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South Africa 574. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 9, 1964, 2:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S AFR. Confidential. Drafted by Hall on January 10, and approved in M on January 20. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Naude began by saying that this was his first opportunity to call on the Under Secretary and that, at this time, he wished only to pay his respects. Mr. Harriman replied that there are a hundred ambassadors now accredited to Washington and he tried to discourage those who only wanted to pay their respects, but he was always glad to see those who had matters of substance to discuss. Naude said that, while his was a courtesy call, it would be impossible for a South African ambassador to avoid politics for two minutes, even if he should want to do so. Naude pointed out that Secretary Rusk had told him there are only a few differences between the United States and South Africa. He, Naude, went on to say that if the United States welcomes diversity, as it apparently does, it should be easy to find common ground. Naude said he had striven since his arrival to enlarge this common ground and help the two nations find additional areas of agreement. Governor Harriman pointed out that this is an ambassador's job. They would get along better, the Governor said, if they recognized there is little chance to agree and he added that many Americans haven't even come to an agreement with some of their southern friends in the United States. The Governor stated that the United States Government is irrevocably opposed to apartheid and will never compromise in the slightest degree on the issue. Racial discrimination is completely unacceptable to most Americans. Mr. Harriman then said he would like to give the Ambassador some unsolicited advice--he shouldn't try to get Americans to accept apartheid because they never will. President Kennedy had met the issue of segregation head-on. The opposition of the United States Government to discrimination goes back to Franklin Roosevelt and will certainly continue under President Johnson. The President was, in fact, a disciple of Roosevelt. The Governor continued that, while there are certain areas of agreement between the South African and American governments, there are diversities which can never be accepted just as Hitlerism and Communism could not be. The United States doesn't go out looking for trouble. We want to leave others alone since we don't really like sticking our fingers in other people's pie, but in our position such action is sometime unavoidable. For example, we simply cannot ignore the apartheid issue. Ambassador Naude said South Africans do not like the word apartheid. One must not equate segregation and apartheid since they are quite different. Apartheid envisages eventual freedom and equality for Negroes. Hence apartheid does not have the same meaning in the United States that it carries in South Africa. Governor Harriman said he was grateful for that. Discrimination has never gone to the extremes in the United States, he said, that it went to in South Africa. Naude stated that the whole character of his country would be lost, the economy ruined without separate development. Such development is the only answer to South Africa's problem. His government doesn't maintain that this is the answer in the United States. South Africa is trying to respect the character of its ethnic groups; it has built-in diversity in its society. Circumstances of the two countries are so different. The American Negro is no longer a Negro and yet he isn't an American either. He is basically insecure. The South African Bantu hasn't lost his African character nor his basic security. South Africa is trying to maintain the racial integrity of the Bantu. The Governor then asked Naude to recommend a balanced book on the subject of apartheid and assured him he would read it. The Ambassador said he would send down something which was not propaganda-inspired. He went on to say that the South African Government is accused of violating basic principles of human rights such as labor standards, the right to work, universal suffrage, freedom of movement, etc. But, the Ambassador added, the Bantu are better off than the inhabitants of most other countries and, while there is an area of discrimination in the Republic, it will disappear in time. A chief problem is that of the franchise but this too will be solved. Few countries have a general per capital income as high as that of South Africa. Governor Harriman asked for figures on such incomes in South Africa and in representative other nations. The Governor inquired about South West Africa and expressed our concern that South Africa should make some concession in the Territory such as agreeing to a form of UN presence there. Naude replied that his country has had a lot of experience with the UN and that most of it was bad. The South African Government proposed on several occasions that the President of the General Assembly and various UN Commissions visit the Territory but such efforts had not been fruitful. For example, one visit--that of the Carpio Committee--was a fiasco. South Africa accepted the report of the Committee and went to the UN to discuss it. Suddenly, without warning, the document was disavowed by the Committee chairman. This action was very confusing to his government, Ambassador Naude averred. Now nothing further could be done until the report of the Odendaal Commission has been received. The Governor asked about the contentious case before the International Court of Justice and the Ambassador expressed his hope that the Court would not rule against South Africa; however, he said he would not presume to prejudge the case. Governor Harriman replied that many of South Africa's friends (Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom) feel as the United States does, that some concessions should be made in South West Africa. Naude acknowledged that this was true. On the other hand, he said, President Wilson and Marshal Smuts were largely responsible for the establishment of the mandate system. The whole idea behind the mandates was that they would eventually be incorporated by the mandatory power. Class C mandates, such as South West Africa, were particularly dependent upon the mandatory and were to be administered as an integral part of that power. South West Africa is as much a part of South Africa as the former territory of Wyoming was of the United States. Just because South Africa forbore to annex this contiguous area it is being asked to hand over the Territory to the UN--scarcely a friendly organization. Governor Harriman said that the case of South West Africa is somewhat different since the South African Government has assumed international obligations for the area. The Governor concluded by stressing the continuity between the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations. The goal of both was, and is, an Africa wedded to the West not to the East. With the withdrawal of Khrushchev from the African continent and the entry of Chou En-lai new problems are arising. South Africa is deeply involved in these programs, and its government must face up to them. The Governor said he very much appreciated the willingness of Ambassador Naude to discuss in a frank manner the issues affecting his country.
575. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa/1/ Washington, January 11, 1964, 3:17 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 S AFR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs Peter Hooper on January 8; cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Charles Runyon, G/PM Director for Operations Howard Meyers, C. Edward Dillery of SCI, Colonel Hatch of Joint Staff, IO/UNP Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Richard V. Hennes, Sloan in DOD, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Jesse M. MacKnight, and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; and approved by Williams. Sent to Cape Town and repeated to Pretoria. 2. Embtel 765./2/ Embassy requested make following points in response SAG note reftel: /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) 1. US aide-memoire of June 15, 1962/3/ assuring SAG it would "give prompt and sympathetic attention to reasonable requests for purchase of military equipment required for defense against external aggression" was applicable as undertaking to give such attention to SAG requests within framework USG arms policy then in effect. Even under that policy assurance did not require that we respond affirmatively at all times and in all contexts to SAG requests for supply of military equipment of the types referred to in the assurance. /3/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, Document 395, footnote 4. 2. USG does not consider assurance now withdrawn, but still applicable in restricted sense current arms policy toward South Africa announced by Stevenson on December 4 and August 2, 1963./4/ We hope SAG will appreciate that this restricted current arms policy constitutes integral part USG effort assist toward peaceful solution southern African problems and is related to other matters where (as in our position at UNSC on economic embargo and UN expulsion) we have tried to be helpful and moderating influence. It remains intention of USG to expedite consideration of any SAG requests relating to supply of military equipment and to supply same if the USG considers such equipment required in sense of Stevenson statement for maintenance of international peace and security and for the common defense effort in the interest of the world community. In this connection Sole's interpretation reported para 2 Embtel 733/5/ is correct, if by "now" he meant "at this time" and not "from now on"; this, of course, should be read in connection with two preceding sentences of this paragraph. /4/For excerpts of Ambassador Stevenson's remarks on December 4, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 694-698. For text of his remarks on August 2, see ibid., pp. 683-689. /5/Not found. 3. Recent SAG military requests were put forward in relation uranium barter negotiations despite earlier notification from USG that it not prepared consider requests for purchase military equipment in connection these discussions. One defense item specifically separated from these discussions is still pending consideration as SAG aware. FYI. A. Embassy should not encourage separate SAG application for new military shopping list under peace and security exception in view of present world security situation. If SAG should seek invoke exception at this time, result our consideration would probably be negative. B. We recognize South African willingness proceed with negotiation on tracking station was, in fact, affected by US willingness proceed with separate affirmation described in quoted language para 1 above. This relationship was indicated by SAG aide-memoire, 15 June 1962. However, SAG did accede US insistence Tracking Station Agreement must be separate from affirmation. Moreover, Jooste, with whom negotiation conducted, assured Ambassador latter not precondition of former. C. In any event, SAG can now at any time and at its option give us six months notice intention terminate tracking station agreement; however we would hope line suggested paras 1-3 above would help discourage possible SAG initiative terminate agreement by giving six months' notice. D. We believe comments para 3 above indicate SAG does not have legal basis for claiming US arms policy change as grounds to cancel agreement immediately, without six months' notice. E. We would appreciate Embassy views re likelihood SAG employment option terminate agreement on six-month notice as threat against implementation of variety of US foreign policies it may find repugnant. End FYI. Rusk
576. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/ I-20675/64 Washington, January 25, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 S AFR. Secret. Dear Alex: As you recall, President Kennedy in September 1963, approved our plan for preliminary discussions with South African officials regarding the sale of submarines, provided that no commitment was made or implied that a decision to sell would be made prior to the end of 1963. Further, the President indicated at that time that the decision to sell submarines to South Africa would be forthcoming after the end of 1963 "in light of the circumstances at the time."/2/ /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, Document 409, for a conversation between South African Ambassador Naude and Secretary Rusk on arms sales to South Africa. You may further recall that we sent a team to Pretoria in November 1963. In summary, the team concluded that the South African Government has a definite interest in the purchase of submarines and more specifically are impressed by a craft of small design which was discussed as an alternate to their interest in the Barbel class submarine. As to the financing, since the South African officials did not raise the question of credit, none was offered. Instead our team members indicated that either (1) cash transaction or (2) an arrangement whereby the manufacturer would accept a blocked bank deposit or line of credit, allowing a draw down of funds according to an assumed progress payment schedule (Incl. 1), would be possible. At that time, South African Government officials expressed a desire to further explore the feasibility of desired changes to design and specification before making a final decision to purchase the small submarine. It was made clear that no decision could be made on the possible submarine sale before December 31, 1963, and that the visit of the team to Pretoria should not be interpreted as an approval in principle to sell submarines to South Africa. The recent action by the South African Government in associating the potential submarine sale with the continuation of the U.S. tracking station in South Africa combined with our earlier indication that a U.S. decision would be made on the submarine sale after the end of 1963 prompts me to request: a. Final White House approval, in principle, to the sale of three conventional type submarines to South Africa, subject only to agreement between our respective defense establishments on specifications and price. Since credit has not been raised we assume that the transaction would be on a cash basis and that the sale including spares, technicians, etc., could range from $45 million, for three submarines of the smaller class proposed by the Electric Boat Company, to $90 million for the Barbel class in which the South African Government originally expressed interest. b. Assuming a favorable decision is made to consummate the sale, the Department of Defense will, with your concurrence, extend an invitation for South African Government officials to visit the U.S. at an early date for the purpose of beginning negotiations leading to the conclusion of a purchase arrangement. Sincerely, Frank
577. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State/1/ Cape Town, February 12, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and Pretoria and passed to the White House. 49. Reference: Deptel 32,/2/ Embtel 48./3/ Following is confidential aide-memoire I presented FonMin Muller and FonSec Jooste this afternoon. Witt accompanied me. Stephenson is making parallel representations today. /2/Dated February 6. (Ibid.) /3/Dated February 12. (Ibid.) 1. My government has noted the intention of the South African Government to proceed with public discussion and the possible legislative and administrative implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa affairs (Odendaal Commission)/4/ in the near future. It has also noted that the Commission's Report related its recommendations to the view of the South African Government that the mandate has lapsed (Report, page 57, para 196), despite the judgment to the contrary of the International Court of Justice in 1962, in the Court's disposition of preliminary objections to jurisdiction. /4/The Commission's report, or the Odendaal Report, dated January 27, recommended the establishment of 10 separate "homelands" for the non-white groups in South West Africa. It also called for expenditure of $218 million for development in the territory over a 5-year period. 2. It is clear that the recommendations of the Commission which further extend apartheid and which shift administrative controls in South West Africa relate directly to issues currently pending before the International Court of Justice./5/ /5/In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia brought an action before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) charging South Africa with violation of the South West Africa Mandate on several counts. Previous ICJ opinions communicated to the U.N. General Assembly had advised that South Africa remained bound by the Mandate, that it must accept U.N. supervision, and that it could not terminate or alter the Mandate without U.N. consent. 3. We accordingly urge your government in its own interest to postpone legislative and administrative implementation of all aspects of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission which are at issue while the case is pending in the International Court of Justice. This postponement would of course be without prejudice to any economic or welfare benefits not related to further extension of apartheid or to basic administrative changes in South West Africa. 4. You will recall that despite considerable difficulty we have restrained actions by the United Nations on the South West Africa issue by calling on members to await the outcome of the pending case in the International Court of Justice. Action by the South African Government to implement the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission now would remove the basis of such restraint. Consequently we urgently request assurances by the South African Government that it will hold such implementation in abeyance pending the adjudication of the International Court of Justice. Report follows. Satterthwaite
578. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs (Rollefson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Washington, March 9, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 15 S AFR-US. Secret. Drafted by C. Edward Dillery of SCI on March 6. Copies were sent to Kitchen, Rostow in S/P, and Cleveland. A March 9 covering memorandum from Rollefson to Williams states that the attached was a revision of his February 18 memorandum on the same subject. (Ibid.) He noted that NASA had undertaken a further intensive review of its requirements and had been able to modify them. It now appeared possible that the requirement to provide tracking coverage for the monitoring of Project Apollo orbits could be met in part through the use of airborne and shipborne equipment. In addition, negotiations had been completed for the location of a second NASA deep space instrumentation facility in Spain. SUBJECT I. Problem To assess (1) the need for ground facilities in the area of Southern Africa for support of the U.S. space program through 1970 and (2) the steps which should be taken to meet that need. II. Introduction 1. Given the present state of the art and our launching sites in Florida and California, the area of Southern Africa is the most critical single area abroad for the U.S. space program. Almost all of our major space programs are supported at critical phases by ground stations located in that area. At the present time these include four stations in the Republic of South Africa and one on Madagascar. In addition NASA requires one new tracking station in the area, and other increments may be necessary before 1970. All these stations should be land-based, but three of them could be ship-borne with substantial degradation of their reliability and mission performance. These facilities are requisite to long-range missile testing, earth orbiting unmanned satellites, lunar and planetary probes and--in the Apollo program--to both earth orbiting and lunar manned flights. The Department should be fully aware of the continuing need for these stations; of the requirement to explore new and alternate sites, if needed to assure uninterrupted operation; and of the necessity to advise DOD and NASA promptly, if relocation appears necessary. III. Conclusion 2. This office has concluded that the continued use and extension of ground facilities (tracking, data acquisition and command stations) under U.S. control in the area of Southern Africa over the next five years is a critical requirement, if the United States is to carry through the space program to which it is committed within this decade. Although technical and programmatic options in our space program are such that this requirement is not absolute, there is no satisfactory alternative. Failure to meet this requirement will be costly in time and money. More important, it will jeopardize the success of key space missions and may, in the long run, damage the image of U.S. technological and scientific achievement which we seek to foster abroad through a successful space program. 3. Within the general area of Southern Africa only the Republic of South Africa offers a location common to all these requirements wherein satisfactory logistic support, communications and local technical cooperation are available. The several minimum technical requirements of our program could be met by relocation of these facilities in southeastern Bechuanaland or separately among a variety of other locations, but only at substantial cost and under circumstances which would reduce seriously the practical probability of successful operation. 4. We recognize that the prospects of retaining these facilities, or relocating them within nearby areas which are technically acceptable, are far from assured. We realize also that the need to do so may limit severely our freedom of action in dealing with other critical problems created by the circumstances in that area. Nonetheless we feel that the Department must take all reasonable steps to meet these requirements. IV. Recommendations 5. It is recommended that, as a matter of urgency, the Department a. Assess the possibility of continued use and extension of the ground facilities in the Republic of South Africa for support of the missile-testing and space programs of DOD and NASA or, alternatively, their relocation in nearby areas which are technically acceptable; b. Frame a program of political actions to meet this need; c. Inform NASA and DOD (through SCI and G/PM respectively) no later than April 15, if possible, of the Department's assessment and of the steps which DOD and NASA should take in consonance with the course of action to be taken by the Department; and d. Inform the White House and interested committees of the Congress of our assessment and proposed course of action. [Here follows Section V.]
579. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, March 10, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Box 7, NSC Subcommittee Meeting, January 1 through December 31, 1964. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. BRIEFING FOR NSC STANDING GROUP SUBJECT Summary 1. Current and contemplated actions of the South African Government in South West Africa threaten to bring about a critical situation in the Security Council involving strong and legally valid demands for enforcement measures to support International Court decisions any time from April this year through the spring or summer of 1965, when a final Court judgment on the merits of pending cases is expected. New and extreme apartheid measures in South Africa will complicate this situation further when reflected in the report of the UN Study Committee on this subject in June. 2. A review of basic US interests, of the urgent timetable and of the risks and advantages of various courses of action open to us in the face of predictable developments points to the following recommended courses of action: a. Delay UN confrontation with South Africa as long as possible through a series of diplomatic actions, and attempt to put off consideration of major enforcement measures until after a final Court decision next year. b. Undertake immediate review of problems relating to our space tracking stations in South Africa and move to locate them elsewhere as quickly as possible. c. Continue our existing policy of refusing sales to South Africa of arms, ammunition, equipment to manufacture arms, military vehicles, firearms and other items of significant use in combat or in training for armed police or para-military forces, except for the fulfillment of existing contracts and the reservation of right to supply under the "strategic exception" provision in case the international situation so warrants. Continue to postpone decision on possible sale of submarines, other naval vessels and spare parts and equipment for naval vessels, pending developments with respect to the South West Africa situation. Decisions on the latter category would be made in the light of developments with respect to South West Africa, and might constitute an element which can be utilized as an inducement to bring about a change in South African policy. d. Warn major US investors of new risks they face in South Africa and cease US Government loans and guaranties for investments in South Africa during this critical period. e. Undertake a modest program of increased contact with and limited covert aid to non-communist African political refugee leaders from South Africa and moderate groups of all races within South Africa. f. Launch without delay a series of studies to permit evaluation of the probable effectiveness of various possible measures against South Africa, which to some extent may ultimately be needed to support a final judgment of the International Court of Justice and to protect basic US interests elsewhere. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
580. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 18, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, Union of South, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 11/63-10/64. No classification marking. RE 1. On February 12 US and British Ambassadors in Capetown presented parallel aide-memoires urging South African Government postpone implementation of Odendaal report apartheid policy in SWA pending ICJ decision./2/ They noted that we have urged other UN members to sit still awaiting ICJ decision and could not restrain them if South Africa moved. /2/See Document 577. 2. In aide-memoire reply of March 3/3/ South African Government insisted its SW A administration is "in spirit of the mandate"; that it cannot postpone Odendaal implementation because of ICJ case; that it can separate "overall design" of report from inoffensive "economic welfare benefits"; that "separate development has been fundamental to administration of SWA from the beginning and is not new issue"; denies that implementation of Odendaal would justify cease and desist order. /3/Telegram 85 to Cape Town, March 5, reported that on March 3 Ambassador Naude had delivered a South African aide-memoire replying to the February 12 U.S.-U.K. demarche. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN) 3. US and British Ambassadors submitting second aide-memoire this week (attached)/4/ asserting--that South African implementation would precipitate ICJ action; that if Security Council called upon to support cease and desist order USG would "respect authority of ICJ" and "could not be expected to shield ICJ consequences of its action". Urges SAG to wait for final ICJ decision. /4/Not attached. The U.S. aide-memoire originally transmitted in telegram 65 to Cape Town on March 5 was corrected by telegram 73 to Cape Town, March 14. (Ibid.) 4. It might be very useful to draw Naude out on what it would take to move South Africa toward some accommodation. Bill Brubeck/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
581. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State/1/ Cape Town, March 19, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, USUN, and Pretoria. 115. Reference: Deptel 73,/2/ Embtel 107./3/ Odendaal Commission Report. /2/See footnote 4, Document 580. /3/Dated March 17. (Ibid.) I presented aide-memoire to PriMin Verwoerd this morning as scheduled. ForMin Muller was also present. I told Dr. Verwoerd I would not read aide-memoire unless he wished me to as he had received from my British colleague yesterday an aide-memoire of substantially same text. PriMin said this was not necessary. Referring to previous exchange of aide-memoires I said this one expressed continuing and great concern of my government that his government might take steps to implement those parts of the Odendaal report having to do with the extension of apartheid and basic administrative changes in SWA relevant to issues pending before ICJ. If they did so applicants would in our view be certain to apply for provisional measures under article 41 of the court's statute. If as we believed probably court granted such measures and his government did not comply with them question would then be brought by applicants before UNSC where we would be compelled to support authority of court. I then said that I had been