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490. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, November 10, 1965, 7:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer. McGB Rhodesian UDI FYI. The Rhodesian situation has not changed since my Situation Report to you of yesterday. Our Consul General in Salisbury reports today that the "GSR gives more ominous signs than yesterday of being poised, indeed impatient, to take UDI." As you requested this morning, I am attaching (Tab A)/2/ three copies of State's draft of a proposed Presidential statement in the event of UDI. It has not yet been cleared on the seventh floor, although clearances have been obtained from AF, EUR, IO, and L. /2/Not printed. Besides the draft Presidential statement, you might also want to take with you to Texas copies of the following (all attached): (1) State's recommendation to the Secretary for US policy and action when UDI occurs (Tab B). (n.b., As of c.o.b. November 10, this document had not yet been approved by the Secretary.)/3/ /3/Tab B is an Action Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Williams to Secretary Rusk dated November 10, not printed. A handwritten notation in the margin of the memorandum printed here reads: "See pp. 5-6." (AF's recommendations for action.) The copy of Williams' memorandum in State Department files bears the handwritten notation: "Overtaken By Events." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) (2) L's memo on "Legal Considerations Bearing on Release of Copper from US Stockpiles" (Tab C),/4/ which concludes that surplus copper can be released to the UK if the President decides that it is in the best interest of the "common defense." There is good reason to believe, however, that we will not be faced with this problem as alternate overland routes for the export of Zambian copper to the UK appear adequate. /4/Not printed. (3) Copies of the most recent telegrams from London (Tab D)/5/ containing details of what the UK intends to do when UDI occurs and evaluating the situation. /5/Not printed. You will find Tab B most useful for general background purposes as well as for details of what our immediate response to UDI might be. Rick
491. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State/1/ Salisbury, November 11, 1965, 1220Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Unclassified; Flash. Received at 8:09 a.m. Repeated to London, Dar-es-Salaam, Pretoria, Lusaka, USUN, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USIA at 9:53 a.m. 335. Ref: Contel 334 at 13.15 local time Nov 11./2/ /2/Not printed. PM Smith read GSR proclamation declaring Rhodesian independence with continuing loyalty to Crown and promulgating new constitution "identical to existing constitution, with exception certain provisions necessary for country enjoying full sovereignty." Smith asserted GSR had negotiated as long as possible, reassured country on ability to weather sanctions, reiterated Rhodesian desire to continue peaceful relations with other countries and not to take steps against neighbors and warned others not to underestimate Rhodesian determination to defend heritage. Concluded: "We have today assumed our sovereign independence." Full text Smith address being transmitted USINFO. Tape also being airmailed. McClelland
492. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, November 11, 1965, 8:05 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McElhiney, cleared by Judd, and approved by McElhiney. Repeated to Salisbury, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. 2550. British Emboff (Killick) delivered note today informing us that Office of Minister for Southern Rhodesian Affairs closed and appointments members that office terminated. Appointments terminated on grounds Southern Rhodesians in Embassy "in response formal questioning failed state they do not support action former GSR." All Southern Rhodesian officers, including non-white Lot Senda, failed renounce action former GSR. Killick asked us not be hasty in taking such action as revoking diplomatic visas, since he felt Senda and possibly one other might change minds. We agreed take no action until British Embassy approached us again, probably in about 48 hours. We have had no contact with Southern Rhodesians except that Bentley, former Counselor Rhodesian Affairs, has requested appointment with the Secretary. Subsequently British Emboff (Walker) informed us by phone Embassy instructed formally request USG announce that we did not intend recognize SR regime and that we withdrawing McClelland./2/ Also, HMG would understand if we vague on possible US countermeasures until HMG acted. According Emboff, further instructions on way re relations US officials with former SR officials such posts as Lisbon. /2/For text of Secretary Rusk's statement after meeting with the President at the LBJ Ranch on November 11, see Department of State Bulletin, December 6, 1965, p. 895. Still later, Walker dictated over phone note informing USG that HMG considered SRG's declaration of independence "an act of rebellion," that Queen had dismissed SRG PM and other Ministers, and that British High Commissioner withdrawn from Salisbury and SR High Commissioner London asked leave. Rusk
