic mechanical components and armaments. Producing over 50% of the world's gold, marketing 80% of its diamonds, and selling large amounts of uranium to US and UK under long-term contracts, South Africa has forty-five commercially exploited minerals. Her export trade in livestock, sugar, wool and fruits is also large. UK investment in South Africa exceeds $3 billion while the US investments surpass $600 million. Businessmen are receiving high returns on their South African investments, which net from 12% to 30% annually. Both US and UK business interests are contributing to South Africa's current drive for self-sufficiency and are being propelled into strengthening its strategic capabilities in partial contradiction to official US and UK policies of arms embargo. In the same vein, our trade policy becomes embarrassing in terms of our relations with the rest of Africa. While economic sanctions and trade boycotts have been imposed on South Africa by various nations, results thus far have been limited. South Africa's economy appears to have many strengths and few weaknesses. The whole complicated problem of what measures might be effective against South Africa should the occasion arise is under study within the US Government and, following a resolution of June 18, 1964, by the Security Council. Difficulties of enforcement, adverse effects on the people of South Africa as well as the race relations situation, and consequences for other countries, such as the UK, all need the more searching analysis that is currently being undertaken in the Department of State. Much more realism needs to be injected into UN consideration of possible enforcement measures. Toward this end USUN will strive for a thorough and truly expert study of the problem in the Security Council over the next several months. The strategic importance of South Africa to the US is based on requirements of an alternate to the Suez Canal as a sea route between the Indian and Atlantic Oceans; availability of air and naval facilities in South Africa for US forces and limited South African military capability to contribute to the security of Southern Africa in event of hostilities inimical to over-all Western or US interest. In addition, the Republic of South Africa is geographically located so as to provide excellent facilities for our DOD and NASA missile and space tracking requirements. While our present South African tracking and space facilities are preferable to alternative facilities, acceptable alternative sites in the general area can be found. Confusion of American attitudes and interests is reflected in conflicting activities of US private citizens and organizations as well as US government agencies. Both in Washington and in Pretoria, South Africans have reasons to regard US policy toward them as ambivalent. They frequently find it contradictory and occasionally unsupported or even undercut by our own representatives, official and private. The present course of events, which we may be able to influence only in minor ways, and only over the short term, promises to be detrimental to all if the trend continues. Ultimately, the US would wish to avoid choice between South Africa and the other African countries; instead, it finds itself in an awkward position at home and abroad in attempting to maintain friendly relations with two hostile factions and at the same time maintaining a basic domestic principle of racial equality. The probabilities of new dilemmas over the South-West Africa issue, of sporadic racial outbreaks in the Republic, increasing campaigns of sabotage and terrorism, and the eventual possibility of widespread disorder, make necessary a reappraisal of our policies toward South Africa. This reappraisal must include a full assessment of US interests and activities in the Republic; the inter-action of international pressures and forces at work within South Africa; the kind of resolution of the international treaty issue concerning South-West Africa for which we should strive, and the significance of South Africa vis-a-vis race relations on the US political scene. In this reappraisal, certain questions are paramount: Should the US avoid intervention in South Africa because the short-term situation is relatively stable and might be worsened by interference? Should the US join in treatment of South Africa as a pariah nation and back up this condemnation with pressures going beyond the arms embargo? Is apartheid so dangerous to international order in Africa and so susceptible to Communist exploitation that the US must seek ways to resolve the issue? Should our own racial problems lend strength to our stand against apartheid, or should they only heighten our awareness of the complexity of race relations and Nationalism? Are there constructive ways in which the US and its allies can show South Africa a path toward racial harmony? Are there ways in which the few liberal elements remaining in South Africa can be rallied and coalesced? Can we help to establish a forum for negotiation and eventual compromise between the races in South Africa? Can we help to avert an open, dangerous confrontation between South Africa and the rest of the world over the problem of South-West Africa? Failing these, should we progressively dissociate the US from South Africa with respect to arms, space, investment, trade and cultural relations? [Here follow Sections II and III on U.S. Objectives and Interests.] IV. A New Strategic Approach National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 of April 24, 1964, states, inter alia: "The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South-West Africa case, aiming to persuade the South Africa Government to acceptance of the Court's decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible basis for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department's Memorandum of March 10th." A. Background The probable harmful effects on US interests in Africa resulting from the South African Government's continued repressive apartheid policies in South and South-West Africa require that every reasonable effort be made to improve the situation there and to mitigate its repercussions abroad. The South African problem can also test the viability of the UN; in the long run over the issue of racial oppression and peace