requested by my government to emphasize a few points orally which I proceeded to do in accordance with Deptel 65,/4/ making points in deleted paragraph 4 of Deptel 65 and emphasizing significance to my government of article 19. I read more or less textually final two paragraphs of Deptel 73. /4/See footnote 4, Document 580. At termination of my presentation PriMin said that since legal issues were involved he would not undertake discuss these with me then and was sure I would agree that it would be better for him to give a written reply clearly setting forth points of view of his government. PriMin said he was surprised at concern of my government in view of firm belief of his legal advisers that there was no real cause for concern. He pointed out that implementation of Odendaal report would be a very long process, that it involved a first five-year plan followed by another five-year plan; while political aspects of report were fundamental to its implementation he implied that such steps as were taken would not give grounds for action by applicants. Verwoerd continued that if the report were accepted in principle by his government it seemed unreasonable and beyond bounds of possibility that court would interpret this in way we fear. He said that foundations for report's implementation had to be laid. He thought however that processes of the court in pending case might well catch up with implementation of Odendaal report before any decisive steps were taken. As case in point he mentioned Ovambaland. The Ovambos he said had always in effect ruled themselves although his government had had a small number of advisers there. SAG had taken and intended take only steps similar to those which British and French governments had taken in areas such as Nigeria in years past. Verwoerd then discussed briefly complicated questions of financing recommendations of report which would themselves take considerable time to resolve. I told PriMin we recognized that there were many favorable aspects of Odendaal Commission report, especially willingness of his government to spend considerable sums for economic development. I again expressed our concern and said I hoped his government would not make any miscalculations. In closing PriMin made interesting remark that his government would of course take very much amiss any representations containing nature of a threat. However he would not at all take amiss representations made by friendly governments simply expressing reasons for their concern, his smile indicating he considered ours to be of latter nature. Interview lasted fifteen minutes and was friendly in tone through- out. I saw UK Ambassador Stephenson last night before his departure on official visit to other parts of SA. He was good enough to furnish me copy of his report to his government re his interview, which was also brief and friendly. Most interesting aspect of Verwoerd's remarks to him were Verwoerd's expressed view that if ICJ thought that proposals in Odendaal report prejudiced those issues before the Court he could only conclude that court was biased and wished to appease the Africans. He could not therefore understand why HMG was so perturbed, as it would take many years to put report into effect and its economic provisions would of course be tackled first. Even more significant perhaps were his remarks to Stephenson that SAG was certainly not looking for trouble and that he would therefore study UK memo carefully and let him have considered reply in due course./5/ /5/On April 29, Verwoerd issued a White Paper indicating that he would not implement the broad apartheid proposals of the Odendaal plan in South West Africa before the ICJ judgment expected the following year. Satterthwaite
582. Memorandum for the Record/1/ I-22469/64 Washington, March 20, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 470 South Africa. Secret. Prepared by Frank K. Sloan. A stamped notation in the margin reads: "Mr. McNaughton has seen." SUBJECT Mr. Vance has reported to me the following conclusions, and his own observations, on the NSC Standing Group Meeting, Wednesday, 18 March, concerning U.S. policy toward the Republic of South Africa: 1. Tracking Station. General conclusions were that we have a maximum of 18 months to two years before the SAG will invite us out of the tracking station at Grootfontein, in view of the fact that we cannot relax our pressure on the SAG to revise its apartheid policy, and further in view of the fact that the squabble over Southwest Africa following the World Court decision (next year) will also find us on the side of the UN against the SAG. Accordingly, Mr. Vance instructed that the appropriate agencies within DOD should continue to survey alternative sites for the tracking station on a carefully controlled basis so as not to reveal our intentions to the SAG. 2. Arms Policy. It seems to be the general opinion of the Standing Group that the gold flow considerations involved in the proposed submarine sale are no longer sufficient to support the sale and that we should not go any farther with it. He said that his own feeling was even stronger than that of the Standing Group that this was the sort of visible support to the South Africans that we should not provide. NESA and ILN should take such actions as are necessary to dampen out the submarine question. Mr. Vance is also of the opinion that the Standing Group will support a policy of supplying not only the spare parts and equipment for which contracts were in existence in August 1963, but also any spare parts or components that would be ordinarily necessary to keep equipment purchased from the U.S. in operation, together with limited supplies of other materials associated therewith and not designed to improve the internal security capabilities of the South African forces. As there was no firm decision on this point at the Standing Group Meeting, the next step indicated seems to be a conference between ISA and Alex Johnson's shop to get the matter ironed out. 3. Summary. I think the principal aim of the U.S. Government should be to maintain the SAG in an equable frame of mind as long as possible in order to protect the tracking station, while realizing that our basic policy in South Africa is certain to bring the arrangement to an end sooner rather than later. F. Sloan [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
