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420. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, May 19, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 ANG. Secret. Drafted by Looram on May 18. Sent through Harriman. A copy was sent to Jerome K. Holloway in EUR. SUBJECT I am taking the liberty of submitting some comments, for whatever they may be worth, on Ambassador Anderson's letter of April 18/2/ regarding our policies on Portugal's African territories. /2/Not found. The Ambassador's Views If I understand correctly, the Ambassador considers that our present tactics and policies are unrealistic--until the Portuguese political system changes, there are no prospects of Portugal permitting self-determination and it is useless and counterproductive to try to get them to do so. Instead, we should focus on the possible and try to get the Portuguese to accelerate their present economic, educational and social reforms, which would eventually lead to a liberalization and weakening of Lisbon's all-out control over Portuguese Africa. Finally, we should explain this new concept to our African friends and endeavor to dissuade the Africans from supporting the Angolan rebellion. Comments I can appreciate the Ambassador's point of view. He is continually charged with the disagreeable task of trying to get some forward political movement out of the Portuguese Government, while still being responsible for maintaining good relations. Moreover, on each approach he runs into a stone wall. Admittedly the prospects for a significant change in Portuguese policies during Salazar's lifetime do not appear very bright, at least at present. I might be able to agree with some aspects of the Ambassador's proposed change of U.S. policies if we were ten years back. Now I think it is too late in the light of the decolonization process that has since taken place in the world, particularly in Africa, and in light of the Angolan rebellion. It is indeed a tragedy that Portugal did not undertake a vast reform program a decade ago. She might thereby have preempted the rebellion. However, a program of evolutionary economic, educational and social development of the territories, without concomitant political advance, and implemented over an undefined period of time into the future will not serve to solve the issue now. I do not believe that any aspect of the reforms to date has had a sufficient psychological impact in the territories to win over the loyalties of the indigenous populations to Portugal and thus deprive the nationalist movements of their "raison d'etre." Nor do I think that future Portuguese implementation of the reforms will be able to do this--it is likely to be "too little, too late." Whether we like it or not, the Angolan nationalist movement, despite its setbacks, cannot be disposed of and forgotten, and a similar rebellion seems likely to break out sooner or later in Mozambique. It is unrealistic to think that the U.S. could discourage African support for these movements, not to mention the adverse repercussions on our interests in Africa if we tried. Self-determination for the territories has become a popular issue in Africa, and irrespective of what may be their private reservations, most of the leaders have no choice but to espouse the cause. We could no more get the Congolese or Tanganyikans to curb the Angolan and Mozambique nationalists than we could have gotten the Tunisians or Moroccans to have curbed the Algerian FLN. Moreover, were the Africans not to support these movements, the latter would then become solely reliant on and thus dominated by the Bloc. Finally, in the theory that African pressures could conceivably be stopped, what would then be the inducement for the Portuguese to modify the status quo at all, even at a snail's pace? It may be that our efforts with the Portuguese will be of no avail. If so, it will indeed be a tragedy, because the struggle will inevitably become more violent and racist with few if any chances of an eventual compromise and transitional solution and of a continued Portuguese presence in any form. The final result then could well be chaos. It is precisely in an attempt to prevent such an outcome that I think we have to persist, despite the obstacles and lack of progress to date, in trying to bring about a change in Portuguese policies. As to the tactics, I agree that Portuguese-African talks under present circumstances are not likely to be successful. But for the lack of any better tactic, they at least serve to establish a channel of communications that may some day have a use; they may constitute pressure on Portugal; they serve to educate the Africans as to just what they (and we) are up against, and they divert African focus on us to produce a settlement overnight. Secondly, regarding the Ambassador's concern that we are not really clear as to what we expect from the Portuguese after they publicly accept self-determination, I think you spelled out to Salazar and Nogueira last summer the type of transitional program we had in mind. What could be sold to the Africans in general and to the nationalists in particular changes as the struggle goes on. I doubt, even with our support, that the Portuguese could now get a cease-fire and agreement to a settlement entailing more than 3-5 years of successive phases of increasing self-autonomy leading to the final decision of self-determination. Our tactic with the Africans including setting forth our aims of self-determination are designed not only to take into account domestic opinion, but are also in the way of a holding operation with the Africans. (CA-9360,/3/ to which the Ambassador refers, carried out the decision of the NSC Standing Group.)/4/ If the Africans, as well as a large part of the rest of the world, came to the conclusion that the U.S. had abandoned its historic principles of self-determination and turned its back on their aspirations in favor of a very long evolutionary process with an uncertain outcome, we would have abdicated our interests and influence in favor of the Soviets and Chicoms, and the Africans would conclude they had to rely on violence and Bloc support. /3/Document 416.
