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468. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. Washington, September 29, 1965, 8 p.m. Perhaps imminent Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) would present us with certain problems. The UK must react strongly, under pressure from its African Commonwealth members. Firm US support of the UK seems warranted: (a) UDI is both legally and morally wrong, (b) our UK ties argue for helping them in a tough situation, which threatens them economically and politically; and (c) almost all Afro-Asians oppose UDI, and will be watching the US as well as UK response. With the UNGA on, we need African votes. We have told the UK that we'd consider actions they felt appropriate to discourage UDI, and support them when and if Rhodesia declared UDI. The British may ask us to: A. Back their request for Security Council support for UK measures against the Rhodesians. Their strategy here would be to pre-empt disruptive Afro-Asian and Soviet Bloc initiatives. B. Join in a Commonwealth boycott of Rhodesian tobacco, as well as in other economic measures. This would work little hardship on us, as our trade with Southern Rhodesia is minimal compared to that of the UK. C. Join in discouraging intervention by Afro-Asian nations or Rhodesian African nationalists. We might also be asked to help discourage Afro-Asian withdrawals from the Commonwealth over this issue. Effect of UDI on Zambia. Since Rhodesia shares power and rail transport with neighboring Zambia, the Rhodesians might just cut off these essential services if Zambia reacts violently to UDI. If so, the UK might ask us to help execute a Zambian contingency plan which we are cooperating in developing./2/ The most extreme contingency envisaged is an airlift of Zambian copper out and general commodities in. We've told the UK that the most we could contribute is personnel for manning the essential flight control centers. The plan is designed to help the UK economy as much as that of Zambia. /2/Telegram 1661 to London, September 29, instructed the Embassy to advise the U.K. Commonwealth Relations Office that it might inform the Zambian Government that the U.S. Government was willing to participate in a joint, on-spot contingency study of airlift requirements in both Tanzania and Zambia. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-1 ZAMBIA) Immediate actions. State is considering (a) telling our Consul General to issue a statement of the US position to warn off the Rhodesians; (b) sending a high-level US mission to London and possibly Rhodesia for the same purpose. We may be able to help at least marginally to forestall UDI. This memo is to advise you on current planning. McGB & RWK/3/ /3/Bundy initialed for himself and Komer above Komer's typed signature. Goldberg's views are attached./4/ /4/Not printed.
469. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Kinsey on September 28; cleared by Fredericks, Runyon, and Judd; and approved by Acting Secretary Ball. Also sent to London for Coote, and repeated to Lusaka and USUN. Washington, September 29, 1965, 8:14 p.m. 184. Subject to HMG agreement re timing of delivery following is text oral statement re UDI referred to in Deptel London 1666./2/ /2/Telegram 1666 to London, September 29, stated that unless the British Government raised serious objections, an oral statement on U.S. policy would be delivered to Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith in advance of his departure for the meeting in London. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. VI, Cables and Memos, 1/65-9/65) Congen instructed to request urgent appointment with Primin Smith to deliver following oral message making it clear you are acting on specific instructions. Written record of US statement not to be transmitted. "The course of events in Southern Rhodesia in recent years has given increasing concern to the Government of the United States. As you know from the official public statements of US officials and from numerous bilateral talks between officials of GSR and US, the United States consistently supported the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to arrive at a solution to the question of Rhodesia's future satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. "The pronouncements of Rhodesian officials threatening a unilateral declaration of independence under certain conditions have caused grave concern, not only in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth countries, but in the United States as well. For many years ties between Southern Rhodesia and the United States have been very close and friendly through war and peace. It would indeed be tragic if these ties were to be severed by an ill-considered and irrevocable unilateral action on the part of your Government. In this connection, it would be a grievous error to assume that the United States could in any way condone an attempt of the Government of S. Rhodesia by unilateral action to deal with such important issues as are involved in the discussions which concern the future of your country. "The GSR will recall United States public support for Prime Minister Wilson's October 27, 1964 warning of the disastrous consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. As you know, the USG supported the Prime Minister's public reiteration of that warning on April 29, 1965. The United States Government does not intend to deviate from its course of strong support for Her Majesty's Government's position now and--if it occurs--after a unilateral declaration of independence. "At the same time, you are assured, should your Government and Her Majesty's Government achieve a constitutional solution which is satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, the Government of the United States would be prepared to support such a solution through diplomatic channels in international fora and with other governments."