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Rhodesia
457. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 26, 1964, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, October 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Thomas M. Judd and approved in U and S on November 9. The meeting took place in the Secretary's conference room. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS UK Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker said that the outgoing British Government on election day had informed the Southern Rhodesian Government that they would not send observers to the independence referendum. The present British Government had confirmed this action. Commonwealth Relations Secretary Bottomley had offered to have talks with Prime Minister Smith, if he could also see Sithole and Nkomo. Prime Minister Wilson had also asked Smith if he would come immediately to London for talks. Smith had refused, as expected, but did say he would come after the referendum. Mr. Gordon Walker went on to say that HMG would be issuing a statement on October 27 warning the Southern Rhodesians of the grave consequences resulting from a unilateral declaration of independence. HMG wanted to shock the Southern Rhodesians and stop them if it could. At the very least, HMG hoped to encourage resistance to Smith. Smith has until this afternoon to agree that there will be no unilateral declaration of independence. Otherwise, the statement will be issued. The Foreign Secretary said he hoped that the U.S. would be able to support HMG in this matter. Perhaps we could issue a statement showing our support. The Secretary replied that the U.S. did support HMG's policy and that we would follow the British lead./2/ He inquired as to the solidity of the white group in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Gordon Walker replied that it was difficult to say. If the British did nothing, the police and the army would probably go along with Smith. With the statement that HMG was going to make, it was just possible that Smith would have a difficult time putting through unilateral independence. The Foreign Secretary noted that the statement was a little vague on trade. This was because HMG realized that the Southern Rhodesians could get help from South Africa and the British, in any case, did not wish to do anything about tobacco. /2/On October 28, the United States issued a statement of support for Prime Minister Wilson's October 27 message to Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith warning the Rhodesian Government of the serious consequences for all Rhodesians if it continued to follow its present course. For text of the U.S. statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 823. Under Secretary Ball asked if HMG would have any problems with economic sanctions in view of the precedent this would create for South Africa. Mr. Gordon Walker replied that this would indeed cause problems. There was a general discussion of what type of representation the U.S. and the UK should maintain in Southern Rhodesia in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence. Secretary Rusk said that we were inclined to maintain a consulate there. Mr. Gordon Walker, for his part, thought that the British would probably not be able to keep any kind of representation but his preliminary reaction was that it would be a good idea for the U.S. to keep a consulate. It was agreed this matter would be discussed again later.
458. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 20, 1964, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, November 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Chalfin on November on November 23, cleared by Mulcahy, and approved in U on November 25. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS After the usual greetings, Mr. Kapwepwe said that he had spent Monday and Tuesday in London. After talks between Prime Minister Wilson and Prime Minister Kaunda, the latter had decided to send Mr. Kapwepwe and Finance Minister Arthur Wina to the United States; however, Mr. Wina was unable to come because he had other important matters to take care of. Rhodesian Independence Threat The Foreign Minister explained that his principal mission on his present visit to Washington was to prepare the way for President Kaunda's talks with the United States Government./2/ He had one urgent subject to discuss. This concerned Southern Rhodesia. The Zambians are convinced that Rhodesia is determined to go ahead with a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). HMG is totally against such a step, and the Zambians are assured that the British will do everything in their power to stop it either through negotiations or by economic boycott. The Rhodesian Government, Mr. Kapwepwe