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440. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/ Washington, November 25, 1966, 9:02 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ANG-ZAMBIA. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth on October 31; cleared by McElhiney, Brown of UNP, Wyle of DOD/ISA, EUR Country Director for Spain and Portugal George W. Landau, Warren, and Koumanelis; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Blantyre, London, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, Lusaka, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and CINCEUR. 91612. Joint State-Defense. Subject: Angola-Zambia Border Incident. 1. Based on information provided by DAO Blantyre, we have established that bazooka rocket motor fragments examined by him in Lusaka come from two of 15,066 3.5 inch rocket motors, manufactured April, 1952 by Heckethorne Manufacturing and Supply Company, Littleton, Colorado. This batch of 15,066 motors, designated Number 2-449, 4-52, was sent to Cornhusker Ordnance Plant, Nebraska, May 1, 1962 for final assembly and placed into one of two complete round lots, designated: COP 4-225 (9,058 rounds)and COP 4-226 (6,008 rounds). It is not possible to determine from which of these two lots the Lusaka bazooka rocket motor fragments originated. 2. Of the total of 15,066 bazookas, it has been possible only to trace the disposition of 1,952 rounds of lot number COP 4-226, which were shipped to Portugal, December 6, 1963, under Military Assistance Sales for use in the NATO Defense Area. Prior to sale, oral assurance was given MAAG Lisbon officer by responsible Portuguese army official on May 2, 1963 and recorded in May 3 memorandum for record by MAAG officer that ammunition was required to meet needs of Portuguese Army NATO forces remaining in Europe. Sale was approved for implementation on August 22, 1963 by Military Sales Division, Mutual Security Office, Headquarters, U.S. Army Material Command. 3. While there is possibility that fragments in possession of Zambian authorities which they permitted us, at our initiative and request, to examine in Lusaka came from those sold to Portugal, we are unable to specifically to identify them as belonging to the group sold to Portugal in 1963. Moreover, as stated in State 16415, July 27,/2/ large quantities of military items of American manufacture can be purchased commercially on world market and are not under control of USG. Conceivably, the Lusaka fragments could fall into this category. As was also noted in State 16415, there is no way we can conclusively establish who had possession of bazooka ammunition from which fragments came or how it had been obtained. /2/Document 439. 4. For Lisbon: Embassy should inform GOP that Zambian government delivered note to U.S. Ambassador in Lusaka July 23 stating that two spent shells bearing U.S. markings had been found in the Zambian village Chipatala, allegedly fired by Portuguese troops based in Angola. The note requested the USG to bring this matter to the attention of GOP. Before doing so, USG made investigation to determine: (a) if fragments came from U.S.-manufactured ammunition and (b) if of U.S. manufacture, explanation of their use in Africa. Embassy should draw upon info contained in Paras 1 through 2 above, to explain results of investigation and to note possibility that fragments may have come from group sold Portugal which they had provided assurances were required meet needs of Portuguese Army NATO forces remaining in Europe. Embassy should state that USG would appreciate Portuguese investigating disposition 1,952 rounds ammunition sold December, 1963. 5. For Lusaka: GRZ may be informed orally or by note at level appropriate to nature of original GRZ note (and informally to President Kuanda at Ambassador's discretion) results DOD investigation of rocket shells and of USG approach to GOP as outlined above./3/ /3/In a letter of July 25 to the President of the U.N. Security Council, Zambia accused Portugal of using bazookas to shell houses in the village of Chipatala in Zambian territory and said that two of the spent shells found in the village had U.S. markings, thereby confirming the invalidity of the Portuguese claim that weapons supplied through NATO would never be used for aggressive purposes. (U.N. document S/7430) In a December 5 letter to the Security Council, Zambia again charged Portugal with committing acts of colonial aggression on Zambian territory. (U.N. document S/7612) In a December 12 letter to the Security Council, Portugal denied the Zambian charges, saying they were without foundation. (U.N. document S/7632) Rusk
441. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/ Washington, November 29, 1966, 8:26 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth; cleared by Lampson, Deputy Director of the Office of U.N. Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen, Heyniger, and Landau; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to USUN, Luanda, and Lourenco Marques. 93308. Subject: Portuguese Territories. Following is based on uncleared memcon, FYI only and subject to revision on review. 1. During courtesy call on Under Secretary, November 29, Portuguese Ambassador Garin said he understood draft resolution now being circulated in UNGA Fourth Committee, similar in substance to that adopted by Committee of 24 in Africa,/2/ which would apply Chapter VII language to question Portuguese African provinces. /2/On June 22, the General Assembly's 24-member Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted a resolution recommending that the Security Council make the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter obligatory against Portugal. 2. Although emphasizing that he was not speaking under instructions from GOP, Garin said he was confident that GOP assumed and hoped that if draft resolution was similar to earlier Committee of 24 resolution which U.S. had voted against, USG would continue same position and vote no in Fourth Committee. He said if GOP had thought there would be any change USG position, he was sure he would have been instructed to discuss matter urgently./3/ /3/On December 5, the U.N. Fourth Committee approved the Afro-Asian draft resolution on the Portuguese territories by a vote of 76 to 12 (including the United States) with 24 abstentions. The resolution was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly as Resolution 2184 (XXI) on December 12 by a vote of 70 to 13 (including the United States) with 22 abstentions. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 132-134. Rusk
442. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research/1/ Washington, March 6, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967-1968. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Halvor O. Ekern of INR/DDC. The source text is an attachment to Document 223. ANGOLA [Heading, 2-line table, and 3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] B. CIA Activities and Assets Clandestine activity with regard to Angola has consisted of periodic support for Holden Roberto, President of the Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE), also leader of the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA) and of the Angolan Peoples Union (UPA). CIA has had a relationship with Roberto since 1955. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] AF and CIA proposals for assistance to Roberto have been consistently opposed by EUR over the years. GRAE has had to compete for funds with the rival Bloc-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Angolan nationalists began guerrilla warfare in Angola in 1961. CIA first proposed major assistance to Roberto in March 1962, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The matter was deferred, however, principally because of EUR opposition. For the same reason a proposal to furnish Roberto [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to permit him to attend the UN in 1962 was dropped. However, in May 1963 the Department did approve [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to assist a GRAE delegation to attend the pre-OAU meeting in Addis. [1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified] A CIA proposal [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to provide non-military support to Roberto and other selected nationalist leaders, supported by AF, was presented to the Special Group in March 1964. However, EUR strongly objected to what amounted to US-Soviet conspiracy against a NATO ally, (separate 303 proposals in May 1964 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were deferred meanwhile). This led to a meeting on May 4, 1964 attended by the Secretary, McNamara, Attorney General Kennedy, McCone, Mac Bundy and U. Alexis Johnson at which it was decided that a GRAE non-violent political program would be explored with Adoula, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Governor Williams and Wayne Fredericks saw these leaders in May 1964. As a result another AF-CIA proposal [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for assistance to GRAE for this type of program was circulated but again dropped because of EUR opposition. Finally in July 1964 another proposal was submitted [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for support of selected Angolan Nationalist leaders. This was approved by the Secretary over EUR objection but on August 6 the 303 Committee deferred action at the request of the CIA Director. Roberto has received assistance from Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Israel, Congo (L) and the AFL-CIO.
443. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 8, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967-1968. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
444. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State/1/ Leopoldville, April 28, 1967, 1523Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 ANG. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. 6814. Subj: Angola. 1. Dilolo area: GRAE President Holden Roberto confided to me today that he had promised Mobutu to control GRAE forces Dilolo area closely and prevent attacks on Benguela Railroad (BRR). Said first two attacks on railroad were made by GRAE forces, but were unauthorized. However latest cutting of BRR done by Portuguese themselves at Mobutu's request. He has sent effective leader (he chose Jorge Peterson) to take command of ATD base at Njolo (phonetic), twelve kilometers from Dilolo. Also has sent his youth leader, Mirando, with instructions to militants that no attacks be made against railroad on grounds that railroad is British property and is vital to Congolese and Zambian brothers. Holden said he had information indirectly from Portuguese intelligence sources that Portuguese were claiming ALN about to make attack on Odixeira de Sousa from Dilolo area (Luanda 550)./2/ Portuguese saying that if this happens Portuguese army will make retaliatory attack across border. As result, Roberto has sent word to ALN base in Njolo that ALN forces should be most prudent in days to come. Roberto said he convinced he can control GRAE forces in Dilolo area. These forces becoming stronger and better disciplined all the time. (Note: We have little info on this subject.) He has sent Tunisian-trained political leaders into area to strengthen GRAE's village organizations. However, he considering moving base and majority of refugees away from Dilolo area at GDRC request, even though this would be big job. Roberto fears that UNITA and particularly MPLA forces likely "continue" make trouble in this area and blame it on GRAE. Said he had given orders that if any MPLA partisans seen in area, they should be killed. /2/Dated April 22. (Ibid.) 2. Relations with Savimbi: Roberto said, in answer my question, that in principle he ready agree reincorporate Savimbi and UNITA leaders into GRAE, but only as individuals and not as group. Claims Savimbi's UNITA party is tribally oriented group, although he denied that his own party was tribally oriented, which is utter nonsense. As tribally oriented group, UNITA could not be brought back into GRAE. Likewise, said Pinnock and youth leaders strongly opposed to Savimbi and were fighting his return. Roberto also said he beginning have questions about Savimbi's orientation. Congolese roving Amb Marcel Lengema had told him (Roberto) that he had seen Savimbi during recent Progressive Summit Conference in Cairo and had impression Savimbi receiving increasing support from UAR, Algeria and perhaps Soviets. 3. MPLA activities in Western Angola and Cabinda: Asked about reports of MPLA infiltration into Angola. Roberto said these infiltrations stopped by cooperation between GDRC and ALN forces. Number MPLA infiltrators arrested and Bas Congo area now clear. Five women, including "Communist agent" [garble], now in GRAE prison in Kinzuku. However, Kinshasa full of minor MPLA leaders, who being "supported" by such persons as Mabika Kalanda (head of ENDA) and even to some extent Minister of Interior Tshisekedi. (John Marcum Lincoln University and one time friend Roberto tells me Roberto admitted that in last two months GRAE has killed over 200 MPLA militants caught in Congo.) 4. Congo-Brazza: Interestingly enough, Roberto claims that Brazza govt beginning withdraw support from MPLA and beginning help FLEC, Cabinda Liberation Movement. GOCB has found from experience that MPLA has had no success in influencing Cabinda population, whereas FLEC is made up of local people. In fact, Roberto claims several members Brazza govt are members FLEC and some are either from or closely related to people from Cabinda. Roberto said aim of Brazza govt is to annex Cabinda as soon as possible and Roberto said this would lead to "war" between Angola and Congo-Brazza. Just yesterday, ALN forces sent with cooperation GDRC and ANC from base at Kinkuzu, south of river, to area west of Tshela in the Mayombe next to Cabinda border to disarm FLEC-controlled refugees. Arms had been coming to these people from GOCB. Operation easily accomplished and in fact not too many arms found. 5. GRAE relations with GDRC: Roberto said his relations with GDRC had never been better. Mobutu and Bomboko operating with him 100 percent, allowing small shipments of arms to pass as needed. In return, he (Roberto) has promised control Dilolo situation. Occasionally, MinInterior Tshisekedi, whom he characterized as pro-MPLA opportunist, gives trouble but we able to regulate this with Mobutu quickly. Relations with Bas Congo provincial authorities which previously very bad have improved. Governor Pauluku of Congo Central cooperating fully with ALN, unlike his anti-GRAE predecessor Moanda. However, Roberto uneasy about continued influence of Kamanda on Mobutu, which he considers to be more pervasive and important than we do for moment, will lead to less support for GRAE in time. He also fears arrival UAR, Algerian and Soviet missions and expects large part of their work to be devoted to work of MPLA in opposition to GRAE. 6. Dept repeat as desired. Blake