493. Notes of Telephone Conversation/1/ Washington, November 12, 1965, 9:34 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, Alpha Series, Rusk. No classification marking. The source text bears no indication of the drafter. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NOTES ONCONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY RUSK Secretary said: "Mr. President, Arthur Goldberg will have to talk in about 45 minutes to the U.N. Security Council on Rhodesia. We feel that he ought to be as specific as he can on particular points for two reasons--to head off an African reaction that may bounce back on us on the Chinese communists issue and second to try to head off an African demand that armed forces be employed. "Now the first point that we would suggest is that we put an embargo on the shipment of arms and ammunition to Southern Rhodesia, second that we suspend action on applications for U.S. Government loans or cut in credit guarantees--there is only one case now with General Electric; third that we suspend that small sugar quota (6000 tons for Southern Rhodesia) and a lot of countries will be prepared to pick that up; fourth that we discourage American private citizens from traveling to Southern Rhodesia. "And I wanted to know if you would be prepared to go along with the aforementioned."/2/ /2/For text of Ambassador Goldberg's statement on November 12, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 686-688. President Johnson said: "Yes. Yes sir." [Here follows discussion of another subject.]
494. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Fowler and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, November 13, 1965, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Britain III, 11/24/64-12/31/65. No classification marking. The source text bears the typed initials "jt." SUBJECT Ball said we are under great pressure from the British and all the African nations to go as far as we can down the British path. We have looked at the law and told Michael Stewart when he was here that under the law the President had authority to do something about our exports to SR but to take action with regard to imports would require application of trading with the enemy and this would mean a declaration of emergency or declaration of war. It would be very awkward to have a trading with the enemy act applied to SR. It would be difficult to do something about exports without also doing something about imports. Ball said he has asked the Dept to study this. If we stop our exports it would be quite a net loss. We would not be able to curtail imports and even if we did they would be imported from other countries. Also there would be an effect on our own investments not so much from expropriation but from the fact that the SR Govt might take some action that would interfere with repatriation of earnings. Ball thought SR would probably do so whether or not we act on the export control line. Ball said we had already taken a certain number of actions which have more visual than actual effect. Ball said in talking with the President at the Ranch he had told him before making a definite recommendation with regard to the export-import laws he would discuss it with Fowler. Ball said the Zambians are under great pressure from the other African nations to stop trading with SR. If they do so the SR would probably cut off the power and this would create a great mess. If there is an economic war the impact on sterling would be tremendous. Ball said when Stewart was here he asked us to be prepared to give them support. Ball said he had replied that we were in no position to make any commitment of this kind and they should not count on it. Fowler agreed we were in no position to help in this way. Ball said PM Wilson had complained in London to Bruce that Ball had not been nearly as responsive as they had expected the US Govt to be and that Ball had thrown cold water on any idea that we would help them if they got into trouble there. Fowler said we could not take on this kind of undertaking. Ball said we had made that clear. Ball said we do have this immediate question of whether we move on export licensing. The practical effect will not be very much. They can buy 90% of it from the South Africans. Fowler said he was working on something that might be offered as a substitute. It is to change the Federal Reserve Board Regulations and any other pertinent executive order documents to take SR out of the less developed country status and priority status it has on bank lending and anything else. It is mainly cosmetic but to the extent it is effective it is effective our way. (FYI. This was a hint dropped by John Stevens as something we might consider.) Ball thought this would be very good. Ball said the politics of this thing are complicated. The American Negro community regards this as a test case of the bona fides of the Administration. The President will be under a lot of heat but his inclination is the same as both Ball's and Fowler's. We don't like doing things that are costly just for a political effect. Ball said he thought it would be better if they made a joint recommendation to the President. Fowler asked how long he had to thrash out this question. Ball suggested they shoot for being able to move on this Tuesday/2/ morning. Ball said he would see that our material is in shape on the export problem and he would get up a memo which could be incorporated into a joint memo with Fowler's. Ball said Solomon would be working on it in State. Fowler said Trued would be in charge but is out of town until Monday. /2/November 16.
495. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, November 13, 1965, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Britain III, 11/24/64-12/31/65. No classification marking. The source bears the typed initials "jt." [Here follows discussion of an unrelated topic.] Ball then discussed the Rhodesian situation. He said it was getting confused with the copper situation because of the Zambians, and before twisting the Chileans arms too much we should look at the real problem. Bundy thought twisting the Chileans arms would be hard. We would have a moral victory if we could just get them to stay put. Ball said he agreed but our African people have turned up an answer to Kaunda's letter which is not satisfactory--it tells him to keep his shirt on as far as sanctions against Southern Rhodesia until we get our contingency plans made. Ball said this is nonsense, because if they get into an economic war the sterling goes to "pot" unless we go in and bail the British out. Bundy said the President was clear that anything that "busts" the copper market open is of no use to him. From our point of view economic warfare between SR and Zambia is against their welfare. Ball said he was wholly on board on this one and the problem is the Security Countil is getting hysterical. Ball said he was talking to Sisco and the Africans had come in with a resolution which we might not be able to stop by abstension. It would be a Chapt. 7 Resolution and call for economic sanctions and the use of force. Ball said the French have taken the position that up to this point it is an internal British problem and have stayed out of it and abstained. Ball thought it might put the British up against the veto on this and it could be quite critical over the week-end. Ball said it would be hard for the British Govt to accept a resolution which could require British troops in against the Rhodesians./2/ /2/On November 12, the Security Council adopted, by a vote of 10 (including the United States) to 0, with 1 (France) abstention, a brief interim resolution condemning the unilateral declaration of independence and calling upon all states not to recognize or render any assistance to the illegal regime established by it. For text of Resolution 216 (1965), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 688-689.
496. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia/1/ Washington, November 13, 1965, 6:31 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Flash. Drafted by McElhiney, cleared by Williams, and approved by McElhiney. Repeated to London. 707. Ref: Embtels 711/2/ and 720./3/ You should see Kaunda (or other appropriate GRZ official if he unavailable) immediately. Inform him we consider it absolutely imperative GRZ take no further measures against Rhodesia, however minor, until you have opportunity discuss matter in more detail with him on basis instructions you will be receiving shortly./4/ /2/Telegram 711 from Lusaka, November 12, reported that Zambia had requested that its friends, primarily the United States and Britain, provide contingency and economic assistance in order to permit it to impose a total boycott on all Rhodesian imports. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 720 from Lusaka, November 13, reported that the Zambian Government had that day introduced a series of economic and financial measures against Rhodesia, which it described as "only initial steps." These included withdrawal of Commonwealth preference for Rhodesian goods and instructions that all government departments refuse to accept Rhodesian currency. (Ibid.) /4/In telegram 775 from Lusaka, November 14, Ambassador Robert C. Good reported that he told President Kaunda that the Department felt it imperative that Zambia take no further measures against Rhodesia. Kaunda responded that he wished to reassure the United States that he was not contemplating any provocative steps. (Ibid.) Inform UK HiCom, if possible before you see Kaunda. Rusk
497. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, November 18, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63-1/66. Confidential. SUBJECT As you know, on November 12, the President decided that the 1966 Rhodesian sugar quota of 6,094 tons would be withheld. There remains the question of what, if anything, should be done about the 1965 Rhodesian quota. The entire 1965 Rhodesian quota of 9,542 tons has been contracted for earlier this year by a US importer and is on the high seas at the present time. As I understand it, the decision reached in Texas was that we would give firm support to the British but not get out in front. Our information is that the British, although withholding their 1966 sugar quota, do propose to honor contracts entered into prior to November 12 for importation of Rhodesian sugar. For us to suspend the 1965 quota would, therefore, involve a deviation from the Texas decision. Arthur Goldberg feels very strongly, however, that we should suspend the 1965 quota. He is joined in this by our African Bureau. The AFL-CIO also feels strongly on the Rhodesian issue. The fear both in New York and among the State Department experts is that the appearance of a boatload of Rhodesian sugar at an East Coast port