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583. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-309-64 Washington, April 13, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Africa 381 (28 Mar 64). Secret. SUBJECT 1. By JCSM-290-64, dated 8 April 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided their views on the National Policy Paper on South Africa,/2/ and on US Policy toward South Africa by JCSM-292-64, dated 7 April 1964./3/ In extension of these views, they are concerned that, in implementing its policy toward the Government of South Africa with respect to sales of military equipment, the United States may be compromising US military interests in the country. /2/JCSM-290-64 is not printed. (Ibid.) For the final version of the National Policy Paper on South Africa approved by Secretary Rusk on January 18, 1965, see Document 600. /3/JCSM-292-64 provided the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the proposed National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) concerning U.S. policy toward South Africa. (Ibid.) See Document 586. 2. Previous views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on US military requirements in South Africa were provided by JCSM-528-63, dated 20 July 1963, for use in developing a US position on issues expected to be raised in the July 1963 session of the UN Security Council./4/ These views on South Africa were stated, however, in the context of a comparative analysis of US military interests in strategically located Portuguese territories and US interests in North Africa and were therefore properly ranked as of secondary importance. This comparative analysis may have obscured some of the absolute values of strategic military importance represented by South Africa. Active military interests consist of a missile tracking station, a NASA deep space probe satellite tracking station, and a communications facility at Pretoria providing the terminus of the Atlantic Missile Range arterial long-haul communications system. Essential military interests lie in the strategic geographic location of South Africa and the need to deny it to the communists. There remains the need to maintain a rapport with the South African military to provide for cooperation and assistance to fulfill US contingency requirements. /4/Not printed. 3. Subsequent to the establishment of an arms policy toward South Africa, the Department of State has held in abeyance final negotiations for the sale of three submarines (new construction) to South Africa. It is noted that this action has been taken despite Presidential approval to proceed with preliminary discussions with South Africa (in September 1963). It was indicated at that time that the decision to sell submarines would be forthcoming after the end of 1963 "in light of the circumstances at the time." As a consequence, the South African Government now considers that the United States has failed to respond to legitimate requests for the purchase of items which by their nature would be used in a common defense effort and not in actions associated with apartheid. South Africans are now beginning to reflect dissatisfaction and resentment in their military relations with the United States. 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, as indicated in JCSM-292-64, that US policy toward South Africa is sufficiently flexible to permit the United States to pursue its diplomatic objectives and, at the same time, safeguard important military objectives in the country. In the application of US arms policy, it should be possible to distinguish between weapons suitable for use or likely to be used for internal repression and weapons which, by their very nature, would be applicable only to external defense. It is recognized that there are political considerations which make it necessary to limit the introduction of certain types of military equipment, but this should not preclude the sale of appropriate military equipment to the South African Government. An early decision should be made, as indicated in JCSM-292-64, to proceed with the sale of submarines and other appropriate military equipment. Suitable conditions for such transactions can be ensured by a combination of (1) careful selection of the types of equipment to be delivered, (2) quantitative limitations upon such deliveries, and (3) effective arrangement for post-delivery audit with respect to location and utilization of the equipment in question. 5. It is estimated that the favorable effect on our international balance of payments by the sale of three submarines and related types of equipment, during the next three years, would be an in-flow of at least $150 million. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Department of Defense position with respect to sales of military equipment to the Republic of South Africa reflect the views expressed above, that these views be included in the formulation of policies toward South Africa, and that the Department of State be advised of this position. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
584. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 20, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. Sometime within the next year, and perhaps within the next month or so South Africa may refuse to abide by a World Court decision which will probably forbid South Africa to extend apartheid to its mandated territory of South West Africa. We would have no real alternative except to uphold the Court's authority, particularly in light of our own Article 19 case, and therefore may find ourselves in the near future in a major confrontation with South Africa. The attached NSAM represents the substantial agreement of State and Defense on a program to deal with this problem./2/ /2/The attached draft is not printed. For NSAM No. 295, April 24, see Document 586. Specifically the NSAM will-- 1. Suspend military sales (already being done, in practice) and government loans or guarantees. 2. Begin contingency planning for alternate tracking station sites if we have to give up our South African facilities. 3. Direct the State Department to develop a program to persuade the South African Government to accept the authority of the Court. The only significant disagreement with this NSAM is that of the JCS who continue to want military sales to South Africa. However, their position has been previously overruled and they are now restating it for the record. In any event the JCS can reopen the question any time Defense wishes to do so. I believe, therefore, we should proceed with the NSAM but I have prepared it for my signature rather than involve you directly so that you can more freely reconsider the issue at a later time if this becomes necessary. Under this program, we have a year in which to solve the World Court problem, and, at the same time, make a start on the underlying problem of getting the South Africans to adopt a more practical policy than apartheid. I don't think we can get the imagination and flexibility, or the high level talent, or the kind of action we need, however, if we depend on the usual processes of the State Department. Instead I propose to discuss with Secretary Rusk the appointment of a special representative to handle South Africa--a distinguished man, on a part-time basis but with a staff of his own and with full authority, reporting directly to the Secretary. I think we would also need a new Ambassador in South Africa with some real skill in personal diplomacy and I propose to explore this with Walter Jenkins and Ralph Dungan. If you agree I will sign off the NSAM and talk with the Secretary along these lines.
