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430. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, January 8, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 60, NSAM File. Secret. The source text indicates that Ball saw this memorandum. SUBJECT For background use in your luncheon meeting with Mr. Gilpatric, I have summarized below: I. his report on his trip to Lisbon, Angola and Mozambique, August 26-September 15, 1964, and, II. recent developments in Portugal and its territories subsequent to his trip. I. Summary of Gilpatric Report. A. Mr. Gilpatric's Over-all Impressions 1. Evidence of economic growth and social advancement in provinces. Remaining problems: economic imbalance (particularly in Mozambique), need for capital and job opportunities. 2. Improved status of natives--education, public health, housing, employment and mobility--under admittedly paternalistic system. 3. Recognition that some political change, i.e., more autonomy for provinces, is inevitable; no consensus on timing and no public acknowledgement for fear of generating pressure for deadline. 4. Determination for the present to maintain Portuguese presence--in some form--in provinces and sufficiency of Portuguese forces to insure same under foreseeable conditions. 5. Unlikelihood that Portugal will be swerved from present objectives, given support throughout all sectors of Portuguese society and with prospects of capital investment from South Africa, Germany and Belgium; also recent developments in Congo, Malawi, Southern Rhodesia, etc. B. Gilpatric's Conclusions and Recommendations. 1. Continued Portuguese administration of overseas provinces is preferable to other immediate alternatives; economic and social progress is now being made consistent with steps needed to prepare for ultimate self-government, institutional forms for which now in formation; without Portugal's presence there would be a dangerous vacuum inviting major conflict among neighboring powers, particularly over Mozambique. 2. U.S. interim acceptance of status quo south of Congo--Northern Rhodesia, Malawi, Tanzania--would not be inconsistent with support of nationalism in middle Africa. 3. U.S. should not underestimate capacity of Communists--Soviet and Chinese--for mischief in middle Africa through penetration and infiltration on both east and west. 4. Since U.S. cannot change present Portuguese policies, it should avoid, both in bilateral relationships and before U.N., exacerbating differences. Granting that neither side is likely to make major shift in near term--i.e., Portugal will not publicly recognize inevitability of more autonomy and ultimate self-government for provinces or any target dates for those eventualities, and U.S.-U.K. cannot retreat from declared positions supporting principle of self-determination--U.S. and Portugal should make interim accommodations by "mutual example" or reciprocation rather than by agreement: such as a. in case of Portugal, allowing U.S. to establish Loran-C sites and continued occupation of Azores bases, and b. in case of U.S., removing restrictions on purchase by Portugal of spare parts in U.S. and perhaps more U.S. military equipment (with stipulation against use in Africa), and abstaining from U.S. actions inimical to Portugal (assuming latter continues efforts to parley with African neighbors). II. Recent Developments in Portugal and its Territories. A. Non-MAP Aircraft Spare Parts: The United States presently sends Portugal no spare parts for aircraft operating in Portuguese Africa under our policy which prohibits sales of all Munitions List items intended for Portugal's African territories. A change in the policy would be heavily attacked in the U.N. Mr. Gilpatric's suggestion that the U.S. remove restrictions on purchase by Portugal of spare parts in U.S. has been under careful consideration, but the Department has not reached agreement on the desirability (or feasibility) of making a basic change in U.S. arms policy towards Portugal at this time. Meanwhile, pending such a decision, we have suspended action on the most recent request by a private U.S. supplier to sell some obsolescent F-84 aircraft engines to the Portuguese Air Force, i.e., we have not rejected the export license application. (The aircraft in question are approximately 22 F-84G jet fighter-bombers which the Portuguese originally received under MAP and which they purchased from us in 1961 for the token price of $6,000 each when the aircraft were declared excess to Portuguese NATO needs and for which the U.S. had no further need.) B. MAP F-86 Aircraft and Loran-C Negotiations: The Portuguese have informed our Embassy that the last of the eight F-86 aircraft of MAP origin were repatriated from Portuguese Guinea to Metropolitan Portugal December 24, 1964. With return evident, Ambassador Anderson had remarked to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira on December 21 that, with the F-86 problem resolved, he hoped we could now begin negotiations for the location of Loran-C transmitter sites on Portuguese territory. The Foreign Minister said there were still other problems between the United States and Portugal, citing the Azores and "tantalite." The Ambassador reminded the Foreign Minister that they had already agreed to separate the question of the Azores base question from the Loran-C negotiations. The question of suspected diversion of the strategic ore, tantalite to the Soviet Union, by Portuguese producers in Mozambique, in violation of COCOM rules, is one the Portuguese Government could resolve by imposing the necessary restrictions. Thus far, they have not been willing to take the necessary steps, although we have brought ample information to their attention. C. Portuguese Purchase of German F-86: The most serious problem affecting U.S.