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520. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 30, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Memos. Confidential. Copies were sent to Komer and Saunders. McGB FYI. 1. The mystery of the President's OK on $2 million for the Zambian airlift has been cleared up. In a conversation with Tom Mann this morning, I asked if he had been informed of the President's approval. His reply was, "yes, by a female secretary from the ranch on Christmas day". 2. If he has not already been in touch with you, Mann will be calling you today and sending over a memo, seeking quick Presidential approval for an additional $3 million in AID funds for Zambian contingency plan. This additional money is required because (a) our participation in the Zambian oil airlift has proven more expensive than anticipated, and (b) we still need to fulfill our agreement to help improve overland transportation routes to and from Zambia. The $3 million will be obtained by juggling around existing SA allocations for Africa. 3. As Komer and I have been predicting, the operation to protect Zambia is proving more and more expensive to the US. At this stage, our support for the Zambian operation represents a two-month commitment. If the Smith regime does not collapse within that period, the UK and Zambia will surely be back to us for even more support. 4. Having gone this far in support of the Zambian airlift, I would certainly recommend that the President approve the additional $3 million. However, State should increase pressures on the UK for the "quick kill" in Rhodesia, stressing that we are fast reaching the financial limits of our support. Rick
521. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 6, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer. McGB Situation Report: Rhodesian Crisis 1. We have finally received some indication of the UK strategy (see London's T-3099 attached)/2/ to bring down the Smith regime. In brief, it is based on the assumption that, once Zambia is allowed to participate, economic sanctions will work by late spring. At that time, the British predict the Governor of Rhodesia could form a new government with wide internal support. (Our assessment is much more pessimistic.) A UK military presence might be necessary to back up such a government for a time. /2/Dated January 5; not printed. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, IT 7-16 TANZAN-ZAMBIA. 2. The UK strategy leaves unanswered an important question of US involvement: Since the US commitment in the Zambia protection effort is for two months only, what will the UK expect of us if economic sanctions don't work by the end of February? 3. A working-level US mission arrives in London today to try to gain a better understanding of the UK's thinking. 4. African pressures on the UK have weakened considerably as they have failed to reach agreement on a unified policy or course of action: (a) The Commonwealth Conference in Lagos on January 11 promises to be a fizzle with indications that Australia, New Zealand, Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago and Tanzania will not participate. Even those who plan to attend probably will not be represented by their PMs. Wilson himself will attend but would have liked to avoid going. His non-attendance would have hurt Nigerian PM Balewa's standing in Africa. (b) There's a good chance that the OAU Summit Meeting on Rhodesia proposed for January 19 will not take place. Already some 11 member nations have objected to the meeting. (c) Because of the recent spate of coups in French-speaking Africa, the 13-nation OCAM meeting in Madagascar may be postponed. Rhodesia was one of the agenda items. (d) The early rush to break diplomatic relations with the UK has ceased with only nine nations having broken. 5. US participation in the POL airlift to Zambia commenced on January 4 and apparently the combined UK, Canadian and US effort will keep Zambia adequately supplied. 6. Smith has announced his willingness to (a) refine and ship Zambia's POL and (b) stop the $14 per ton export royalty on Rhodesian coal shipped to Zambia. Kaunda has rejected (a) and has not reacted to (b) on the grounds that these are Smith's propaganda ploys to divert world attention from the central issues. So far, the UK agrees with Kaunda. Rick
522. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, January 7, 1966, 4:56 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted, cleared, and approved by Bruce Lancaster of S/S. 3894. For Charge only. Following message received by President from Primin Wilson January 7: "Before I set off for this rather extraordinary Commonwealth meeting at Lagos, I thought I would let you know how I see things developing in Rhodesia. I need hardly tell you that I have very considerable qualms about going: but I have decided that it would be more harmful to absent myself than to be present. Faced with this choice of evils, I have decided it was right to go: first, because I think it is in all our interests to try and keep the Commonwealth together and secondly because I am sure that we must do all we can to maintain the prestige and standing of moderate African leaders like Abubakar./2/ /2/Sir Abubakar Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria. "When we last met I told you that I thought that the euphoria of independence and of Christmas would carry the Smith regime over into the New Year, and that they would thereafter start to suffer from post-hogmanay gloom. Thanks to your Administration's ready agreement to join with us in an oil embargo and to help us with a consequential airlift to Zambia and to fairly general support throughout the free world for what we are doing, this is precisely what is now happening. With the introduction of petrol rationing, the dolce vita of the European population is starting to come to an end. Responsible business leaders are forecasting considerable European unemployment before long. Added to that there is severe drought in Matebeleland where the maize harvest has failed (though this throws up further problems) which we are looking into. Two Johannesburg papers, originally pro-Smith, are now saying he cannot win: the South African Government is cautiously neutral and the Portuguese seem to be hedging their bets. "As economic difficulties begin to press upon the regime, I think we shall find that, administratively, they will not have the experience or competence to deal with it. Indeed, the evidence is now starting to accumulate that many thinking people in Rhodesia realize that the Smith regime cannot win. It is only a matter of time before more and more people come to realize that life can only get worse and that the alternative of returning to constitutional rule is better than any prospect that Smith has got to offer. It is tempting but unwise to try and put a date to the turning point, and I will not attempt to do so: but I personally am convinced that it will come and that it could come sooner than we think. "I am therefore totally convinced, privately, that we have Smith on the run, and that it will not be long before this becomes clear publicly. It may soon be wise to start thinking of peace terms. While we want to bring Smith down and bring him down quickly, we must be able to discredit Smith utterly if we are to make sense of the reconstruction period. There can be no question of negotiating with Smith as equals. But this does not mean that we should not be thinking of methods of restoring the rule of law in Rhodesia and we are hard at work on this. As soon as our ideas are clearer I will be in touch with you again. Any public announcement of our peace aims will need very careful timing: I cannot afford to lose my African audience by giving them any reason to think that we are weakening in our resolve to bring Smith down: equally I must make a statement early enough to give the Europeans hope for better things if they reject Smith. The problem of my four constituencies is always with me. "The next immediate hurdle is of course the Lagos meeting. Now that, with your help, and with that of all our allies and friends, sanctions are clearly beginning to bite, I am more hopeful of being able to turn discussion into constructive channels than I was when Abubakar first made his proposal and visited London before Christmas. "I shall have to give our Commonwealth partners a very frank account of what we are doing and try to make them share my own conviction that this rebellion will be brought to heel. There will also be some talk about Zambia's problems. I shall, moreover, have to listen to some fairly severe lectures on the need to introduce one man one vote at the earliest possible moment. But I am resolved not to give way to demands for the use of force at once and I shall at this stage be able to do no more than listen to their advice about how to handle matters in the future. It would be fatal to spell out in detail our ideas for constitutional development. It would be bound to offend one or more of my constituencies. If I can keep the Africans quiet for a few more weeks and avoid senseless action in the Organization of African Unity and embarrassing initiatives in the United Nations the visit will have been worthwhile. "I will let you know how I get on and keep you in touch with my thinking for the future. My people were in touch with yours about the details of current strategy and tactics. I am much encouraged by your resolute support. We shall win." Rusk
523. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, January 7, 1966, 5:11 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted, cleared, and approved by Bruce Lancaster of S/S. 3896. For Charge only. Following is message received from the Prime Minister to President via privacy channel: Begin Text: "In my earlier message today, I mentioned that drought in Rhodesia was presenting Smith with problems and might have repercussions on ourselves. My colleagues and I discussed this further this morning and it is clear that the drought is prevalent throughout central Africa. We have therefore decided that it would be right, on humanitarian grounds, to prevent starvation and on practical grounds to prevent starvation leading to rioting and bloodshed to see what we can do to help. As we are proposing to press sanctions on Rhodesia on other fields, we might appear to be inconsistent: but I think that opinion generally would draw the necessary distinction. I have therefore this morning been in contact by telephone with both Bob Menzies and Mike Pearson and we have agreed to look into the possibilities of a joint commonwealth initiative to relieve the famine. If wheat is a suitable substitute for the failure of maize, then both Australia and Canada will be able to help from their own stocks: we should of course make a financial contribution. If maize is essential, then we may have to make this a combined operation bringing you in. But you have done so much already that we shall not do so unless it is absolutely necessary. I know that famine in India is in all our minds. I shall be letting it be known, informally, this afternoon that Menzies, Pearson and I are in touch on this problem." End Text. Rusk
524. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson/1/ Washington, January 7, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. No classification marking. A covering note from Bundy to the President dated January 8, 11:30 a.m., reads: "Mr. President: Bob Komer has negotiated the attached rather short and straightforward message to Prime Minister Wilson (Tab A) in answer to his message of yesterday on Rhodesia. I think it meets the requirements. You may also want to look at a second message which came in yesterday (Tab B), but which does not require an additional answer. McG.B." A handwritten notation indicates that the President's message was sent at 3:30 on January 8, presumably through the "privacy channel" referred to in Document 523. It was most considerate of you to share your thoughts on the Rhodesian crisis again on the eve of your departure for Lagos. We on this side certainly appreciate the delicacy of the situation you face, as well as the problem of supplying Zambia while applying sanctions to the Smith regime. After your meeting in Lagos, we shall look forward to getting your latest estimates and plans. There may be serious difficulties ahead, particularly as to whether the African states will sit still long enough to permit sanctions to bring Smith down. My best wishes for every success at Lagos. Sincerely, /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
525. Note From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 8, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos. Secret. Mac: FYI: According to Mann, Pat Dean said that it would help enormously if we could issue a statement Monday asking our companies not to import asbestos and lithium from Rhodesia. This is apparently a play to back British contention of total embargo at Lagos. I agreed with Tom that a low-key State announcement to this effect would cause no problem. Our imports are marginal. However, this would bother US Vanadium which has a major chrom mine in Rhodesia. Vanadium fears that if it is then asked to cut off chrom imports, Rhodesians will retaliate by letting the mine flood, at substantial cost. Tom and I thought this contingent problem worth risking./2/ /2/A notation in the margin in Bundy's handwriting reads: "I agree." RWK
526. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, January 11, 1966, 4:58 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by John P. Walsh of S/S, and approved by Mann. 3979. The following message was received today from Prime Minister Wilson through White House channels: "(1) In my last message on the Rhodesian problem I said I would keep you informed about how I get on in Lagos. Now that I am here, I am hopeful that with a modicum of luck we should get through this meeting all right. But having spoken to Malcolm MacDonald, who is here from Lusaka, it appears that the situation in Zambia is far from good. I have therefore decided, at very considerable inconvenience that it would be right for me to pay a brief visit to Kaunda to try to get him on the rails again. (2) The facts of the situation are these. At the right moment, the closing of the Zambia border with Rhodesia could be of decisive influence in giving Smith a coup de grace but it is essential that this card should be played at the right time. If it is played too early before the Smith regime and Rhodesian opinion are convinced that the game is up and before we have taken all the necessary steps to see that Zambia could survive the few weeks of final collapse in Rhodesia and possible cut off of supplies from the copper belt, this key move in the whole process could ruin Zambia without overthrowing Smith. The timing is therefore of the essence. Kaunda, who is understandably, in a very nervous frame of mind, is threatening to close the border before we are ready for it, before he can survive it and before it will be really effective in terms of bringing Smith down. (3) My main objective in going to Lusaka will be therefore to try and steady him and to get our strategy better