/3/President Johnson checked and initialed this option. McG.B.
585. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State/1/ Cape Town, April 22, 1964, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 S AFR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, USUN, Pretoria, and Lagos. 168. Reference: Department telegrams 116 and 118, Embassy telegrams 158, 164 and 167./2/ Rivonia Trial./3/ /2/Telegram 116 to Cape Town, April 17; telegram 118 to Cape Town, April 20; telegram 158 from Cape Town, April 17; telegram 164 from Cape Town, April 20; telegram 167 from Cape Town, April 21; none printed. (Ibid.) /3/In the "Rivonia" trial, nine African Nationalist leaders, including Nelson Mandela, were charged with planning and carrying out sabotage. The Rivonia trial was so called because of the arrest of a number of the defendants on a farm in Rivonia, Transvaal. I read following statement to FonSec Jooste yesterday afternoon: "Nigerian Foreign Minister Wachuku has expressed to our Ambassador in Lagos his view that if death penalty should be imposed and carried out on Mandela and other defendants in Rivonia sabotage trial it would place moderate African leaders like himself and Government of Nigeria, who are attempting to follow a reasonable course on SA problem, in an impossible situation. I know that you are aware that Mr. Wachuku has taken a moderate position regarding SA and I thought that SAG would wish to know his thinking." I then said I would take advantage of opportunity to make following observation: "While I fully realize that Rivonia case is before the court, and that SAG as well as everyone else must wait court's findings, I also think that SAG should be aware that considerable concern exists among Americans, who follow SA developments within and outside of USG, about possibility and consequences of death sentences in Rivonia trial." Jooste took careful notes. His reaction to Wachuku's statement was calm. To my own observation however he reacted rather violently saying he thought that any comment on trial in process was interference with SA's domestic affairs and judicial procedure. He asked why it was that SA was only country in world which is being subjected to such treatment. Observing that SA courts were known for their fairness and objectivity, he asked whether USG, which is leader in fighting Communism, would stand for a minute for any interference by SAG in any trial of subversives going on in US. Moreover he said defendants in Rivonia trial were being tried for crimes against Constitution and laws of SA. Had we, he asked, made similar observation to other governments whose names he would not mention where no trials were held for persons simply op- posing government? Did my government, he asked, pass on to US court trying the Rosenbergs the international protests that were made or comply with their pleas for clemency? To this outburst I pointed out that I was not making a representation but only an observation and reminded him of Plimpton's explanation of our vote on October 11 resolution quoted Department telegram 2077 to New Delhi./4/ Jooste calmed down and said he recognized that views I had expressed were indeed moderate in tone. /4/Dated April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 S AFR) Comment: Strong reaction of Jooste, who is reasonable man of moderate views and great experience and skill in international affairs, to my very moderate statement convinces me that any further representations on our part while trial is in process can only be counter-productive and could indeed contribute to a state of mind on part of SAG which might lead it to reject appeals for clemency if death sentences should unfortunately be imposed and upheld by Appellate Division of SA Supreme Court. I would like to add very serious warning that any reply to appeal of the Apartheid Committee along lines of Stevenson draft as reported to us by the British (Embassy telegram 167--we apologize for misspelling his name in that telegram) could be expected to provoke sharp reaction from SA Government and have counter-productive effects as far as possibility of death penalties is concerned. It could also endanger our current highly delicate diplomatic efforts with SAG re SWA. Satterthwaite
