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502. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 6, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Rhodesia. Secret. Mac-- I'm becoming quite concerned lest Rhodesia rapidly get out of hand. So I've redrafted my memo to make this point, and to help the President by showing that there's more than one option, even at cost of appearing an advocate. The reason is that State has to my knowledge never given him the whole picture, only a set of piecemeal tactical requests, and a general philosophy that this is a situation in which we can make haste slowly. Partly of course this is because no one wanted to bother LBJ unduly during convalescence, and also because the Seventh Floor professes to feel that he himself wants to stay as far away from yet another mess as he can. However, this is also the Seventh Floor's own feeling and I'm not at all sure their wish isn't father to the thought. Hence my memo which you might just leave at the Ranch. It has the merit of giving the other side of the story. Nor do I feel apologetic for my consistent instinct--now amply supported by the evidence--that State's counsels of caution ignore the likelihood that such crises tend to get worse if we let them drift, and that we're likely to get sucked into this one sooner or later anyway. It is also sheer inconsistency for State to send the President a Strengthened Africa Program, but not warn him that our stance on Rhodesia will have a far more decisive impact on our influence in that dark continent. RWK Attachment Washington, December 6, 1965, 5 p.m. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The Rhodesia Mess. Without mounting a neighing charger (I agree with Bruce that we should look any UK gift horse in the mouth), I offer this broader look at a looming problem than the piecemeal tactical requests put up to you so far. Moreover, at risk of being frankly partisan, I think that you should be given the case for action now to match against the counsels of caution natural in this situation. As the recent OAU meeting shows,/2/ the Rhodesia crisis is already moving a lot faster than the UK bargained for. There is a mounting risk that Wilson may lose control of it to a gaggle of irresponsible Africans, perhaps with Soviet support. All this is happening while the British (and we) debate whether the UK should go for some kind of "quick kill" strategy, or a much slower economic strangulation. However, this question may soon become academic. /2/The OAU Foreign Ministers met in Addis Ababa December 3-5 and voted to break diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom by December 15, if it had not crushed the Rhodesian rebellion by that date. The real question for the UK may rapidly become one of whether it can move fast enough to forestall African escalation. This in turn may depend on the kind of support we can offer, because the UK will find it very hard to carry out any effective strategy without such support. Thus we probably can exert a decisive influence on HMG's choice. A. Why get involved in Rhodesia? There's no doubt that we ought to duck this mess if we can afford to, leaving it to the British or others. We already have enough even larger problems on our plate. But can we? Rhodesia itself isn't very important to us. But the point is that it's critical to all the other Africans. They see it as a straight anti-colonial issue, and all their anti-white instincts are aroused. So our stance on this issue will greatly affect our influence throughout Africa--it will be a test of whether we mean what we say about self-determination and racialism. It will be far more significant than the Congo in this sense. Next, we're already involved. We've declared ourselves at the UN and imposed some sanctions. We'll be under great Afro-Asian and UN pressure to do a lot more. Nor would I discount the likelihood of growing domestic pressure here for supporting in Africa what we insist on at home. Third is the rapidly growing risk that the UK may lose control of this game, or even throw up its hands and let the OAU take over. The radical Africans are already trying hard to force the issue. They'll plug for use of overt force or guerilla warfare, thus posing the UK (and US) with the dilemma of either helping out or seeing the Soviets, Chicoms, and Nasser do so (or maybe even being pressed to join with them). Thus the longer this crisis rolls, the greater the chance of it becoming a far bigger and less controllable affair, with pressures on us to block the Communists a la the Congo. Fourth is the inevitable pressure on a quarter of the world's copper supply if Zambia and Katanga are cut off by the Rhodesians. Finally, as Arthur Goldberg points out (NY 2411), how we handle Rhodesia will also directly affect the remaining agenda of Portuguese territories, Southwest Africa, and apartheid. The longer the Rhodesian boil goes unlanced, the sharper the confrontation over the Southern third of Africa will become. Conversely, if we can lick Smith quickly, it may induce greater Portuguese and perhaps even South African flexibility as they see the handwriting on the wall. For all these reasons, it is unrealistic to think we can stay aloof. The odds are that if the British don't move fast--which they probably won't without our support--we'll probably be compelled to get involved anyway, but under far worse circumstances. If so, then it might be much better--and less costly in the long run--to try and help the UK choke Ian Smith quickly. This case is outlined in more detail below. B. Will a slow economic squeeze work? The answer seems to be "no," as the UK itself is coming