co-ordinated. There are in addition other things to discuss with him. I plan to be in Zambia on Wednesday evening and Thursday morning. It would be an immense help to me if you felt able, before my arrival, to send a personal message to President Kaunda through your Ambassador in Lusaka saying that I have explained our strategy fully to you, expressing your confidence that economic sanctions were working, that the crunch with Smith might be approaching but that it was essential in everybody's interests to get the timing of the final sanction of closing the Rhodesia border with Zambia right; and that you would hope that he, Kaunda, and I would reach agreement on this in everybody's interest. He simply must be made to realise that the vast efforts which you and we are making at great cost to ourselves need to exert their maximum effect but that given time they should put Zambia in a position where she could safely administer the final blow."/2/ /2/On January 12, the President sent a message to Wilson saying that he was "weighing in at Lusaka in an effort to steady Kaunda." (Telegram 1445 to Lagos, January 12; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 67 D 262, Presidential Correspondence, Pres. to UK/Wilson) Telegram 1195 to Lusaka, January 12, transmitted a letter from Johnson to President Kaunda urging close coordination with Prime Minister Wilson, and emphasizing his own belief that it would be harmful if the border between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia were closed before Zambia was prepared, as a result of the programs currently being carried out, to meet the situation. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 7 UK) Ball
527. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 13, 1966, 11:45 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. "For Information Only" is handwritten at the top of the source text, which also bears a handwritten "L," indicating that the President saw the memorandum. Rhodesian Sitrep. Wilson, who is handling Rhodesia personally, seems to have bought some time by his skillful handling of the Commonwealth Conference. However, the key remains Kaunda, whom Wilson is seeing today in an attempt to get Zambia to hold off cutting its own economic lifeline until sanctions have had a chance to work. Wilson's effort, backed by your message, should suffice for a time--though many of us are skeptical that Kaunda will sit still long enough to give Wilson's strategy a full run. Meanwhile, there are mildly encouraging signs that sanctions are beginning to bite in Rhodesia. We hear that the business community is hurting. State's best experts are now coming around to the view that it's no longer a question of whether sanctions will work but of whether Smith will cave before Kaunda or other Africans do something foolish. If Smith caves, Wilson's plan is to restore direct UK rule via the Governor (who is still holding the fort in Rhodesia) and devise a new plan for gradual progress toward black majority rule. There is a risk, however, that even if Smith caves soon other extremists will take over, creating a chaotic situation in which Wilson may have to fly in troops. In sum, even we skeptics are a little more hopeful now that Wilson's strategy may work. If so, he will have pulled our African chestnuts out of the fire along with his (although the success of economic sanctions will create an ominous precedent for the Portuguese and South African problems still down the road). R.W. Komer/2/ /2/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
528. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson/1/ London, January 14, 1966, 11:20 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the source text indicates that the President saw the message. The message was sent to the President along with a January 14 memorandum from Komer noting that the key point was probably the agreement with Kaunda that Zambia should not cut its economic links with Rhodesia until at least mid-February; that airlift demands would "go way up" when that happened; and that Wilson was "quietly trying to position himself to use force for the final kill." (Ibid.) I am now back in London after my round Africa safari having seen all seven African heads of government with whom we are in relations, the only notable omissions being of course Nkrumah and Nyerere. It has been well worth while and I think my Commonwealth and African constituencies are now quiescent at least for the time being. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting at Lagos went in the end far better than I could reasonably have hoped. The meeting itself was not without its moments, particularly my debate with Field Marshal Margai of Sierra Leone about an opposed landing in Rhodesia on the first day and a very rewarding closed session at the end of the second day when only heads of government were present without their advisers and in the course of which I was able to take them pretty fully into my confidence both about present policies and future objectives. As you will have seen from the communique the Commonwealth as a whole have reaffirmed their recognition that Rhodesia is a British responsibility and while in a sense I have had to account to them for that responsibility, they are now content to let me discharge it for the time being in my own way. There were some members--a minority I am glad to say--who still hankered after the use of force: but the Commonwealth collectively has agreed to give sanctions a fair run. Your own decision on asbestos and lithium could not have been better timed to make maximum impact. The meeting was I think a victory for moderation. It has strengthened the Commonwealth vis-a-vis the extremists of the Organization of African Unity and it has held at least for the time being, the position in the United Nations on Chapter VII. It has added to the prestige of the sound moderate leaders like Abubakar; above all, I have avoided being pressed any further than my public position in the House of Commons. The price of this has been the very modest one of the establishment of two committees to meet in London and an undertaking to meet the Commonwealth again if, by July, sanctions have still not succeeded in their objective, to that extent time has been gained. All in all commonsense and realism prevailed. I then went on to Lusaka where I have had very good meetings with Kaunda, both privately and with his ministers. Your own very helpful message had eased my path for me. I had two main objectives: first, to secure Kaunda's agreement that plans for the quick kill (the closing of the Zambian frontier with Rhodesia) should be carefully coordinated between Zambia and Britain, Kaunda is no longer suicidal and I managed not only to secure acceptance that we should not proceed to the second front before mid February, but I also have a fair prospect of getting their agreement, that even when the Zambian frontier is closed to Rhodesian industrial goods, coal will be exempt, with all that that means in airlift terms. This date of mid February is the earliest at which, on the best expert advice, it would be prudent to contemplate delivering the death blow to illegality. Even so it may mean that Zambia will be reduced to a care and maintenance basis for a period of indeterminate length. My second objective was to try and persuade Kaunda to accept British forces in Zambia so that at the right moment, they would be ready to move into Rhodesia either invited or unopposed. On this I think I have got Kaunda away from his insistence on placing troops across the Zambia and though he has not yet agreed to accept a Commonwealth presence on the Zambian side of the frontier with Rhodesia, he is now, I think, at least more ready to contemplate something along lines I could accept. All in all, he is a bit more relaxed, much more ready to give sanctions a chance, and does at least accept that we really mean to bring Smith down. He does of course feel himself very exposed economically and, politically, he finds it very difficult to accept a position in which Zambia, for purely practical reasons, is forced to take up a less uncompromising attitude than his fellow Africans towards commercial ties with Rhodesia, because of the inevitable interdependence of the two neighbor economies. For the time being, however, I think we have got him on the rails again. In Nairobi I had an hour meeting with Kenyatta, and found him as usual wise, relaxed and completely sympathetic, both on sanctions and on the inevitability of gradualness towards majority rule in the reconstruction period. As you will have seen, the Commonwealth Secretary did not in the end manage to get to Salisbury to see the Governor. But as I indicated in my earlier message, I can play at home the difficulties about personal safety and recognition as usefully as if he had gone in. My qualms about the Governor remain, home African and world fronts now in tolerable order--and I realize of course that the most overworked phrase in this message has been for the time being--I can now concentrate on the internal Rhodesian situation. All in all, the past week has been time well spent. The situation has of course been transformed by the oil sanctions and the working of the Zambia airlift. In consequence the Commonwealth in general and Commonwealth Africans in particular now accept Britain's responsibility and good faith and this means that we can now make the running ourselves. The point of major difficulty which lies ahead is how to translate economic hardship in Rhodesia into a political readiness to capitulate. For this the Europeans in Rhodesia will have to be given some assurances for their future as well as evidence of continuing and growing hardship if they persist in rebellion. The time is approaching therefore when I shall have to make a public statement on our peace aims. This I shall probably have to do before Parliament reassembles during the last week of January. This will have to be accompanied by a further tightening of the sanctions screw in order to demonstrate that we are not peace-making from weakness. You have experience in such strategy. I will be in touch with you again.
529. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer)/1/ Washington, February 2, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, Chrono (Haynes), 3/1/65-6/15/66. Confidential. RWK FYI. The following are the main points of interest to come out of yesterday's US-UK talks/2/ on the Rhodesian crisis: /2/The annual U.S.-U.K. talks on Africa were held in Washington February 1-3. The U.S. delegation was headed by Assistant Secretary Williams and the British delegation was headed by Sir Roger Allen, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The discussions are recorded in memoranda of conversation in Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. 1. UK feels they can hold off Zambia's participation in sanctions until the latter half of March (in spite of the Wilson-Kaunda previous agreement on a February 15 date). 2. Rhodesia should run out of POL products in mid-April with serious distribution problems arising before that time. 3. Sir Hugh Beadle predicts that white Rhodesian confidence in the Smith regime will crack when a complete POL cut-off occurs because of Smith's assurances to his supporters that this would never happen. 4. Coal from the Kandabwe mines will start reaching the Zambian Copper Belt at the rate of 15,000 tons per month by mid-February. 5. During the period of Zambia's participation in sanctions, there will be no copper production because available coal will be used exclusively to generate the power needed to keep the copper mines pumped out. 6. UDI is now being referred to as "IDI" by the British, i.e., "Illegal Declaration of Independence." 7. According to British estimates, the chances are very slim for majority rule in Rhodesia even within five years after the end of IDI. 8. The UK plans to hold a meeting around the end of February to determine how friendly governments and private foundations could help them in the rehabilitation of Rhodesia after IDI. 9. Specific UK requests for US assistance: a) continuation of airlift support through the end of April; b) US assistance in calming down African governments when and if there is an increase in African pressures on the UK for the "quick kill." My general impression of the talks on Rhodesia is that the British are surprisingly optimistic about the success of their scenario. They are certainly much more optimistic than we are./3/ /3/A February 3 memorandum from Haynes to Komer summarizes items of interest raised during the concluding sessions of the talks. It states that the British indicated that they intended to rely on economic sanctions to bring down the Smith regime and did not want to use force because of the consequences to Zambia, the negative attitude of the British public, and the risk of more direct aid to Rhodesia from South Africa. They were prepared to use British forces after Smith's downfall, however, if necessary to guarantee internal security. (Johnson Library, Name File, Haynes Memos) Rick Haynes/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
530. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 17, 1966, 4:10 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 3/66-12/68. Secret. The Rhodesian situation is heating up again and attracting a lot more press coverage--some of it with adverse ramifications on us. Unlike the British, our experts feel that while economic sanctions have succeeded in hurting the Rhodesian economy, they are far from achieving the political objective of Smith's downfall. The situation in Rhodesia remains calm and local authorities are in firm control. Smith's ability to hold out this long has earned him virtually the solid support of the white minority. The African majority is still quiescent. Smith's continued ability to hold out is being reinforced by (a) an increasing trickle of POL from private South African sources, (b) effective radio and press censorship, (c) the fact that economic sanctions are not 100% effective, and (d) Harold Wilson's widely disseminated announcement that HMG will not use military force to end the rebellion. The longer the Rhodesian problem remains on the boards, the more difficult it will become for the US. Already, the US is being criticized by Africans for permitting the reopening of the Rhodesian Information Office here last week. (The Governments of Ghana and Nigeria have officially protested, and the African Ambassadors in Washington have been meeting to work out some concerted action.) The Justice Department points out that because the Rhodesians have registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, there is no quick way to close down the office./2/ Our explanation that registration in no way implies US approval of the Rhodesians' activities or US recognition of the Smith regime has not silenced critics. Already connections are evident between the reopened Rhodesian Information Office and extreme rightwing US groups. In connection with our support for economic sanctions, we are also faced with the possibility that some of the US tobacco companies may not cooperate with the recent UK ban on the export of and trade in Rhodesian tobacco. Finally, with Zambia chafing at the bit to participate fully in sanctions and pressuring Wilson for a forceful military solution and with white resistance in Rhodesia increasing, the UK may well be obliged to commit a lot more military might to achieving an ultimate solution than if it had gone for the "quick kill" at the outset. /2/A February 25 letter from Under Secretary Mann to Henry J.C. Hooper, the registered agent for the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, formerly attached to the British Embassy, stated that since Hooper was no longer a diplomatic representative of the British Government and the United States did not recognize any independent state of "Rhodesia," he had no official capacity in the United States. If he wished to remain as a private citizen, he could apply to the Department of Justice for adjustment of his status to that of resident alien. For text of Mann's letter, see Department of State Bulletin, April 11, 1966, pp. 588-589. The UK's measured approach to ending the Rhodesian rebellion seems to ignore the financial and practical limits to US support of efforts to keep Zambia afloat during the crisis. In fact, yesterday the UK put out feelers to test our willingness to extend our airlift participation beyond mid-April. That they plan to do so is further evidence that Wilson is no longer counting on bringing Smith down in two months or so. The longer the crisis goes on, the greater the risk that African frustration will be turned on the UK and on us. R.W. Komer/3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
531. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, April 4, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 236, SIG/DOC: 3--4/14/66-- Southern Rhodesia: Next Talks With the British. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text which is filed with a covering note of April 4 from Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) Harry H. Schwartz transmitting the paper for consideration at the fifth SIG meeting scheduled for April 5. The meeting was subsequently rescheduled and held on April 12. SUBJECT The Problem The purpose of this paper is to obtain the approval by the Senior Interdepartmental Group of "a set of instructions for a frank talk with the British Government shortly after the British elections which would set forth the limits of U.S. involvement in the Rhodesian problem." There are listed below (a) a statement of the basic objectives the U.S. seeks to achieve in its relations with the U.K. on the Rhodesian problem (at this stage strictly for internal USG use) and (b) talking points for use by an American spokesman designed to elicit from the British their current assessment and future plans. Information elicited from the British would be used to define U.S. objectives more precisely before we inform the British of the limits of our involvement. Basic U.S. Objectives in Relations with British 1. The U.S. should encourage the U.K. to reach a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian problem that would be compatible with the spirit and intent of (a) Security Council Resolution of November 20, 1965, and (b) Prime Minister Wilson's six principles. (It is understood that such a settlement can be negotiated only when HMG can deal from a position of greater strength than at present, which would probably have to be based on a tightening of the present economic sanctions and/or some troop deployment carrying a credible threat of force.) 2. We should endeavor to avoid a situation in which effective African pressures could be mounted to invoke mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. We should therefore encourage the British to take courses of action which would minimize this possibility. 3. In consideration of our relations with Zambia and other African governments and quite apart from our relations with the British, it is in the U.S. interest to continue to help mitigate the effects of UDI upon Zambia. However, HMG should understand that Congressional attitudes could prevent the use of appropriated funds for this purpose or other purposes connected with the Rhodesian problem unless positive steps are taken soon by the U.K. to end traffic with North Viet Nam by British- flag (Hong Kong-registered) shipping. 4. The U.S. should make clear to the British that it cannot commit itself to direct military involvement in Rhodesia. 5. The U.S. should keep the burden of responsibility clearly on the British to find an acceptable solution to the problem. We should therefore confine ourselves initially to endeavoring to obtain a clearer indication of British intentions and should refrain from encouraging or discouraging them with respect to any particular course of action at least until after this has been accomplished. Talking Points 1. The policy of the U.S. is to continue to support the Security Council Resolution of November 20 and, to the extent possible, to support British efforts to reach an early settlement of the Rhodesian problem. 2. On the basis of recent intelligence do the British now believe that the Smith regime can be brought down through economic sanctions alone within the time limits that appear politically tolerable? 3. Do the British believe that it is wise to encourage Zambia to sever completely its economic relations with Southern Rhodesia unless or until it is clear that by so doing Zambia would be contributing to the early downfall of the Smith regime? HMG's estimate as to when this cut-off might take place is desired. 4. In view of the leakages in the oil embargo, does the U.K. believe that further approaches should be made to Portugal and South Africa to reiterate earlier warnings of dangers inherent in the Southern Rhodesian situation for those countries helping the illegal regime? 5. How do the British assess the prospects of rising African pressures for mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII and how could we best coordinate our positions to deal with these pressures? 6. What does HMG consider are the prospects for success in negotiations with Rhodesian elements on a basis compatible with the Security Council Resolution of November 20 and with Prime Minister Wilson's six principles? 7. With whom might the British be willing to negotiate a settlement: With the Smith regime? With the Rhodesian Front without Smith? With a coalition of white elements after the downfall of Smith? With a coalition of anti-Smith whites and moderate Africans? With a coalition of Africans and moderate whites? With the African nationalists? 8. In the event that the sanctions program does not appear to be achieving the U.K.'s objective within the time frame which HMG considers tolerable, what alternative or supplementary measures does HMG believe it could take in order to strengthen its negotiating position or otherwise terminate the rebellion? [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
