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511. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-882-65 Washington, December 16, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Rhodesia 091. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source reads: "Sec Def has seen." SUBJECT 1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-27, 885/65, dated 6 December 1965,/2/ which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze Rhodesian defense capabilities, estimate the nature and size of military force required to accomplish specified objectives, and point up any particular military problems in mounting the operation. /2/Not printed. A copy is ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 092 Rhodesia. 2. (S) From the standpoint of plausible national involvements in Rhodesia, including a United Nations force, there are almost unlimited combinations of military force that could be examined. Since Rhodesia is an area of recognized UK primacy, it appears that military intervention in Rhodesia, if any, will most likely be accomplished primarily by UK forces. 3. (S) The detailed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the information requested are contained in the Appendix./3/ A summary of these views is set forth below: /3/Not found. a. The small Rhodesian active Army (3,000), Air Force (69 assorted aircraft), and Police Force (5,100) are well led and in a high state of readiness. The Rhodesian Government can mobilize an additional 6,000 reservists on extremely short notice. This force is capable of successfully meeting any likely threat posed by African states, but it could not repulse a major UK military effort. The major Rhodesian strength is her ability to make deliberate preparations for defense behind the formidable Zambezi River obstacles and the ability to destroy the critical Kariba Dam power facilities and the Wankie coal mines. The major military weaknesses of the Rhodesians are the limited size of their forces and difficulty in replenishing ammunition, spare parts, and POL supplies if confronted by a major UK military force. b. The estimated nature and size of the UK force required to take and hold the Kariba Dam area and the Wankie coal field are: one airborne/infantry division force, three tactical fighter squadrons, combat and logistic support forces, and necessary airlift. Two brigades would be employed to secure the Wankie coal mines and maintain a rail line of communications to the Zambian border, and one brigade would be employed on the south bank of the Zambezi River to seize and hold the Kariba Dam. c. An estimate of the UK military force required to overcome Rhodesian resistance and restore lawful government is: two airborne/infantry division forces, five tactical fighter squadrons, combat and logistic support forces, and necessary airlift. One airborne division would be employed to seize and hold the Kariba Dam and the Wankie coal mining areas; and, subsequently, one reinforced infantry division would be used to seize and hold the capital city of Salisbury. d. Major problems which bear on a UK military operation in Rhodesia are as follows: (1) The loyalties of the 225,000 white Rhodesians are difficult to determine; but, initially, the majority would probably be loyal to the Smith government. Over an extended period, the white urban population would be inclined to accept the authority of Her Majesty's Government. The rural white Rhodesians, however, would probably resist and harass a UK force. (2) South Africa and Portugal would probably furnish major economic support to Rhodesia. South Africa might furnish some military supplies and volunteers to Rhodesia, but it is doubtful that either South Africa or Portugal would overtly deploy forces to Rhodesia to fight against the United Kingdom. (3) There is a shortage of UK troop transport to meet this and other commitments. (4) The United Kingdom would have difficulty in mustering adequate combat forces, both ground and air, because of current commitments. (5) It is probable that military action in Rhodesia would result in destruction of the Kariba Dam facilities and certain Wankie coal fields. 4. (S) If the United Kingdom should request US military assistance, it would most likely be for military airlift for deployment of UK forces to the area and their continued logistical support. There are three AFSTRIKE troop carrier squadrons which could be committed if implementation were directed. Their employment would, however, result in the cancellation of other commitments such as deployment of one troop carrier squadron to Southeast Asia, support for GEMINI recovery, programmed USAFSTRIKE support of MATS, and airlift support for deployment of one tactical fighter squadron to Southeast Asia. 5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that any US military commitment in Rhodesia is militarily unsound because of the resultant degradation of the US strategic military posture. Present major military commitments in NATO, Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Dominican Republic do not permit an additional significant military commitment wherein the depth of involvement is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that no US military forces be committed to operations in the Rhodesian crisis. 6. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is downgraded to Secret. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
512. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 16, 1965, 9:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, PM Wilson Visit, 2/17/65. Secret. SUBJECT You currently have three meetings with Wilson: 5:15 today (1-1/2 hours), lunch at 1:00 tomorrow with a small working group, and a third meeting, with a communique, at 4 p.m. tomorrow. There are six main subjects which I list in the order of their importance to the British: 1. Rhodesia 2. The British defense review 3. Vietnam and Malaysia 4. India/Pakistan 5. Non-proliferation and East/West relations 6. Nuclear arrangements with the Germans Dean Rusk will be here tomorrow morning but not before, and for this reason I think you might wish to save Vietnam, Soviet relations, and nuclear arrangements with the Germans until tomorrow. That would leave Rhodesia, British defense, and India/Pakistan for this afternoon. (1) Rhodesia This is Wilson's make-or-break issue. He must go the limit to break Smith without shooting, and we are not at all sure he can do it. So far we have given full support on economic measures, including airlift support for oil to Zambia. But Wilson may use this meeting to lay the basis for more: in particular, he may feel us out on help to keep Zambian copper moving or even for access to U.S. stockpile copper. We have resisted any such feelers, and you may want to hear George Ball on this subject. [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]
513. Memorandum of Conversations/1/ Washington, December 16-17, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2567, Visit of Prime Minister Wilson, December 15-19, 1965, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Prepared in the Department of State. VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF PRIME MINISTER WILSON [Here follows a record of a private meeting between the President and Prime Minister Wilson, December 16, 5:15-6:10 p.m.] Cabinet Room Meeting, December 16, 1965, 6:10-7:20 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Prime Minister Wilson [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.] Rhodesia President: Asked Mr. Ball to summarize our position on providing support for the oil embargo of Rhodesia. Mr. Ball: Very tough problem. We can manage to help you in ameliorating a crisis--but if copper supply dries up completely and serious sterling troubles, there will be real difficulty. We can help you with an oil embargo if you will go ahead with an Order in Council, thereby providing protection for our oil companies against any damage claims. We can supplement your airlift to supply oil to Zambia in case Smith retaliates by cutting off the flow of oil to Zambia. It is our judgment that such an oil embargo would put real pressure on Rhodesia even if it is not airtight. We would have to get the Germans, Italians, and French to go along. We think they would probably cooperate. There might be problems with the South Africans. Prime Minister: We must expect Smith to retaliate by cutting off oil to Zambia--we could manage to offset this. More serious, they could cut the electricity. We have warned Smith that we would retaliate by cutting off his electric supply. If they take the third step and cut off coal, this would pose "a phenomenal problem". The best we could probably do would be to provide Zambia enough oil to keep the mines pumping. But there would be no output of copper. There are three questions: (i) Will the large oil companies cooperate--what if they do not play? What about a free booter? Any such leakage would lead to very great pressure for a blockage in the UN. (ii) Angola--two frigates could probably stop that. (iii) South Africa--we are not overly pessimistic about this; though they do some very evil things, they are very law-abiding; it's possible that they would not, in fact, try to break down an embargo. We will go forward with an Order in Council--a bit worried about it with our thin parliamentary situation, and will qualify it ("as long as Smith's government lasts"); but we will do it. Zambia is the key to the entire situation; hope they remain reasonable. It is important to keep things in the UN as quiet as possible, and to have the right answers for the Zambian missions to Moscow, Washington and London. We are quite clear about what to do if and when Smith does fall; UK will have to resume effective government of Rhodesia; UK will have to take parliamentary control on all matters of human and civil rights; troops will have to go back under British control. It will put us back 40 years, but it can't be helped. Hope President will agree to George Ball's proposals, and that Arthur Goldberg will help in the UN to keep things quiet. Mr. Ball: I have talked to Arthur and he is fairly optimistic. UK must keep the initiative and responsibility on this; the principle we must follow is that these are UK measures, which the U.S. is reinforcing--not joint measures. President: We will reinforce and supplement what you do. Prime Minister: Should like to work out the language on the airlift as soon as possible so as to indicate that we are "not alone." We have a specific question that I will have to decide this evening. Do we divert a ship on its way to Rhodesia? It carries a two-week supply of oil. A tough problem; it is probably safer to let it go through despite the two-week supply. Mr. Ball: We do not want to inhibit your decision either way. The President has approved the program we outlined to you so that our position is clear. Prime Minister: "Quite right. We have got your mind on the general situation and will make our own decision on the immediate problem." Meeting at British Embassy, Morning of December 17 PARTICIPANTS Under Secretary Ball Rhodesia was the principal subject of discussion and agreement was reached on the announcements to be made of an oil embargo and U.S. participation in an airlift for Zambia. No detailed record of the discussion is available. White House Lunch