445. Letter From the Country Director for Central Africa, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius (Brown) to the Ambassador to the Congo (McBride)/1/ Washington, June 1, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, AF/AFCM Files: Lot 70 D 65, Official-Informal Letters, 1967. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Brown on May 26, and cleared by Landau, McElhiney, and Palmer. Dear Mr. Ambassador: The National Policy Paper on Portugal states inter alia that "we should with extreme discretion further develop and maintain unobtrusive but useful contacts with Portuguese African nationalist leaders in Africa." This course of action should govern Embassy relationships with Holden Roberto. It would seem appropriate for these contacts to be centered in the office of the DCM and limited to the DCM and the Chief of the Political Section. It should also be the responsibility of the DCM to coordinate actions and contacts of other US Government agencies with Holden Roberto and other nationalist leaders in the Congo./2/ /2/The source text is attached to a May 29 transmittal memorandum from Brown to Assistant Secretary Palmer that reads: "Ambassador McBride has asked me for guidance on contacts with Holden Roberto in the Congo. I have prepared the attached letter which I hope you will approve." Palmer initialed his approval on the memorandum. Sincerely yours, /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
446. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, July 5, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 60, October 6, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
447. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 6, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 60, October 6, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
448. Airgram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State/1/ A-190 Kinshasa, October 26, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, PORT 30-2 ANG. Confidential. Drafted by Embassy Political Officer William J. Boudreau on October 25, and approved by Chief of the Political Section Herman J. Cohen. Repeated to Lisbon, Luanda, Lubumbashi, Lusaka, Paris, and USUN. SUBJECT The reporting officer met with the President of the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile, Holden Roberto, on October 24, 1967 and discussed several topics. Roberto was well-disposed and forthcoming in conversation. African Refugee Conference Roberto is very skeptical that there will be any meaningful follow-through of OAU resolutions arising from the African Refugee Conference which concluded on October 18 at Addis Ababa. His doubts are based primarily on the belief that the African states are incapable of working together for the common good of Africa. He expressed a deep apprehension about the ideology promulgated by a number of African states and he does not wish to involve any of his refugees with these countries for fear of "brainwashing." Of the proposed Placement Bureau he said in effect that he would have to see it to believe it. He would welcome assistance in education and placement but only from certain countries, e.g., Tunisia, Liberia, Ghana, Senegal. Organization of African Unity As mentioned above, Roberto does not think that the OAU can be a cohesive force in any of its undertakings. When asked about the OAU's intention to abolish the GRAE's special status within the organization, he said that it means very little since most members recognize MPLA's ineffectiveness and thus must rally to GRAE's cause. He added that the new OAU resolve to pressure the GRAE and the MPLA to work together toward the establishment of a common front will not be pursued. He said that all previous attempts to arrive at an entente between the two groups have been frustrated and there is no reason to believe that any future endeavors along this line would end differently. Education of Refugees Roberto stated that he is very satisfied with the American university-educated Angolan refugees to date. He singled out Alphonse Videira and Sebastien Pinto Ramos, both of whom work for him in the GRAE headquarters, and Pauline Touba, who has recently returned to New York as GRAE representative to the United Nations Committee of 24. He said that the results of an American education demonstrated by these three have strengthened his judgment on the advantages of a Western-orientated education over schooling obtained in Communist-bloc countries. This is based on his findings that the former is more general and therefore more practical for the needs of his people, and is not fraught with ideological propaganda as is the case with studies in the Communist-bloc countries. Contrary to his previous thinking, Roberto is not particularly interested in obtaining scholarships for GRAE members at Louvanium University in Kinshasa. The advantage of proximity is now outweighed by, according to Roberto, a bad climate at Louvanium for GRAE students. He said that this is due to the successful propaganda of a few MPLA students at the university, and particularly one student who is currently in the faculty of medicine. Many non-Angolan students (presumably largely Congolese) are allegedly pro-MPLA, which would make for an unhealthy atmosphere for GRAE students. Roberto also mentioned that the few Congolese Government-sponsored scholarships for Angolans have recently been cancelled, and cited the case of two students at the Institute of Fine Arts in Kinshasa who are unable to continue their schooling for lack of funds. He will send them to the UNHCR representative to seek assistance. Comment: This cut-off of GDRC funds is not likely to be political, but probably ties in with the present Congolese