/3/ /3/Telegram 1411 from London, September 30, reported that CRO Permanent Under Secretary Savile Garner believed that it would be a mistake to deliver this message, which would infuriate Smith. The ostensible purpose of Smith's trip was to reach agreement with the United Kingdom, and the U.S. statement assumed in advance that he would fail to do so. Garner suggested that McClelland see Smith before his departure and indicate that the U.S. Government was very concerned about the situation and earnestly hoped that the Rhodesians and the British could find a solution. (Ibid.) Telegram 198 to Salisbury, October 1, stated that the Department was yielding to Garner's advice, and instructed McClelland to see Smith before his departure if possible and make the points suggested by Garner. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) Ball
470. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, September 29, 1965, 8:56 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 RHOD. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, George S. Springsteen, Jr.; cleared by Mulcahy; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Salisbury. 1669. For Kaiser from Acting Secretary. I have seen London's 1373 rptd Salisbury 44/2/ and, in view of possible imminence of UDI, believe it essential that we and British thoroughly understand steps each can take should UDI occur. /2/In telegram 1373 from London, September 29, Kaiser reported that the British were faced with a dilemma in deciding how far to go in imposing economic restrictions against Rhodesia in the event of UDI. He noted that the British Government believed that it had received firm assurances of U.S. support no matter what it decided, and he advised that if the U.S. Government had any doubts about unqualified support of the eventual British decision, it should make these known to the British as soon as possible. (Ibid., POL 19 RHOD) Our support for HMG position on UDI is not without qualification. We cannot undertake, for instance, to make up any balance of payments losses--whether they be 50 million pounds or 200-300 million pounds--which UK suffers as result of sanctions imposed in event of UDI. While British may be aware that there is some thought here that we might provide substitute for UK imports of SR tobacco by sales from CCC stocks of US Virginia leaf tobacco we not yet sure this can be done promptly, that we have authority for exactly this type transaction, or that it could be done without balance of payments costs to UK. Similarly, another suggested course, that of suspending SR sugar quota on US market to complement removal of access to Commonwealth markets for SR sugar, requires further study as to exact steps necessary to achieve it. Finally, course of embargoing all US trade--imports and exports--with SR presents problems which require further study here. In short, we not in position now to give unqualified support to UK economic proposals in event of SR UDI and British should be aware that our political support is not to be construed as blank check for support in other spheres. While I have instructed Department to do its staff work and get on top of these matters urgently, and we will inform you more specifically of what we can and cannot do, believe you and other Embassy officers should be guided by foregoing in discussions with British authorities. At same time, seems clear that as hour of decision approaches, HMG not precise as to what it will or can do. Believe we should have from them clearer indication of their proposals, their ability to undertake them, and rapidity with which they might move. In using foregoing as guidance you should avoid making it possible for HMG to seize upon our yet-to-be-determined ability or inability to follow the UK fully or partially on sanctions or of our unwillingness to offset balance of payments losses as excusing them from taking action or permitting them to place blame for lack of action at our door particularly in justifying themselves to other Commonwealth countries./3/ /3/In telegram 1418 from London, October 1, Kaiser reported that he had told Garner that while the U.S. Government fully supported the British political position on Rhodesia, there was a question at this point as to how far it could go on economic actions. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD) Ball