for Prime Minister and Subsequent Conversation (Based on Comments of Assistant Secretary Leddy and Ambassador Bruce) PARTICIPANTS Prime Minister Wilson Oliver Wright, Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister Lloyd Hughes, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister Rhodesia The Prime Minister concentrated during lunch on the subject of Rhodesia. He expressed appreciation for United States backing, particularly on the oil sanctions and the airlift for Zambia. The Prime Minister took an optimistic view of the prospects of bringing down the Smith regime in a short time through economic action. While the Prime Minister did not give a specific time estimate, Oliver Wright, Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, subsequently told Ambassador Bruce that it was hoped to achieve this result in a matter of weeks. [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]
514. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 20, 1965, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature. Rhodesia becoming a US problem. The Africans in their frustration are turning increasingly to the US in their disillusionment with the UK. This will put us more and more under the gun./2/ /2/A December 20 note from Komer to Bundy reads as follows: "Attached is another try on Rhodesia. I realize the problem, but to my knowledge LBJ simply hasn't been told the likely dimensions of this mess. Rick and I feel that all the evidence shows that it is getting steadily worse, not better, and will continue to do so. HMG is in a spot, caught between the Tories at home and Africans abroad, but the point is that we're going to become the African target too shortly. So the harder we push the Brits, the better off we'll be. Attached is best device I can think of for smoking out State." (Ibid.) Nyerere of Tanzania has written you (Tab A)/3/ asking US support for (1) mandatory UN sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter; and (2) a UN peace keeping force to take over the Kariba dam. He told us he wanted to fly here and discuss this at the UN and with you; now he's dropped the idea for the moment. /3/Not printed. Zambia's Kaunda has also written (Tab B)/4/ asking for some C-130s for the emergency airlift he needs because the US/UK oil embargo led Rhodesia to cut off Zambia's oil. We're allotting 3 civilian DC-7s to the airlift, but reports suggest that present US/UK plans will fall far short of the demand. Pressures on us for more help will mount steadily. /4/Telegram 993 from Lusaka, December 16, transmitted the text of Kaunda's letter; not printed. There are new African calls for OAU meetings, Security Council Sessions, and Commonwealth meetings. Out of these will come further pressure on the UK, and new appeals to us. Also, if Zambia cuts itself off from Rhodesia, or if Ian Smith clamps down on Zambia, we'll have a real mess. Airlift demands will skyrocket if we're to get coal in and copper out. The simple fact of the matter is that Ian Smith can strangle Zambia a lot faster than Britain can strangle Smith. My own sense is that this Rhodesia crisis is likely to get a lot worse rather than better, unless the UK can come up with something more than economic strangulation. The longer the crisis lasts, the greater the chance the UK will lose control, and the more painful the choices which will be put to us. So you might want to ask State for a full dress analysis of this gloomy prospect, and whether there isn't some other way out which we ought to be pushing on the UK. R.W. Komer Ask State/5/ /5/This option is checked. A handwritten note in the margin reads: "RWK: Your hunting license. MGB."
515. Special Memorandum No. 30-65 Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, December 21, 1965. [Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Rhodesia 091. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
516. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 22, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON THERHODESIAN CRISIS/2/ /2/A December 28 covering memorandum from Komer to the President states that attached was Mann's "excellent analysis of the Rhodesian crisis." Komer notes that the gist of Mann's "gloomy report" was that the British program of economic sanctions, while it would probably work in time, would not have time to run its course. The African states do not believe that the present U.K. program of economic sanctions will be adequate to bring down the Smith regime. They doubt Wilson's sincerity. They favor the use of military force and have, so far, looked to the U.K. to supply that force. Wilson has, on the other hand, publicly stated that the U.K. will not use military force against the Smith regime. U.K. officials claim that British public opinion would not support military action. The British have hinted that many of their officers, particularly those in the air force, might resign their commissions if ordered to attack the Smith regime. On the other hand, an unknown percentage of officers in the Rhodesian armed forces are, according to some estimates, loyal to the Queen and might not wish to fire on British forces. Fast-moving political developments in Africa and elsewhere, British preoccupations that failure to deal quickly and effectively with the 200-odd thousand whites in Southern Rhodesia may cause a large part of the Commonwealth to break away, and the risk that communist countries may be able to use the crisis to extend their influence or power in Africa, may cause the British to reconsider. Ambassador Bruce believes that the British consider this their most serious crisis since Suez. It is an Africa-wide crisis with impact on the U.S. as