difficulties in the field of education. GRAE Manifesto Roberto stated that he was aware that his representative in Algiers had published a certain paper declaring GRAE solidarity with Afro-Americans, Latin Americans and Vietnamese in their revolutionary struggles. He assured the reporting officer that his man in Algiers had done this without his (Roberto's) sanction, and upon learning of this, Roberto ordered the immediate destruction of all such tracts. He said that he fully appreciates the efforts being made by the American people and the American Government to reach an equitable solution to a difficult situation in the field of civil rights. Concerning "his declared intention to establish a socialist regime in Angola," he said that he was not aware that his Algiers rep had published such a declaration, and moreover, Roberto doubted that he would have done so. He denied ever making such an announcement, and maintained that his views have not changed with regard to steering clear of all ideological considerations until after "Angola has won its independence," and then it will be "for the people to decide which course to follow." He said that his Algiers representative had apparently added on his own the passages cited in Lisbon's 350 (notal) to the previously published "Platform of the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA)." Roberto has asked his New York representative to obtain a copy of the newspaper article on the "manifesto" in question so that he can further investigate the matter. Relations with Portugal The reporting officer queried Roberto about a story which appeared in the Koblenz, West German newspaper Rhenisher Merkur on October 6 and written by Wilhelm Schlosser. The author of the article stated that he had seen Roberto in Kinshasa and the latter had told him that the armed conflict with Portugal is to be abandoned in favor of a working-together with the Portuguese toward a peaceful solution. Roberto said that the contents of this article, which apparently appeared in no other newspaper, had been brought to his attention by the Tunisian Ambassador in Kinshasa and that he had denied that there had been any change in his policy. He added that he does not recall ever meeting a reporter by that name, and that he certainly has not seen him recently. Savimbi The reporting officer mentioned to Roberto that he had heard Jonas Savimbi, UNITA President might be on his way to Brazzaville to explore the possibility of a merger of his group with the MPLA. Roberto said that he had received a letter two weeks ago from his representative in Cairo which said that Savimbi was still in Cairo and that he did not appear to be getting ready to go anywhere. In any event, Roberto declared that he seriously doubts that Savimbi would be "foolish" enough to go to Brazzaville, because he is fully aware that he would be "killed" if he did so. He said that the MPLA do not trust Savimbi because the latter has demonstrated that he is nothing more than an opportunist. The MPLA leadership is allegedly angry with Savimbi for having thwarted previous overtures for a MPLA-UNITA merger. Their relations were further strained by the UNITA military clashes with the MPLA in eastern Angola. Roberto said that Savimbi has never replied to the former's invitation to rejoin the GRAE which was given when the two met in Lusaka at the beginning of 1967. He said that he would still accept Savimbi back but that he would have to come back alone and without his organization as Savimbi seems to want. Comment: Savimbi apparently does not believe that his future would be very secure if he chose to return to Kinshasa without his adherents. Lusaka Office Roberto said that he was originally due to leave for Lusaka on October 24 to open a GRAE office in Lusaka. He has been forced to delay his departure until next week at the earliest because the person who is to accompany him is awaiting the arrival in Kinshasa of his wife from the United States. This man is Fnu Gonsalves (phon) who has been until recently the GRAE representative to the United Nations Committee of 24, and has now been designated as the GRAE representative in Lusaka. Mrs. Gonsalves is said to be an American citizen. According to Roberto, both President Kaunda and the Angola refugees in Zambia have been pressing him to open an office in Lusaka. He said that he has been purposely stalling because it would be useless to open there without the means to deliver supplies to the refugees. By supplies, he implied that he meant arms, and then went on to say that he is incapable of affecting deliveries to Zambia, which is not a problem for the MPLA who are able to transit Tanzania. Roberto cited the case of a quantity of weapons and ammunition which had been flown from Kinshasa to Lubumbashi several months ago with GDRC authorization, but which were impounded at Lubumbashi upon arrival. He said that he has been promised their release from one day to the next by the Lubumbashi authorities but to no avail. He now intends to take up the matter with President Mobutu before going to Lusaka. Relations with GDRC Roberto said that his relations with Mobutu continue to be cordial. He did admit that he is unable to see Mobutu as frequently as in the past but he attributes this to the busy schedule which has pre-occupied Mobutu for the past few months. Roberto is of the opinion that Mobutu's remarks with regard to the GRAE during the recent OAU summit conference were nothing more than lip-service and that his basic policy toward the GRAE has not changed. He said that he is certain that Mobutu realizes that he (Roberto) would never agree to work with the MPLA, that Mobutu himself does not trust the MPLA, and that Mobutu does not wish to have the MPLA operating from his territory. McBride
449. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, October 27, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 62, November 10, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on October 30. Copies were sent to Kohler, Nitze, and Helms. SUBJECT PRESENT [1 heading and 1 paragraph (4 lines) of source text not declassified] b. Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer, 2nd, stated that his impression of Eduardo Mondlane was a favorable one--that the man was pro-West--endogenously in favor of peaceful change, and he had been almost led into insurgency by Portuguese unwillingness to recognize modern times. He further felt that Mondlane's principal concerns were the secondary education and civil training of his Mozambique brethren. c. Former Ambassador to Tanzania William Leonhart reinforced these impressions. He had known Mondlane between 1962 and 1965 and held a good opinion of the man. He reiterated that Mondlane had always hoped for negotiations with the Portuguese and was concerned with bringing the Mozambicans into the 20th century at a time when the Salazar regime kept the province aloof from the political process. He added the independence movement would certainly continue, Mondlane was a force for moderation and that the other African states, so deeply committed to self-determination, would sense any U.S. pro-colonial posture. By continuing support to Frelimo, we would reindorse Mondlane's pride and affection for the USA, buy some investment in stability for the movement, and keep a better watch on the direction of the struggle. [2 paragraphs (4 lines) of source text not declassified] Peter Jessup
450. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/ Washington, November 22, 1967, 2250Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 ANG. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Roy T. Havercamp of AFCM; cleared by AFI Labor Adviser Alvin M. Rucker, Hadsel, Edward W. Holmes of AFSE, and Funseth; and approved by Country Director for Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Burundi, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius Affairs John A. McKesson. Repeated to Kinshasa, Luanda, and Lubumbashi. 73567. Ref: Lisbon's 624,/2/ 629,/3/ Kinshasa 5780./4/ Subject: Press Allegations: US Aid to GRAE. /2/Telegram 624 from Lisbon, November 16, quoted Lisbon press reports charging that the United States was providing aid to Roberto and that the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa had opened a new Angolan section directed by Americans who collaborated closely with Roberto. (Ibid.) /3/Dated November 20. (Ibid.) /4/Dated November 21. (Ibid.) 1. If you questioned by GOP or press concerning Radio Brazzaville allegations reported Lisbon 624, you may reply along following lines: 2. As reported Kinshasa's 5780, Embassy Kinshasa never has had nor does it now have section dealing with Angolan problems or GRAE or any of its affiliates. Any Angolan refugees in Congo who appear at Embassy on legitimate business would be received. As reported, Kinshasa reftel, no one named Hitter or Bapb at Embassy and Embassy knows of no official American collaborating with Holden or any other Angolan liberation movement. 3. Holden has not asked USG for technical-military assistance and there are no American soldiers anywhere in Congo or elsewhere collaborating with any Angolan liberation movement. 4. Department has no way of knowing about approaches made by UPA to private organizations or individuals such as ICFTU, American Unions, or John Marcum. We know nothing of Charles Doki, Bernard Manert, or Carlos Kassel none of whom associated with USG. 5. Do not believe we should volunteer any comment on Radio allegations but foregoing plus info Kinshasa reftel should be of assistance in event you asked. Rusk
451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/ Washington, February 8, 1968, 0140Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFRICA-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Arthur T. Tienken of AFCM on February 7; cleared by Colonel Kennedy in DOD/ISA, Landau, INR Deputy Director for Coordination William C. Trueheart, Officer in Charge of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea Affairs Ernest B. Dane, Peter Sebastian of AFNW, Country Director for Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal Affairs Bayard King; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Kinshasa, Conakry, and Dakar. 111904. Ref Lisbon 947,/2/ Conakry 1129, Dakar 1822,/3/ Kinshasa 7420./4/ For Ambassador. /2/In telegram 947 from Lisbon, January 31, Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett described Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira's questions involving allegations of U.S. official cooperation with anti-Portuguese guerrilla forces and military activities in the Congo and in Guinea and Senegal. (Ibid.) /3/Both dated February 2. (Ibid.) /4/Dated February 5. (Ibid.) 1. Your reply to Fonmin's latest complaint about alleged US official cooperation with anti-Portuguese guerrilla forces and about alleged US military activities in Congo was exactly correct--both in substance and in tone. 2. Based on concurrence of all appropriate USG agencies here as well as replies from field (which you have seen), you may reaffirm to Fonmin a categoric and outright denial of all allegations./5/ /5/In telegram 995 from Lisbon, February 13, Bennett reported that he met with the Foreign Minister that day and, as instructed, provided a categoric denial of Nogueira's allegations. (Ibid.) 3. Specifically, you may inform him that you have been instructed to respond that there are: a. No official American citizens, civilian or military, are either in Senegal or Guinea working with anti-Portuguese forces, nor are there any official Americans associated with GRAE or any other Angolan group in Kinshasa or elsewhere in Congo; b. No arrangements have been made with GDRC re Kamina or Kitona; c. No American military personnel have arrived in Congo for purposes manning either base nor has USG any intentions man bases in future; d. Role of US military personnel in Congo is solely to provide advice and assistance to GDRC military forces. 