said, has started building detention camps for Europeans who are opposed to UDI. When these camps are ready, Rhodesian authorities will start arresting these Europeans and go on to imprison African nationalists as well. In all likelihood, the Rhodesian "round-up" will include European business men, Indians and even unsympathetic army officers. Unfortunately, HMG will probably not be able to stop a Rhodesian seizure of independence. /2/Documentation on Kaunda's visit, November 30-December 2, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Zambia, Kaunda Visit, 11/30-12/2/64. Consequences for Zambia With this strong likelihood of UDI, continued Mr. Kapwepwe, the Zambians have begun to consider what is likely to be the consequences for their country. The Zambian Government firmly believes that the Rhodesian Government intends to: 1) close down electrical power from the Kariba Dam; 2) shut off the coal supply to Zambia's copper mines; and 3) deprive Zambia of railroad facilities for the shipment of copper, Asked why Rhodesia should take such steps, Kapwepwe replied that it was probably due to Zambia's political stand vis-a-vis Rhodesia. Continuing with his recitation on the consequences to Zambia of the above Rhodesian actions, Kapwepwe opined that they could probably get electricity from the Congo but they see no substitute sources for coal. If coal supplies are cut off, the copper mines will have to shut down. In this event, the Zambians fear that the world copper market will be completely upset. Copper prices would rise and force consumers to use aluminum instead. This would be a permanent and disastrous loss to the Zambian economy. There would also be, in the event of the closure of the copper mines, a complete discharge of labor which presently comes not only from Zambia but as well from Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Malawi and the Congo. Others who would suffer, Kapwepwe continued, are overseas investors in the copper industry and the World Bank to which Zambia would have to default on its loan payments arising from the Kariba Dam. Given the magnitude of this threat to Zambia's life blood, said Kapwepwe, they are approaching the United States to see whether we can exert influence on the Rhodesians to desist from their course. The Zambians are also convinced that South Africa is encouraging Rhodesia to hurt Zambia. Possibly the United States can express its displeasure to South Africa on this score. British Undertake to Help Asked by Mr. Ball about the attitudes of the copper companies to the situation, Kapwepwe referred to conversations which Prime Minister Kaunda had had in London with Sir Ronald Prain, Chairman of the Board of Rhodesian Selection Trust. According to Kapwepwe, Sir Ronald feels that Rhodesia is determined to go ahead with UDI. He further added that HMG and the United States Government are not doing all they can to dissuade Rhodesia away from this path. Sir Ronald came up with a suggestion that the problem of coal supplies might be partially met by sending British coal through Tanzania. The route would be through Suez to Tanganyika and to the Lake Tanganyika port of Kigoma and across the lake to the Zambia port of Abercorn. However, this would require very complicated, expensive and time-consuming arrangements. Kapwepwe went on to say that the copper mines have tried to stock-pile as much Rhodesian coal as possible but the Rhodesians have been limiting supplies to one month's requirement. This is a further sign of Rhodesia's intentions. US Will Discuss with Kaunda Under Secretary Ball concluded the meeting by saying that all this is a most disturbing prospect. The United States would study the problems further in preparation for its discussions with President Kaunda. We would also consult with the British. We recognize that copper is a life and death matter for Zambia and would approach the situation sympathetically and look for ways to help out. It would be of great assistance, he added, if we could have some idea of the magnitude of coal, electricity and copper shipments. Mr. Ball asked whether Mr. Kapwepwe had any other topics to discuss. He replied that he was leaving everything else to President Kaunda who, he believes, would like to raise questions on the Congo and US technical assistance. Mr. Ball added that we are anxious to discuss the Congo problem. Note: During a brief absence of the Under Secretary, Mr. Mulcahy asked the Foreign Minister whether his government planned to give a haven to a Rhodesian nationalist government-in-exile should UDI occur. The Minister made it plain that the Zambian Government had no such intention; indeed, they had talked to the ZAPU leaders, Nyandoro, Chikerema, to convince them of the expense and folly of such a move.
459. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia/1/ Washington, April 5, 1965, 5:42 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RHOD-ZAMBIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Mulcahy on April 1-2; cleared by MacKnight, Judd, and Fredericks; and approved by Williams. Also sent to Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, Nairobi, and Salisbury. 1878. Ref: Lusaka tel 1232. Following summary of agreements reached at US-UK London talks re Rhodesia-Zambia relations and related Southern African issues/2/ should be useful as background info in planning regional meeting suggested reftel: /2/The U.S.-U.K. talks on Africa took place in London, March 22-24. The discussion of Southern Rhodesia and Zambia on March 23 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation ibid., POL UK-US. Rhodesia and Zambia Agreed there were great difficulties bringing about the kind of solution which we and Africans would like to see, and danger of UDI had to be guarded against at every turn. Following suggestions were made as possibly helpful lines of action: 1. President Kaunda (and perhaps other African leaders) should at right time be encouraged use his influence with African Nationalists in Rhodesia to respond favorably to any initiative which looked as though might hold out hope resolving constitutional deadlock. 2. Any information effort open to us should be made to try persuade Europeans in Rhodesia all was not chaos and communism in black north. Agreed two Governments should urgently concert together on further enquiries suggested into means protecting Zambia against consequences of UDI. Education in Southern Africa Various efforts to improve educational opportunities in Southern Africa noted: UN proposal for education of South Africans, US efforts with respect refugees from South Africa; Southwest Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese territories and UK efforts, assisted by US, in HCT's. Agreed this was extremely important long-term effort and both governments should examine carefully what additional efforts could be made. UK agreed to see whether it could take even few refugee students from Portuguese territories. Both parties agreed give further consideration to UN project for education of Southern Africans, with thought this might be expanded to include Africans from other parts of Southern Africa. Attention also directed to efforts presently being made in HCT's territories, with general understanding these continued be worthy sympathetic consideration. General Approach to Southern African Problems In view intractibility Rhodesian problem and line which we were bound take over sanctions on South Africa, agreed further thought should be given to following suggestions for broad approach to problems of Southern Africa, with view to reducing tensions, buying time for ourselves and meantime giving African governments positive indication our interest in their problems and their future: 1. Discussions might be opened with selected Governments in Eastern Africa on broad handling of whole situation south Zambesi on basis neither US nor UK prepared see Rhodesian problem settled by military force nor apply economic sanctions to South Africa, short of violation of ICJ decision; 2. Desirability introducing into talks of this kind prospect of developing transportation links between Zambia and Tanzania, as something positive on which we might help; 3. Drawing on broad spectrum of sources (perhaps consortium of private companies IBRD, ECA et al) we should explore possibility developing assistance package of such attractiveness it would encourage countries on borders of southern Africa turn from difficult political problem of southern Africa to strengthening of their own countries. Separate telegram follows with Department comments on other points raised reftel. Copies entire conclusions being pouched soonest. Ball
460. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/63-1/66. Secret. Copies were sent to Gordon Chase and Komer. McGB SUBJECT FYI. African member-nations of the UN have successfully requested a Security Council meeting on the Southern Rhodesian question which they consider a threat to international peace and security. The sessions will begin tomorrow (Friday) at 10:30 a.m. with Senegal, Algeria, as spokesmen for the Africans, and the Soviet Union taking up most of the time venting their spleen on the UK for its failure to take stronger action to grant political rights to Southern Rhodesia's African majority. The Security Council will probably adjourn over the weekend and reconvene on Monday. The UK is expected to give its formal reply some time on Monday along the following lines: 1. UK will not grant independence for Rhodesia under conditions other than majority rule; 2. UK will resort to sanctions if the Southern Rhodesian Government unilaterally declares itself independent; and 3. UK will continue to negotiate with the Southern Rhodesians to find a way out of the current impasse. The US is expected to speak on Tuesday in general support of the UK. Our ace-in-the-hole is a public announcement of our policy of a total arms embargo (already in effect) on Southern Rhodesia. We'll save this ace for the most propitious time./2/ /2/In a June 15 speech on U.S. policy toward Rhodesia, Assistant Secretary Williams stated that the United States had supplied no military arms or equipment to Rhodesia since the dissolution of the Federation in December 1963. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 677-679. The UK would prefer to defeat an unfavorable Security Council resolution by obtaining five abstentions. However, they are prepared to exercise the veto, if necessary./3/ /3/On May 6, the Security Council adopted Resolution 202 opposing a possible Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence by a vote of 7 to 0 with 4 abstentions (including the United States and the United Kingdom). For text, see ibid., pp. 675-676. Ambassador Stevenson explained that the U.S. delegation had abstained because the resolution called for action exclusively by the United Kingdom, and he stated that the United States would not recognize a unilateral declaration of independence. I'll follow closely. Rick
461. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 RHOD. Secret; Priority. Drafted by William C. Kinsey of AFE, cleared by Judd, and approved by Williams. Repeated to London, USUN, and Lusaka. Washington, May 6, 1965, 6:36 p.m. 754. Urtel 712 rptd 193 London, 47 USUN./2/ For McClelland from Williams. Offensive SRG Aide-Memoire/3/ should be returned soonest through same channels as received. No written record your oral statement to be transmitted to avoid possibility publication later. Return of document coupled with US statement UNSC May 6 on non-recognition SRG in case UDI may have beneficial effect in correcting SRG illusions re USG policy toward SR and reaction to UDI. /2/Dated April 30. (Ibid.) /3/Airgram A-676 from Salisbury, April 15, transmitted the April 14 aide-memoire, which formally protested the U.S. Government refusal to sell T-28 aircraft to Rhodesia. (Ibid.) Drawing on Deptel 737,/4/ last para Deptel 738 and five points comment your A-676,/5/ you should stress USG shock, regret and irritation at inaccuracies, unrealistic tone, intemperate and undiplomatic phrasing and offensive lecturing tenor of document. US has repeatedly attempted to make SRG see error of ways, most recently in my talks with Bennett/6/ on his departure and with Lord Graham/7/ during visit Washington. Other Deptoffs have engaged in running dialogue with Towsey/8/ and Congenoffs have expressed USG position clearly to SRG. You should state firmly USG hopes SRG will have no further illusions re USG policy toward SR in its desire for peaceful, mutually acceptable agreement on SR future between HMG and SRG. /4/Telegram 6941 to London, sent as telegram 737 to Salisbury, April 30, instructed Charge Philip Kaiser to meet with Rhodesia's Minister in Washington, who was in London, and stress the seriousness with which the United States viewed current Rhodesian developments and the "particularly offensive" Rhodesian aide-memoire. (Ibid.) /5/Telegram 738 to Salisbury, April 30, and airgram A-676 from Salisbury, April 15. (Ibid.) /6/Rhodesian Minister in Washington, Oliver Bennett. /7/Rhodesian Minister of Agriculture, Lord Graham. /8/Rhodesian Counselor in Washington, Kenneth Towsey. Rusk
462. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Kinsey, and cleared by Judd and Charles A. Schmitz of L/AF. Copies were sent to Komer, Harriman, L, IO, and EUR. Washington, May 10, 1965. SUBJECT You have requested Mr. Fredericks to provide you with information concerning our planning for contingencies arising from a possible unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia. The following information summarizes our preparations to the present time. The basic US Contingency Paper for Southern Rhodesia of July 2, 1964/2/ is still valid. The Contingency Paper (copy attached) is based on the assumption of a severance of constitutional relations with HMG by the Southern Rhodesian Government. This could occur by a UDI of the SRG or by usurpation of Crown authority through "enacting" independence by a two-thirds majority in the SR Parliament. /2/A copy of the Southern Rhodesia Contingency Paper of July 2, 1964, is ibid. The Legal Adviser's Office has prepared an addendum to the SR Contingency Paper which has now completed Department clearance (copy attached)./3/ The addendum discusses the legal status of the American Consulate General in Salisbury in the event of a UDI. It is based on our policies of supporting the UK in our relationships with a post-UDI Southern Rhodesia and of retaining an official US presence in SR for as long a time as feasible. /3/Not printed. Our Emergency and Evacuation Plan is current and no major problems are foreseen in evacuating the 1825 American citizens and their fireside aliens resident in SR at the end of March 1965. The country is divided into seven areas; each area is the responsibility of a "key man." Seven telephone calls could alert the key men who in turn would alert US citizens in their areas. In addition, most missionary groups maintain radio contact with their outposts. The US position in case of a severance of constitutional relations between HMG and SRG would be largely dependent on the extent to which HMG and the Commonwealth would go in imposing punitive action on Southern Rhodesia. US resources available for use in case of UDI are limited, but our national interest dictates support for HMG and the Commonwealth action. We are now engaged in informal consultation with HMG and the Government of Zambia on a possible contingency operation to save Zambia, which is dependent on its copper exports, from economic collapse in case normal transportation, electricity and coal from SR are cut off for any reason following a UDI. The current US planning position in case of a UDI is based on support for HMG and Commonwealth punitive actions which were most recently threatened by UK Prime Minister Wilson on April 29. These would be of an economic and financial nature primarily. Punitive military action by HMG has been eliminated from HMG planning, at least for the present. Recognition of any minority SRG by the US soon after a UDI would be politically impossible but we would attempt to maintain a skeleton staff at our Consulate General as a symbol to SR Africans of US concern for them. We would cooperate with Commonwealth and African nations working toward a solution of the SR problem. While our traditional policy does not favor recognition of Governments-in-Exile, we would maintain friendly contact with major SR exile organizations. We would support the UK in its appeal to the UN Security Council immediately upon the severance of constitutional relations between HMG and SRG and would support UK endeavors to mobilize UN and world support for economic and financial action against the rebel colony. HMG has hinted guardedly that it might not oppose the entry into SR of an international military force under certain conditions and guarantees.
463. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Washington, May 28, 1965. Mac-- FYI, there's a big flap over proposed Tanzania-Zambia railroad, designed to give Zambia an alternate outlet to sea for its copper if S. Rhodesia goes sour. The IB turned down this $400 million boondoggle as economically infeasible and AID feels the same way. But now Kaunda of Zambia sent word to Harriman and Williams at Addis Conference that Chou En-lai (due in Tanzania 3 June) was going to offer to build it. Kaunda pled for a Western pre-emptive offer, and all our Africanists sent in a fervent plea to keep Chicoms out of heart of Africa. Rusk and Ball thought this nonsense and signed [so did] LBJ on Tuesday. But Averell and AF are unwilling to take "no" for an answer, and former is in London trying to get UK excited. So we'll probably have a second round on this one. I'm staying loose for now, but doubt that one Chicom railroad means curtains for us in southern Africa./2/ /2/A notation in Bundy's handwriting in the margin of the source text reads: "OK--keep an eye on it." RWK
464. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 14, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Rhodesia. Confidential. A copy was sent to Komer. McGB SUBJECT "Soapy" Williams will deliver a speech on Southern Rhodesia tomorrow in Chicago before the Chicago Chapter of the Federal Bar Association./2/ What distinguishes this speech from other public statements by American officials on the same subject is "Soapy's" announcement (cleared by the Department) that the USG has ceased supplying any arms to the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The announcement of the cessation of arms shipments is in accord with your recommendation of about a month ago. /2/For text of Assistant Secretary Williams' speech, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 677-679. "Soapy" will also state that the USG will follow the UKG lead in responding to a UDI. These statements are in the process of being cleared with the UK Embassy in accordance with our established policy of coordinating our actions with them. Rick
465. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 12, 1965, 10:15 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12. Confidential. Tanzania-Zambia Railroad. This is to bring you up to date on a looming problem. We now hear that the Chicoms did make an offer to Nyerere of Tanzania to (a) survey the Tanzania-Zambia rail route, and (b) possibly build the Tanzanian segment. Chicom "surveyors" reportedly will soon arrive in Tanzania for this purpose. President Kaunda of Zambia was apparently unaware of how deeply Nyerere had become involved with the Chicoms. The British are sore at Nyerere for having brought in the Chicoms while a private railroad survey offer by a British firm is still under consideration. The British are ready to finance half its cost, and a Zambian mission is currently in Tanzania in an attempt to formalize arrangements. Some experts think the likely cost of a railroad has been grossly inflated, but we still think a road would be cheaper and better. So we've offered a parallel highway study by a US firm. Kaunda seems interested, but Nyerere's determination to construct a rail link for political reasons makes us dubious that he'll accept. At any rate we've probably bought some time. This whole question arises primarily because of landlocked Zambia's fear of having its main copper export routes cut off following a possible unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia and a break in its relations with Zambia. To avoid dire effects on the Zambian economy, we and the UK are developing contingency plans. But an alternate rail route via Tanzania may not be the best solution: (a) it could take ten years or more to complete, by which time the Rhodesian threat might be long past and the railroad a multi-million dollar "white elephant," and (b) the present mutual interdependence of Zambia and Southern Rhodesia through common ownership of the existing rail route is precisely what discourages each from taking precipitous vindictive action against the other. Also the Chicoms may lack the financial resources for a mammoth railroad construction effort. Although Nyerere says the Chicoms have made a firm offer to survey, he says in the same breath that their agreement to construct is only a "possibility." But this whole problem bears close watching, since a major Chicom bridgehead in East Africa could be highly painful. R.W. Komer
466. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, September 13, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rhodesia, Vol. I. Secret. McGB SUBJECT Possible Speeding up of Southern Rhodesian UDI European sentiment in Southern Rhodesia is heating up to press Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front (RF) government to make an immediate unilateral declaration of independence. Lack of progress during the past six months dialogue between Salisbury and London has driven both Rhodesians and British to the point of mutual exasperation. With the principals in this state, anything can happen. Indeed, there are indications that the Rhodesians are preparing an imminent UDI: (a) appointment (opposed by the UK) of an autonomous Rhodesian "diplomatic representative" to Portugal; (b) the impatience for UDI shown by right-wingers at the late August RF Party Congress against which most observers agree Smith cannot hold out beyond the end of the year; (c) recent Rhodesian proposals to Zambia that they negotiate a mutually agreeable formula for the division of the unified Zambia-Rhodesian Railroad system; [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (e) PM Smith's desire to meet with PM Wilson in London. On a recent African tour, Bottomley was disturbed to find deep concern among all African Commonwealth members over the UK's failure to solve the Rhodesian crisis. So great was the concern that UK officials fear the Commonwealth itself could be threatened if the UK backed off from its position of independence for Rhodesia only under a Constitution granting majority rule with strict guarantees of minority rights. The situation is further complicated by the split of Rhodesia's African nationalists into two equally ineffective groups: the Zimbabwe African Political Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Event he OAU's African Liberation Committee has thrown up its hands in disgust over ZAPU and ZANU refusal to unite and evolve an action program. In short, neither group offers the material out of which a majority African government could be fashioned. The US has little leverage in this situation, but there are great risks to us that a sudden deterioration in the Rhodesian situation could trigger similar deterioration in other potential trouble spots in Southern Africa: i.e., Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, South West Africa, Zambia and Malawi. The US has already (June 1964) suspended its modest AID proj-ects in Southern Rhodesia. Soapy Williams has publicly announced (June 1965) that we have ceased supplying any arms. In the UN we have consistently supported the British position of (a) no independence without majority rule; (b) economic sanctions in the event of UDI; and (c) continued UK-Rhodesian negotiations. We had hoped to deter UDI and preserve the admittedly shaky status quo in order to buy time to work out an accommodation agreeable to both parties. So far we have not succeeded. However, with Rhodesia now on the brink of UDI, Komer and I feel that a more aggressive deterrent effort is called for. Therefore, we plan to suggest that the US: 1. Touch base again with the UK as to current seriousness of the situation in Southern Rhodesia; 2. Decide whether the US should make a unilateral approach to the Rhodesians telling them that in the event of UDI we will fully support the UK and that we suspect the UN will do the same; 3. Perhaps send Harriman on a trouble-shooting trip to Salisbury to deliver the above message if we decide to approach the Rhodesians unilaterally. Rick
467. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 20, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 RHOD. Secret. Drafted by Mulcahy on September 21, and approved in S on September 25. The source text is marked "Section II of V." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary told the Minister of State that he would like to discuss the Southern Rhodesian problem and its impact on the UK and the US. Mr. Hughes summarized the most recent developments for the Secretary. Last February Smith was clearly ready to make concessions; today "he is the captive of the extremists of his party," he said. He is a hard man to deal with, not very intelligent but very shrewd. During the talks that had gone on regularly for several months with Smith and during his own visit to Salisbury in July, HMG had stuck to insisting upon its three principles: (1) assurance that the safeguards embodied in the "entrenched clauses" of the Rhodesian 1961 constitution would be preserved, (2) guarantees for African political and social advancement and (3) removal of all racial discrimination (including specific repeal of the Land Apportionment Act). For some time Smith seemed to be reasonable and to be prepared to make concessions himself. Now things had changed for the worse. The Minister of State said that HMG was "anxious to avoid a unilateral declaration of independence." But the present situation was viewed as most serious by the UK because of its probable impact on the Commonwealth and its potential adverse effect on the already precarious UK balance of payments picture. The tolerable relationship had worsened recently when Smith took to the offensive with the Reedman appointment to Lisbon. However, HMG would have to stand firm on this issue. The Portuguese were being watched very closely. As the next step, the