would cause considerable excitement at the United Nations and cast doubt on the good faith of our determination to bring down the Smith regime. Representatives of the Afro-Asian Bloc at the United Nations are apparently aware of the projected arrival of this shipload of sugar and may well undertake to start some kind of demonstration if it is permitted to arrive in the United States. The Legal Adviser's Office of the State Department advises that the President has the authority to suspend the 1965 quota under this year's amendments to the Sugar Act of 1948. While this might result in legal action against the US purchaser and perhaps the Government, they regard it as unlikely that such an action would be successful. Possible damages involved are on the order of $760,000, based on the difference between the contract price and the current world price of sugar. The matter is of some urgency. The ship is due to dock at Yonkers on December 10, and it is desirable to give the owners as much time as possible to divert the shipment. The Agriculture Department would prefer not to interfere with the 1965 Rhodesian quota in view of adverse comment in the trade and the possibility of legal actions. However, Under Secretary Schnittker advises that he will go along if it is determined that such action is called for by overriding political considerations. White House guidance is requested./2/ /2/The President decided on November 18 to suspend the 1965 and 1966 U.S. sugar quotas for Southern Rhodesia. (Memorandum from Ball to Johnson, November 19; Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD) Benjamin H. Read/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Read signed the original.
498. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, November 27, 1965, 3:52 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 24 RHOD. Confidential. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Jonathan Dean on November 26; cleared by McElhiney, Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Peter H. Pfund of L/UNA, Director of the Office on Inter-African Affairs Fred L. Hadsel, and Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Mortimer D. Goldstein; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Salisbury, Lusaka, Pretoria, Lisbon, CINCLANT, and CINCSTRIKE. 2997. Deptel 2950./2/ UN Role in Possible Oil Embargo Southern Rhodesia. /2/Dated November 24. (Ibid., FT 11-2 RHOD) 1. In connection study feasibility oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia, should be noted as additional consideration that it may be difficult to make clear to Afro-Asian UN members solely through feasibility analysis on paper that implementation of oil embargo would have many practical difficulties. It may prove necessary in order demonstrate good faith for UK and US to actually apply some restrictive measures regardless of prognosis for success of embargo. 2. In any case we would expect US-UK study to consider following UN aspects of an oil embargo program. 3. Clearly desirable to have broadest possible support and participation any embargo program which results from present study as this would maximize pressure to comply on obvious weak links as South Africa and smaller brokers. Depending on actual content of feasibility report and on need for positive US-UK proposals in next round SC consideration of Rhodesian problem,/3/ it might prove desirable seek SC Res embodying main points of whatever program US-UK may agree on, and urging all member states to support and apply it. In addition, SYG might be given role as recorder and publicizer of compliance and non-compliance. Finally, we exploring possibilities for sharing burdens of embargo and other measures against Southern Rhodesia among UN member states. Above points raised with British Embassy November 26. /3/On November 20, by a vote of 10 to 0 with France abstaining, the U.N. Security Council adopted a compromise resolution calling upon all states not to provide arms and military equipment to Rhodesia and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with it, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. For text of Resolution 217 (1965), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 689-690. Rusk
499. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State/1/ Salisbury, November 29, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the source text but the telegram was received at 11:20 a.m. Repeated to London, Lusaka, and Pretoria. Passed to the White House DOD, CIA, CINCLANT, CINCSTRIKE, and USIA at 11:58 a.m. 448. With UDI nearly three weeks old, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn: A. Although sanctions are bound to have effect on local economy in long run, there are no signs of major repercussions in immediate future; some businesses, particularly in luxury trades, are being affected and there may be some shifts in employment, but these should not produce critical problem for several months. B. Despite some acts of intimidation, partially successful strikes in both Salisbury and Bulawayo areas, and incidents of stoning and petrol bombing, security forces remain firmly in control of country. C. Smith regime has made no moves against Zambia and continues to affirm its determination to live harmoniously with its neighbors. D. Perhaps single most important conclusion to be drawn is that white Rhodesian community appears united and solidly behind Smith regime. Because of press censorship, fact that Parliament is in recess until Feb 22, and general feeling among whites of "all hanging together or each hanging separately," it would be extremely unwise to base hopes of any immediate change in this situation on divisive elements. 