well as the U.K. Today the British Ambassador informed us that Wilson had sent a message, through Governor Gibbs in Rhodesia, for Smith. The letter stated that it was unlikely the U.K. could delay more drastic action for more than a short period of time. This tends to confirm the intelligence report which is at Tab A./3/ The Ambassador stated that Smith subsequently indicated that he is willing to negotiate for the establishment of a constitutional government in Rhodesia. The Ambassador asks that this information be treated as top secret. /3/The tabs are not attached to the source text. A handwritten notation on Komer's memorandum reads: "Tabs did not go forward with memo." Tab A is presumably Document 515. The British have also considered a possible naval blockade in order to make the oil embargo and other economic sanctions more effective. They have told us, however, that this is not in the cards because, among other problems, it would mean a confrontation with South Africa (where Britain has important investment and trade interests) and possibly Portugal as well. If the British ultimately decide to use force, they could (and hopefully would) decide, instead of attempting to occupy Southern Rhodesia, to take over the Wankie coal fields some 38 miles from the Zambian border and the Kariba Dam, which is on the border and jointly owned but controlled from the Southern Rhodesian side. Southern Rhodesian machine-gun emplacements are believed to be at the Kariba Dam; Smith may have taken similar precautions at the coal fields. If the U.K. should attempt to secure these two facilities, there is a risk that the Smith forces would sabotage generators and other electrical facilities at the dam site, blow up a high bridge at the frontier over which the coal moves to Zambia, and perhaps sabotage the coal mines themselves. We cannot predict the extent to which the Smith forces would offer resistance otherwise to a limited operation of this kind. The Africans are probably right in their estimate that economic sanctions alone will not quickly bring down the Smith regime. There is, however, a good chance that they would work in the long run. But for several reasons the British probably do not have the time they need to give the sanctions program a fair chance to work: First, all of the Zambian copper, more than half of the Katangan copper, and a large part of Zambian imports move over a railroad which runs through Southern Rhodesia. As is pointed out later, adequate alternate overland facilities are not immediately available. Second, Zambia also depends on the Smith regime for coal needed to run its copper industry (one ton of coal is needed for every ton of copper) and other facilities. Work has already started on developing a low-grade deposit of coal in Zambia, but it will take some time to get production going, when it is going it will be inadequate for Zambia's total needs, and it cannot be used to smelt copper without costly and time-consuming changes in smelting machinery. Smith has already raised export duties on coal to Zambia from 14 cents to 14 dollars a ton. This poses for Zambia a difficult political problem. If they pay the export tax they will appear to be subsidizing the Southern Rhodesian economy. If they refuse to pay the tax, it will cost even more to import coal from other sources even if adequate alternate overland transportation facilities were available, which they are not at this time. Smith also has the power to cut off electricity generated at Kariba. While thermoelectric facilities are available in Zambia to meet essential requirements for electricity, they require coal which may not be available. The World Bank has not been successful thus far in persuading Smith to allow it to maintain an effective presence on the Rhodesian side of the dam. And even if the Bank were to win Smith's consent, the few security guards it would use to protect the property against sabotage could not resist the armed forces of the Smith regime if he decided to use them. In short, given the kind of economic blow and counter blow which is in prospect, Zambia will, in the short run, be hurt far more than Southern Rhodesia. Third, Kaunda is under great pressure from extremists within his own country to retaliate against Smith. It is not clear he can resist these pressures even if he wanted to. If, as seems likely, there is an escalation of sanctions, pressures on the U.K. (and the U.S.) to supply Zambia's economy with its essential needs will be very great. The British are planning on keeping the Zambian economy going on a "care and maintenance basis", i.e., tight rationing and austerity. We doubt, however, that the fragile Zambian government can hold together for an extended period of time under severe pressures of this kind. Fourth, if, as seems probable, a substantial part of Zambian (and perhaps Katangan) copper--which together constitute 24% of the world supply--is cut off for a period of months, the U.K. will lose substantial amounts of foreign exchange. If the crisis continued for a long period, confidence in the pound could be impaired, thereby generating pressures on us for large-scale assistance. And there would immediately be demands on us for some scheme to share our copper with the U.K. and our other allies. (We are asking Joe Califano to call a meeting to discuss this facet of the question; we have suggestions to offer.) Against this background, we have agreed to support the U.K. airlift of POL products for Zambia. The Canadians have offered four C-130s. We have asked for bids and are requesting today the President's authorization to spend two million dollars of AID funds to defray the cost of three or four