NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
601. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, March 31, 1965, 4:28 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Republic of South Africa Affairs W.B. Campbell on March 25; cleared by AFE Special Assistant for Southern Africa Economic Affairs Peter H. Delaney, Sarich in Commerce, and Hooper; and approved by Williams. Sent to Cape Town, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, and Durban, and repeated to all other Africa posts, London, and USUN by pouch.
1838. Re Dept's CA-8425./2/ Following summary of conversation is uncleared, FYI, Noforn and subject to revision. /2/Dated February 16. (Ibid.) In meeting with Secretary March 23 delegation from "Conference on South African Crisis and American Action" urged economic measures against South Africa. Conference had resolved in favor full economic sanctions but delegation stressed definite policy of discouraging loans and investment would be major forward step in lessening US involvement, bringing pressure to bear on South African whites, and improving US relations with other countries. Secretary pointed out UN membership not ready use sanctions to enforce human rights. US did not have much influence on major trading countries' policies. Unilateral action might only cause South Africa to shift trading patterns. He was not sure that economic pressures would induce South Africans to change their policies. Discouragement of investment would depend to large extent on developments in South Africa and on outcome of Court case regarding South West Africa. However, with respect to President's balance of payments message, US investment in highly developed SA economy should be slowed down (Under heading "US Delaying Any Move on South Africa" AP item in Evening Star, Washington, March 24, page 20, said Houser told reporters after delegation's talk with Secretary that its minimum request had been for curb on investment and trade but Secretary had indicated Administration wanted to wait for Court judgment expected in autumn.) Secretary stressed objective was change in South Africa, not warm glow of feeling at home or approval from other countries. Court judgment on South West Africa, he said, might provide handle for influencing South Africa situation since solid international stake existed and US had obligations derived from World War I and mandate system. US might have to consider sanctions in UN, he said, depending on nature of judgment and South Africa's response. George Houser, organizer of conference said delaying tactics might draw out proceedings so long that issue might be before UN bodies for years with little result. Secretary replied USG had warned SAG it should cooperate and not stall. Background About 400 persons from 38 organizations--churches, unions, students, civil rights--attended conference organized by American Committee on African and Consultative Council on Africa. Main aim was to do what is "right" rather than be restrained by UN Charter limitations and concern about effectiveness or consequences of actions. Congressman Fraser of Minnesota's speech effectively expressed conference attitude: US should oppose apartheid forcefully because it was wrong, by restraints on investment and trade, even unilaterally if need be. Conference was another manifestation of growing ties between apartheid and American civil rights issues. Leaders of CORE and other civil right organizations were prominent. Day before conference opening American Negro Leadership Conference members met with 25 African ambassadors. CORE member of delegation told Secretary American Negroes and civil rights movement would insist on identifying Sharpeville with Selma and demand forceful action, whether or not it was successful. Labor and civil rights spokesmen, however, disagreed among themselves about ability of leaders to arouse rapidly mass interest of unions and civil rights organizations in remote South African situation. Sidelight was tribute Victor Reuther paid courageous unionists who were struggling for genuine labor principles in South Africa. AFL-CIO, he said, favored increasing ties with them. Demonstrations were held March 19 in New York City, Boston and San Francisco against US firms in business with South Africa. Main demonstration was by students and CORE against Chase Manhattan's Wall Street office, where 49 were arrested. On March 23 conferees demonstrated at Commerce Department and were received by Commerce officials. Embassy authorized use background on conference and demonstrations in its discretion in informal conversations with South African officials to impress them with growing concern American interest groups over racial discrimination Southern Africa and with seriousness USG views Court issue. Remarks of Secretary to delegation, however, are FYI. Rusk
602. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa/1/ Washington, April 12, 1965, 3:46 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Meyers; cleared by Captain Coward in OPNAV, Williams, and Hooper; and approved by Kitchen. Sent to Cape Town, and repeated to Pretoria. 111. Joint State-Defense message. Re: Visit USS Independence (Capetown's 129)./2/ Appreciate SAG clearance of visit USS Independence. Number of flights from Independence to Capetown involving landing onshore will be few, and generally limited to those necessary to assure in advance of Independence docking all necessary actions have been taken to facilitate mooring of ship, handling mail, etc. /2/Dated April 7. (Ibid.) In informing SAG of foregoing, however, you should indicate to Duplooy USG cannot accept any stipulation regarding utilization crew members including any which would result in racial segregation. If SAG should make such a condition of visits US will have to plan its Naval operations to exclude calls in Republic. Ship's aircraft including helicopters will of course refrain from taking photographs of military establishments and their immediate environment in Cape peninsula area as requested. Further details should be handled by Embassy Naval Attache through establishment channels, as indicated Deptel 67./3/ /3/Dated February 25. (Ibid.) FYI. We recognize visit of vessel such as Independence bound stimulate public interest, as noted Embassy's 130./4/ Will provide press guidance as soon as possible. /4/Dated April 8. (Ibid.) Rusk
603. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa/1/ Washington, April 13, 1965, 6:24 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Campbell and Kriebel; cleared by Hooper, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Stephen M. Schwebel, Sisco, Buffum, MacKnight, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Frank D. Taylor, Runyon, Fredericks, and Komer at the White House; and approved by Williams. Sent to Cape Town and London, and repeated to Pretoria, Paris, Rome, USUN, Bonn, Ottawa, Tokyo, The Hague, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Oslo by pouch. 114. Ref: Deptel 74 to Cape Town./2/ US and UK agreed at London Africa talks March 23 desirable both countries make early confidential approaches to SAG about ramifications SWA problem after ICJ judgment. Aim would be continuing discussion with appropriate levels in SAG, if possible, to keep fully advised SAG thinking and to encourage contingency planning by SAG for response following judgment which will avoid UN-SAG confrontation and facilities accommodation. British initially anticipated difficulties beginning discussions now but subsequently concluded current SAG efforts in London to discuss sanctions questions with UK officials might provide basis for broader talks to include consequences of ICJ judgment. /2/Telegram 74 to Cape Town, March 4, expressed the Department's belief that the United States and the United Kingdom should initiate and carry on a dialogue about the South West Africa problem with the South African Foreign Office during the months remaining before the ICJ judgment. (Ibid.) Embassy Cape Town should discuss soonest with British Embassy timing, level of approach, and content of these first representations. US should then begin dialogue with Foreign Minister Muller. If UK Embassy not prepared to make own representations within reasonable time of your first talk with Muller or if there substantial disagreement on content, Embassy should request further instructions. In Dept view commencement of dialogue should be low key, such as incidental to call on Foreign Minister concerning some other matter or informal exchange of views on possible nature of judgment and of choices available to parties to case and to UN after judgment. Developments of past year in South Africa, in US and in US relations in Africa and elsewhere emphasize it essential we make clear US policy with respect South Africa under administration President Johnson continues be one of firm support for rule of law and racial justice. There has been no softening on these fundamental issues. Significance growing and articulate interest American public, particularly churches, trade unions, students and, above all, civil rights groups in South African situation and ICJ case may not be realistically appreciated by SAG. Based on reports of American visitors to South Africa, probing pressures by SAG on such items as Ford boycott, and conversations with SAG representatives in US and elsewhere, there is reason believe SAG may be operating on mistaken premises that USG softening its policy. This is not so. Both UK Ambassador and SAG Fonoff should understand USG desires dialogue because in its view SA course respecting ICJ judgment can have most importance consequences for SA position in world and USG policies toward SA. Initial talks should cover at least following six points: 1. US believes it would be useful to initiate conversations with SAG on problems which may arise as result of ICJ decision whatever its substance. USG regards these as logical follow-up to representations made in Spring 1963 and as extension continuing frank exchanges on matters mutual concern. US appreciative of spirit in which past conversations, including those in Spring 1964, received by SAG. 2. US interest in subject stems from policy of support for rule of law and authority of ICJ and its participation in UN which is bound to be seized of various aspects of South West African problem, as well as USG constant desire for peaceful disposition of SWA issues. 3. USG would welcome views of SAG on shape it thinks ICJ decision might take. 4. Without wishing to prejudge outcome of Court case USG believes it would be prudent to discuss all contingencies including those ICJ rulings and UN responses which might be most unsatisfactory from SAG point of view. 5. US would welcome opportunity to continue conversations on this subject from time to time as desirable. 6. Should ICJ judgment follow 1950 advisory opinion that SWA still under Mandate, that SAG still subject to Mandate and Article 22 of Covenant, and that UNGA has succeeded to League's supervisory functions, prompt declaration by SAG of readiness to comply, and action by SAG evidencing intention to respect judgment, for example by sending annual report and negotiating appropriate supervisory machinery to give effect to judgment, could forestall precipitate UN action. Such an approach essential to counter efforts in GA to terminate Mandate or pressure for SC action under Article 94. 