to realize. Economic sanctions will take time and could prove ineffective. Time may also play into the hands of Ian Smith and his crowd. With South Africa and perhaps Portugal quietly determined to sustain the Smith regime, the key to an effective sanction campaign is missing. This is one reason for Wilson's reluctance to invoke total economic sanctions, or to support an oil embargo unless other nations comply. So Ian Smith is betting that, with a little belt tightening, he can outwait the UK, the UN, and the Africans, who will soon adjust to a fait accompli. The UK has talked of the Smith regime's collapse in terms of three to six months, since the real bite may be delayed till the tobacco sales next spring. But the longer it stays afloat, the less chance for its downfall. C. The Likelihood of Escalation. But an even more compelling reason is that economic sanctions won't have time to work because the Africans will probably force the issue first. African frustration is growing in direct proportion to UK and UN inability to bring Rhodesia to heel. As during the Congo crisis, African pressure for direct military action, fed by the Chicoms and Soviets, will probably increase rather than fade out. Bitterly dissatisfied with UK action to date, they are trying to up the ante, either by prodding the UK to take more drastic steps or by taking the initiative away from it. D. The key is what Rhodesia's neighbor Zambia does. Unless it joins the other Africans, they will be noisy but largely impotent. But Kaunda is under increasing pressure to act, even though Rhodesian retaliation would cripple Zambia's economy and put great pressure on copper. To ease this pressure, Kaunda has pled for UK forces. The UK is sending a fighter squadron and probably an infantry battalion too. HMG is also talking about shifting to a "quick kill" strategy, though we don't know yet whether these moves--and bold words--are designed mainly to pacify Kaunda and others, or betoken a really new UK plan. In any case, such moves might actually encourage Kaunda to take precipitate action in the expectation that the UK and US would bail him out. Almost all of Zambia's hydro power, coal, POL, etc. comes in from or through Rhodesia. Smith hesitates to cut it off, because Rhodesia would lose its most lucrative customer (with much greater economic impact than from the present sanctions). But he might do so in desperation. US/UK studies show that it would be very hard and quite expensive to keep Zambia afloat. The biggest problem would be to get enough coal in to run Zambia's railroads and provide power for its mines, and then to get copper out. Alternate rail routes are not very good, and depend mostly on tacit Portuguese cooperation. A civilian airlift seems very expensive for more than a minimum of emergency supplies. One partial hope would be to step up coal output quickly from a new Zambian mine, though it's lower quality coal. All this leads to three conclusions: (1) At present reading this crisis will probably get much worse rather than tail off; (2) the UK may lose the whip hand, which would make the mess even worse; (3) sooner or later Zambia will clash with Rhodesia, and then appeal for a rescue operation--which would be very expensive. E. What are the US options? Barbara Ward listed them in the analysis she sent you. They boil down to (1) stay loose and let the UK do what it can; or (2) back the UK in taking a stronger line. But if I'm right, we don't really have two options; instead it's more a choice between helping the UK move faster now (with our backing), or being dragged in later when the UK may no longer be in control. It's the perennial question of whether it would be wiser--and cheaper--to move vigorously to choke off a crisis, or to play it more gradually. F. Could tougher measures bring Smith to heel quickly? There is no easy answer. The key is to convince the Rhodesians that they're going to be in impossible hot water if they don't back down. Preliminary troop dispositions and tougher economic measures would help, and may also be essential to keep the other Africans to give the UK a chance. The mere threat of forceful seizure of Kariba could have an enormous psychological impact, both within and outside Southern Rhodesia. The case against such "quick kill" threats is that they might only trigger Rhodesia to cut Zambia's water off. But once again the point is that if the UK doesn't move fast, African pressure on Zambia may force it to self-inflict this wound anyway. And once the Africans themselves get going on a military solution the chances of a UK-style solution will be compromised. Thus there may even be a strong case for urging the UK to consider use of force. This would be highly painful to Wilson, but less so to us. I'd hazard that our commitment could be limited to airlift of UK troops. This would be a lot less expensive than bailing out Zambia. G. What would it cost us to back the UK fully now? Wilson is operating both politically and economically so close to the margin that it will be hard for him to act decisively unless he can count on us. His people have already presented a bill of particulars (London 2488 attached). We just don't know yet how much these measures would cost us. Presumably stockpile releases for the "common defense" would be done on a deferred barter basis without B/P impact; if done as a sale they would help our payments balance. Most of what we lent or supplied to help Zambia (locomotives, rail cars, cargo planes) would doubtless be US-made too. These things need careful study, but I'd hazard that the costs would be less than those if the Africans take over, with Soviet support. And if