/4/A record of the NSC Standing Group discussion of Portuguese Africa on February 18, 1964, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XII.
421. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, May 21, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 122, May 28, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on May 22. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Vance, and McCone. SUBJECT PRESENT Mr. Vinton Lawrence, Mr. Robert Meyers, and Mr. Kinloch Bull, Jr. were present for Item 1 [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] 3. Angola The paper, "Covert Support for Non-Violent Activities of the Angolan Nationalist Movement,"/2/ was approved with the following exception: Mr. Hughes stated that the Secretary did not go along with the proposal to allocate [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] GRAE members; it was not his understanding that the meeting summarized in the memorandum dated 5 May 1964 gave approval for subsidies to individual politicians. The Secretary asked that this aspect of the program be deferred for another week pending additional study. Mr. Bundy requested that Mr. Hughes make note of the fact that the other members were unanimous in their approval of the proposal in its entirety. /2/Not printed. The paper dated May 18 is a revised version of the March 6 proposal discussed at the Special Group meeting on March 12. (See Document 415.) [text not declassified] (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 121, May 21, 1964) [Here follows discussion of another subject.] Peter Jessup
422. Telegram From the Embassy in Tanganyika to the Department of State/1/ Dar-es-Salaam, June 8, 1964, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 MOZ. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Nairobi, Kampala, and Lisbon. 2317. 1. Frelimo President Mondlane saw DCM today and gave him advance word he planned hold press conference prior his departure abroad this week to reply to Ambassador Anderson's alleged statements praising Portuguese administration in Mozambique. Mondlane said Anderson's remarks, which Dar-es-Salaam press has not yet published, had been subject recent Frelimo Executive Meeting and described them as major set-back to his efforts maintain good image of US within Nationalist Movements Headquarters Dar-es-Salaam. In reply question, Mondlane said public reply to Ambassador Anderson's press statements necessary. They had provided those who wish label US as arch-imperialist with gratuitous ammunition and if he let them go by unchallenged he would be regarded as US stooge. Mondlane preparing detailed rebuttal of Ambassador Anderson's alleged observations which he intends release to press within next several days. 2. Minister Home Affairs Lusinde told Embassy Officers last night that, if reports Ambassador Anderson's statements accurate, US position with African Nationalists would be seriously undermined. Lusinde said he had understood USG position vis-a-vis colonial territories was one of sympathetic support for ideal of self-government and inquired whether Anderson's remarks indicated change in USG policy. We said there had been no change in this firmly established US policy. 3. Would appreciate texts press reports Ambassador Anderson's observations./2/ /2/Telegram 1937 to Dar-es-Salaam, June 17, reported that the Department did not intend to respond to Mondlane's statements to the press concerning the remarks attributed to Anderson on his visit to Angola and Mozambique. If questioned, it intended to state that the Ambassador's comments had been in keeping with firmly established U.S. policy, which supported the rights of all the people of Portuguese Africa to self-determination, encouraged Portugal to play a constructive role in Angola and Mozambique, and was aimed at furthering a peaceful and equitable solution based on the principle of self-determination. (Ibid., POL 1 ANG-US) Anderson visited Angola February 29-March 10, and Mozambique March 10-19, 1964. Leonhart
423. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 71-64 Washington, July 1, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on July 1. SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE The Problem To estimate the prospects of the African nationalist movement in Angola and Mozambique over the next year or so. Conclusions A. The guerrilla activities of Angolan nationalists have been for the past two years confined by the Portuguese military to sporadic fighting in a restricted northern area. There is little evidence of active dissidence elsewhere in Angola. The Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile (GRAE), in Leopoldville, is the political backing of the guerrillas. The GRAE is autocratically but inefficiently controlled by Holden Roberto; it is torn by internal dissension and tribal rivalries and disheartened by its lack of progress. Roberto will probably seek help, including arms, from the USSR and Communist China, and we foresee some increase in Communist influence in the next year or so. (Paras. 