2. There is widely-held intense animosity among Rhodesian whites against person of UK PriMin Wilson, but continuing conviction that HMG will not follow through with measures to cripple Rhodesia. Among those who aware, retention sizable UK HICOM staff strengthens belief. [If] the British measures do in fact prove to be less stringent than originally expected, brunt of Rhodesian anger will concentrate on USG which already commands little affection. 3. Distasteful though prospect is, ConGen hopes USG contingency planning will include possibility of relatively long tenure Smith regime. If Smith survives for more than year, without any outside encouragement except from South Africans and Portuguese, chances will have increased geometrically that Rhodesia will fall completely into South African clutches. At that time it may well be too late to do anything to change situation short of all out military efforts. 4. If UK makes attempts aimed at finding modus operandi for renewed dialogue, this would appear from here to be all to good. The larger mentality will do more to keep regime and its followers united than anything else. It is only by introduction of fresh breaths of air that we can hope to have any constructive influence with moderate elements that might change course of events. Gebelt
500. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, November 29, 1965, 8:40 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Herbert B. Thompson of S/S, cleared by Bromley Smith, and approved by Read. 3031. White House has received following message to President from Prime Minister: "I was very glad to have a talk with Bob McNamara and George Ball last week about the various problems that confront us./2/ I am much looking forward to discussing all these matters with you when we meet on December 17. /2/Telegram 2443 from London, November 27, transmitted a memorandum of conversation of the Prime Minister's talk with Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Ball in London on November 26. (Ibid., POL UK-US) George Ball told me that you have now asked Gilpatric to return to your service to take charge of the whole of the Rhodesia operation. This is just to say that we should be very glad to see him just as soon as he has got his eye in. On that subject, as you may know, Malcolm MacDonald has just spent a few days in Zambia with Kenneth Kaunda and has brought back with him a whole series of requests. Kenneth Kaunda, understandably, is in a very apprehensive and jumpy mood: He desperately wants to be sensible and statesmanlike but he is under great pressure from his own extremists who want him to take energetic but suicidal action against the Smith regime and from the Organization of African Unity who are pressing him to allow Zambia to be used as a base for African inspired operations against Rhodesia. In these circumstances, he has asked me to provide a British military presence in Zambia. He has two requests: First, a detachment of British troops to take over and guard the Kariba installations on the Rhodesian side of the frontier and secondly an RAF presence in Zambia to deter the Rhodesia Air Force and to pre-empt the O.A.U. He also has made a great number of economic requests. We considered these requests this morning. We decided to decline to mount the Kariba operation, not least because Smith may well have mined the installations and an operation by us might well accelerate what we want to avoid. We decided to meet the second request by sending a squadron of Javelins to Ndola. The operation, which has been planned on a contingency basis for some time, will start today and should be completed by Tuesday or Wednesday of this week. The Javelins will go into Ndola, the radar environment to Lusaka and men of the RAF regiment will go to both airfields and possibly to Livingstone as well to guard against sabotage etc. We shall thus be in occupation of all the main airfields in Zambia. We have made it a condition of acceding to this request that Zambia will invite no other foreign forces into the country without our agreement. At the same time H.M.S. Eagle, which sailed from Singapore some ten days ago, is off Dar-es-Salaam able to cover this operation, and provide a second strike in the highly unlikely case of its being necessary. Let me make it quite plain that the purpose of this operation is entirely defensive. Its main purpose is to reassure Kaunda and pre-empt a hostile (e.g. Ghanaian or U.A.R.) African presence which might well develop communist overtones. It should also indicate to the Smith regime that we are in earnest and it should enable Kaunda to resist further pressures from the more extremist of his African friends who incidentally, seem to be the more