7. As to apartheid, even if judgment rules certain practices incompatible with Mandate obligations, we would hope SAG would not react negatively, and would take time consider all implications and advantages maintaining its traditional attitude of respect for ICJ and the law. Rejection of judgment on racial matters would create major complications jeopardizing any prospect for moderate solution of SWA problem. Embassy may wish to cover point 7 in subsequent conversation because of SA sensitivity and possibility judgment may be less clear about apartheid. In London talks UK expressed view that SAG might prefer give up Mandate rather than submit to international supervision, provided territory demilitarized. Dept believes talks should proceed on assumption SAG wishes to retain Mandate but Embassy should note any indication of SAG consideration of relinquishing Mandate rather than submit to international supervision. Following Embassy report of opening talks Cape Town Dept will arrange similar conversations with Ambassador Taswell whose first meeting with Secretary still pending and unscheduled. N.B. London's 4939 to the Dept/3/ indicates UK Emb Cape Town has already been instructed make similar approach to SAG. /3/Dated April 9. (Ibid.) For Embassy London: Advise Fonoff and report reaction to Dept and Cape Town. Rusk
604. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, May 3, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139. Secret. Dear Dean: Pursuant to the National Policy Paper on South Africa,/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed an analysis of the feasibility of using U.S. military forces as a part of a possible UN peace-keeping action, either to enforce a decision of the International Court of Justice regarding South West Africa or to enforce economic sanctions against South Africa. A copy of this analysis is attached. /2/Document 600. The most significant factor in the Chiefs' analysis involves the magnitude of forces which might be required. If the South African Government were to reach a decision to use force in resisting an adverse ICJ decision, the Chiefs believe that it would employ two light infantry divisions in South West Africa, keeping other South African units in reserve for the defense of South Africa proper. Against the units in South West Africa, the Chiefs consider that at least a four division force would be needed, at an overall force strength of about 160,000, supported by three wings of land-based aircraft and three carrier task forces. These forces would be supplemented by air and sea lift forces. Needless to say, if an action against South Africa proper were contemplated, considerably larger forces would be needed. In the opinion of the Chiefs, the imposition of a naval blockade against South Africa alone would involve four carrier task forces, comprising four carriers, twenty-four destroyers and eight submarines on station. An extension of the blockade to the Angola and Mozambique coasts would entail an additional three carrier task force. The normal requirements of rotation, repair and the like would treble the overall number of ships if a blockade were maintained for an extended period. The difficulties in mounting either military operation would be formidable. There would first be the task of finding the equivalent of four U.S. divisions that could fight together effectively against the forces of a modern, well-equipped and well-trained adversary. There would then follow the problems of organization, command, logistic support and other complexities associated with a military operation under international auspices. It is at least questionable whether the UK, France or any other of our NATO allies would contribute to either a land operation or a naval blockade and, as a result, the brunt of any Western contributions would fall on the United States. The consequence would be an extremely costly diversion of U.S. forces. In light of the above and other politico-military consequences which the Chiefs also note, they have strongly recommended against any military involvement in support of UN actions in southern Africa. I believe that you will find the Chiefs' view particularly helpful in putting the dangers of such involvement in proper perspective. I am sending a copy of this letter to McGeorge Bundy. Sincerely, Bob
605. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State/1/ Cape Town, May 5, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 S AFR-US. Confidential; Immediate. No time of transmission appears on the source text; the telegram was received at 3:13 p.m. Repeated to Pretoria and Defense. 163. Department pass Defense. Reference Deptel 130/2/ and previous ref USS Independence. /2/Dated May 4. (Ibid.) I called on Foreign Minister Muller at his request at 5 p.m. Naude and Dunn were with him. Minister first expressed regret that arrangements which had previously been handled at military level had gotten into political sphere. I pointed out it had gotten into that sphere by action of his own department. Muller then referred to our mixed receptions. He said SAG feels very strongly that diplomats should observe customs of country. I said I had explained why we could not do so in this case to Prime Minister when matter first arose. Muller continued that reason he raised this question was that US Embassy did nevertheless pursue its legal right to do what it pleased in our Embassy. SAG therefore intended insist on same right with reference to its two airports whose use we had requested here. I raised question whether there was any difference in international law between a war vessel and a military aircraft or between our use of harbors and airports. Minister thereupon