4. We believe you should generally consider info provided by Kinshasa, Conakry and Dakar for your own background. You may, if asked or if you deem it advisable, however, in case of Senegal and Guinea state that US military personnel have provided advice to Senegalese and Guinean military on use of engineer equipment associated with road construction projects. In deciding whether to discuss now terminated US Army civic action project in Guinea, you may wish consider that we do not recall Portuguese ever raising this project so there remains possibility that they were not aware of its existence. Rusk
452. Memorandum From William McAfee of the Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Quimby)/1/ Washington, July 16, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, Mozambique, April 1967-1968. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to the source text is a CIA proposal for [text not declassified]; not printed. SUBJECT The minutes of the 303 Committee meeting, 12 July 1968, contained the following item: [Heading and 1 paragraph (13 lines) of source text not declassified]
453. Research Memorandum From the Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ RAF-17 Washington, August 9, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 MOZ. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. SUBJECT The rebellion in Mozambique has intensified since a year ago, but the Portuguese and the rebels are still fighting each other to a standoff. Neither side appears able to break the stalemate in the near future, although unforeseen events could alter the present balance without much warning. We examine below recent developments in the conflict. Abstract The Rebellion Goes On. Despite Portuguese claims that the areas of rebel activity have been steadily reduced over the last few years, the rebels are now operating over more of Mozambique than at any time in the past. An incontrovertible fact is that the rebellion has persisted since the first outbreak in September 1964. The Portuguese in Mozambique have resigned themselves to living with insurgency for the indefinite future. The Tempo Rises. In the first six months of 1968 the rebels significantly increased the number and frequency of their attacks. The effects of their offensive have been reflected in the highest monthly Portuguese casualty rates of the war. But the recent activity may have brought the liberation groups to at least a temporary high water mark. There is evidence that FRELIMO forces in the north are having difficulty extending their campaign more than a moderate distance from their traditional strongholds. In the west COREMO has mounted a few low-level actions north of the Zambezi but will not pose a serious threat unless and until it overcomes a chronic shortage of arms and material. The military stalemate therefore continues. The Rebels Face Uncertainty. In addition to their difficulties inside Mozambique the liberation groups face an uncertain future as exiles. The strains of a protracted struggle may have adverse effects on their capacity to direct the struggle inside the country. Leadership challenges, tribal rivalries, recruitment problems, diminishing resources, and the limits of tolerance from their host countries--all present potential threats. The Portuguese are Determined . . . The Portuguese, too, have problems, but none so serious as to overcome their strong determination to retain Angola and Mozambique intact. Despite some evidence that the war effort has stimulated the economy, military expenditures in Mozambique, as well as those in Angola and Portuguese Guinea, are an undeniable strain on a relatively poor nation, but one so far willingly borne. A more intangible problem may result from one of the strategies adopted to counter the guerrillas--the practice of resettling the African population on the fringes of the war zone in defended villages (aldeamentos). The program has been ostensibly successful to date, but the Portuguese have had to abandon several of the more "exposed" aldeamentos and may be creating resentment among peasants who are forced to abandon their ancestral lands. On present evidence the Portuguese should be able to maintain the upper hand for some years to come. They were spurred by the outbreak of the African rebellions to invest far more heavily in economic infrastructure than before. Once begun, however, they are proceeding in the confidence that their investments will be returning dividends for a long time. They have the military capability to contain anything less than a major increase in the scale of the insurgency for as long as they are willing to pay the price. Furthermore, present evidence suggests that the liberation groups may be in for a period of increasing internal strife that could damage their ability to prosecute