-Portuguese relations at present is the Portuguese attempt to purchase 65 F-86 aircraft from Germany which the Germans bought from Canadair, a Canadian firm, in 1956. These aircraft had been produced in Canada under the provisions of a 1949 licensing agreement between the U.S. and Canadian Air Force which prohibited their transfer without the concurrence of the U.S. Government. Our Embassy in Lisbon has reported that the Portuguese Air Force intends to use some of these aircraft in Portuguese Africa, notwithstanding the assurances they reportedly gave to the Germans that the aircraft would be used only for NATO purposes and on the European continent. The Canadians have requested that we join them in an attempt to dissuade the Germans from selling the aircraft. We declined, recommending to Canada that they, having sold the aircraft to Germany, might consider making a formal attempt to persuade the Germans from making the sale. Subsequently, we agreed that the Canadians could inform the Germans that the United States shared Canada's concern and that, if asked the United States position, they could suggest that the German ask the U.S. government. Ambassador Anderson has stated that if the sale is blocked, the U.S. will almost certainly be blamed, Loran-C negotiations will probably be negated, and there is a chance that the Portuguese will give us an eviction notice from the Azores.
431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika/1/ Washington, March 17, 1965, 8:27 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 MOZ. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Looram on March 16; cleared by Appling, Fredericks, O'Sullivan, and MacKnight; and approved by Director of the Office of West African Affairs William C. Trimble. Repeated to USUN. 2670. Embtel 1953./2/ Please assure Mondlane that there is no change in US policy re seeing FRELIMO representatives. You may add that in this particular case Dept had no previous information re individuals in question, their bona fides, or especially whether they had Mondlane's blessings. Also we normally prefer look to Mondlane himself for discussions on FRELIMO matters. /2/Telegram 1953 from Dar-es-Salaam, March 14, reported that Mondlane had informed the Embassy that the Department had declined to receive the FRELIMO delegation currently at the United Nations, and that he had asked the Embassy to confirm urgently if the report was correct and if it was now official U.S. policy not to meet FRELIMO representatives. (Ibid.) Despite foregoing, in response to delegates' request have talks with Dept transmitted through George Houser, American Committee on Africa, Dept proposed that if they desired a Departmental officer would go to New York in order meet with them informally. FYI: You are aware limitations on contacts with Portuguese African nationalists as set forth Dept. CA-14448, June 24, 1963./3/ End FYI. However they refused this suggestion according to Houser who said they wanted to be received in Dept. This negative reaction and insistence come to Dept seemed indicate some lack of interest in having talks. FYI: In fact it appeared that their purpose might be principally to embarrass Dept and also US-Portuguese relations. End FYI. /3/Sent to Algiers, Conakry, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Elisabethville, Leopoldville, Rabat, Salisbury, and USUN. (Ibid., POL 17 US-AFR) Rusk
432. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, May 10, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 MOZ. Secret; Noforn. Drafted on April 30 by Joanne Curtis of the Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The source text is an attachment to circular airgram CA-11930 to Lusaka, London, Salisbury, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, and Nairobi, May 10. PROJECTED COURSE OF THE MOZAMBIQUE REBELLION On the surface, Mozambique appears to be the southern African area most vulnerable to well-organized guerrilla and terror campaigns. The local Portuguese population is clearly suffering from a state of anticipatory nerves. The Portuguese security services have proved to be inadequately prepared to cope with the intensified intelligence needs resulting from the outbreak of rebel attacks in northern Mozambique. The Portuguese military, while heavily reinforced, are experiencing the normal difficulties of pursuing an elusive enemy over terrain which is relatively more advantageous to rebel movement. In addition, Portuguese troops in Mozambique lack special counter-insurgency training, with the exception of a few experienced units