made it clear he was trying to confine issue in this case to use of DF Malan and Ysterplaat Airports and not to use of harbor by Independence. Minister then went on to say that in future where groups of Americans wished to use SA facilities they would be required to observe SA rules. I said in other words you are raising in this case what was first put as a suggestion to a condition. He said yes this was so but that he hoped this issue might fall away in present case. Reason for this was that military (who are obviously anxious for Independence to call here) felt assured that in present case there would in fact be no violation of rule he had just stated. I said I could give him no such assurance and was confident that no naval commander could or would take step to segregate any navy crew in any naval aircraft. Indicating concern at my negative reply Muller then explained that if our policy could be complied with while at the same time USN observed SA's policy there would be no problem. Both Naude and Dunn from their remarks made it clear that they were very hopeful that this formula, namely that if both SA's and our policies were observed (presumably because of absence of mixed crews), it might make it possible for visit to take place. In course of conversation I pointed out that USN aircraft with non-white members had in fact used these same airports before. I also said that of course it would be a convenience for Independence to stop at Capetown. Furthermore our naval vessels had especially enjoyed using SA ports because of the hospitality that had been rendered them. Comment: Conversation lasted some 40 minutes. Foregoing how- ever is essence of what was said. Miller kept expressing regret that matter had gotten to political plan. By this he may well have meant that he had had to refer it to Prime Minister. Minister, Naude and Dunn all seemed concerned that I had reacted negatively throughout to their proposed solution. If sufficient importance is attached to visit of Independence to Capetown, problem can of course be settled by making no use of aircraft on board Independence. Minister made it abundantly clear that use of harbor by ship was most welcome. I am not however recommending this. From foregoing it is clear that SAG not only has not given an inch on this issue but has raised what was only a suggestion to a condition. It also seems clear they would like Independence to call at Capetown but on their own terms. Unfortunately their equation of use by our naval aircraft of the two local airports with our multi-racial entertaining makes their terms even less acceptable. Prime Minister may well believe that our need to refuel Independence is so great that he can take this opportunity to teach us a lesson. I recommend that we not permit him to do so. I gave no indication of what I thought reaction of my government would be but said simply I would report our conversation to Department./3/ /3/Telegram 133 to Cape Town, May 7, instructed the Embassy to inform the South African Government that the U.S. Government was withdrawing its request for a Cape Town port visit by the USS Independence. (Ibid.) Satterthwaite
606. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 10, 1965, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. Secret. SUBJECT South African industrialist Harry Oppenheimer (biography attached)/2/ has come to Washington to discuss Southern African affairs. Oppenheimer is a liberal South African whose views on race relations conflict with those of South African Prime Minister Verwoerd ("fair-VOR T"). Before his appointment with you, he will see Rusk and Ball. Because of his great influence in the commercial world and excellence contacts, your meeting could serve to (a) obtain his informed estimate of future trends in Southern Africa, and (b) impress on him certain US ideas for passing to political and business leaders in South Africa. /2/Not attached. Oppenheimer's visit is probably prompted by his concern over the slow deterioration in US political relations with South Africa. For example, the South African Government has increased its public criticism of the US Embassy's inter-racial entertaining. Most recently, South African restrictions on the use of inter-racial crews on flights from the carrier Independence resulted in our cancelling its port call at Cape Town. We are in turn deeply concerned about the accelerating trend toward Government-sanctioned racial discrimination ("apartheid") and extreme political repression in South Africa. "Apartheid" in particular is a major handicap to the Free World in its efforts to stabilize the political situation in Africa and keep the Chicoms and Soviets out. Our determination to solve our own racial problems in America, and our dedication to the democratic ideal, make it difficult to maintain friendly relations with South Africa. The gut problem in our relations with South Africa is that the policies of the Verwoerd government are driving the rest of the world into a kind of opposition which in turn will probably only make the South Africans more bitter and determined. We have had to stop selling arms to South Africa and there will be heavy pressure for further action if and when the International Court of Justice rules against the South Africans on their application of apartheid to South West Africa. We receive Negro and liberal deputations all the time which ask us to apply "sanctions." We tell them that such measures would only make such things worse, but what is there that would make things better? Oppenheimer, as the attached biography shows, is a man who might have the answers, if anyone does. So I think you may want to feel him out on this central question. R.H.
607. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 13, 1965, 9:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12. Confidential. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson that reads: "Mr. President: I think this memorandum, drafted by two members of my staff, is worth reading. The statement referred to in the last paragraph will not be issued except in response to questioning. For your information, Charles Johnson is a veteran NSC Staff Officer who monitors NASA and AEC. Rick Haynes is a talented young Negro Foreign Service Officer who covers Africa under Bob Komer. It was Johnson's initiative that led to the contingency planning which had given us a prospect of alternative facilities if we run into a dead-end with the South Africans. McG. B." Status Report--Tracking Stations in South Africa. For his own domestic political reasons Prime Minister Verwoerd is taking a tough line toward our non-segregation policy. In a recent speech he said that South Africa would not permit US Negroes to work at US space tracking stations in his country. His statement following only weeks after South Africa's similar ban on mixed aircrews from our carrier Independence and after repeated official criticism of the US Embassy for holding multi-racial functions. Your accomplishments in race relations and civil rights here at home make it essential that our position on similar issues abroad be consistent with domestic policy. Failure to do so if this issue becomes widely publicized, would alienate some members of Congress, American Negroes, civil rights groups, labor, church groups and liberals in general. It would also jeopardize our continued use of important installations in the rest of Africa, and could result in some loss of Afro-Asian and Latin American support in the UN. However, it might also force us to get out of certain US installations in South Africa. NASA, DOD and the Smithsonian have space facilities manned by 143 South African contract employees and 53 Americans. None of the Americans is Negro. Some of these facilities are required to read out "Mariner IV" pictures of Mars this month, and for the first attempts at a "Surveyor" lunar landing in the fall of 1965 and spring of 1966. We've anticipated this problem, and through sensible contingency planning alternate facilities are now under construction in Madagascar, Spain and on Ascension Island. They will be fully operational by June 1966. To meet expected continuing pressure to accommodate to South American racial practices, we are (a) examining emergency measures to be taken if early evacuation becomes necessary; and (b) fixing the timing of the scheduled transfer of facilities to assure the least interference with our on-going space programs. In the past, the US has quietly complied with South African racial practices by not spending Negros to represent us at our Embassy or other official establishments. However, we probably cannot continue to avoid the issue. Therefore, the State Department is considering issuing a statement emphasizing that (a) the tracking station agreements contain no racial clauses, (b) the South African Government has not approached us for modification of these agreements, and (c) the US cannot accept the imposition of racial conditions by the South African Government at our tracking facilities. While avoiding a confrontation, this approach puts us on record as firmly opposed to racist conditions on our activities in South Africa. It remains to be seen if the South African Government will choose to press the issue. Charles E. Johnson
608. Note From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, July 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. II, Cables, 11/64-9/66. Secret. McGB/2/ /2/Komer crossed out the initials "RWK" and wrote "McGB" on the source text. FYI. In response to this incredible and unprecedented request from the SAG for the transfer of three senior members of our Embassy staff,/3/ AF is recommending the following courses of action to the Secretary: /3/In telegram 97 from Pretoria, July 28, Satterthwaite reported that Acting Foreign Secretary Naude, under instructions from the Prime Minister, had suggested that the Ambassador should have three senior members of the Embassy staff (William H. Witt, Patrick O'Sheel, and Argus Tresidder) and Consul Horace F. Byrne at Port Elizabeth transferred because the South African Government had "lost confidence in them." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 US-S AFR) 1) that Ambassador Satterthwaite be immediately recalled for consultation;/4/ /4/A notation in Komer's handwriting in the margin of the source text reads. "Grrr." 2) that before the Ambassador's departure he be instructed to make a stiff statement of our position to the SAG Foreign Minister; 3) that the Secretary recommend to Dr. Weinberg, Director of the Oakridge National Laboratory, that he not go to South Africa next week to attend the opening ceremonies inaugurating the American-made research nuclear reactor. Should the SAG resort to the extreme measure of declaring the three Embassy officers PNG, AF would recommend our immediate retaliation against three already identified members of the South African Embassy here in Washington./5/ /5/A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text reads: "This is the kind of problem the State Department can handle--a highly esoteric form of tit-for-tat. RWK." Rick
609. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, July 31, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. Sent under cover of a July 31 memorandum from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. No drafting information appears on the source text. STATUS REPORT ON NSAM NO. 295 OF Key Factors in Current Relations with South Africa /2/NSAM No. 295 is Document 586. Apartheid and Tracking Stations The South African Government has informed our Ambassador that it does not wish or intend that past public statements relating apartheid to tracking stations should lead to official confrontation. The Prime Minister's extemporaneous speech at De Aar on June 25 was for internal political consumption according to Foreign Minister Muller. No South African official has commented in public on the issue since that date. It appears that the South African Government in the face of sharp attacks from its political opposition and some growing concern among business leaders is prepared pro tem to abandon the subject, except for lingering echoes in the Nationalist press. Alternate Sites As the result of actions begun over a year ago, NASA and DOD would be prepared, if necessary, to move all space tracking operations from South Africa to alternate sites (principally Malagasy, Spain, Ascension) by June 1966 without serious degradation to scheduled programs. (See details below in action on paragraph 4 of NSAM 295.) Timing of ICJ Judgment on South West Africa The best current prediction is that the ICJ, now in summer recess, will not make its decision on the pending South West Africa cases until March or April 1966. This is based on recent estimates by the Court Secretariat and by Ernest Gross, Counsel for the Applicants. The South African Government has called up numerous witnesses and will continue this process when the Court resumes session this fall. Future Action Lines of action set forth in NSAM 295 and the National Policy Paper on South Africa continue to comprise adequate policy framework. NASA and DOD are proceeding as rapidly as possible to complete and equip alternate tracking stations. Other issues will continue to complicate our relations with South Africa, and Prime Minister Verwoerd may well move to create new incidents. We are currently involved in a serious situation involving a South African Government initiative against personnel of our Embassy. This was unpredictable. A further deterioration in increasingly strained relations may come with a possible showdown between South Africa and the United Nations over South West Africa in late 1966. Between now and then the perennial problem of apartheid resolutions in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly may complicate relations with Afro-Asian powers. Pressures may increase in Security Council and General Assembly sessions this coming fall for more concerned UN action against apartheid in South Africa. Consideration is being given to US-UK strategy during the period still ahead before the ICJ decision. Diplomatic discussion designed to persuade South Africa that its best long-range interests would be served by complying with the ICJ decision will be resumed later this year. Informally this point is being made whenever the opportunity arises in talks with both official and non-official South Africans here and at our posts in South Africa. Consideration of additional measures such as higher level approaches will be reserved until the date of the ICJ judgment approaches. NSAM Decisions--Implications and Prospects Following numbered paragraphs correspond to the seven numbered paragraphs of NSAM 295: 1. Defer Implementation of Odendaal Report The South African Government has continued to postpone action on controversial political recommendations of the Odendaal report. However, the Government has continued to lay the groundwork for dividing South West Africa into little Bantustans largely responsible to departments of the Republic. Such actions include buying land to facilitate redistributing the population, a propaganda ploy about Ovambo chiefs petitioning for an Ovambostan, a Government-sponsored visit by South West African chiefs and headmen to the Transkei "State", and planning by a South African Government committee for administrative reorganization of the relationships between South African and South West African units of government. The South African Government also has rushed economic and social development such as roads, airfields, schools and hospitals in an obvious attempt to influence favorably the International Court of Justice and world and South African opinion. To ensure that this outpouring of funds is fully appreciated, the South African Government has invited the Court to visit South Africa and South West Africa as well as other parts of the continent. 