the struggle. . . . But So Are the Rebels. Their determination is equal to that of the Portuguese. Despite quarrels and inevitable military setbacks, there is no sign that the rebels are likely to abandon the struggle, or even that the Portuguese can capture their strongholds and reduce them to isolated bands of outlaws. When Will the Stalemate End? How and when there might be a fundamental change in this situation will probably depend on developments outside Mozambique. Several possible events could unbalance the equation: political change in Portugal that challenged the present government's commitment to its African policies; an intensification of racial conflict in other areas of southern Africa; a Vietnam settlement favorable to the communists, that might bring about intensified communist aid to African liberation movements and renewed dedication to the idea of "revolutionary warfare;" or a collapse of Portuguese resistance in Portuguese Guinea, where the rebels have made far more substantial inroads than in Mozambique. Any one of these or other, now unforeseen, events might provide a sufficient stimulus to the rebels, or check to the Portuguese, to break the stalemate. Because of this high degree of uncertainty, we cannot estimate when the stalemate will be broken. It could continue for a considerable period of time. It could be ended much sooner. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/ Washington, October 8, 1968, 0007Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-PORT. Secret. Drafted by S.G. Gebelt of EUR/SPP on October 4; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs George S. Springsteen, Landau, Eric Rehfeld of EUR/RPM, Gorman of DOD, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Thomas H.E. Quimby, Holmes, Licht of Commerce, IO/UNP Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Donald McHenry, Seymour S. Goodman of E/EWT, and John M. Bowie of G/PM-MC; and approved by Deputy Assist-ant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley. 251405. Ref: Lisbon 2055./2/ /2/In telegram 2055 from Lisbon, October 2, Bennett reported that the Portuguese Government was interested in purchasing "sorely needed" transport aircraft, trucks and wreckers, helicopters, and surveillance aircraft. He requested advice as to whether any of the items would be licensed for export to Portugal for unrestricted use. (Ibid.) 1. USG policy remains firm that no military equipment, weapons or munitions from US stocks or American firms can be supplied to GOP without clear assurance that they will be used only in North Atlantic Treaty area. 2. Regarding non-munitions list commercial aircraft and vehicles (including trucks) with specifications practically identical to those in normal military use, USG will continue to review each such order on individual basis. When any order appears intended for counter-insurgency or is probably destined for police or armed forces use in African provinces, approval will presumably not be given. Katzenbach
455. Briefing Memorandum From the Country Director for Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Uganda (Feld) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore)/1/ Washington, October 28, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-PORT. Secret. Drafted by Alan Logan of AF/E. Copies were sent to Holmes, Havercamp, the Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, and the Embassy in Conakry. SUBJECT Following the charge by Tanzanian Ambassador Lukumbuzya on October 23 that the United States was assisting Portugal, you asked Alan Logan for information on the type and level of military assistance which we are in fact providing the Portuguese. According to available data, from FY 50-67, $317.6 million was authorized for Portugal as grant aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Annual programs were substantial in the 50s and early 60s. However, since FY 1965, it has been limited to about $1 million a year with actual expenditures projected through FY 1974. According to EUR, recent aid has consisted almost entirely of spare parts for equipment previously provided under MAP or purchased directly by Portugal, primarily aircraft and radar. In the past two years, it also included radar for two frigates supplied by other European countries under NATO arrangements. While Portugal can buy additional military equipment and materiel in the U.S., in view of the U.S. embargo on arms for Portuguese Africa, all such purchases must be reviewed and licensed and assurances provided by the GOP, in order to assure that it will be used only in the NATO Treaty area. The U.S. Government has even gone to the point of reviewing each order for export of dual purpose equipment, such as trucks and jeep-type vehicles, which could be used to increase Portugal's transportation capacity in its African colonies unless Portugal assures that it will not be so utilized.
Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar underwent emergency brain surgery on September 6, 1968, and slipped into a coma on September 16. On September 26, President Americo de Deus Rodrigues Tomas announced that Salazar would not recover and appointed Marcello Caetano as his successor. Secretary Rusk visited Lisbon November 18-19 and met with Prime Minister Caetano and Foreign Minister Nogueira. Memoranda of conversation recording the Secretary's discussions with Caetano and Nogueira are in Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Three of these memoranda are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XII. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