chartered airplanes for a two months period. This amount will be inadequate even for the U.S. part of the POL airlift if the airlift continues for longer than two months or if it is expanded in size. We are making every effort to get our planes on the ground as soon as possible. But the POL airlift is addressed only to a fraction of the total problem. On the assumption that Smith denies to Zambia electricity and coal and use of the railway through Southern Rhodesia, our estimates are that it would require a capital expenditure of between 125 and 150 million dollars, plus an additional amount in ordinary expenses to improve alternate overland transportation routes on a crash basis. If this amount of money were spent, it might be possible to supply the minimum requirements of the Zambian economy under a very austere standard and permit the export of some 400,000 tons of Zambian copper (present exports are 700,000 tons a year). Even this level could not be achieved except gradually over a period of one year on the most optimistic assumptions. A map indicating the alternate overland transportation routes and a memorandum giving details on the costs and timing estimates are attached at Tab B. We cannot be sure, even if we or the British spent this amount of funds, that the Africans would have the patience or the Zambians the discipline to wait out this period. And, if, in the fast moving political scene, there should be an early political or military solution of the overall problem, these funds would be to a large extent wasted. The Africans would gain somewhat through the improved overland facilities but the alternate routes of communication are not efficient as compared with the railroad through Southern Rhodesia. Another facet of the problem is the possibility of additional action by the UN Security Council. The Zambian Foreign Minister is reported by the press to have announced Zambia's intention to ask the Security Council for mandatory sanctions and "the use of United Nations Forces." This would involve a determination that a threat to the peace exists; thus it would bring into play Chapter VII of the UN Charter under which Council action can legally bind all UN members to take certain steps. At an early stage the British were tentatively prepared to accept a Chapter VII determination by the Council but backed off at the last minute. We believe that, whenever the next Council meeting is held, mandatory, economic sanctions are very likely to be imposed unless the British or we veto. Unless South Africa and Portugal complied, the next succeeding measure in the Council might well be to call for a naval blockade against them. Moreover, if economic sanctions did not bring down the Smith regime, the Council would thereafter be likely to call for the use of force against Southern Rhodesia, which again would face the British with the dilemma of casting a veto or permitting the Council to force a decision upon them. This might in fact be easier for Wilson than taking such a decision on his own volition. In sum, we believe that under great pressure the U.K. has been forced to announce an economic sanctions program which will probably not achieve its objectives either in terms of maintaining the U.K.'s relationships with the African Commonwealth states or of bringing down quickly the Smith regime. We should bear in mind that African resentment against the U.K. will inevitably rub off on the U.S. Conclusions 1. The hard decisions have yet to be taken by the British. The U.K. must, and presumably will, make the necessary decisions as soon as they estimate their situation permits. 2. We have thus far refrained from recommending any particular action to the British on the ground that this is an internal Commonwealth affair. This should continue to be our attitude for the foreseeable future. 3. We should continue to express to the U.K. our doubts that the sanctions thus far proposed will achieve U.K. objectives or indeed even enable the U.K. to maintain control of the situation for a long period of time. And we should continue to make clear to the British that they should not count on us for large-scale financial aid which we think is likely to be wasted. 4. We are consulting with the Department of Defense on the military aspects of this question. Our tentative thinking from a political point of view is as follows: If the British raise with us the question of military force, we should make clear this is a decision for the U.K. to make. If they ask for U.S. troops we should decline. If the U.K. decides to use force and we have a chance to express an opinion between a limited action to secure Wankie and Kariba and a larger type of action, we should express an opinion in favor of the former. If they ask for an airlift to move and support a British force we should probably react sympathetically. Thomas C. Mann
517. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia/1/ Washington, December 22, 1965, 11:02 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 11-2 RHOD. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Mann and Mulcahy; cleared by Williams, Solomon, and McElhiney; and approved by Mann. Repeated to Dar-es-Salaam, Leopoldville, London, and Salisbury. 1032. Ref: Embtel 1045./2/ Please point out again to Kaunda that action proposed by him would be far more harmful to Zambia than to Smith regime. It is obvious that alternate overland transportation routes are inadequate meet Zambia's needs. US is not rpt not in position extend assistance on scale GRZ would require if Kaunda stops copper shipments through Rhodesia. Present US commitment is assist British in meeting emergency POL shortage. No existing combination current outward transportation capacities and limited port facilities is currently adequate to ship entire Zambian copper production. A premature escalation of economic sanctions is therefore not in Zambia's own self-interest. /2/Telegram 1045 from Lusaka, December 22, reported that President Kaunda was planning to stop all copper shipments through Rhodesia if by noon on December 24 Smith had not revoked a 5 pound surcharge on coal exported to Zambia. (Ibid.) If Kaunda nevertheless determined to move in the direction indicated, agree you should try to persuade him to refrain from specifying any particular quantity of copper so as to leave room for greatest possible flexibility. While continuing to support British position you should not commit US to measures beyond those already taken by USG and announced. We have already asked for bids on charter aircraft for POL lift and hope complete arrangements soon. Will telegraph latest developments on this point. Unable to give estimates at this moment on quantity of copper that could be moved on airlift as now planned after allowing for space for empty drums but believe quantity would be small. Will cable separately additional estimates on this point. FYI: Recent Department analyses indicate full Zambian rescue operation likely cost about $150 million. Funds are not available. As indication magnitude US contribution you have been informed we currently thinking in terms $2 million. End FYI. More guidance follows. If you can delay conversation with Kaunda even for hour or two, would be preferable. If this impossible, proceed on basis foregoing guidance. Rusk
518. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer)/1/ Washington, December 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, Chrono (Haynes), 3/1/65-6/15/66. Confidential. RWK FYI. Most of the points made by the Zambian Foreign Minister and Minister of Mines at Soapy's dinner last night covered old ground./2/ However, a couple of arguments not often heard are worth noting: /2/A Zambian mission composed of Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe and Minister of Mines A.G. Zulu visited Washington December 22-27 to discuss the Rhodesian situation. 1) Most observers in the UK and US seem more concerned about the political consequences to the Wilson Government, if the UK resorts to force in Rhodesia. Such observors ignore the political consequences to the Kaunda Government, if force is not used. (Comment: This is a valid point. If the Wilson Government falls, its successor will still be a responsible government with which we can deal. If Kaunda falls, leftist radicals will assume power, and racial strife and chaos could result throughout Southern Africa.) 2) The GOZ wants the UK to pay the extra royalty and taxes imposed by the Rhodesians on coal and coke going to Zambia. They suggest that payment be made from the Rhodesian funds blocked in the UK. Thus far, the UK has been non-committal. 3) The Minister of Mines underscored the danger that European and Japanese industrial users of Zambian copper might permanently adapt to other metals, if the uncertainty caused by the rebellion continues. In this event, the effect on the Zambian economy would be irreparable and disastrous. 4) In its meeting today, the GOZ mission will probably press for US support to get the UK to put down the Rhodesian rebellion by force. They would probably reluctantly settle for our promise to approach the UK to reimburse the GOZ for the extra charges on coal and coke. (Comment: If the UK were to agree to reimburse the GOZ, this might ease the pressure within Zambia for the use of force until after the Christmas holidays. By that time, the UK predicts the "bite" of sanctions will be severely felt in Rhodesia.)/3/ /3/The joint communique issued on December 27 states that Secretary Rusk confirmed that the United States planned to begin to make a significant contribution to the airlift of oil supplies to Zambia in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada in the first week of January 1966. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 694. Rick Haynes/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
519. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia/1/ Washington, December 29, 1965, 8:36 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by McElhiney and Chalfin on December 23, cleared by Mann and Haynes, and approved by Williams. 1084. Embassy is requested to deliver the following reply from President Johnson to President Kaunda's letter of December 15 (urtel 993):/2/ /2/Dated December 16. (Ibid.) See footnote 4, Document 514. "Dear President Kaunda: Thank you for your letters of December 15 and December 18 in which you express your concern which I share for the situation in Rhodesia and its ramifications on your own country. By now you have been informed of our willingness to assist the British in mounting an airlift to provide Zambia with the petroleum products denied to your country by Southern Rhodesia as a consequence of the recently declared oil embargo. I want to assure you that I am most sympathetically aware of Zambia's difficult position and that we will continue to be as helpful as possible during these trying days. Secretary Rusk and other officials of the Department of State welcome the opportunity that you gave them for direct conversations with Foreign Minister Kapwepwe and Minister of Mines Zulu. The exchange of views we have had with them has been most useful and constructive. Rest assured that the United States is keenly aware of the need to safeguard the position of Zambia in this period of crisis. Lyndon B. Johnson" Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