2. Policy Regarding Military Sales The arms ban policy continues to be carefully observed. Consistent with the posture adopted by the President in the case of the proposed sale to South Africa of Lockheed Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft, United States representatives in the appropriate NATO committee have been successful in deferring action on the sale to South Africa of a NATO consortium-sponsored aircraft, the Brequet Atlantique. So called "Gray Area" items continue to arise either in Commerce or in the Department of State, and they are treated on an ad hoc basis. These are items suitable for either military or civilian end use but not on the controlled Munitions list; or on the Munitions List, but covered by exceptional treatment accorded in the case of some follow-on spare parts. 3. Suspension of Action on Applications for United States Government Loans and Investment Guarantees In June 1965, the Department interposed no objection to an application to the Eximbank for a guarantee to cover diesel engines manufactured in the United States to be supplied to South Africa for assembling in 25 locomotives for the Mozambique Department of Port, Railroad and Transportation Service. We looked upon this transaction as mainly concerning the United States and Mozambique. Only one other rather special case has arisen in connection with this policy. A New York firm had applied to FCIA for Short Term Political Risks Insurance coverage, including $30,000 in military equipment to be exported to South Africa in the next twelve months. The Department requested the Eximbank to advise the exporter that, because of our strict arms embargo policy, the Eximbank would not be prepared to cover any proposed military shipments to South Africa. 4. Alternative Space Tracking Facilities By June 1966 NASA and DOD space stations in South Africa, if necessary or desirable, could be closed down without damage to programs other than relatively minor degradation. NASA and DOD have been planning and arranging for facilities alternate to those in South Africa. NASA's needs can be met elsewhere by mid-1966 through: (1) the completion of alternate facilities at Ascension Island by April 1966, and in Spain and Malagasy by June 1966; (2) the continued use in South Africa by DOD on NASA's behalf of DOD's GLOTRAC system near Pretoria through the second quarter of 1966 to support NASA's testing of the Centaur launch vehicle (to be used by Surveyor); and (3) the assumption by NASA on Madagascar of certain DOD tracking and telemetry tasks being performed now at the DOD station in South Africa. These latter tasks include support of NASA launches. The NASA facilities in Malagasy are being planned to handle these DOD tasks, if DOD were to withdraw from South Africa. DOD's needs can be met on six-months notice by equipment installed, or removed, to available sites elsewhere. Thus, after the completion of the Centaur tests in the second quarter of 1966, the DOD facilities will not be critical for either DOD or NASA projects, provided NASA can assume certain tracking and telemetry tasks on Madagascar. Negotiations for additional land in Malagasy and Spain were initiated in May and June 1965, respectively. Completion of negotiations in Spain is expected by mid-October. In Malagasy, oral agreement has been obtained; however, these negotiations relate only to NASA facilities. It is now believed that the Malagasy Government's approval should be obtained for NASA to cover certain DOD requirements. No difficulty is expected, but a delay in obtaining the necessary approval may occur. Such delays in negotiations need not slow up the contingency program, however. 5. Program to Persuade South Africa to Comply with International Court of Justice Decision and to Encourage Moderate Whites in South Africa US-UK Talks with Foreign Minister Muller. Due primarily to the number of witnesses South Africa is using, the judgment of the International Court of Justice on South Africa's obligations as Mandatory of South West Africa is now not expected until March-April 1996. The British and American Ambassador separately commenced in April 1965 a dialogue with the South African Foreign Minister about the South West Africa issue. They sought to influence the South African Government in the direction of contingency planning for prompt compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice, whatever its substance might turn out to be. Ambassador Satterthwaite stressed United States support for the rule of law and for the authority of the Court, and the advisability of contingency planning by the South African Government for the possibility of an ICJ decision adverse to South Africa. The Independence and tracking station incidents in May-July 1965 delayed resumption of the United States talks; but the British Ambassador on May 24, in an interview with Foreign Minister Muller before going on long leave, brought up the subject a second time. He used a possible Security Council debate on the report of the Security Council Committee on Measures as the occasion for mentioning the desirability of avoiding a confrontation. The British Embassy in Pretoria, like our own, intends to raise the South West Africa issue with the Foreign Affairs Department as occasions arise. United States contingency planning for the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and the next General Assembly could provide such occasions for resumed talks with Muller. Other Talks and Briefing. In the Department at all levels opportunities are used to implant among South African as well as foreign diplomats of countries such as