586. National Security Action Memorandum No. 295/1/ Washington, April 24, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 295, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. Secret. An information copy was sent to the Secretary of Commerce. Copies were sent to Bundy, Brubeck, Haynes, Johnson, and NSC Files. MEMORANDUM TO SUBJECT 1. The State Department should as a matter of urgency develop a comprehensive program of diplomatic activity, based on the response of the South African Government to our two aide-memoires, to the end of assuring that the implementation of the Odendaal report is deferred as long as possible and, hopefully, until the decision on the merits of the case in the International Court of Justice. In developing this program, the Department should consider all available diplomatic techniques, including the use of special emissaries, Presidential communications, etc. It should include modes of securing concerted or parallel action by other interested governments, particularly those in Western Europe. 2. Existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa will be continued. Decision regarding possible sales of submarines or any variations in existing policy will be postponed and considered only in light of further developments, including those in the South West Africa-ICJ problem. 3. US Government lending agencies will for the time being suspend action on applications for loans or investment guarantees with respect to South Africa. There should be no avoidable disclosure of this policy to interested parties, however, and agencies should continue to accept and process applications. No policy of warning private investors not to invest in South Africa will be undertaken pending further developments. 4. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense should immediately undertake such planning for and construction of alternative stand-by facilities as would be required if it became necessary to evacuate the facilities in South Africa on six months' notice. In support of this, the Department of State will determine immediately the political acceptability of countries which the DOD and NASA may indicate as technically feasible and desirable. The Department of State will give priority to accomplishing required site surveys and negotiating necessary base agreements and assisting in needed land acquisition recommended by DOD and NASA. This program shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid its coming to public notice as long as feasible, and in close consultation with the Department of State particularly so that the public aspects and the diplomatic aspects of our relations with South Africa may be coordinated. 5. The State Department will develop a program for actions during the months ahead, pending final ICJ decision in the South West Africa case, aiming to persuade the South African Government to acceptance of the Court's decision. In addition to use of available pressures, particular attention will be given to exploring possible bases for accommodation and understanding with more moderate members of the South African white community along the lines proposed by the State Department's memorandum of March 10th./2/ /2/Reference is to the March 10 Department of State briefing paper prepared for the NSC Standing Group; see Document 579. 6. The State Department, in consultation with other interested agencies, will develop a program to explain privately to interested African countries the character and objectives of our program in order to try to obtain their understanding and cooperation. 7. The Department of State shall immediately undertake a comprehensive analysis of the various sanctions that could be considered if South Africa does not accept the ICJ decision on South West Africa. This analysis should include an estimate of the effectiveness on South Africa of the sanction if general compliance were obtained and of the prospects for obtaining such compliance. McGeorge Bundy
587. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 4, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, "B." Confidential. Attached is proposed US position for UN Security Council debate and resolution later this month on South Africa. Key points we will support-- 1. Appeal for clemency in South African sabotage trials against nationalist leaders. 2. Security Council committee study of possible economic sanctions against South Africa (but making clear no US pre-commitment on sanctions). Essentially, there are just minimum concessions we think must be made to African pressures in order to win Security Council vote; our immediate purpose is to buy time pending next year's World Court decision on South Africa's mandate policy in South West Africa, and this should do it. B./2/ /2/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Brubeck's signature.
/3/This option is checked.