in Southern Africa; in the short run over the issue of South-West Africa. For the US, with its significant ties to various sectors of Africa and with its own domestic racial situation in an acute stage of resolution, the situation in South and South-West Africa, as elaborated elsewhere in this paper, poses grave policy problems. The usual arguments for the status quo policy are that South Africa needs a long time to modify significantly its racist policies, the problem is intractable, outside pressures will only worsen the situation, and the alternative is chaos. These are counsels of caution but hardly justifications for a policy of inaction. The weakness of the status quo approach is that the world and Africa are moving fast in one direction while the South African Government since 1948 has been moving as fast in the opposite direction. Thus, the ground is being rapidly eroded from under the policy of precariously balancing what are at times contradictory US interests. An alternative to the status quo policy is needed. An examination of alternatives indicates that a combination of pressures--national and international, internal and external--offers the best hope for the future. As a maximum, a program is necessary to deal constructively with the South African situation by promoting a non-violent approach, if possible; as a minimum, the program should limit the adverse international effects of the situation on US interests. A pressure program to be effective should aim to achieve (1) compliance with the judgment of the ICJ next year regarding South Africa's obligations as Mandatory of South-West Africa, (2) realistic contingency planning by the South African Government, well in advance of the judgment, regarding the broad economic, social and political implications of compliance, (3) moderation in South Africa's domestic policies in order to facilitate a workable accommodation on the South-West Africa issue, and (4) in the long run (possibly as an indirect consequence of a UN-South African accommodation on South-West Africa) promotion of an eventual dialogue among leaders of all groups in South Africa itself about race relations and government by consent. The ICJ decision could have a major impact on internal political alignments in South Africa. However, it would not necessarily weaken the general commitment to apartheid or some form of separate development. In the event of SAG relinquishment of responsibility, probably the most effective immediate way to influence favorably the situation in South Africa would be to ensure an efficient, enlightened administration of South-West Africa which would aim at rapid progress toward well-distributed prosperity and self-rule. South-West Africa's resources and favorable foreign trade balance would facilitate this objective. Since the South African problem and the South-West African issue are closely linked, any program of action for one must include at the same time attention to the other. Similarly, an accommodation in South-West Africa or on the other hand an intensified application of apartheid policy regarding South-West Africa would profoundly affect the South African situation. If the Verwoerd Government successfully defied the Court on the South-West Africa issue, the possibility of any flexibility within the Republic itself would virtually vanish. Conversely, the establishment of UN authority over the Territory, by persuasion or force, would be a severe blow to the prestige of the Verwoerd Government. Whether the circumstances attending assertion of UN authority tended in the short run to divide or coalesce the white community in South Africa, undoubtedly the defeat would intensify the pressures on apartheid. Our first objective then should be to make a maximum effort to encourage the South African Government to change course in South-West Africa and prepare the way for accommodation to the findings of the Court. There have been a number of indications that the South African Government anticipates an adverse Court judgment and realizes that its continuance as Mandatory is in jeopardy. At the same time, the SAG has consistently rejected efforts on the part of the UN to exercise any supervisory authority. However, it is worth noting that in 1951 South Africa proposed an agreement with the three remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers of World War I (US, UK and France) for her continued administration of South-West Africa. This was rejected by the three countries because it constituted an effort to sidestep the authority of the UN. Nonetheless it indicated that South Africa might be more willing to discuss the future of South-West Africa with the US, UK and France than with the U.N. as a whole. In any event the results of US/UK demarches earlier this year on the Odendaal Plan suggest that (1) some useful progress may be made through such diplomatic approaches and (2) it would appear that the South African Government was anxious to avoid a major confrontation over South-West Africa at that time. The South African Government was clearly anxious to buy time to strengthen its security situation during the year remaining before the Court decision. However, it might, through sufficiently credible and forceful approaches, be persuaded to avoid a full-scale confrontation following upon the ICJ judgment of mid-1965. B. Proposed Plan We therefore set down in general terms the outlines of a two-phase operational approach to the South African Government. The essence of the plan is to reveal our concern, in the first phase, with securing South African compliance with the judgment of the ICJ. The second phase of the plan would be concerned with events following the ICJ decision and would depend on the nature of the decision and South Africa's reaction thereto. Both these phases would constitute the principal thrust of the US response to the increasingly disturbing situation in South Africa with its implications for US national interests in Africa. It is recognized that the following program, if invalidated by unforeseen events, could require new contingency plans and new objectives. Problems such as the effect of South African withdrawal from the UN; the future of the port of Walvis Bay; the future prospects for confederation or further more satisfactory, development of Bantustans; and development of South Africa's nuclear weapons capabilities, etc., may well be considered as subjects for Working Group study under new contingency situations. 1. Diplomatic Approach to South Africa on South-West Africa (Phase One) During the months remaining before the judgment in the South-West Africa case, a basic, high-level diplomatic approach to South Africa would appear to have some utility for inducing the SAG to prepare for an accommodation in South-West Africa. To underline the need for South African action this approach should be made together with the UK (and possibly France) as soon as feasible. If the UK should prove reluctant to join with us in carrying out this plan, we should be prepared to make some concessions in planning and timing because of the value of joint US-UK participation.