8, 11, 14, 16-17, 21) B. Roberto may be forced by others in the GRAE to share control and direction, but probably not for some months at least. The Angolan nationalist movement will be able to keep the rebellion alive at the present level if, as seems likely, it retains access to the Congo sanctuary, but we do not believe it will seriously challenge Portugal's hold in Angola over the next year of so. (Paras. 18-20, 22-23) C. The principal nationalist movement in Mozambique is Mondlane's Frelimo. The movement has not yet progressed to the point of open fighting, though a few raids and excursions in the north, based on Tanganyika, are likely during the next year or so. The Portuguese military and security services appear to have control of the situation and the Mozambique nationalist movement is more important in terms of African politics than as a physical threat. (Paras. 28-29, 35-37) D. Despite a few steps to liberalize their colonial policy, the Portuguese have not taken, and are not likely to take, any significant steps to meet the pressures brought on them to move towards self-determination or independence for their African territories. Portugal may be able to preserve its present control of Angola and Mozambique for a good many years. But, we believe that the growing political and military costs of maintaining control of the African provinces will almost certainly force Portugal eventually to accommodate to nationalist aspirations for self-determination and independence./2/ (Paras. 1-5, 41) /2/The longer term Portuguese position will be discussed in an NIE on Portugal scheduled for August, 1964. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 27.2-64, "Prospects for Portugal," was issued on August 5, 1964.] [Here follows the body of the paper.]
424. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, July 1, 1964. /1/Source: Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 17 cl, Rusk, Dean, 1964. Personal & Confidential. Drafted by Harriman. I had an extraordinarily rewarding experience yesterday. At the urging of one of my former colleagues (not now with the government), I invited Edouardo Mondlane to come to my house in the late afternoon. Wayne Fredericks was present. I found him an exceptionally well-balanced, dedicated, serious man, who has a deep sense of responsibility towards his fellow Mozambiquans. I gained quite a different impression of the movement as a result of my talk, and I am sure it would be well worth your giving him a half hour of your time. He will be seeing the Attorney General tomorrow. Wayne Fredericks can arrange for you to meet him at any time and place you request (of course, outside of the Department)./2/ /2/A note in Rusk's handwriting in the margin of the source text reads: "I do not wish to meet him. DR." Averell
425. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, August 6, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, 303 Committee Meetings, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on August 8. SUBJECT 1. The Angola paper was set aside for the time being./2/ /2/Reference is to a CIA paper, "Covert Support for Selected Angolan Nationalist Leaders," dated August 3, which requested authority to provide covert support to selected Angolan nationalist leaders [text not declassified]. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 7, August 6, 1964) 2. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] paper was set aside for the time being./3/ /3/[text not declassified] Note: The reason for this was that McCone stated that in view of the confusion in the Congo, it was probably good judgment to place the Roberto and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] matters on a low key and while we should take such actions as are necessary to "keep our hand in," and to keep these characters from accepting help from Moscow and Peiping, and hence become their instruments, nevertheless this was not the time to develop the Congo and exacerbate the situation in Angola and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. [Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tanganyika/1/ Washington, October 28, 1964, 5:17 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOZ-TANZAN. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Jesse M. MacKnight and John P. Meagher of AFE, Curtis Strong of AF/CWG, and Officer in Charge of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius Affairs George B. High on October 27; cleared by Director of the Office of Central African Affairs James L. O'Sullivan, McKillop, Ludwig Hauschner of AID's Food for Peace Division, Deputy Director of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs Clement Sobotka, and Thomas W. McElhiney of AF/CWG; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Lisbon, and by pouch to Leopoldville, Lourenco Marques, and Luanda. 