transferred from Angola. Military tactics in Mozambique appear to have emphasized intense and indiscriminate retaliation against local populations at the expense of the loyalty and/or cooperation of hitherto apolitical Africans. The length of the borders, which are contiguous to states which, if not actively hostile, are at least providing sanctuary to rebel groups, itself presents a considerable surveillance problem which the Portuguese are not yet fully equipped to handle. Rebel infiltration from Tanzania and Malawi, therefore, has proved difficult to control. Rebel groups, however, have developed only a limited offensive capability, are deficient in well-trained officers and, to an even greater extent, have been unable to turn out well-disciplined and trained recruits to carry the burden of the action in Mozambique. FRELIMO, headquartered in Tanzania, is presently by far the most active group militarily. As far as we can determine, FRELIMO has 150-250 men of officer potential, trained in guerrilla tactics for 3-6 month periods in Algeria, the UAR, Communist China, or the USSR. (The number trained in Communist countries is relatively small.) Training of the bulk of recruits is carried on in 2 or 3 camps in Tanzania, under the direction of Mozambican, Tanzanian, and, we understand, Algerian instructors. FRELIMO leaders have admitted the difficulties of training in a matter of weeks raw recruits who lack even a rudimentary understanding of guerrilla tactics. Portuguese military sources have alleged that the rebels lack sure knowledge of the proper use of their weapons and that they frequently abandon their arms at the slightest sign of resistance on the part of the Portuguese. FRELIMO seems to command adequate arms supplies from the personnel it has sent into the field thus far. Portuguese military officers have indicated that the rebel groups active in northern Mozambique are equipped with modern weapons. FRELIMO public statements claim that the arms are being obtained from friendly African countries. While technically this may be true, it is probable that portions of Russian and, possibly, Chinese Communist arms shipments to Tanzania have been made available to the Mozambicans. The USSR backs FRELIMO in its public media, albeit with a certain amount of reserve. FRELIMO leaders are in frequent contact with Chinese Communist representatives in Dar and Peking. Of FRELIMO's rivals, the once vociferous MANU is seldom heard from at present. A recent MANU adherent, Leo Milas--formerly "Defense Secretary" for FRELIMO--claims that MANU has attracted a number of disaffected FRELIMO militants. MANU was apparently responsible for a number of the more primitive guerrilla actions in October and November 1964, but it now seems to be no more than a small political exile organization temporarily based in Kenya. A second would-be rival, the UDENAMO faction led by Paul Gumane, lays no claim to guerrilla activity in Mozambique. Gumane engaged in abortive merger discussions with FRELIMO leaders in February 1965. Subsequently, UDEMANO's Vice-President David Mabunda--once FRELIMO Secretary General--either resigned or was expelled from the organization, leaving it with little claim to cohesiveness or power. The latest entry in the nationalist ranks, a UDENAMO organization led by a Ghanaian protege and suspected Portuguese agent, H. Gwambe, claims to be directing insurgent activities from its headquarters in Lusaka, in coordination with FRELIMO. These claims lack confirmation and appear to be groundless. Rebel Prospects There appears to be little doubt that the rebel groups face a long, uphill struggle before they can seriously challenge the Portuguese military or political position in Mozambique. Considerable preparations, training, and planning are required to achieve this goal. At present, the best the rebels seem able to do is to frighten scattered and isolated European settlements in northern Mozambique, keep the military busy with patrolling duties, and inflict casualties at the rate of 1 or 2 every fortnight. Should there be a change of regime in Malawi, bringing to power a group more wholeheartedly committed to the "liberation" effort, the Portuguese would be required to devote more serious attention to the defense of Mozambique's borders with Malawi and Tanzania. If this change were accompanied by the beginning of sabotage, strikes, and/or terrorism in Mozambique's urban areas, the psychological effect would be profound and the retaliation by Portugal on the African population severe. While Tanzania appears fully committed to support of the Mozambique rebels, in practice it is constrained by fears of Portuguese retaliation across the border and distracted by a plethora of domestic problems. Zambia shows no signs of becoming directly involved in support of insurgency. Portugal's Economic Status Metropolitan Portugal, presently entering its second year of a mild economic upturn, shows no signs of suffering from the financial burden of the hostilities in Portuguese Africa. We estimate that Portugal, given its present situation, could quite possibly support defense costs at twice the existing level without too much strain to the economy.
433. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/ CA-2167 Washington, August 23, 1965, 6:37 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL PORT-US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and Robert H. Edwards of IO/UNP; cleared by George B. High of AFC, Fredericks, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, George L. Warren of G/PM, Harry A. Quinn of ARA/BR, AID Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Herman Kleine, Thomas Pape of E/ITED, and Col. Smyser, Lloyd, and Colonel Lardner of OASD/ISA; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Luanda and Lourenco Marques. SUBJECT With timing at your discretion, the Department would appreciate your seeking an early occasion to continue the discussion with Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira in the light of his meeting with the Secretary and the Under Secretary, June 18, 1965, and of your earlier conversations with him in Lisbon, January 11 and March 5, 1965. We see some advantage to your conveying our oral responses to his catalogue of complaints at the same time as you broach your plan for a peaceful resolution of the Portuguese African problem. Additionally, because the Foreign Minister presented his complaints in the context of a request for a clarification of U.S. policy and of our pending requests for a renewal of the Azores bases agreement and the location of Loran-C sites in Portugal, we would suggest you make reaffirmations of basic U.S. policy objectives of maintaining friendly and constructive relations with Portugal and of our interest in both the Azores bases and Loran-C. We recognize this presents you with a formidable agenda for one meeting but the placing of your plan for Africa in the context of a continuation of earlier meetings might provide a favorable context to introduce your new initiative. However, if in your judgment it would be preferable to separate the response to the complaints and the reaffirmation of our interests in the Azores and Loran-C from your African proposal, you are authorized to request separate meetings. Also, if you believe it desirable, in order to assure that the Prime Minister has an accurate account of our responses to the complaints presented by the Foreign Minister and of your proposal, you may make a similar oral presentation to him--tailoring it for the occasion. There follows an outline of the points we would like you to make in your presentation. [Here follow Sections I-III.] IV. Anderson Plan for Resolving the Portuguese African Question. A. In introducing your proposal for a peaceful solution of the Portuguese African question, you may wish to set the stage by informing the Foreign Minister that you have been instructed to pick up his conversation with the Secretary at the point where the Secretary asked why Portugal did not hoist a flag around which its friends could rally. You should reiterate the remarks of the Under Secretary, June 18, that the U.S. has a good impression of what Portugal is doing in Angola and Mozambique and that we do not believe the Portuguese have as much to be afraid of as the Minister suggested in his reluctance to endorse a public acceptance by Portugal of a fixed date for self-determination. You should also state, that before discussing the proposal, which the U.S. would like Portugal to consider, the Foreign Minister should recall Secretary's June 18 reaffirmation that the U.S. would accept the results of a genuine plebiscite, notwithstanding a possible rejection by certain other states, and that we noted with great interest the Foreign Minister's reply to the Secretary that the Portuguese agreed to the U.S. concept of self-determination. Moreover, we would like to reaffirm the Under Secretary's observation that if there is a possibility of the Portuguese and the Africans working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement, the communists could be out and the security of the Portuguese African territories protected. Finally, it is the U.S. hope, as stated by the Secretary June 18, that Portugal would help itself in seeking a peaceful solution and a U.S. fear that if Portugal hews to the status quo, its position in Africa will steadily weaken. With these thoughts conveyed to the Foreign Minister, you are authorized to orally introduce your proposal as outlined in Embassy telegrams 652, April 13; 799, June 18; 38, July 23,/2/ and Department telegrams 671, June 9,/3/ and 19, July 19./4/ /2/None printed. (Ibid., AID PORT) /3/Telegram 671 to Lisbon, June 9, stated that the present juncture offered an opportunity for Portugal and the Africans to reach agreement on a peaceful resolution of their differences, and noted that the key elements of such a solution would have to be a transition period leading to self-determination and cessation of nationalist-inspired violence and subversion. (Ibid., POL 10 PORT) /4/Not printed. (Ibid., AID PORT) B. Summary of Anderson Plan--In interest of clarity, there is summarized below your plan as modified by above referenced telegrams. 1. Introduction It is proposed that the U.S. attempt to persuade the Portuguese Government to publicly accept the principle of self-determination for its African territories on the basis of a definite timetable. This action would be combined with a suspension of African nationalist anti-Portuguese activities during that period and carefully tailored political assurances and specified economic inducements being offered to the Portuguese Government in order to forestall the inevitable argument that any deadline would be bound to be telescoped drastically. The proposal is based on the estimate that, at the present juncture when the Portuguese are in a relatively strong position in both Angola and Mozambique, there is an opportunity for Portugal and the Africans to reach agreement for a peaceful resolution of their differences. Key elements of the solution would have to be a transition period leading to self-determination and a cessation of nationalist-inspired violence and subversion, as well as inspiration and support for such actions by the African governments concerned. A full range of choice would be left to the people, and would include maintenance of the present relationship with Portugal, autonomy within a Portuguese commonwealth, or full independence. Aim of the U.S. proposal would be a peaceful transition and creation of stable societies in the Portuguese African territories no matter what political decisions are made by the people. 