As soon as possible we should consult with the UK (and France) to determine whether it (they) would be prepared to proceed now to work out a common diplomatic strategy for persuading South Africa to accept and adjust to a probable adverse ICJ decision on South-West Africa. We should be prepared to proceed with a US-UK effort if France is unwilling to join and the US should "go it alone" should the UK refuse. South Africa has three main choices re the ICJ decision on South-West Africa: (1) non-compliance; (2) relinquishment of the mandate; or (3) compliance. Any of these courses might also involve South African procrastination and legalistic delay before a choice were eventually made. Any one would have far-reaching consequences for South Africa and the UN. Non-compliance with the judgment would bring into being, with even greater force, the perils the US and UK impressed on the South African Government during the Odendaal crisis. These perils have been spelled out elsewhere in this document. The very existence of the Security Council study committee on sanctions should help impress on South Africa the serious problems which might confront it should it fail to comply with the Court's decisions. Relinquishment of the mandate would create an administrative problem for the UN, but it would be manageable for such a sparsely populated and relatively prosperous territory. Such a solution would be a blow to South Africa's pride. However, apartheid within South Africa might even further be strengthened. Yet it would bring to an end one major problem in South African-UN relations. This is a decision South Africa might make when fully cognizant of the difficulties the other choices entail. Compliance would raise many serious problems for South Africa, the US and other states. Assuming the Court's judgment parallels the 1950 advisory ruling, it would necessitate the utilization of UN supervisory machinery. Presumably South Africa would be required by the Court to be accountable to the UN General Assembly only to the extent that it was to the League of Nations. However, it is likely that the Court also will decide that apartheid is not reconcilable with the obligations of the mandate system. Ethiopia and Liberia allege this, and South Africa's response is that apartheid is necessary and desirable. Prime Minister Verwoerd publicly recognized this on May 5, 1964, in telling Parliament that the adjudication "concerns the policy of the Government of South Africa, namely the policy of separate development." Loss of this aspect of the case for South Africa would mean that compliance would entail administration of a non-racial policy by a racist-minded Mandatory. Many South Africans as well as others believe Prime Minister Verwoerd would find giving up the mandate less schizoid. There will be strong pressures in the UN for South Africa to give up the Territory. South Africa might also attempt a legalistic sort of compliance, probably involving procrastination and delay. Verwoerd said on May 5 that "the Government of South Africa is a stickler for doing what is juridically correct." Under the Class C mandate agreement, South Africa is not specifically obligated to advance the indigenous population politically. However, Prime Minister Verwoerd and other South African spokesmen repeatedly have proclaimed that they aim at self-determination of peoples. On June 5, 1964, Verwoerd said that the prospective British grant of independence to Basutoland amounted to the fulfillment of one of the purposes of the separate development policy. The Republic was prepared to help the High Commission Territories along the road to independence, he said, in the same way it was assisting the Transkei. Although the mandate agreement does not require political development of the indigenous population, the South African Government would be inconsistent in attempting to deny to South-West Africa the self-rule that it claims to project for territories within South Africa itself, such as the Transkei, and to welcome in the Basutoland enclave. Assuming that the Court judgment prescribes a non-apartheid policy and the General Assembly insists that the Territory be treated as a whole rather than as a collection of Bantustans, South Africa's declared intention to carry out the Odendaal proposals would prove untenable, both legally and politically. There would be nothing to preclude South Africa from engaging in a new series of legal maneuvers to blunt the Court action. This would frustrate the Black African States and would pose new difficulties in the UN and for the US.