1157. For Fredericks and Ambassador. Re Embtel 826./2/ /2/In telegram 826 from Dar-es-Salaam, October 21, Ambassador William Leonhart reported a discussion with Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere on the Mozambique problem. Nyerere said that, since the outbreak of fighting in Mozambique in late September, refugees had been streaming across the border and residents of the area were in a panic. Nyerere had ordered Tanganyika army units and one company of Zanzibar troops with Soviet advisers to the area, but he assured Leonhart that there would be no URTZ attacks across the border. He noted that the larger problem was that the Mozambican struggle to free the country would continue. Nyerere suggested that a NATO program of economic aid for Portugal might enable the Portuguese to acknowledge the principle of self-determination for their African colonies. (Ibid.) Mozambique Matters raised reftel pose difficult problems for USG in its efforts limit and hopefully eliminate intrusion Chicom/Soviet cold war presence Eastern and Southern Africa, as well as encourage stability and progress URTZ, see change in Portuguese African policy with acceptance self-determination, develop favorable relations with Africans who we believe ultimately will probably control territory with or without continuing political ties with Portugal. Principal objectives are to exclude Communist influence which as alien to African traditions as colonial rule and foster economic and political development of entire area. Problem not an easy one, as Nyerere presentation clearly indicates. Dept inclined believe best approach to take in responding increasingly complicated questions raised reftel is to indicate USG concern over situation, to express our determination explore any suitable and profitable course to encourage peaceful change, and to stress our desire receive suggestions on possible courses of action. Leave manner presentation to your discretion. We of course wish continue encourage Nyerere's interest in exploring such situations with us. As he will appreciate, if we have any hope of influencing GOP, we must also preserve our position of independent advice both sides. We concerned lest fruitless go-around may discourage this free flow of ideas and opportunity influence Nyerere thinking. As occasion warrants, believe it useful for you to encourage Nyerere to realize that if he is going to allow nationalist training and safehaven in Tanganyika he has to be prepared accept consequences, as well. While we appreciate Nyerere's assurances GURTZ not preparing military attack against Mozambique, and we have noted report (Zanzibar's 359)/3/ that PLA company, its weapons and advisers have been withdrawn from border area, GURTZ providing training and safehaven for Mozambican nationalists does create dangerous situation for GURTZ. Violence likely to harden Portuguese attitudes and could lead to retaliation of kind alluded to by Fonmin Nogueira in recent press conference (Lisbon 287)./4/ These hardly in best interests African nationalists, URTZ, or prospects peaceful settlement. /3/Dated October 26. (Ibid., OS 12-12 TANZAN) /4/Dated October 22. (Ibid., POL 15/PORT) As Nyerere aware, USG has favored peaceful efforts to resolve problem Portuguese territories. Indicative of fact our stand goes beyond speech making are frank talks with GOP (which have greatly strained US-Portuguese relations), education assistance to Mozambican refugees, and our willingness provide relief to Portuguese African refugees. Seems to us limited utility of force as means to resolve matter demonstrated by present situation in Angola. There Portuguese military has succeeded bringing guerrilla warfare under control and this has served to undermine whole nationalist movement. USG remains committed work for self-determination Portuguese territories and peaceful change. This integral part basic policy toward Africa and stems from our own strong traditions. We continue to press Portugal on its African policies. We earlier raised matter economic assistance to Portugal to ease peaceful transition in territories. This was rejected by GOP, but we believe this is sound, constructive proposal which we prepared to explore again with Portuguese whenever circumstances seem propitious. As one incentive maintain dialogue for future, you authorized indicate to Nyerere US desire support appropriate humanitarian assistance on refugee problem and relieve GURTZ some of unanticipated economic drain that country. Assume he would agree such assistance might best be handled in international context such as UNHCR and WFP. [Here follows discussion of the Congo.] Rusk
427. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs (O'Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Washington, November 2, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 ANG. Secret. Drafted by High. Also sent to Fredericks, Tasca, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Samuel Z. Westerfield. SUBJECT Considerable thought has gone into Leopoldville tel 1491 (attached)/2/ which gives the Country Team's assessment of the mounting difficulties inside the Angolan liberation movement. /2/Dated October 16, not printed. A copy is ibid., POL 12 THE CONGO. The Country Team reports the GRAE complex as a whole seems to be slowly running down and Roberto himself is desperately short of funds. The Congo (Leo) Government has refused to cooperate with GRAE in permitting the importation of arms. The ALNA (the GRAE army) is increasingly ineffective, and has been racked by mutinies and deserted by many of the southerners. It is chronically short of food and ammunition, and largely cut off from its own forces inside Angola where nationalist activity has virtually ceased. The political groupings within the GRAE are at odds with one another, and dissension within each of these groups further undermines the political structure. While a number of the students who left the GRAE with Jonas Savimbi have become disillusioned with him and are turning back to the GRAE, the Embassy questions how significant this support will be over the short term. Savimbi's new party is still a negligible fact except for weakening GRAE's claim to represent all of Angola. Embassy Assessment. The Embassy believes it would be a mistake to hold Tshombe responsible for this decline since much of it predated his appointment as Premier. However, Tshombe's accession has intensified GRAE problems. The Embassy believes most Congolese, including Tshombe, see no Angolan leaders strong enough to lead the country to early independence, and, in contrast, they believe the Portuguese are so strong and determined to hold on that they (the Congolese) are not willing to take many risks. The Embassy ascribes the present declining fortunes of GRAE to: 1. Fragmentation of the nationalist movement. 2. The paucity of materiel and ineffectiveness of political assistance--the reluctance or inability of African powers to contribute needed funds and equipment. 3. The lack of a "nation"-wide uprising in Angola, and the continuing tribal friction in Angola and within GRAE. In the face of this, the Country Team believes it is unlikely that Roberto will long be saved from the consequences of his failure to achieve any marked successes against the Portuguese or in organizing the GRAE. While the Embassy believes Roberto cannot be written off at this point, it reports that some of the most experienced observers in Leopoldville do not believe Roberto is the man to organize the GRAE to enable it to effectively carry on the liberation struggle. It believes the consequences of this decline in the GRAE could be very unhappy for the West. It foresees the most likely alternative leadership to Roberto as being the pro-Chinese Viriato da Cruz or others who can swing the support of the Chicoms or the Russians. With the Western role necessarily circumscribed by relations with Portugal, there will be increasing opportunities for the Communists to extend their influence over the Angolan nationalists, especially as the frustrations of the Angolan leaders grow owing to lack of military and political progress in their campaign. The Embassy comments that if in the meantime Portugal fails to train Angolans to run their own affairs, when independence comes the United States may wake up to find the only effective leadership at the very least is beholden to the Communist bloc. AFC Comment. The Country Team's views and analysis are very close to our own. John Marcum, the closest American to Roberto, now questions Roberto's leadership ability and potential.
428. Memorandum for the 303 Committee Washington, November 10, 1964. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, 303 C. 14, November 12, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
429. Letter From the Consul General in Mozambique (Wright) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Lourenco Marques, December 14, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Papers of G. Mennen Williams, 1961-1966, Country Files, 1961-1966, Algeria-Zambia, Mozambique. Confidential; Official-Informal. My dear Governor Williams: I am enclosing a copy of my last will and testament on Mozambique/2/ which I thought you might find of interest. /2/Not found. In my opinion the moment of truth for the Portuguese is at hand. The time left for a negotiated settlement of relations with their African territories is fast running out. Dr. Eduardo Mondlane has had to embark on a program of violence which, although it is out of character, is essential if he expects to continue to lead the liberation movement. Recent events in the Congo and East Africa have in my opinion greatly eroded our position with a number of newly independent states. Even moderates like Nyerere and Kaunda find it difficult any longer to counsel moderation in the face of continued Portuguese intransigency. I shall be leaving Lourenco Marques within the next few days in order that I can report to the Inspection Corps January 4. It is my understanding that I am to spend the month of January being briefed on my new assignment. I would hope to have a chance during this period to chat with the people in AF on the situation in Mozambique. [Here follows brief discussion of personnel matters.] I am looking forward to seeing you early in the New Year. With kindest personal regards, [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