the plan misfired, we'd be no worse off than we would be anyway if Zambia's links with Rhodesia will be cut sooner or later in any case. H. Conclusions. (1) We can't stand aloof from the Rhodesia crisis--events won't let us; (2) a gradual economic squeeze already seems inadequate to bring Smith to heel; (3) the slower the UK moves the more likely the Africans will take over--with unpredictable results. Nor does a cautious US policy really protect us from eventual greater involvement; it may merely postpone this until after the crisis has become much worse. If all this is so, then urging the UK toward a quick kill--provided that it seems to have a fair chance of working--may be our best bet. HMG isn't asking to take over, but only to back it. All we need say is that we'll consider doing so, if the UK plan looks reasonable (they haven't really shown all their cards as yet). But Washington's inclination will be to err on the side of caution unless you call for a serious look at a quick kill. To do so would not commit you, merely offer a better basis for choice. R.W. Komer/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Attachment The UK has asked for our reactions to the following questions (State's preliminary reactions are also given): 1. Will the US take actions corresponding to the UK's intensified trade and financial sanctions, and support UK efforts to get others to do the same? We are willing to approach private US companies to encourage their voluntary support of UK sanctions; we already have Presidential authorization to regulate US exports to Rhodesia and can match UK action commodity by commodity; we would support UK efforts to enlist the cooperation of other countries. 2. If the US cannot support an immediate oil embargo, how far are we prepared to go? We don't want to commit ourselves to more than consultations on this subject because an oil embargo is ineffective without a naval blockade. 3. Would the US agree to meet the cost of any equipment, more quickly obtainable in the US, which Zambia urgently needs for contingency planning? We first need to study the contingency planning exercise. 4. Would the US join the UK in the financing (insofar as Zambia is unable to finance) and planning of an airlift? We would agree to join in planning, but not in financing. 5. Would the US release manganese from stockpile and help persuade the Belgians to take it in order to release freight cars to carry additional Zambian copper out via the Congo? We'd agree to sell manganese from stockpile to the Belgians. 6. In the event of a copper shortage, would the US agree to help the UK and Europeans from our stockpile? We would not be able to release stockpile copper. 7. Would the US participate in an economic mission going to Zambia next week to delve into the economic ramifications of UDI? We would not participate; however, we'd send an economist to our Embassy to work with the mission.
503. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 8, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63-1/66. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. McGB Situation Report: Rhodesian Crisis 1. Most of the African governments are looking for face-saving ways to avoid complying with the December 15 deadline for a diplomatic break with the UK. The present reading indicates that the hard-line holdouts are the UAR, Tanzania, Ghana, Guinea, Congo (B) and Burundi. 2. Ball's meeting with the UK officials continues late into the afternoon without any firm indication of the atmospherics. The most I've been able to hear was a second-hand quote from a UK Embassy officer: "The air is thin." 3. In Salisbury, Smith has threatened severe retaliatory measures against the UK's economic sanctions: a) repatriation of Africans from Zambia and Malawi, if UK sanctions cause unemployment; b) requiring payment in non-sterling foreign currencies for goods delivered to Zambia; c) possible increase in the price of Rhodesian coal; d) possible increase in railway charges to Zambia; e) reductions of imports from the UK. 4. The latest on-the-spot report from our Congen in Salisbury indicates that "at the end of the first month of illegal independence, the regime is firmly in control and not under any obligation, as a result of internal pressure, to yet turn back." Rick
504. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, December 8, 1965, 7:22 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Exdis. Drafted at the White House and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. 3246. The following message from the President was transmitted today to Prime Minister Wilson: "Thank you very much for your thoughtful message on the Rhodesian situation. I cannot express too strongly my admiration for the calm but forceful way you have taken personal responsibility of this complex and difficult problem. Within the limits imposed on us by Vietnam, we intend to give our utmost support for your efforts to reach an acceptable solution in Rhodesia. As you know, our people are tightening the economic noose. We have established administrative machinery for controls on exports and will put these into effect in tandem with yours. We are asking our importers to restrict the shipment of Rhodesian goods to our shores, though total value of these imports last year amounted to only $11 million. We will recognize the authority of the newly-appointed Board of Governors of the Rhodesian Bank. And we are prepared to talk with our oil companies about termination of shipments to Rhodesia, depending on the outcome of your analysis of this particular dilemma. We all hope that these measures will produce the desired objective. At the