extreme the further they are away from the scene. Kenyatta and Nyerere are both being very reasonable and moderate in this whole business. I do not expect that Smith will react violently, but we are ready for him if he does. Nor do I think that this will make him react on the copper front: This would be a two-edged weapon for him, and one of the rebel ministers on television only last night emphasized Rhodesia's interest in normal relations with Zambia. But we are well aware that a defensive military presence in Zambia, valuable though it will be, will not of itself quell this rebellion. The economic measures which we and our friends have so far taken may well do the trick, but they will take time and will not start to bite until after Christmas. We have therefore decided to go for the quick economic kill. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will be turning the financial screw more tightly: We shall add all agricultural commodities, minerals and metals to tobacco and sugar on the list of prohibited imports and hope that all other importing countries will do the same. Sir N. Kipping, former Director-General of the F.B.I., has been out to Zambia, and has a plan for replacing Zambia'a imports from Rhodesia from other sources. We shall also want to talk to the principal suppliers about cutting out exports to Rhodesia of economically important commodities. There remains the question of oil sanctions. Here action by Britain alone, even if it were thought desirable, would not be effective without international backing. This is a subject which we want to discuss with your people in the first instance, and discuss very quickly, so I hope you will agree to send Gilpatric to talk to George Brown, who is in charge of the whole economic side of our operations, as soon as possible. Meanwhile we shall take advantage of the presence here of Tom Mann to talk all these measures over with him as well as the contingency plans to keep Zambia going if relations between her and Rhodesia deteriorate. Overriding everything is my awareness which I know that Kenneth Kaunda shares, that unless we in Britain deal promptly with this rebellion and if possible without force, there is a danger of a racial war in Africa with all that that means for the free world. It is therefore encouraging that not only Kaunda, but Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote as well, should be taking the view that it is only the presence of British forces in Central Africa which can avert this catastrophe. You will, of course, realize the relevance of all this to our East of Suez role, on which McNamara will no doubt report to you." Rusk
501. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts/1/ Washington, December 3, 1965, 6:48 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Southern Rhodesian Affairs Michael P. Hoyt; cleared by Kinsey, McElhiney, William D. Rogers of U, Officer in Charge of Ethiopian Affairs Fred J. Galanto, and Goldstein; and approved by Williams. Sent to Nairobi, Kampala, Blantyre, Lusaka, Lagos, Addis Ababa, Dar-es-Salaam, Abidjan, and pouched to Salisbury and London. 1059. Southern Rhodesia 1. You should approach host government soonest to make clear USG strongly believes most useful action on Rhodesia at present is to support British measures designed both put pressure on Southern Rhodesia to topple rebel regime and to protect Zambia from probable retaliation from SR as consequence these pressures. Indications are that some countries, specifically UAR and Tanzania, hesitant grant over-flight clearance to UK aircraft supporting movement military forces to Zambia. OAU Ministerial Conference on SR opening Dec 3 in Addis Ababa will undoubtedly discuss UK measures. 2. In approach to governments, following concrete measures undertaken by UK may be pointed out: A. Embargo on almost all imports from SR. B. Stringent financial controls, which largely remove SR control its foreign exchange held abroad. C. Direct and substantial financial assistance to Zambia. D. Dispatch of RAF unit and possibly other military forces to Zambia. 4. US firmly supports UK in its policy and is convinced UK determined bring down rebel regime. We believe UK will exert maximum economic pressure on SR and will help Zambia in event rebel regime reacts with retaliatory measures. Actions on part of any state which interferes with or blocks these British measures appears only to detract from their effectiveness. Violent and premature statements on part of other states could embarass Kaunda in his negotiations with Wilson on arrangements between these two countries on use of increased UK military forces. 5. Objective of approach to governments would ideally be instructions to their delegations in Addis Ababa designed produce resolutions assist UK and Zambia in present measures being taken. At very least, it would be hoped that no resolution would be passed which would condone activity hindering these concrete steps UK taking assist Zambia. 6. For Addis Ababa: Above may be used in approach to IEG and may be drawn upon discreetly in your continuing reporting contacts for exchange of views with delegation members. Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