Canada, Australia, Japan, Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Belgium the importance of the International Court of Justice judgment and the serious problems, if the South African Government were to fail to comply. Non-official Americans on the way to Africa and South Africa, such as jurists and historians, and South Africans also are briefed thoroughly on this subject, particularly those likely to discuss this matter with influential South Africans. After further talks with Foreign Minister Muller, it will, at an appropriate stage, be desirable to make more systematic our conversations about the issue with governments other than the British. These could be carried on in Washington, various capitals and New York in conjunction with talks about the prospective Security Council session on apartheid and sanctions, and before and during the upcoming United Nations General Assembly session. The Department repeatedly has endeavored to encourage writers--scholars as well as journalists--to treat adequately in their publications the potential significance of the International Court of Justice case to South Africa's future prospects, in a manner to bring maximum realization to South Africa of the possible consequences of failure to comply without delay. The Department discreetly has encouraged public ventilation of the issue in ways likely to impress South Africans. Encouragement of Moderate Whites. In diverse ways efforts have been made to help moderate whites in South Africa. On the initiative of the Department of State, an AFL-CIO officer has been working with the multiracial South African Trade Union Council for several months training labor organizers. The United Automobile Workers are arranging to send a fraternal delegation to South Africa. A special effort is being made by the Embassy and Consulates to reach South African youth. Religious and educational groups in the United States have been encouraged to support the moderate Christian Institute in South Africa and to maintain closer contact with their sister churches in South Africa. American businessmen and scientists have been urged to encourage their moderate South African contacts, the businessmen by their example as well as in discussions. Most such briefings have been with individuals, but Ambassador Satterthwaite in South Africa and Governor Williams in Washington have talked to groups of American businessmen along these lines. United States officials have carefully avoided actions which would further strengthen extremists in South Africa--actions such as public espousal of "one-man, one-vote" for South Africa or a United States Government contribution to private funds for legal and welfare aid to persons on trial in South Africa. At the same time, the United States positions during the Independence and tracking station incidents were in part encouragement to moderate whites critical of the South African Government's racialism. 6. Program to Explain United States Objectives to Interested African Countries In addition to supplying copies of the National Policy Paper on South Africa to all our embassies in Africa, background and instructions about our objectives regarding South West Africa are provided on a continuing basis to USUN and to all United States diplomatic missions in Africa. A special effort is made to brief our Ambassadors going out to Africa, the many visitors here from Africa, including students, and Americans likely to discuss the subject with influential Africans. American leader grantees from the legal and judicial fields have been briefed on the South West Africa case and sent to the Hague during the ICJ proceedings prior to their visiting African countries (including South Africa), where they have discussed the issue with influential persons and groups. Departmental officers on African trips also have emphasized the issue in discussions with Africans as well as our own missions. Because the judgment of the Court is not expected until Spring 1966, the United States and the United Kingdom will be increasingly exposed to African pressure for action now regarding apartheid in South Africa itself. To relieve such pressure in the Security Council and General Assembly, instructions to the field have included emphasis on the comprehensiveness of the United States arms embargo and have suggested the desirability of making the embargo effective on the part of other countries. Before the United Nations is asked to consider additional pressures on South Africa, co-operative action should be instituted to close existing gaps in the arms embargo. 7. Analysis of Sanctions The respective bureau heads of the Department concerned with the comprehensive study of possible sanctions against South Africa have been asked for final clearance of the study by August 2, 1965. United States and United Kingdom United Nations delegations in the near future will conduct a series of joint discussions in tactics and strategy in the United Nations after the Court decides the current case on South West Africa. The Department is developing proposals, for discussion with the British, of possible limited measures which could, as appropriate, be used in case of non-compliance by South Africa with the Court's decision. This is still in the preliminary stage. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