(a) The US, UK (and France) would explain that our purpose was to forewarn, not to threaten, and that we have a special interest (stemming from our position as the remaining principal and allied powers of World War I) in the finding of a solution for South-West Africa which is acceptable, if not entirely satisfactory to the parties concerned (the South African Government, the inhabitants of South-West Africa and the UN). (b) We would suggest extensive informal and secret discussions in advance by experts of the four (three or two) countries to consider various possibilities for a solution in South-West Africa acceptable to the UN, the inhabitants of the Territory, and South Africa. (c) We would state our conviction that to have a reasonable prospect for success, an essential step must be South Africa's acceptance of UN supervisory authority (already ruled upon by the ICJ), and the South African Government must be prepared for unreserved acceptance and compliance now with the final ICJ judgment or, alternatively, for relinquishment of the Mandate. (d) We would explain, as there is a strong possibility at least that the Court may find in favor of the applicants on some of the issues, very possibly including that of the practice of apartheid in the Territory, we are convinced that apartheid must be eliminated in South-West Africa, we are convinced of the wisdom of frank exploration with the Government of South Africa and other key governments of what can be done in this direction before it is too late. (e) Finally, we would point out the necessity for South Africa to prepare contingency plans for the future of the Territory of South-West Africa which would move away from the present practice of apartheid in the Territory and establish a practicable basis for the eventual according of self-determination to the inhabitants. Follow-Up Approach: If the first "oral" diplomatic approach fails to elicit any constructive responses, a second more specific and written demarche should be made. Its primary and immediate purpose, like the first approach, would be to maximize within the South African Government realistic thinking either about how to comply with the Court judgment or about the alternative of withdrawal from South-West Africa before involving South Africa itself in an escalating confrontation with the UN and its key member states (including the US). In order to achieve a constructive engagement of South Africa, this approach would be worded in a way as not to negate its primary purpose by provoking the Nationalist Government into an intransigent attitude during the South-West Africa crisis. These demarches have the merit of beginning a dialogue well in advance of the ICJ decision. An important secondary purpose of the written demarche would be to buttress our propaganda position in the event the Verwoerd Government refuses to comply with the judgment or chooses to withdraw from the Territory. At that point in time it is proposed that the demarche would be released to the public. To be a useful element in US propaganda the demarche should be designed to have maximum appeal to moderates of all parties and groups. It would be intended to throw on the Nationalist Government the onus of either loss of the Mandate or the hardships resulting from increasing pressures against South Africa. Its purpose would be to strengthen the moderates and encourage their coalescence into a more effective opposition to the Verwoerd regime. It would also be aimed at weakening the resolution and unity of the extremists. Supporting Actions on South-West Africa: As an important supplement to diplomatic efforts, the Department of State, with appropriate assistance from other agencies, should provide full briefing on the South-West Africa issue to prominent American business and professional people who in the course of their normal activities have access to influential South Africans. Aside from that regularly provided to USIA, special guidance for US diplomatic and other personnel who engage in frequent conversations with South Africans should also be prepared on this issue. In short, a total US effort, official and non-official, public and private, should be devised with the end of persuading influential South Africans in and out of Government that accommodation to the ICJ judgment is essential to their best interests, and that the major nations including the US have no alternative to supporting respect for the authority of the ICJ and the rule of law. 2. An Alternative to Apartheid in South Africa (Phase Two) Under present conditions a major diplomatic approach to the South African Government proposing alternatives to apartheid in the Republic would probably be rejected. It might diminish our prospects of influencing the South African Government beneficially on the more immediate South-West Africa issue. At a later stage, however, after the judgment of the International Court on South-West Africa has been made, it might be opportune to make such an approach. A South African Government cooperating with the UN in South-West Africa and discovering that a reasonable alternative to apartheid can be made to work there, might be more amenable to suggestions for constructive change at home. On the other hand, if the South African Government should resist the Court's judgment and UN measures supporting the Court, the publication by the US and others of a minimum, positive program for re-orientation of South African society by South Africans might serve as a rallying point for moderates and perhaps a way of dividing extremists and reducing their resistance to the UN. This could be useful if the South-West Africa issue shakes South African racial politics into flux. Because either the opportunity or the necessity may thus arise in the next two-year period for a major diplomatic approach on apartheid in South Africa, it is considered useful to have prepared within the context of this paper the general lines which such an approach should follow. The immediate aim of a comprehensive and practical proposal for moving toward a modus vivendi acceptable to all races in South Africa would be the beginning of informal discussions about South African race relations by spokesmen of all groups. The governments making representations would stress: (a) The best solution would be one worked out by the South Africans themselves. The associated states do not desire to impose a settlement. (b) The South African Government should create the proper atmosphere for discussions by relaxing oppressive laws and discrimination. (c) The associated governments would support agreed proposals covering all groups' and individuals' minimal rights and opportunities, under the protection of the law as means of achieving full equality. (d) Rejection of the combined approach would necessitate a reassessment of the participants' relations with South Africa. Should the South African Government reject the combined approach, the details would be released at the most opportune time and exploited to the full. [Here follow sections on Courses of Action and Perspectives and Conclusions, and Part II, the Supporting Analysis.] [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