2. Significant Points to Which the Portuguese would have to agree: a. Acceptance of a fixed date, for a broadly based plebiscite or referendum in Portugal's African territories. A full range of choice would be given to all of the inhabitants, and would include maintenance of the present relationship with Portugal, autonomy within a Portuguese commonwealth, or full independence. Plebiscite would have to be free and open and observed by U.N. and O.A.U. representatives. In this initial approach, the U.S. would not propose a specific number of years when the plebiscite should take place but would state that an integral part of the plan would be a Portuguese announcement of a specific time period. In the last analysis, the U.S. would expect and prefer that this question be worked out between the Portuguese and the Africans. FYI. Reftels reflect Department's views on the time period which the Africans would seek and what might be a possible compromise. End FYI. b. Accelerated interim Portuguese effort to improve the social, economic and political status of all of the people of the provinces. (See paragraph 4g, below, for possible assistance to Portugal by NATO allies.) c. Granting of increasingly free political activity in the territories in order to assure a meaningful plebiscite, as well as granting full amnesty and repatriation of all refugees. FYI: Problem of amnesty for nationalist leaders would probably be qualified as Portuguese may adamantly refuse to accept certain such individuals whom they regard as "terrorists." While we recognize this qualification could be a major stumbling block, we would not want the exclusion of a few individuals to impede the over-all progress on this grave and important problem, affecting the millions of inhabitants of these provinces. End FYI. 3. Significant Points to Which Neighboring African States would have to agree: a. Refusal to permit the use of their national territory as a training or operating base for any anti-Portuguese forces during the interim period preceding the plebiscite. b. Active support by African governments concerned for a cessation of all nationalist-inspired violence and subversion. 4. Significant Points to which other Selected Nations, most especially the U.S. and other NATO partners would have to agree: a. U.S. and other NATO allies would encourage Africans to accept and would urge fulfillment of terms of such an agreement. b. Publicly come out in full support of the agreement once it is adopted. c. Publicly condemn any violation of terms should such occur subsequently from any quarter. We would make all parties concerned aware of our position on this point from the outset. d. U.S. would sympathetically consider Portuguese requests for support for any Portuguese complaint at the U.N. if we were satisfied that deliberate and organized violations had taken place. e. U.S. would be responsive to Portuguese requests for arms purchases if we were satisfied that deliberate and organized violations had taken place. FYI: Likewise, if Portugal violated terms of agreement, the U.S. would consider sympathetically African requests for support. End FYI. f. FYI: U.S. would guarantee to maintain maximum political pressure on Portugal so that rights of all concerned would be protected within the Portuguese multi-racial communities, without distinction or race, creed or color. End FYI. g. During transition period, the U.S. would itself provide and would encourage other NATO allies to provide, if Portugal so requests, economic and technical support for Portuguese efforts to develop its African territories. FYI: Question of participation and observation by U.N. and its specialized agencies in development programs and of possible invitation to OAU member states to provide economic and technical assistance are considered to be second-echelon problems to be worked out with Portugal only after broad agreement in principle had proven to be possible. End FYI. h. At such time as Portugal agrees to U.S. proposal, we would propose to make an initial approach to selected African leaders before Portugal would undertake such discussions. We would hope that Portuguese talks with African leaders would initiate a dialogue which might result in meaningful negotiations. Please confirm by telegram when you have met with the Foreign Minister as it is the Department's intention to convey the substance of the foregoing to the Portuguese Ambassador following your meeting in Lisbon./5/ /5/In telegram 93 from Lisbon, September 3, Anderson reported that he had conveyed the U.S. proposal to Foreign Minister Nogueira on September 2. The Foreign Minister responded that he could not comment immediately and officially upon a proposal of such scope, which would require personal consideration by Salazar and other members of the government. (Ibid., PORT-US) Rusk