moment, however, we here feel that it is hard to be certain of favorable results in a short period of time. Because of this, we are convinced that the maintenance of Zambia-Katanga copper exports must take a high place in our planning. Our long-term interests indicate that the only sensible course of action is that which avoids strangling the Zambian economy and dislocating world copper markets for any substantial period of time. The efforts involved and the possible dangers, both economic and political, are so great that I think we should, as you suggest, arrange to have our people get together before our meeting on December 17. Although Roswell Gilpatric will not be available for this, George Ball has himself organized a group within his own office at the State Department which is acting as a focal point for the Rhodesian situation. They are presently discussing with your representatives measures in East Africa and at the UN in the coming difficult weeks and going over the Rhodesian items to come up at our meeting--to which I look forward with great pleasure." Rusk
505. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, December 9, 1965, 12:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, S. Rhodesia, 10/2/65-5/10/66. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials "vh." RE B reported things are going well in the meetings with Roll/2/ and Dean re above. They have until the 15th on the ultimatum--that means they should have an announcement by Monday/3/ or Tuesday so that the Africans don't start a stampede which would be hard to reverse. B feels the thing that would have the most effect on the Africans would be oil. We have gone into this in detail; there are only three companies involved. If the British, as sovereign in Rhodesia, took some kind of legal action against the import of oil and we could get our companies to go along with the British; B felt the French would also join, etc. /2/Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Under Secretary, U.K. Department of Economic Affairs. /3/December 13. The immediate question B needs guidance on is: Does Bundy think the President would object to our getting the American companies in on the assumption the British get theirs, asking them to comply. Bundy thought this would be all right but suggested Ball send the President an informational memorandum in the night's reading, saying this is what we are doing, following the British lead which is designed to tamp down African reaction. We could back it up later, if the President should need it. It would be better coming from Ball to the President than any other way.
506. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, December 9, 1965, 7:39 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers and Daniel K. Mayers of U; cleared by Goldstein, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon, Mary J. Wichser of AID's Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Williams, and Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs Murray J. Belman; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Lusaka and USUN. 3274. Thursday PM meeting ended two days of talks with UK officials headed by Sir Eric Roll. Last meeting summarized discussions: Economic sanctions: US has scheduled meetings with asbestos and lithium importers seeking voluntary controls. Similar meeting to be held with chrome importers after consideration has been given to stockpile availability. Voluntary controls on these commodities would approximate 80% US imports from Rhodesia, putting US roughly in line with UK import bans. UK is refining information on exports to Rhodesia. UK will consult with Embassy London when it has reached decisions on UK export bans. UK considering possibility of complete UK export ban rather than selected items, and thinks this would have its advantages even if US banned only selected exports. US stated it would cooperate in any event in matching export controls insofar as possible. UK, through consultation with third countries, hopes to raise cut-off of Rhodesian exports from present 25-30% level to 50-60% in near future. Our Embassies have been instructed to cooperate with UK demarches in this regard (Cir. 1070)./2/ /2/Dated December 4. (Ibid., FT 11-2 RHOD) Recent UK financial measures aimed at cutting off Rhodesian credit and forcing cash payments for Rhodesian imports. US has recognized UK-named Board of Rhodesian Bank. US told UK it cannot control private Rhodesian accounts, but US suggested it might talk informally to NY banks to discourage any short-term credit to Rhodesian importers. US gave UK reps memorandum outlining possible UK legal actions that might cause economic uncertainty and administrative difficulties for Rhodesia. Zambian contingency planning: Timing of UK mission to Lusaka still not firm. UK suggests Reed should consult High Commissioner when he arrives Lusaka. UK requested information what financial aid, if any, US might supply for maintenance Great North Road, Benguela route, airlift. "Every little bit helps." US took questions under advisement and indicated difficulty obtaining contingency funds. On POL airlift, UK now talking of Leopoldville-E'ville lift as supplement or alternative to Dar-Lusaka route. In view December 15, US urged UK to announce or commence some airlift ASAP. US to give UK Embassy Washington FAA analysis joint airlift study tomorrow. If US decides it can contribute airlift, joint planning will take place in London. UK to approach immediately Belgians and Congolese in effort to overcome reported reluctance to upgrade efficiency of BCK line. UK will report results to US. US to repeat to London Michell's preliminary report