471. Telegram From the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia to the Department of State/1/ Salisbury, October 2, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. No time of transmission appears on the source text, but the telegram was received at 9:12 a.m. and repeated to London, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam, and USUN. Passed to the White House at 9:50 a.m. 163. Pursuant Deptel 198 (1720 to London)/2/ saw PM Smith, who received me on an hour's notice, at 11:20 am. MinExtAff Dupont was with him. /2/Dated October 1. (Ibid.) In accordance London's 47 (1411 to Dept)/3/ made following points: 1) expressed deep concern USG over critical stage now apparently reached in GSR-HMG relations; 2) Stated USG would follow forthcoming GSR-HMG negotiations in London with closest attention; 3) Voiced earnest hope USG, GSR and HMG would succeed in reaching agreement acceptable to all parties; 4) Said USG would view failure this respect as tragic and likely have grave repercussions throughout Africa and indeed world. /3/See footnote 3, Document 469. In reply Smith said he thanked SecState for his message which he regarded as "constructive" and "positive." Asked me convey following additional points to USG: 1) He considered it "ironic" that HMG now appealing to USG for assistance, as he had heard on the "grapevine," against potentially rebellious colony whereas situation was just the reverse in 1775; 2) GSR does not intend to do anything "rash or irresponsible." On other hand it was his duty protect Rhodesia from becoming another Tanzania, for example, dangerously infiltrated by Chicoms. To avert such a development GSR would feel fully forced take this extreme step, which he still hoped avoid; he trusted USG would refrain from "interfering" with situation. Such outside interference would only make matters worse, particularly for Africans in SR; 4) If vindictive and harmful sanctions were taken against SR we should not delude ourselves that repercussions would be confined to SR alone. Neighboring countries, such as Zambia and Malawi, could also be hurt. (Smith referred here to 500,000 Zambian and Nyasa workers in SR who figured in earlier GSR whitepaper.) Comment: I did not attempt argue any of these points since Smith indicated he considered interview, which reasonably friendly and relaxed, terminated. I regard points 3) and 4) as essentially tactical threats calculated deter US since GSR clearly apprehensive over possibility USG may back up and reenforce UK economic sanctions. Alacrity with which I was received at time when Smith very taken up is further sign, my view, of definite GSR concern over position US will take on SR case./4/ /4/Telegram 1458 from London, October 4, reported that the British were very pleased with McClelland's approach to Smith. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) McClelland
472. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, October 2, 1965, 1:24 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Terrell Arnold of the Economic Bureau's Temperate Products Division; cleared by USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Administrator Raymond Ioanes, Director of the Economic Bureau's Office of International Commodities George R. Jacobs, Chief of the Economic Bureau's Temperate Products Division Fred H. Sanderson, Springsteen, Mulcahy, and Judd; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Salisbury, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam, and USUN. 1730. Rhodesian UDI. Following is Department thinking re possible solutions UK tobacco problem:/2/ /2/Telegram 1409 from London, September 30, reported that Rhodesian tobacco was a substantial part of the total 50 million pounds of the estimated British balance-of-payments loss in the event to a trade embargo against Rhodesian goods. (Ibid., POL 16 RHOD) 1. Department and USDA could arrange PL-480 Title IV program to substitute UK requirements Rhodesian tobacco in event UDI. However, this appears least desirable. Use of this program for UK probably would have adverse psychological effects, especially other Commonwealth countries. Extension PL-480 assistance Britain would be sensitive issue here. 2. It is our expectation UK would anticipate living off present tobacco stocks--estimated at twenty-one month supply--for an interim period upward six months or more. Further, we anticipate UK would try to cover as much as possible tobacco needs from increased buying Commonwealth sources and purchase enhanced quantities soft currency sources before resorting to US. Possibilities for making substantially larger purchases from Commonwealth and soft currency sources would increase over time. We believe this well understood by British tobacco trade. In any event, we have ample stocks equal and better than Rhodesian tobacco which available if necessary to cover entire amount normal UK purchases Rhodesia. 3. We prepared make available following credit terms on commercial purchases: (a) UK now receives six-month CCC credits on tobacco purchases. This can be extended to three years on short notice. (b) In the event longer credit terms desired, CCC prepared seek special five-year credits. In both instances transactions would remain in private trade, therefore, not subject criticisms likely surround PL-480. 4. Possibilities for making US price terms more attractive are difficult predict, because we cannot know state actual markets at future date, especially in event UDI precipitates aggressive Rhodesian market activity. However, at present, CCC stocks tobacco of approximate Rhodesian quality could be landed UK at prices closer Rhodesian price and cheaper than US higher quality tobacco normally sells UK. Additional stocks could also be obtained under barter such as AID offshore procurement in which UK tobacco concerns already participate. Price incentives tobacco barter trade also understood by UK trade./3/ /3/Telegram 1786 to London, October 5, stated that the British decision on a tobacco embargo should be made on its own merits and without regard to a possible alleviation of the tobacco supply problem from U.S. sources. If such a decision were made and the British Government approached the United States for assistance, the substance of telegram 1730 could be delivered. (Ibid., POL 19 RHOD) Ball
473. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in New York/1/ Washington, October 2, 1965, 4:41 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by MacKnight; cleared by Joseph F. Starkey of EUR/BNA, Springsteen, John J. deMartino of S/S, and Haynes (in substance); and approved by Fredericks. Repeated to London, Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka, and Salisbury. Tosec 53. Following is text letter on Rhodesian UDI from PriMin Wilson to President Johnson delivered this afternoon by Stewart, UK Emb, who under instructions asked text be given to Secretary soonest: "As you know, we have been keeping in close touch about Rhodesia with your Administration at all levels and we are most appreciative of the support which we have received. "We are now entering a crucial phase and the discussions I am to have with Smith next week are likely to be final and decisive. He seems to have retreated from the basis of negotiation which the Commonwealth Secretary established with him earlier this year, and I do not think it likely that we can now reach any agreement with him. The risk of unilateral declaration of independence must therefore be regarded as serious and I know you share with us the belief that this could escalate with disastrous consequences for the whole area and serious damage to Western interests. "If our negotiations unhappily fail, I shall do everything possible to bring home to Smith the consequences of an illegal step in the hope of deterring him from it. If there is still any chance of deflecting him and his colleagues from such a disastrous course I believe that your influence might be a decisive factor. I wonder therefore if you would be prepared to approach Smith in whatever way you think best calculated to bring home to him the gravity of the step which he is apparently contemplating. Subject to the way things go in the next few days I think that a message from you would be most effective immediately after a break-down in the negotiation. Since the timing of such a message could be crucial we will keep your Ambassador closely informed of the progress of our discussions with Smith. I hope very much that you will feel able to intervene in this way and to do so publicly since your message would then have the maximum effect on the Rhodesian public." USUN requested pass to Komer. Ball
474. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 4, 1965, 7:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. Message from PM Wilson. He's in with attached personal appeal that we support the UK against Southern Rhodesia./2/ Specifically he urges that we join the UK in warning Rhodesia's PM Ian Smith, and making this warning public if Smith's negotiation with Wilson on 6-7 October fails. He is also appealing for help to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Rhodesia's key trading partners. /2/See Document 473. We here agree that we ought to back the UK on this issue, if only to stay on the right side of all the Afro-Asians. We'll probably be compelled to do so in the UN should Rhodesia kick over the traces. So this is a good opportunity to be helpful to the UK. The best tack is, as Wilson suggests, to help deter Smith from declaring independence in the first place. So we propose at Tab/3/ a forthcoming reply to Wilson which: (1) authorizes him to tell Smith the US will also oppose him; (2) volunteers a direct, private US approach to Smith, either before he sees Wilson or after; and (3) agrees to make our position public if needed to warn off the Rhodesian electorate. We suspect Wilson may be angling for a personal message from you to Smith but doubt this would be useful. /3/See Document 476. The UK has not yet decided how hard to hit Rhodesia if it goes astray, but may use economic sanctions. Even if we went this far it would not be too great a problem, since our Rhodesian trade is small. The UK's most immediate problem if it uses sanctions is tobacco, so we might be able to help out by offering Title IV PL 480 tobacco, or easing the terms on CCC credit sales. Approve message/4/ /4/This option is checked and a handwritten note reads: "Check with me and lets follow his ideas in our message. L." Bundy's handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text reads: "I'm against a message from you to Smith. And if you prefer we can answer Wilson on the Rusk-Stewart channel. But on substance I agree. Mac." R.W. Komer/5/ /5/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
475. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/ Washington, October 5, 1965, 3:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Britain III, 11/24/64-12/31/65. No classification marking. Bundy called regarding the proposed message to the Prime Minister on Southern Rhodesia. (It was ascertained during the course of the conversation that the draft Bundy was discussing was not the final version, but one which had been sent over previous to the draft which was in the Secretary's office.) Ball questioned putting the President in the position of telling Wilson how to handle Smith. As a matter of policy, Ball felt we should say to the British, "You take the lead and we will follow to the extent we can; but we are not going to try to tell you how to do it." Then the British can't turn on us if there is a blowup. Ball said he has not discussed this question with Wilson, but the general problem. The British are playing a game of trying to push us out in front. Ball said he has had trouble keeping the Department in line on this. Bundy replied this was not a big issue; the White House was more in line, however, with the Bureau's thinking than with Ball's. Ball felt a letter from the President would not be in order and Bundy replied that he was not recommending this; he had, instead, recommended against it. Bundy's main worry is that we have not made our views known to Smith. Ball replied the reason we have not is because the British didn't want us to spoil the waters with Smith until after they worked on him. Bundy still felt we have not made a strong case with Smith and the British, at certain levels, agree. For Smith to go to London with the idea the Americans don't give a damn about UDI is a mistake, Bundy felt. We have not stated it as strongly as we may want to. Ball felt it came down to the basic question whether the President wants to weigh in with this fellow before he talks to the PM. Bundy said he was talking about the USG weighing in, rather than the President; it is agreed the USG has not done so. Bundy suggested the message from the President be changed to say we will do this promptly if you wish us to. Bundy said he was not talking about a Presidential message to Smith in either case. The differences are not substantive. Bundy said he was only sorry he did not know Ball's feelings before-hand. Ball explained the draft had not come to the 7th floor until this morning and he had redrafted it; that Bundy did not have the latest draft. Bundy said this was the result of the time factor. Bundy said he would send it along with the change and Ball raised no objection.
476. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson/1/ Washington, October 5, 1965, 3:17 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret; Via Private Wire to London. No drafting information appears on the source text. CAP 65594. To: Prime Minister Wilson. From: The President. We agree that the Southern Rhodesia affair could quickly become a calamity, with potentially serious damage to Western interests. We also agree that deterring Smith from any fateful step is by all odds the best course open to us. If you see fit, we would be glad if you would tell Smith when you see him that we as well as you would take a very poor view of UDI, and that we would necessarily have to oppose it vigorously. We would also be prepared, as you suggest, to approach Smith directly along the above lines, either through our Charge in London or by calling in the Rhodesian Minister attached to your Embassy here. And if deterrence is our prime objective, it may be better for us to convey our views before your decisive meeting with Smith, rather than after. We will do this promptly if you wish. Should negotiations fail, we would certainly be prepared to make our views public in an appropriate way. I am glad that our two governments are in close touch, since it is important to coordinate our efforts with yours in dealing with this unhappy problem./2/ /2/On October 6, Prime Minister Wilson thanked the President for his support and agreed that deterrence was the main U.K. objective. Wilson told Johnson that it would be very helpful if Johnson were able to make his administration's views known to Smith before the decisive meeting. He would leave it to the President to judge the best way of doing this, but suggested the possibility of using both techniques. (Ibid.)
477. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 6, 1965, 9:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. No classification marking. RE I think you will want to know that with British support we are quietly urging the usefulness of a carefully phrased resolution on Southern Rhodesia in the General Assembly. This is a matter on which Goldberg, Rusk and I have consulted, and we are all in agreement. We are also acting with British encouragement. Our object is two-fold: First, to give additional clarity to the fact that Smith will face very strong international opposition if he insists on UDI; Second, to have our own language in the field and thus to avoid the much more inflammatory and tendentious resolutions that hot-headed Africans would prefer. We hope that we can get friends to sponsor our moderate resolution, but it is a possibility that we would have to put it forward ourselves. I think you will want to give Goldberg tactical flexibility on this, but if you have a strong view, I know he would want to hear it. He will, of course, act under Dean Rusk's guidance. A copy of the draft resolution is attached./2/ /2/Not printed. McG. B. Let Rusk and Goldberg handle it/3/ /3/This option is checked. A handwritten notation in the margin reads: "See memo to Sisco attached." In this memorandum, Bundy informed Sisco that the President had delegated to the Secretary and Ambassador Goldberg the tactical authority to decide whether such a resolution should be sponsored by others or by the United States, and noted that the President was clearly sympathetic with the basic objective.
478. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, October 6, 1965, 11:15 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Kinsey, Springsteen, and Special Assistant to Ball Jacob Myerson; cleared by Fredericks, Leddy, and Komer; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Salisbury and USUN. 1790. For Kaiser from Acting Secretary. In light of most recent communication from Prime Minister to President re Southern Rhodesia,/2/ you are requested to seek an immediate appointment with Prime Minister Smith in order deliver following message. Message is to be delivered orally by your reading from verbatim text and with no additional comment other than that you are delivering it upon instructions of your government. /2/See Document 473. Begin Verbatim Text: In view of the highly important discussions now underway between HMG and GSR, the USG wishes to make clear its position and concern with this problem. The course of events in Southern Rhodesia in recent years has given increasing concern to the Government of the United States. As you know from the official public statements of US officials and from numerous bilateral talks between officials of GSR and USG, the United States has consistently supported the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to arrive at a solution to the question of Rhodesia's future satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. The pronouncements of Rhodesian officials threatening a unilateral declaration of independence under certain conditions have caused grave concern in the United States. For many years ties between Southern Rhodesia and the United States have been very close and friendly through war and peace. It would indeed be tragic if these ties were to be severed by an ill-considered and irrevocable unilateral action on the part of your Government. The United States considers that a political solution acceptable only to the minority in Southern Rhodesia and unresponsive to the interests and rights of the vast majority of the population would be a grievous error. My Government could not condone such a solution. The GSR will recall United Sates public support for Prime Minister Wilson's October 27, 1964 warning of the disastrous consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. As you know, the USG supported the Prime Minister's public reiteration of that warning on April 29, 1965. The United States Government does not intend to deviate from its course of strong support for Her Majesty's Government's position now and--if it occurs--after a unilateral declaration of independence. At the same time, you are assured that, should your Government and Her Majesty's Government achieve a constitutional solution that is satisfactory to the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, the Government of the United States would be prepared to support such a solution through diplomatic channels in international bodies and with other governments. End Verbatim Text. Please advise HMG of appointment. Bentley called in to receive similar message here./3/ /3/In telegram 1526 from London, October 7, Kaiser reported that he had delivered the oral message to Prime Minister Smith that morning. Smith responded that the United States did not understand the situation and argued that independence under the present constitution was acceptable to the majority of Rhodesians. He declared that, if all else failed, Rhodesians would have no choice but to take their independence; this was a matter of "life and death." The Prime Minister also referred bitterly to the British "crawling" to the United States for assistance, and compared the present Rhodesian situation to the American one in 1776. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD) Ball
479. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, October 9, 1965, 1115Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to USUN and Salisbury. Passed to the White House. 1569. Private Secretary of Prime Minister Ian Smith has just delivered the following letter to me: "Dear Charge d'Affaires, "You were good enough to call upon me yesterday to deliver a message from your government relative to the Rhodesian government and the British government over the grant of independence to Rhodesia. In receiving the messages I informed you that I was grateful to your government for their interest and concern and I would now like you to convey this reply to your government in acknowledgement thereof. "Would you please say to your government that the Rhodesian government are approaching these negotiations in a spirit of goodwill and conciliation but, at the same time, with the knowledge that what they are proposing to the British government as a settlement of the problem of Rhodesian independence is one that has the acceptance and support of the majority of the people in the country, both European and African. "Rhodesia is working for independence on its 1961 Constitution, a constitution, freely negotiated between the then British government, the government of Rhodesia and representatives of all political parties and of all racial groups in the country. This constitution contains the fundamental elements which provide for a widely representative government when the time comes. But it is the claim of the Rhodesian government that it is for them to decide the pace of the evolution towards majority rule. Therefore, the government of Rhodesia, while they will take the very closest account of all the views expressed to them by friendly governments like the government of the United States, must in the end consider the ultimate good of the country of Rhodesia and must assume the final responsibility for deciding what course is in the best interests of that country. "The Rhodesian government would be failing in their duty not only to themselves but to the ordinary people of the country and to the cause of Western civilisation on the continent of Africa if they were persuaded to abandon the stand they have taken and to expose the people of the county to all the unhappiness and conflict which stems from unbridled racial government, which would be the result of immediate majority rule. Yours sincerely, I. Vaughn Smith." Thompson told me that Harper and Wrathall were returning to Salisbury tonight but that Smith would probably not be leaving until Monday or Tuesday. Kaiser [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