434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika/1/ Washington, September 2, 1965, 5:21 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 ANG. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Looram and Officer in Charge of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea Affairs Lambert Heyniger; cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of Central African Affairs William E. Schaufele, Director of the Office of Central African Affairs L. Dean Brown, and Funseth; and approved by Deputy Director for Eastern African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy. Repeated to Leopoldville, Lusaka, and Lisbon. 575. Ref: Dar's 394 to Dept./2/ Leo's 386 to Dept./3/ Lisbon's 88 to Dept./4/ Notal. While regrouping of moderate nationalist elements desirable, particularly to counter MPLA, believe on balance we should not get involved internal nationalist matters, especially personal differences, by acting as go-between. Also danger of leak. Similarly do not wish intervene in strictly African matter by appearing endorse Savimbi's request with Kapwepwe. Therefore if reply to Savimbi required, you may wish suggest he contact Nigerians or other appropriate African Mission. /2/Telegram 394 from Dar-es-Salaam, September 2, reported that Jonas Savimbi, ex-Foreign Minister of the GRAE, had asked for Embassy assistance in transmitting messages to Holden Roberto and Kapwepwe that he was ready to discuss reconciliation. (Ibid.) /3/Dated August 30. (Ibid., POL TUN-US) /4/Dated September 1. (Ibid., POL PORT-US) Rusk
435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, October 25, 1965, 8:02 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Sisco and Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Patricia Byrne; cleared by Fredericks, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Stephen M. Schwebel, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Lisbon and to The Hague for the Embassy, Leddy, and Ambassador Anderson. 968. USUN's 1371./2/ For Ambassador Goldberg. /2/Dated October 15. (Ibid., SOC 14 S AFR/UN) SC--Portuguese Territories We have given careful consideration to question how best cope with SC exercise on Portuguese territories scheduled begin October 28. Following general guidance for use at your discretion. Will appreciate receiving your recommendations after you have made soundings with parties and key SC members. FYI. Ambassador Anderson continued effort in Lisbon on October 22 to ascertain whether any flexibility existed in Portuguese position on principle self-determination for African territories (Deptels 169 and 171 to Lisbon/3/ and CA 2167/4/). While discussion with Prime Minister Salazar (Lisbon's 214)/5/ disclosed no substantive change in Portuguese thinking, Salazar assured Ambassador GOP would continue give serious consideration US proposal (Anderson Plan). Anderson Plan as whole is known only to US and GOP and should not be surfaced in SC. Moreover, since self-determination has become sharp election campaign issue in Portugal with GOP asserting advocacy such self-determination by opponents "treasonous," we not optimistic that Portuguese will be willing show some flexibility. End FYI. /3/Both dated October 19. (Ibid., POL 10 PORT) /4/Document 433. /5/In telegram 214 from Lisbon, October 23, Anderson reported that Salazar had argued that the Portuguese experience indicated that civilization and preparation for self-government of native peoples took much longer than the U.S. Government appeared to believe. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT) We believe SC meeting does offer opportunity for you follow up on recent discussions in Lisbon and Yost conversation with Slim with a view to promoting our objective of getting a practical dialogue started between the parties at an early date. Tunisian statement that self-determination could cover full range of future options encouraging, though we recognize that Africans following Accra Heads of State conference unlikely depart publicly from position stated November 1963 communique that only purpose resumption talks would be bring about necessary conditions for direct negotiations leading to accession to independence. We believe that SC res of December 11, 1963,/6/ which included in preamble para "recalling GA resolution 1541 (XV) of December 15, 1960"/7/ and went on in para 4 of operative section to reaffirm interpretation of self-determination contained GA res 1514 (XV)/8/ should be used to advance objective of getting discussions underway. It might be possible, for example, for Council to reaffirm these provisions of December 11, 1963 res, thus making clear all options remain open in connection with exercise of self-determination and to call for talks on this basis. You will wish stress with parties, other SC members, and in any statement you make in SC wide range provided by previous SC res, which could meet both African and Portuguese views, and need for parties to get into dialogue on this basis. /6/For text of Resolution 5481, adopted by the U.N. Security Council on December 11, 1963, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 161-162. /7/For text of Resolution 1541, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 15, 1960, see ibid., 1960, pp. 116-118. /8/For text of Resolution 1514, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 14, 1960, see ibid., pp. 110-111. We expect Africans will probably press for total arms embargo against Portugal, condemnation of foreign economic interests in territories, appeal to Specialized Agencies to refuse assistance to Portugal, and trade embargo on specific products. Dept continues oppose proposals for sanctions as inappropriate under Charter except in situation falling within Chapter VII. Portuguese territories problem not within Chapter VII. Also do not favor withholding of assistance by Specialized Agencies, on same ground; there is added technical reason that agreements between SAs and UN contain restrictive clauses requiring prior consultation and in some cases assume Chapter VII situation as condition for acceptance SC recommendations. While we could not agree to total arms embargo in view our NATO commitments, assume you will wish reaffirm our continued adherence to partial arms embargo policy. Formulation along following lines is essence of policy: In order avoid actions of any kind which could further increase tensions in area, we have for number of years followed policy of providing no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use