Attachment Washington, May 3, 1964. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT The United Nations Security Council will probably be called into session by the African states about mid-May to consider again the problem of apartheid. Continuing failure of the Government of South Africa to mitigate its discriminatory racial policies, the trials of leading African nationalists and the completion of recommendations on next steps by a UN expert study group will lend impetus to demands for more far-reaching UN action against South Africa. We expect the Council to focus on four major subjects: (1) the trials in South Africa of several hundred people in the past year under various South African security laws; (2) a multi-racial conference involving the UN in South Africa on the country's future; (3) establishment of a committee to study sanctions; and (4) the imposition of sanctions on South Africa in the event the first two subjects are not satisfactorily settled. Our objectives in the meeting will be to maintain our posture of opposing apartheid without going so far as to invite a rupture of our ties with South Africa and to defer a substantive decision on the imposition of economic sanctions until close to the time (1965) when the International Court of Justice hands down its ruling on South Africa's conduct of its mandate in South West Africa. To maintain the credibility of our anti-apartheid position, to avoid being faced with a vote on a resolution which we could not support, and to demonstrate our continuing concern about the need for movement by the South African Government, we plan to take an active lead in seeking support for a resolution containing the following major elements: 1. an appeal to South Africa to end arrests and detentions without charges and without trials, to exercise clemency in the trials of African leaders, and to grant amnesty to political prisoners who have not been guilty of common crimes; 2. provision for UN-sponsored educational and training programs for South Africa; 3. establishment of a committee of all Security Council members to make a broad study of sanctions, including those cited in the report of the UN Expert Study Group; however, we would make clear our support for such a study does not commit us to implement sanctions at some future date; and 4. endorsement of the need for a multi-racial dialogue in South Africa. Dean Rusk
588. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 73-64 Washington, May 20, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 20. SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA Conclusions A. The Nationalist government is firmly entrenched in power, despite some internal differences on specific applications of apartheid policies. The white opposition is divided. Virtually all the white population supports white supremacy. The nonwhite majority has virtually no political rights and is disorganized. The police are well armed and highly efficient and will ruthlessly suppress any outbreaks of violence. We do not believe that internal developments alone will cause a significant change in basic domestic policies for the next year or two and probably for considerably longer. (Paras. 1, 5-10) B. Calls for more severe international action, particularly economic sanctions, may come in response to the bloody suppression of rioting, as a result of various discussions in the UN, or in the event of a South African refusal to comply with UN demands arising from the final ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on South West Africa. (Paras. 17-20) C. We consider it unlikely that any outside pressures brought to bear on South Africa would cause the government to alter its basic domestic policies./2/ They might only harden the Nationalists in their determination to go their own way. However, there is some flexibility and possibility of accommodation with respect to South West Africa. South Africans regard the US attitude toward international pressures as important and almost certainly believe that the US and UK would be likely to take a strong position in respect to a final ICJ decision on South West Africa. (Paras. 12-16) /2/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that there is an even chance that a military enforced blockade against South Africa would produce a realignment of forces within the white community and a shift away from present apartheid policies. [Footnote in the source text.] [Here follows the body of the paper.]
589. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-439-64 Washington, May 22, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Africa 381. Secret. SUBJECT 1. In a memorandum, dated 3 April 1964, subject: "U.S. Policy Towards South Africa," the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) relating to US policy toward South Africa. These views were provided by JCSM-292-64, dated 7 April 1964./2/ The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently have noted that their views were not reflected in NSAM No. 295, dated 24 April 1964./3/ /2/See footnote 3, Document 583. /3/Document 586. 2. The NSAM requires: a. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense to undertake immediately "such planning for and construction of alternative stand-by facilities as would be required if it became necessary to evacuate the facilities in South Africa on 6 months' notice"; b. The Department of State to give "priority to accomplishing required site surveys and negotiating necessary base agreements and assisting in needed land acquisition" for alternative facilities in other countries; c. US Government lending agencies to "suspend action on applications for loans or investment guarantees with respect to South Africa"; d. The Department of State to undertake immediately "a comprehensive analysis of the various sanctions that could be considered" if South Africa does not accept the pending decision of the International Court of Justice on Southwest Africa; and e. The postponement of any decision regarding the possible sale of submarines to South Africa, and any variation in existing policy regarding military sales to South Africa, without reference to the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCSM-309-64, dated 13 April 1964./4/ /4/Document 583. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the thrust of these provisions of NSAM No. 295 may lead the United States to an inflexible position of attempting, without likelihood of success, to force South African compliance with external views in seeking precipitate solutions to South Africa's racial problems and the problem of Southwest Africa. Such provisions at this time are believed to be counterproductive to US interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such provisions are reminiscent of attempts made by the United States, with tragic consequences, to influence the domestic policies of the Chiang Kai-shek government in 1946 and the Batista government in 1958. In both of these cases, the political, military, and economic support necessary to maintain in power anticommunist governments was withheld. This should not be permitted to happen in South Africa. 4. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their views that the objectives of the United States toward South Africa should include its alignment with the Western Powers and the continuance of existing deep-space and tracking facilities in South Africa. As long as communist penetration and racial discord in Africa remain an active threat to Free World interests, stability in South Africa is desirable and the United States should do everything that its political and moral position permits to contribute to this. It should be noted that these views are in consonance with those of the US Embassy in South Africa which has stated that "We should not risk our valuable defense, space and economic advantages in South Africa by making a major demarche in support of proposals which would be so radical in view of the South African white population that extremists could rally most of the whites in rejecting them"; and that radical measures ". . . would disrupt the highly developed South African economy and the maintenance of internal security, both of which are necessary preconditions for real progress on race problems." The Embassy has also stated that "We are not operating under threat of any immediate drastic security crisis in South Africa and the only threat to peace is from outside South Africa." 5. It is recommended that, as a matter of urgency, you discuss these views with the President and the Secretary of State and that you advise them to revise NSAM No. 295 to avoid precipitate measures that could result in the loss of South Africa in the strategy of Western defense. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
590. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs (Hooper) to the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hilliker)/1/ Washington, June 5, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 29 S AFR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Runyon and Hall. SUBJECT The Rivonia Trial More than 90 trials for subversion and sabotage in South Africa have taken place since January 1963. The most important of these is the "Rivonia" trial, held at Pretoria, in which the court is expected to hand down a judgment about June 11. The nine defendants are charged with planning and carrying out sabotage and six have confessed their guilt. Our Embassy estimates that the death penalty will not be imposed on any of these six and that one or more others may be acquitted. The trial has dramatized, through defendants' statements, the degree to which ever harsher measures denying opportunities for peaceful political protest against apartheid in South Africa have influenced the non-whites to turn to violent methods. Two of the best-known leaders of the African political opposition, who are officers of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, are among the accused. The trial has already occasioned world-wide attention and protests by church and civil rights groups and there has been considerable public concern about these and other political trials evidenced in this country. International support for amnesty for South African political prisoners and clemency for persons convicted in trials such as the "Rivonia" trial has been growing. In April our Ambassador conveyed to the South African Government our concern over the possibility and consequences of death sentences in the "Rivonia" trial. In our view such sentences, if carried out, would seriously increase the obstacles to a peaceful solution of South African problems./2/ /2/On June 9, by a vote of 7 to 0 with 4 abstentions (including the United States), the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 190 (1964) appealing to the South African Government to end the Rivonia trial. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 796-797. For text of U.S. Representative Plimpton's statement expressing U.S. opposition to interference in the judicial process of South Africa, see ibid., pp. 797-798. On June 12, eight of the nine defendants were found guilty of sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment.
591. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 5, 1964. [Source: Department of State, INR Files, Country Files, Republic of South Africa, 1964 Thru. Secret; Special Handling. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
592. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, June 18, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Director of the Office of UN Affairs William B. Buffum and Hennes. SUBJECT Early this afternoon, the Security Council adopted by a vote of 8-0-3 (USSR, Czechoslovakia, France) the Norwegian/Bolivian resolution on apartheid in South Africa (Tab A)./2/ /2/For text of Security Council Resolution 191 (1964), June 18, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1964, pp. 802-804. Particularly noteworthy was the affirmative vote of the United Kingdom. Although the British had continued to be unwilling to work openly for the resolution's adoption, their position changed from a reluctant abstention to a guarded endorsement of the resolution. In addition, the British for the first time agreed to participate in the sanctions study committee. I believe our talks with them last week--on which I have reported to you--contributed substantially to allaying British fears by convincing them that (a) a study committee was a useful time-consuming device; (b) we would seek to assure that the committee's work was serious and constructive; and (c) that UK participation would help assure a responsible approach by the committee. The African members of the Council (Morocco and the Ivory Coast), while supporting the resolution, expressed disappointment that it did not include sanctions. I consider this was a sop to the more radical segments of African opinion who had played a very tough negotiating game throughout the proceedings. In the last analysis, however, they all recognized the art of the possible and apparently considered that even this modest step is a net gain in their war on apartheid. Creation of the committee, however, is admittedly a far cry from the recommendations of the Expert Study Group which called for the application of sanctions against South Africa if the South Africa Government refused to respond satisfactorily "by an early date" to a Security Council invitation to discuss the formation of a National Convention of all races of South Africa. The Communist powers, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, explained their abstentions on the ground that the resolution was too weak and that it did not invoke sanctions against South Africa. They blamed this alleged deficiency on the U.S., the U.K., and France. The France explained their abstention by their opposition to UN intervention into the internal affairs of a member state. On balance, I think we came out very well in this exercise. We were able to maintain every essential aspect of the position you approved following your discussion with Governor Stevenson last April. The main carrot in this position, the sanctions study committee, may well prove of considerable utility by introducing a new note of realism into calls for sanctions in colonial and racial situations. Of course, the concept of the sanctions study committee was hedged in by appropriate reservations, both on our part (first paragraph on page 4 of Governor Stevenson's speech at Tab B)/3/ and that of the British and Norwegians to the effect that support for the study committee was without prejudice to our ultimate position on the application of sanctions. /3/For text of Ambassador Stevenson's statement in the Security Council on June 16, see ibid., pp. 798-802. The next item on the agenda is to organize ourselves and our friends on the Security Council to turn the sanctions study committee to useful ends, along the lines of the US-UK agreed paper (Tab C)./4/ /4/Not printed.
593. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, July 30, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 295. Secret. Drafted by Hooper; cleared by Fredericks, Dillery, P. Wesley Kriebel of IO/UNP, Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs Thomas M. Judd, George L. Warren of G/PM, and William R. Duggan of the Policy Planning Council. STATUS REPORT ON NSAM NO. 295 OF Following numbered paragraphs correspond to the seven numbered paragraphs of NSAM 295:/2/ /2/Document 586. 1. Defer Implementation of Odendaal Report in South West Africa
After negative South African Government responses to US and UK representations to Foreign Minister Muller on this subject in February, we convinced the British after some discussion that a second effort should be made with Prime Minister Verwoerd directly. Our approaches to the Prime Minister on March 19th brought a much more conciliatory, but not entirely clear South African response on March 27. Meanwhile Mr. Clarence Randall, whom we had briefed and enlisted before his private trip to South Africa, made strong personal representations to both Muller and Verwoerd in mid-March. Applicants in the International Court cases, Ethiopia and Liberia, were kept generally informed of progress and their Counsel was encouraged to refrain from seeking interim ICJ action.
In a Government White Paper and statement to Parliament on April 29, Prime Minister Verwoerd came round to full acceptance of our representations with regard to postponement. Citing South African technical reasons for delay, as we had suggested, he said inter alia and included in the White Paper the statement that the South African Government would "refrain from action which may be regarded--even theoretically--as detrimental or prejudicial to the alleged rights of the applicant states, or which may unnecessarily aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court". In effect, all controversial aspects of the Odendaal Report were postponed pending Court judgment and certain economic and social development projects not involving shifts of population or changes in administration were approved for action. Ethiopian and Liberian Ambassadors expressed satisfaction with this achievement and indicated that interim Court action which might have precipitated a Security Council crisis this year would not be sought. The larger problem of South African intentions after Court judgment is still very much with us. While agreeing to postponement of implementation of the Odendaal Report, Dr. Verwoerd nonetheless accepted it "in broad principle" and said "it will be implemented when the time is ripe." Thus, twelve to fourteen months' time was gained, but the issue will become even more critical by mid-summer 1965 when final Court decision on the merits is expected. 2. Policy Regarding Military Sales Thus far during 1964 the South African Government has not initiated any official requests for arms or military equipment. Existing policy has been adhered to save for two technical exceptions under which it was decided to approve the sale of 100 helicopter firing heads (a safety device, not a weapon) and 12 sets of MK 32-5 torpedo tubes and 6 control panels as accessory equipment for torpedoes purchased by South Africa prior to inauguration of our arms embargo policy last August. 