Minister of State indicated, Commonwealth Secretary Bottomley would go to Salisbury on October 12. Bottomley will make an effort to have Smith come to London for a final confrontation with Prime Minister Wilson. The situation promises to remain very critical for the next few weeks. The Secretary asked whether HMG had felt the discussion last week in the NATO Council had been useful. From the UK's point of view, Mr. Hughes and Sir Savile agreed, it had been very encouraging to have such a solid display of support for its position. The backing given by the US had been especially appreciated. The Secretary said that he had talked with three Zambian cabinet ministers last week/2/ and had been impressed with their story of the new coal deposits (at Kandabwe) that Zambia was developing. Mr. Hughes agreed that this was an encouraging development but it would be too little to make a real change in the prospects facing Zambia in the event of UDI and the possible cutting off of the Wankie coal sources. Sir Savile said that HMG was coming back to the thought that only an airlift could keep the Zambian economy afloat if worse came to worst. Mr. Hughes agreed, adding that President Kaunda would probably have to yield to African pressures to take a firm stand against the Rhodesian rebels after UDI, bringing the full wrath of the Smith Government down on Zambia. Sir Savile added that, under such circumstances, Rhodesia would lose trade worth 30 million pounds a year. This in addition to the other measures that could be taken by the UK and the rest of the world might succeed in bringing Southern Rhodesia to her knees. /2/A memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with the Zambian Cabinet Ministers on September 14 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Zambia, Vol. I, Memos and Miscellaneous, 8/64-9/68. The Secretary asked whether the British believed that Kaunda would assist infiltrators to enter Southern Rhodesia after UDI. Mr. Hughes and Sir Savile thought it was likely that Kaunda would ultimately have to yield to African pressures to do so. In addition, he would probably have to give a haven to a Rhodesian government-in-exile and probably to a Mozambique government-in-exile. Mr. Hughes said he felt that if Smith could be removed from the bad influence exerted on him by Harper, Lilford, Knox, Gaunt and Benson it might be possible to deal with him more rationally. But the situation was becoming critical and HMG was bending very effort to "postpone the evil day" when UDI would come. There were a few good members in Ian Smith's cabinet, he said, citing Mr. Howman as an example, but their influence was not strong. They were a small group, the Minister said. Mr. Fredericks inquired how the Governor (Sir Humphrey Gibbs) stood in the present controversy. Mr. Hughes and Sir Savile agreed that he was tired and asked often to be relieved of his heavy duties. In the present situation he was "quite powerless." Sir Savile stated that only the judiciary had been able to resist the SRG's efforts to control it, otherwise Smith held all the cards. The Secretary asked whether there was any possibility of using British troops to quell a rebellion after UDI. The British officials indicated that there was not the slightest chance of this. There were not enough troops in any case and none near enough to be of any use. Mr. Hughes said that the only conceivable circumstances under which he could envisage the use of British troops would be upon the request of the SRG if absolute chaos within the country occurred (implying a massive African uprising), but he saw little probability of that. Mr. Fredericks agreed that our estimate of African nationalist capability to provoke violence also made such a situation unlikely. Secretary Rusk inquired whether the British officials felt the US and UK were "in line" with regard to the Southern Rhodesian problem. Mr. Hughes and Sir Savile unhesitatingly said that they were confident we were "in line." Mr. Hughes then said that we would have to give much thought to keeping "in line" when and if it came to handling the question in the UN after UDI. He believed it important that HMG seize and maintain the initiative in the UN. The Secretary said he agreed and asked whether they believed the African members of the Commonwealth would be together with the UK in the UN debate. Sir Savile indicated there was room for doubt on this point since the African Commonwealth members would probably join in a demand for some form of UN military action, which Britain, of course, would have to oppose. He added that, on his recent West African trip with Mr. Bottomley, the Southern Rhodesian question was the main subject of interest everywhere. Feelings on it were very strong, he said. Strangely enough, however, the only leader who did not raise the issue with them was President Nkrumah, although his Foreign Minister had done so. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