outside NATO defense area and we have also prohibited direct export of arms and military equipment to either side for use in Portuguese territories. In view fact SC meeting scheduled October 28, assume you will wish to see Portuguese and Africans promptly to see whether there is any hope of getting a dialogue going./9/ /9/Telegram 1592 from USUN, October 27, reported that Ambassador Goldberg met with Foreign Minister Nogueira at the United Nations. Goldberg expressed the U.S. hope that the Portuguese would renew the dialogue with the Africans and leave all options open in defining self-determination. Nogueira responded that he was prepared to renew discussions with the Africans, subject to instructions from Lisbon. He warned, however, that Portugal was small and weak, and that independence would mean the end of Portuguese and Western influence in Angola and Mozambique. Nogueira argued that no Portuguese Government could remain in power for 30 days if it accepted self-determination leading to the kind of results the Africans were seeking. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN) Rusk
436. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, November 3, 1965, 2:33 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Byrne on November 2; cleared by Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs Edgar J. Beigel, EUR Regional Planning and United Nations Adviser Edward T. Lampson, Williams, Sisco, and Schwebel; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Lisbon and London. 1063. SC--Portuguese Territories. USUN's 1677./2/ /2/Telegram 1677 from USUN, October 30, reported a conversation the previous day between Goldberg and the U.K. representative on the Security Council, Lord Caradon, on the forthcoming Security Council consideration of Portuguese Africa. (Ibid.) 1. If your efforts bring about resumption dialogue between Portugal and African states are unsuccessful, you have discretion in forthcoming SC meeting either A) make US position clear in debate (without taking public lead but working privately to obtain sufficient abstentions to defeat Res if it contains wholly unacceptable elements), or B) to bring about introduction of resolution reaffirming those provisions of SC resolution of December 11, 1963 which make clear all options remain open in exercise self-determination and calling for renewal talks on that basis. 2. We would very much prefer see discussions resumed, but, if parties unwilling, we see value in making record of US efforts to gain acceptance of reasonable proposal, whether by statement in debate or by resolution as in B) above. Rusk
437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, November 20, 1965, 4:16 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by John E. Reinertson of IO/UNP, cleared by Brown of IO/UNP, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Lisbon, London, and Salisbury. 1255. Ref: USUN's 2114./2/ Portuguese Amb. Garin on instructions called on Asst. Secy Sisco November 19 to request US support in opposing res circulated by Ivory Coast, Malaysia and Jordan on Port. Territories (text contained reftel). Garin pointed out Preamb 4, operative paras. 1 and 8 particularly objectionable in Portuguese view, noted that res makes no mention Portuguese proposal for SC Commission of inquiry as to whether situation in territories constitutes threat to peace. Stated that no mention yet made in debate of arms from Warsaw Pact countries, specifically Czech, Russian and some Polish arms, being furnished nationalists. /2/Dated November 18. (Ibid.) Sisco agreed res in present form not one US could support and suggested Portuguese Permrep New York approach LA SC members whose views not yet known. Reinforcing Goldberg's talks with FonMin Nogueira in New York Sisco stated that in his view situation required Portugal open discussions with Africans on basis 1514 and 1541, including all three options. He suggested present So. Rhodesian crisis might present Portugal with fateful choice--concerted support of white settler minority would have grave implications whereas another policy might help Portuguese. Ball
438. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/ Washington, November 23, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Unclassified. Drafted by Reinertson. A notation on the source text indicates that Ball saw the memorandum. SUBJECT The Security Council today adopted a compromise resolution on the Portuguese territories by a vote of 7-0-4 (US, France, Netherlands, UK) (Tab A)./2/ The resolution, which was sponsored by the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Tunisia, was greatly modified by corridor negotiations resulting in the adoption of two amendments introduced by Uruguay, both of which the United States supported. /2/Not printed. For text of Security Council Resolution 218 (1965), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 176-178. The first amendment, cutting back the language of operative paragraph one from Chapter VII to Chapter VI by inserting the phrase, "seriously disturbing" international peace and security, was adopted 10-0-1 (France). The second amendment replaced two paragraphs of the original draft that called on all States to impose an embargo to prevent the sale and shipment to Portugal of equipment and supplies for the manufacture of arms and ammunition. The amendment makes the embargo applicable only to such equipment as would be employed to produce arms for use in the territories. Ambassador Goldberg explained that the United States voted for the amendment because its provisions fall within the terms of our present policy toward Portugal. His statement is attached at Tab B./3/ /3/Not printed. Operative paragraph 8, which called for a total trade embargo of Portugal, was voted on separately in accordance with advance agreement of the co-sponsors and rejected by a vote of 4 (Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, USSR)-0-7.
