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480. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 11, 1965, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. VII, Memos and Miscellaneous. Confidential. Drafted by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, J. Harold Shullaw, and approved in S, U, and G on October 19. The source text is marked "Part 4 of 6." The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Foreign Secretary outlined the political and economic measures which the UK proposed to take in the event of a Southern Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence. He prefaced his summary with the statement that the UK would employ military force only in the unlikely circumstance that the situation in Southern Rhodesia deteriorated to the point where the Southern Rhodesian authorities themselves requested it. If UDI is announced the UK will: 1) dismiss all Southern Rhodesian ministers; 2) end Commonwealth preferences; 3) exclude Rhodesian tobacco exports to the UK; and, 4) call immediately for a meeting of the Security Council. In the UN the UK will seek a resolution welcoming the measures which it has taken and calling on all members to assist the UK in making these measures effective. The object, Mr. Stewart said, would be to head off wilder action which might otherwise be taken in the UN. The Foreign Secretary said that unfortunately some of the economic measures and possible Rhodesian retaliatory action against Zambia might undo some of the good work which has been done, with U.S. help, to strengthen sterling. He said that the UK hoped if financial difficulties for sterling arise from the economic measures taken, that the U.S. will give further help. He estimated the potential strain on sterling resulting from possible UK measures and SR retaliation at as much as #200 million. He said he was making this point at the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If Smith does not make an early declaration of independence, the UK will wait two or three weeks and then try to get a constitutional conference organized to draw up a new constitution. The Foreign Secretary said that it is not clear to what degree Smith has been moved by world-wide opposition to UDI. Secretary Rusk asked whether economic sanctions would require legislative action in the UK. Mr. Stewart replied that legislation would not be necessary since action could be taken on the grounds of rebellion against the Crown. The Under Secretary said that the practical economic measures we can take without Congressional action are limited. We can apply export controls against SR but are doubtful that it would be very effective since there are alternative sources of supply for the commodities involved. So far as imports are concerned, we cannot apply the Trading with the Enemy Act in the absence of a state of war or the declaration of a national emergency. The only possibility we can see at this time would be action pursuant to a resolution by the Security Council under Article 41 of the Charter. The US could help the UK on tobacco through medium-term commodity credits. It was our understanding, however, that in view of the level of tobacco stocks in the UK, there would be no immediate problem. We could not help with respect to the sugar quota which would require legislative action and this would be controversial in Congress. Mr. Leddy asked if the UK believed that economic sanctions would force Southern Rhodesia to change its political stance, and observing that economic sanctions had not been historically effective for this purpose. The Foreign Secretary replied that he would hope so but it would take time. Meanwhile, white-black relations would be exacerbated throughout Africa. The Secretary and Under Secretary, referring to the estimate of 200 million pounds sterling loss in the first year, if Zambian copper exports were cut off, gave the UK representatives no encouragement regarding the willingness of the US to give additional support to sterling in these circumstances. Sir Paul Gore-Booth pointed out that Southern Rhodesia can easily cut off power to Zambia. Furthermore, Zambia itself may make it inevitable that Southern Rhodesia will take action against it. The Under Secretary asked if Zambia could be kept under control so that it did not provoke Southern Rhodesian retaliation. The Foreign Secretary said he hoped so. A further difficulty would arise if Southern Rhodesia expelled laborers from Zambia and Malawi. In discussing the Portuguese attitude both the Secretary and the Foreign Secretary expressed doubts that Portugal would recognize Southern Rhodesia immediately. Also it was doubtful that South Africa would give early recognition. The Secretary expressed concern that a two-thirds majority might be found in the General Assembly for a peacekeeping force. Mr. Stewart agreed and said it would be difficult for the UK to oppose such a proposal without encouraging the colored races of the world to turn against the Western powers. In discussing possible airlift requirements for assuring the continuation of Zambian copper exports, Mr. Fredericks said a survey indicated that as much as 100,000 tons of copper would have to be brought out and coal brought in. The Secretary said he was skeptical of the estimates of the carrying capacity of the railroads and thought they were probably low. He said the US would be reluctant to call on military air transport to transport coal and copper when commercial transport was available. Secretary McNamara endorsed this view.
481. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 12, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. Developments in Africa. The number one problem continues to be the crisis over the imminent Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independ-ence (UDI). Another crisis may develop in the Congo if President Kasavubu forces Tshombe's resignation--perhaps this week. [Items in brackets are those too sensitive for use.]/2/ /2/Brackets in this and the following paragraph are in the source text. Rhodesia. As predicted, Rhodesian negotiations with the UK over independence broke down last week. Pursuant to your exchange with Harold Wilson, our Charge in London presented a US message to Smith advising against UDI and warning of the consequences. [Similar warnings were sent to Smith by Australia, New Zealand, Canada, West Germany and Japan.] Zambia's President Kaunda immediately cabled you his personal appreciation for the US stand./3/ /3/Telegram 501 from Lusaka, October 9, transmitted Kaunda's message to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) So far our efforts to seize the initiative in the UN on this issue have met with success. Ambassador Anderson's speech on UDI met with an encouraging response and an anti-Rhodesian resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by the General Assembly: 107 for, 2 against (Portugal and South Africa) and 1 abstention (France)./4/ The UK did not vote, although it confidentially concurred in the language of the resolution. /4/For text of Resolution 2012 (XX), adopted October 12, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 680. Wilson has asked us to publicly release an official statement along the lines of our message to Smith; we are preparing one. UK strategy is to appeal to the more moderate elements of the Rhodesian population. The UK is considering a top-level Commonwealth "Peace Mission" to Rhodesia, to be led by Australian PM Menzies. Wilson appears today on BBC in connection with this crisis. Smith has returned to Rhodesia. His first moves will probably be to (a) meet with his Rhodesian Front party leaders; (b) call a cabinet meeting; and (c) recall parliament. It's anyone's guess how long thereafter UDI will follow. Smith himself is now speaking in terms of "before Christmas." In any case, this is still primarily a UK problem. We will continue to march no faster than they. [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.] R.W. Komer/5/ /5/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
482. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 72-65 Washington, October 13, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on October 13. REPERCUSSIONS OF A UNILATERAL DECLARATIONOF INDEPENDENCE BY SOUTHERN RHODESIA [Here follows a table of contents.] Note This estimate is primarily directed to the few months following a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia, though some longer range estimates are made. Conclusions A. We believe that for the next several years at least, political and economic sanctions would not dislodge white rule in Southern Rhodesia and that effective military intervention from any quarter is highly unlikely. Rhodesia's white minority government would probably be able to maintain internal security following independence; it would be unlikely to undertake serious economic measures against neighboring African states unless severely provoked. (Paras. 22, 20, 16, 6-7) B. African frustrations over Rhodesia's ability to sustain itself would cause recurrent difficulties for the West in the UN and African forums, and bring down new pressures on African moderates, particularly Kaunda in neighboring Zambia, and on the UK and the US, to take stronger measures against Rhodesia. (Paras. 9-10, 15-19, 21, 24) C. The situation might lead to severe strains between Britain and the African states in the Commonwealth and a few of the latter might withdraw. (Para. 18) D. The probability that the West will be unable to resolve the Rhodesia issue to the satisfaction of the Africans will provide opportunities for Communist propaganda. While Western influence will suffer a considerable setback, the West will, however, retain an important presence in Africa, and Africans will continue to look to the West for the bulk of their economic, technical, and other assistance. (Paras. 20, 22) [Here follows the body of the paper.]
483. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer)/1/ Washington, October 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63-1/66. Secret. "To McGB.," with a question mark, appears in Komer's handwriting on the source text. RWK FYI. Wayne Fredericks tells me that this morning George Ball took the position that the US has nothing to worry about in the event of a Rhodesian UDI. Wayne and Joe Sisco argued to the contrary and pressed again for the public release of our message to Smith. Ball's initial reaction was that UDI is inevitable and there is no point in releasing our statement to coincide with it. Fredericks and Sisco insisted; Ball then agreed to refer the whole matter to the Secretary./2/ AF is, therefore, preparing a telegram to Salisbury for the Secretary to sign off on authorizing the release of our message. /2/A memorandum from Haynes to Bundy later on October 19 stated that Ball had referred the matter to the Secretary, who refused to clear release of the statement. (Ibid.) Already UK Embassy officials here are wondering why we seem so reluctant to release the statement. I presume the same concern is growing in London. Time is running short and the release of the statement is our last remaining deterrent trump card. Is there any chance that Bundy might give the Secretary a gentle nudge on this one?/3/ /3/The following sentence is added in Komer's handwriting: "After all, the President did tell Wilson we'd make appropriate public noises." Rick
484. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, October 22, 1965, 12:36 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ball, cleared by Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 2129. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Please deliver the following message from the Secretary of State to Prime Minister Wilson as soon as possible: "We have given careful thought to the most useful way in which we can assist you in deterring the Rhodesian Government from going over the cliff. Our considered judgment is that any further public statement on our part at this eleventh hour would run the risk of driving the Smith Government further into a corner and stiffening their desperate resolve. At the same time, we wish to leave no ambiguity in Prime Minister Smith's mind as to our condemnation of the step he is proposing. The President has asked me to tell you, therefore, that he would be entirely agreeable to your conveying to Smith the following views as coming directly from him: 1. The United States is gravely concerned at the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia. 2. The United States Government fully supports the efforts that the British Prime Minister and his Government are making to arrive at a solution to the question of the future of Southern Rhodesia satisfactory to that colony's population as a whole. 3. A unilateral declaration of independence unresponsive to the rights and interests of the majority of the population and in violation of the existing constitution would be a tragic mistake. If such a step should be taken, the United States would feel compelled to sever the traditional close and friendly ties that have characterized its relations with Southern Rhodesia through war and peace. 4. The United States Government believes that most people in Africa and in the world at large share the hope that with British help the Rhodesian people will find a peaceful solution to their constitutional problems and eventually take their place in the world community as a united and democratic nation."/2/ /2/Telegram 1842 from London, October 23, reported the delivery of the Secretary's message to 10 Downing Street. (Ibid.) Rusk
485. Message From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Memos and Miscellaneous, Vol. VII. Secret. This typed message, which was apparently prepared for transmission to the LBJ Ranch, was directed to Special Counsel to the President Jake Jacobsen for delivery to the President. The following message from Prime Minister Wilson arrived here at 2 a.m. It asks for a personal plea from you to Prime Minister Smith in Southern Rhodesia. I have talked with Acting Secretary Ball, and he and I fully agree that we cannot reject Wilson's request. We further agree on a draft message to Smith, which follows the Wilson message to the President. The language of this draft carefully follows language we have used in earlier non-Presidential messages and contains no new position. Wilson's preferred time for this answer had already arrived when his message reached us, so we have decided to hold this until you could deal with it this morning. Text of Wilson message to the President follows: Attachment/2/ /2/Secret; Personal. The attachment does not indicate place of origin or channel of transmission. Personal for McGeorge Bundy from Wright. Following is text of a message for President from Prime Minister which will be coming to you via the Embassy. Message Begins: I was most grateful for the message which Secretary Rusk sent to me with your authority for delivery to Mr. Smith if I thought it helpful. 2. After three days of intensive discussion here,/3/ with the government, with the African Nationalist leaders, Nkomo and Sithole, and with every representative body of opinion including the churches, business, the financial community and the defeated opposition, not to mention ex-Prime Ministers of Rhodesia, I have come to the reluctant conclusion that a message from you delivered through me would not have the necessary impact. /3/On October 24, Prime Minister Wilson traveled to Salisbury in an attempt to break the deadlock in the negotiations. 3. The situation is bleak. Although I have tried every method of persuasion the African Nationalists are prepared neither to work together nor to make any move from their extreme position to any extent necessary to win even a breathing space. The government are impervious to argument and are collectively like a suicide on a windowsill waiting to jump. Moderate European opinion is paralyzed by a sense of helplessness before impending doom, and subject to personal intimidation which saps their will to oppose. The government is manipulating the organs of publicity such as radio and television although the press is still free. 4. Although I have the sensation of witnessing the final act of a Greek tragedy, there is just the slightest chance that catastrophe may be avoided. I have today pulled out all the stops in working on Smith and have put to him a reasonable alternative to a U.D.I. which no rational man could refuse, namely a Royal commission. The terms of reference would be to seek the highest common factor of agreement between all shades of opinion in Rhodesia on the terms for independence. In these circumstances, a message direct from you to Mr. Smith delivered through your Consul General here in Salisbury would be of infinitely greater value than a message delivered through me. To make its maximum impact it should preferably be delivered by 9:00 a.m. Salisbury time, tomorrow Friday. Since I have found some doubt here in Salisbury not only in government circles, but also more generally, about the attitude of the United States to a U.D.I., I hope that your message might state your position in unequivocal terms. Even this may not do the trick: but when I think of the consequences of failure to deter this suicidal government, I believe that no means of pressure should be neglected. Message Ends.
486. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia/1/ Washington, October 29, 1965, 12:44 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Fredericks and Read, and approved by Ball. Also sent to London and to USUN for Ambassador Goldberg. 342. You should seek an immediate appointment with Prime Minister Smith to deliver following message from the President: "Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In these days of decisive importance for the future of Southern Rhodesia, I believe you are entitled to know at first hand of our thinking here in the United States. While we fully recognize that the matter is centrally one between the British Government and the people and Government of Southern Rhodesia, it would be irresponsible for us to run the risk of any misunderstanding of our own position in the matter, so I think you should know of our views direct from me. The United States has consistently supported the efforts of the British Government to arrive at a solution in Rhodesia which will be satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. While we recognize that there are grave and difficult issues still to be worked out in pursuit of this objective, we are convinced that a unilateral declaration of independence would be a tragic mistake which would serve the true interests of no one. The United States would have to make known its strong opposition to any such decision, and we do not intend to change our course of firm support for the position of the British Government after any such unilateral declaration. It is our present understanding that Prime Minister Wilson has made further proposals, and that the road to agreement and understanding remains open. With full recognition of the great difficulties which you face, and the strong feelings with which you are surrounded, I express the hope that you and your colleagues will avoid a course which, in addition to all its other consequences, would inevitably break the strong ties of friendship and understanding which have bound our countries together in war and peace. We in the United States strongly value these ties, and we remain convinced that a peaceful, honorable and constitutional solution can be found. Such a solution will have our full support./2/ /2/In telegram 280 from Salisbury, October 30, McClelland reported that he delivered the President's message to Smith at 9 a.m. that morning, and that the Prime Minister expressed gratitude for the "courteous and reasonable tone" of the message. Prime Minister Smith also said that a significant last minute breakthrough had been achieved when the two sides agreed to a Royal Commission of Inquiry to examine the Rhodesian independence problem. (Ibid., POL 19 RHOD) Lyndon B. Johnson" Note: It is important that knowledge of this message not originate from US sources. Rusk
487. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State/1/ Salisbury, November 1, 1965, 1200Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential. Repeated to London. 281. Received this morning following reply from PM Smith to President's letter of Oct 29 (connectives omitted): "Dear Mr. President: Roswell D. McClelland, American Consul General, has delivered to me your urgent personal message dated 29th October and, in receiving message, I asked him thank you very much indeed. I appreciate tremendously fact that Chief Executive of United States, in midst of his heavy responsibilities, can find time to give his consideration to future of Rhodesia. I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that it is firm intention of Rhodesian Government to seek solution of its problems with British Government through patient negotiations and discussion. I and my colleagues in the government will go on trying as long as hope remains. Current negotiations have by no means been suspended and we are continuing exchange ideas although Mr. Wilson has, naturally enough, in view of his own many duties, had to return to Great Britain. We have made significant steps forward and there is hope that differing views of two governments will be brought together eventually in support of successful conclusion. We in Rhodesia reciprocate with utmost sincerity your conviction that peaceful, honorable and constitutional solution can be found. To this end we also have made proposals to British Government and are hopeful we will reach solution and that British Government will contribute materially towards this by conceding reasonable and statesmanlike compromises. It is encouraging to know that such a solution will have full support of Government of USA. You may rely upon us to do our best to bring about this happy state of affairs. Yours sincerely, I. Douglas Smith" Original by pouch. McClelland
488. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson/1/ London, November 1, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Memos and Miscellaneous, Vol. VII. Secret. CAP 65642. I am now back in London after a week in Rhodesia and shall be making a statement in Parliament this afternoon. I have asked our Ambassador to let you have the full text of the statement which sets out pretty fully the position we have now reached. It was an exhausting and in many ways a depressing week, depressing because so many people have their minds in blinkers and they are wrapped up in cocoons of self-delusion which it is terribly difficult to penetrate. To be in Salisbury was to have the sensation of being present at the fifth act of a Greek tragedy. I tried every method to persuade the African Nationalists both to work together and to work the existing constitution: but to no effect. Moderate European opinion, represented by business and finance, is paralyzed by a sense of helplessness before impending doom and, what is worse, subject to the personal intimidation which saps their will. Smith has quite a nice little police state in embryo there. The government have control of television and radio, although the press is still free. Most of Smith's cabinet are impervious to argument and divided only on whether they should commit suicide now or later. One thing is certain and that is if I had not offered on Thursday, October 21 to go to Rhodesia, U.D.I. would have been with us on Friday, October 22. But I fear that the most I may have achieved is the respite of a little more time before Smith and his cabinet go over the brink. But time is the most precious commodity of all in this problem. My chief purpose was therefore not to negotiate, although I had many hours of tough discussions with Smith and his colleagues, but to see whether, as a last hope, there was any chance of changing the political climate and finding some last minute formula which would give Smith pause and give the moderates of all races something to support. Hence my talks with every conceivable representative body to whom I gave the carrot and stick treatment: I had to get home to them both the tragic consequences of U.D.I. and the fact that no one was faced with a simple choice of U.D.I. or majority rule tomorrow. There were many alternatives. Hence the proposal for a royal commission, which gives them a way out if they have the will to take it. Quite frankly, there are so many Gadarene minds in Rhodesia, and that goes for most of Smith's cabinet, if not totally for Smith himself, that I doubt whether good sense has much chance of prevailing. So while I am hoping for the best it is only sensible to prepare for the worst. The worst may come quite quickly but we are quite ready for it.
489. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, November 9, 1965, 12:48 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Thomas W. McElhiney on November 8; cleared by Williams, Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs Francis T. Underhill, Judd, and Buffum; and approved by Ball. Sent to Accra, Blantyre, Canberra, Dar-es-Salaam, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Nairobi, Ottawa, Pretoria, Salisbury, Wellington, and USUN. Repeated to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE. 857. Subject: Rhodesia. 1. From Wilson-Smith correspondence, supplemented by US-UK discussions in London, Salisbury and here, it appears that neither British nor Rhodesians believe Royal Commission will produce mutually acceptable constitutional basis for Rhodesian independence. From outset British have conceived of Commission as device gain time. British believe Smith willing go along, with same objective in mind. In addition, according Emboffs here, Wilson attempting widen split in Rhodesian Front. Pursuit these objectives obviously carries risk replacement Smith by more militant pro-UDI Prime Minister in Rhodesia. It is conceivable, if Smith finally commits self publicly or privately to work on alternative to UDI, that British may seek U.S. help to shore up his position. 2. Emboffs believe if discussion of Commission and subsequent Commission activities can be dragged out until January, prospect of UDI substantially reduced at least for several months, primarily because Rhodesian tobacco farmers unable at that late date switch to marketable food crops. 3. British appear believe five basic principles on which they have stood (second paragraph Depcirtel 597)/2/ need not be compromised as this game is played out, although Emboffs here acknowledge pressure to compromise becoming stronger as exchange continues. However, they say Parliament would not accept solution which departs from principles and, in any case, departure would put such powerful weapon in hands Conservatives to use against Wilson that he most unlikely compromise on principles. We believe consequences might be equally serious within Labour Party and in relations with Liberals. In addition we assume Commonwealth pressures would be in direction maintenance principles. Our concern with maintenance of five principles is not only that they offer long-term solution most acceptable to Rhodesian majority, but also that they provide framework within which we committed support British. We believe British share our view that continuing adherence to principles vital to maintenance both British and U.S. positions elsewhere in Africa. /2/Circular telegram 597, October 12, listed the British Government's five conditions for granting independence: 1) Unimpeded progress toward majority rule; 2) Firm provisions against any retrogression by the Rhodesian Government on constitutional guarantees for majority rule; 3) Immediate constitutional advance for Africans; 4) Progress in reduction of racial discrimination including repeal of the Land Apportionment Act; and 5) Satisfactory evidence that the majority of Rhodesia's population accepted the present 1961 Constitution as a basis for independence. (Ibid.) 4. Disillusioning results Wilson's soundings of African nationalist opinion in Rhodesia served as reminder that nationalist intransigence may well become main obstacle not only to ultimate resolution Rhodesian problem but also to successful pursuit current British tactical objectives. If nationalists refuse cooperate with Commission or denounce in advance any Commission recommendation other than immediate far-reaching revisions of constitution, use of Commission to gain time would be jeopardized. Intransigent African attitudes likely become firmer as result greater isolation which may well result from National Emergency measures. 5. In light foregoing, we see four general problem areas: A. Smith's position on time-gaining devices and UDI, reactions to his position within Rhodesian Front, and possible British decision support him if he agrees seek alternative to UDI. B. Pressures to compromise five principles and how British will meet them. C. Lack of constructive attitude on part Rhodesian African nationalists. D. If Royal Commission time-gaining gambit works, problems resulting from lack of progress toward genuine solution. 6. Would appreciate action addressees' comments this analysis and recommendations re how meet problems posed paragraph 5, insofar they pertinent at your post. Analysis should be closely held. You should not approach host government in connection drawing up your comments and recommendations. Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