from Dar so it available before Michell's London stopover. Bridgman will also stop over. POL Embargo: London's 2605/3/ overtaken. Scenario now as follows, all pending highest level agreement both sides: (1) UK immediately to evaluate likelihood of Smith cut-off Zambia POL supply, latest info re Zambian POL reserves, effect embargo announcement would have in Africa and time within which airlift could be mounted and ground transport brought into operation. UK then will notify US of its willingness to institute embargo provided US can obtain voluntary compliance of its companies. (2) US will then seek voluntary compliance its companies. (3) UK and US to seek compliance by three other countries involved in Umtali refinery consortium (Netherlands, France, Kuwait), and secondarily to seek cooperation of other exporting nations who could fill the gap left by consortium embargo. (4) Assuming some support three principal other nations, public announcement embargo to be made. December 15 is target date, although obviously difficult. /3/Dated December 6. (Ibid., PET 17-2 RHOD) Copper: UK to send copper expert here next week, probably Wilks, Board of Trade. US told UK it unwilling to consider release copper stockpile, or international allocation of domestic consumption, leaving main area for discussion allocation based on import movements. However, agreed formally there would be no preconditions to discussion. Rusk
507. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, December 11, 1965, 11:40 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, S. Rhodesia, 10/2/65-5/10/66. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials "jm." Ball said we have been giving a very hard look at the whole Rhodesian problem; we have been talking with the British, etc. Ball said we are seriously contemplating voluntary oil embargo on Rhodesia and effect would probably be that Rhodesia would cut off flow of POL into Zambia and we might have to have some airlift. British have asked if we would set up separate airlift, but we are considering one ancillary to British. Ball said he thinks time has come where we should sit down and take a hard look at this with some of Vance's people. Vance asked what sort of quantity Ball had in mind and Ball said initially about three Connies. Ball said one of limiting factors is hard stands at the two airports. Vance said MAT supply is short right now. Ball asked about availability of a few planes and Vance said he thought it could be done. Vance said he would look into it and have his people get together with Ball's. Ball said should be tomorrow as British want to move on announcement of oil embargo before December 15. Vance said he was coming over for Noon meeting and they could talk further about it.
508. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, December 13, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, S. Rhodesia, 10/12/65-11/2/66. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials "jt." 7 p.m. Ball said he had a problem which he thought he would have to give an answer to the British tonight. It is the question of the airlift for oil in Rhodesia. The situation is that we have agreed with the British that we will get our oil companies to stop sending oil into Rhodesia if they will do the same with theirs. Our oil companies were in this afternoon and Ball thought they would go along. Ball said he had told the British to get an order in council which would help the oil companies with their own directors. Ball thought they would do this. B said the oil that goes into Rhodesia goes into a refinery in Rhodesia which in return supplies Zambia. If we cut off the oil to Rhodesia their first impulse is to husband their supply and they would say they have to cut off oil to Zambia. Ball said we could not have this for very long because their stocks are very low. The mines would have to stop pumping and we would be in trouble with copper. Ball said an airlift has to be set up on a temporary basis to enable them to carry oil in for about two months. The British have asked us to join them--we would have one from one point and they from another. Ball said he had told the British we could not do this but we would explore the possibility of putting additional men and planes in. The Air Force does not have the planes to do it and we would get civilian planes on charter. Ball said the total cost of the operation would be about half million dollars. There would be no problem on the balance of payments (gold outflow) because for the most part the planes and crews would be US. However, Ball said he thought we should get the Boss' reaction and the British would like an answer tonight. Ball said he planned for this to be a public arrangement and we want to be able to announce that we are reinforcing the air lift because we want to get some kudos out of the Africans ourselves. Bundy said he would do his best to reach the President and he would have to do it within the next half hour. If not they would just go ahead. 7:05 p.m. Bundy had one question--why do we need to join in something that is as low in cost as this? Is this something we want to do? Ball replied that he thought we wanted to do it and the British say they are putting in a lot more money and that it will exhaust the supply of planes readily available to them which they could get for sterling in the UK. Ball said he told the British the most we would be prepared to do would be to reinforce them. Bundy asked why it would be for two months. Ball said by that time they will be able over the rail facilities to get enough oil in to stock it and could manage. 7:10 p.m. Bundy said the President said o.k. go ahead.
509. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 14, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 17. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. McGB: Situation Report: Rhodesian Crisis 1. At Kenya's request, today's UNSC meeting on Rhodesia has been cancelled; Kenya reserves the right to call for another meeting later this week. 2. State's approach to the major US suppliers of oil to Rhodesia on voluntary compliance with an oil embargo met with a reluctantly favorable response. While doubting the efficacy of an oil embargo, the oil companies' sole condition was that the UK issue an order-in-council to provide them with "legal cover" for voluntary compliance. 3. Approaches to US importers of Rhodesian lithium, chrome and asbestos (accounting for about 75% of US imports from Rhodesia) for voluntary compliance with sanctions met with no apparent dissent. However, compliance would raise technical problems for some importers. 4. We have told the UK we are prepared to support a Zambian airlift with either three DC-7C's or one 707 provided, (a) support is limited to a 2-month period, (b) cost is kept below $300,000 per month, and (c) it is understood this is not an open-end undertaking. 5. An IBRD Vice-President is enroute to Rhodesia and Zambia to explore the possibility of the Bank acting as a trustee or custodian of the Kariba Dam installation. Comment: The cancellation of today's UNSC meeting temporarily takes some of the pressure off the US and UK to broaden and intensify sanctions. Kenya's request for cancellation is probably due to the lack of any instructions from the Kenyan Government. With increasing defections from the OAU December 15 deadline for a diplomatic break with the UK, the position of the Africans is both confused and weakened. The next move is the UK's when Wilson addresses the UNSC on Thursday. Rick
510. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 15, 1965, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer. McGB: Situation Report: Rhodesian Crisis (Sensitive information is bracketed)/2/ /2/In fact, that information is in parentheses. 1. So far, Guinea is the only African state to break diplomatic relations with the UK pursuant to the December 15 OAU deadline. 2. HMG has told the Tanzanians and Kenyans that it had moved to a position in support of mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII and to some form of IBRD presence at Kariba. This probably provoked the Kenyan cancellation of its request for a UNSC meeting and also may account for Tanzania's silence on a diplomatic break with the UK. (3. UK Embassy sources here tell us that HMG has now changed its position in support of Chapter VII economic sanctions. So far, neither Tanzania nor Kenya has been informed. Having altered their respective positions on the strength of the UK's representations to them, Tanzania and Kenya will undoubtedly feel betrayed. The result will be terrifically intensified problems for the US and UK in trying to keep African responses to UDI in constructive channels. US concern has been relayed to London.) 4. Zambia is sending a 4-man ministerial mission to London on Sunday to discuss the safeguarding and securing of the Kariba Dam with troops. If talks with the UK fail, the mission will split in two with the Foreign Minister coming to Washington and the Finance Minister going to Moscow for talks on the same subject. (5. Wilson has sent word of his approval of an oil embargo and Zambian airlift on our terms. We have replied that UK approval ignores the UK order-in-council upon which the voluntary cooperation of our oil companies is predicated. We have proposed that they announce the order-in-council in London. Whereupon, we would be prepared to make a simultaneous announcement of the details of our support for the UK.)/3/ /3/For text of the December 17 statement issued by the Department of State supporting the British decision to prohibit oil imports into Rhodesia, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 693-694. (Comment: At present the UK position seems confused. Our understanding of their strategy is hindered by the absolute UK black-out on information regarding the substance of Wilson's speech to the UNGA tomorrow. We have repeatedly pointed out to the British that their failure to take us into their complete confidence could affect the outcome of the President's talks with Wilson later this week.) (The timing of the UK's reneging on its support of Chapter VII economic sanctions could not be worse: (a) African frustration is at its highest over their inability to comply with the OAU Foreign Ministers' resolution; (b) Kenya and Tanzania have altered their public positions in reliance on UK assurances; (c) Zambia, a key country, is moving toward a more aggressive stance.) Addendum. Rhodesian PM Ian Smith is scheduled to appear on CBS' Face the Nation on December 26th. Rick [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