439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia/1/ Washington, July 27, 1966, 6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ANG-ZAMBIA. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Southern Rhodesia Affairs Michael P. Hoyt and Heyniger; cleared by Warren, Steve Koumanelis of G/PM-G/MC, Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Thomas W. McElhiney, Dean of IO/UNP, Lardner of DOD/ISA, Funseth, Robert H. Human of L/AF, and Thomas Judd of EUR/BMI; and approved by Trimble. Also sent to Lisbon. Repeated to London, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Blantyre, Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and USUN. 16415. Angola-Zambian Border Incident. Lusaka 154./2/ /2/In telegram 154 from Lusaka, July 24, Ambassador Robert Good transmitted the text of a letter to him from the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking the U.S. Government to take up with Portugal its use of NATO arms on the Angola-Zambia border. (Ibid.) 1. Following is text reply to be delivered to GRZ Foreign Office: "The Embassy acknowledges receipt of the Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated July 23 and has informed the Department of State of its contents. The Embassy has been instructed to reply that the United States Government is concerned over the statement of the Zambian Government that materiel with American markings was found at the site of a reported incident near the Zambian-Angolan border. It would be appreciated if the items referred to in the Foreign Office Note could be made available for examination. "For a number of years the USG has followed a policy of providing no arms or military equipment to Portugal for use in its African territories. In 1961 the USG sought and received assurance from the Government of Portugal that materiel provided by the US to help Portugal meet its NATO obligations would not be diverted for use in its African territories. The USG has also prohibited direct export of arms and military equipment to the territories themselves. It should be noted that large quantities of military items of American manufacture can be purchased commercially on the world market and are not under the control of the USG. Also, military equipment based on original American patterns is manufactured in a number of countries. If more detailed information could be supplied the Embassy on the incident, the USG would consider the action requested in the Note." 2. You should also make oral presentation to appropriate FonOff official, or at your discretion to Kaunda, along following lines: a. Take up matter MPLA and other insurgent activities reported Lusaka 143/3/ and previous, pointing out that as long as exile military activity against Angola based in Zambia continues, retaliatory attacks bound take place. In view sources your information on Angolan exile activities, you should bring up details at your discretion, particularly since it appears Kaunda may not be aware full extent involvement his Ministers and officials in exile activities. It should be noted we have information MPLA and other exiles also have American equipment furnished from sources over which USG has no control. You should emphasize availability US-manufactured military items, such as materiel under question, throughout world including Communist countries, such as USSR and Communist China as well as elsewhere, explaining these items date from World War II stocks and include important quantities arms seized by Chicoms in Korea. /3/Dated July 23. (Ibid.) b. Make clear we concerned with possible misuse of American arms by the Portuguese in Africa but we of course are not directly involved in bilateral questions of possible border incursions which are direct concern of Portugal and Zambia. We prepared discuss with Portuguese use in Angola of US arms and equipment supplied thru MAP program or via commercial sales if clearly demonstrated such have been used in Zambian territory. c. Re alleged American markings two items, Dept notes discrepancy in Zambian note (Embtel 154) which states "of two (sic) spent shells that were found in destroyed village, two bear American markings" and text Kaunda press statement (Embtel 151),/4/ in which he reportedly said, "although they have nothing to identify them with, would appear to be American-made." Embassy, at its discretion, should seek clarification. From the description provided, it is impossible to identify the origin of the shells in question. If whole shell available, identification may be made but still would be difficult to trace. Even if item determined be of US origin there no way we could establish who had possession or how it had been obtained. FYI: If GRZ offers shells or fragments for inspection, USG would consider sending military officer (perhaps USDAO Blantyre) to Lusaka for this purpose. End FYI. /4/Dated July 23. (Ibid.) 3. Dept invites Embassy's evaluation info reported other channel from Lusaka/5/ that incident took place inside Angolan territory. /5/Not further identified. 4. Any public disclosure of foregoing suggested course of action could be counter-productive to any discussion we might subsequently have with Portuguese. Therefore, addressees should refrain from any public comment on US action and/or reaction to GRC statements re alleged incident. 5. For Lisbon: Embassy at its discretion may inform GOP that Zambian Govt delivered note to US Ambassador in Lusaka stating that an armed incursion into Zambian territory was made by Portuguese troops based in Angola. The note stated two spent shells were found in the village bearing American markings and requested that the USG bring this matter to the attention of GOP. Embassy may inform GOP that we are discussing question with GRZ in Lusaka and may be meeting with GOP on this matter when we have additional information. Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