3. Suspension of Action on Applications for US Government Loans and Investment Guarantees Implementation of this policy has involved refusal of only one application thus far and no others are presently pending. The application which was not approved was in the form of a request for a special political risk guarantee covering a proposed loan of approximately $7 million by Chase Manhattan Bank to the Palabora Mining Company of South Africa. The loan was to have been for purchase of mining machinery and equipment. The Palabora Company, an international consortium including Newmont and American Metals Climax of the United States, has since obtained alternate capital. The venture involves development of an extensive copper mine complex in the Republic of South Africa to begin production in 1966. There has been no repercussion from the South African Government as the result of the Ex-Im Bank action. A high functionary of the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) did complain irately to one of our Embassy officers and vowed that in retribution the mining equipment would not be purchased in the United States. Ultimately about 95 percent is to be purchased in the United States, however, because letters of intent had already been signed for much of it and Palabora technicians insisted for the rest only US-manufactured machinery would be satisfactory. Knowledge of the Palabora refusal has spread to some extent among American firms under contract for equipment as well as other US firms, some involved in the venture and some not. However, the general policy has been kept secret and no action beyond that indicated in the NSAM has been taken. US private investment is contributing at a high rate in South Africa because of unusually favorable returns. Depending on future developments it may become necessary to review the policy of no warnings late this year or early in 1965. 4. Alternative Space Tracking Facilities NASA and DOD are proceeding actively with plans and preparations for alternate space tracking facilities. NASA will locate various alternative facilities in Malagasy, Spain and Ascension Island. Separate equipment will be installed and used in supplementary fashion pending any possible requirement to substitute entirely for present South African stations. NASA expects to complete its alternate sites by late 1965. Consent of the Spanish and Malagasy Governments has been obtained. The Ascension site is still subject to final negotiation with the British. DOD requires only stand-by land for a transfer of equipment which can be accomplished within six months. Malagasy is the prospective site for this. At some point later this year South African technicians will be able to deduce the purpose of alternate NASA facilities despite plausible and to some extent real additional reasons for their existence which NASA is fully prepared to make known. It is anticipated that the South African Government will not be likely to raise the issue with us in present circumstances so long as NASA and DOD continue normal operations in South Africa as planned. The questions of whether and when we should inform the South African Government about our alternate sites are still under consideration. 5. Program to Persuade South Africa to Comply with ICJ Decision and to Encourage Moderate Whites in South Africa The State Department has discussed this problem in preliminary fashion with Mr. Millard of the British Foreign Office. The British had been thinking of taking a renewed diplomatic initiative re South West Africa after the Court decision next year. Mr. Millard conceded during discussions in Washington in June that there might be some risk in waiting until that stage to take diplomatic action. We told him that we were developing a plan for approaching the South African Government later this year to allow time for repeated discussion and for the South African Government to develop an alternative to the Odendaal Report (which took two years), before the Court decision and resultant heightening of international pressures make South African adjustment much more difficult, if not impossible. The British will be prepared to explore with us in late summer or early fall the possibility of cooperating in such an earlier approach. The substance and strategy of new diplomatic approaches to the South African Government concerning the future of South West Africa are currently in the process of inter-agency review as part of the final draft National Policy Paper on South Africa. This is scheduled for final inter-agency clearance by mid-August. During the past few months discreet liaison with and encouragement of the major opposition party, United Party, in its active campaign against the Odendaal Report has been successfully carried out by AmEmbassy Pretoria. More effective liaison between interested private American groups and similar groups in South Africa has been assisted in response to inquiries to the Department of State from American groups in the fields of business, labor, religion, youth and science. 6. Program to Explain US Objectives to Interested African Countries Background and instructions have been provided USUN and all US diplomatic missions in Africa on our objectives concerning South West Africa and the Odendaal Report. These have been used as the basis for private conversations to bring about greater African understanding of the US position. To some extent this effort may have contributed to African willingness to go along with our current position on thorough and time-consuming study of sanctions in the UN Security Council. 7. Analysis of Sanctions A comprehensive series of studies of sanctions and other possible enforcement measures, including estimates of their effectiveness, costs and prospects for compliance, has been launched in the State Department. First drafts on all topics are scheduled for completion between July 31 and August 15. These will be timely and useful both for the purposes envisaged in the NSAM and as supporting information for USUN participation in the Security Council Study Committee on enforcement measures. The British are doing a similar series of studies and have indicated willingness to exchange views and information with us as they proceed. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
