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Portuguese Africa
413. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State/1/ Leopoldville, January 14, 1964, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 ANG. Confidential. Also sent to Lisbon, Luanda, USUN, Brazzaville, Bukavu, Elisabethville, and Stanleyville. 1368. GOC Views on Holden Roberto. In call on Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lengema) January 13, I discussed with him Holden Roberto's reported decision to seek arms from Red China./2/ Lengema expressed GOC views along lines of his press interview in New York Times of January 8. Government did not believe it could "forbid" Roberto from obtaining arms from communist states as long as non-communist states were unwilling to provide them. However, GOC would oppose introduction of communist "volunteers" or training personnel into Congo. Lengema then argued that it was still in power of US to "save" Roberto by doing more to support him. He suggested public statement calling for negotiation between Portuguese and Roberto and thought we could find ways to make transport available to him. Lengema said we should not be surprised to see Roberto turning to communists for help when Western support was so "discreet" as to be virtually non-existent. /2/On January 4, The New York Times reported that Angolan nationalist leader Holden Roberto had decided to accept assistance from Communist China and other Communist countries. I told Lengema that there was no possibility of giving Roberto US equipment to wage war in Angola. We were anxious to encourage peaceful settlement of Angolan problem and Roberto, as well as GOC, should realize that actions Lengema advocated we take would result in rupture our relations with Portugal and would thereby destroy our ability to moderate Portuguese position in interests of negotiated settlement. I said that Roberto's reiterated public statements about seeking help from Red China would produce strongly unfavorable effect on US public opinion and that sending of GRAE delegation to Peiping would further diminish our ability to encourage dialogue with Portuguese. Lengema said that he understood our point of view but repeated that Roberto, while not himself communist-oriented, believed he had nowhere else to turn for material needed to conduct "liberation struggle." O'Sullivan
414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal/1/ Washington, January 17, 1964, 6:06 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Robert H. Edwards of IO/UNP and Officer in Charge of Portuguese Affairs Robert Barbour; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs William C. Burdett, Cleveland, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green, and Williams; and approved by Harriman and Ball. Repeated to USUN and Leopoldville, and by pouch to London, Madrid, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Abidjan, Tunis, Lagos, and Addis Ababa. 444. Lisbon's 559./2/ You should seek early appointment with Fonmin and, if you believe it advisable, Primin Salazar, to consult on following problem. /2/Dated January 14. (Ibid.) Developments in early months 1964 could significantly affect future course events in Portuguese territories. In first place, it clear from growing Chicom presence and Chou En-lai visits that Red China embarking on major political offensive in Africa. This will see Chicom effort to identify themselves with African movements and to increase their influence among nationalist groups by generous offers of assistance. Recent reports of GRAE leader Roberto's intention accept these offers show that Chicom offensive cannot fail affect situation in Portuguese territories. This in Chicom view is made-to-order situation pitting non-whites against European, NATO power in "liberation struggle" which offers glittering opportunity deal blow to West and at same time assert superiority Chicom revolutionary ideology over that of USSR. Second, African Fonmin meeting late February will be in effect caucus to outline strategy on Portugal and other issues. Once African line set and announced, flexibility African moderates these issues seriously curtailed. If meeting took place today result would probably be hardened African stance reflecting growing opinion among African states that Portuguese policies antagonistic to aspirations peoples Portuguese territories. These two elements show that situation in overseas provinces becoming more acute, as Under Secretary Ball had predicted, and that moves along lines suggested by Under Secretary more necessary than before. For this reason we desire consult GOP on problem and to solicit suggestions for dealing with it. We also have proposals to make as to immediate actions which we hope will be received as serious expressions of our concern at a trend of events we consider adverse for Portugal unless new elements injected into it. We believe one of most hopeful elements which would in the first instance seize initiative and encourage African response would be Portuguese move encouraging resumption Portuguese-African dialogue under UNSYG auspices. Review of Fonmin's statements in Washington indicates GOP prepared meet again with African reps on condition that there be no conditions. While some Africans reportedly prepared urge resumption on this basis, majority maintain talks futile without some Portuguese acknowledgment that self-determination is valid political goal for peoples its African territories. Fonmin has acknowledged that definition self-determination contained UNGA resolution 1514/3/ and reaffirmed in SC res S/5481 or December 11, 1963,/4/ ("All peoples have right to self-determination; by virtue that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development") has advantages for Portugal (USUN 2502)./5/ We believe Portugal disserving own interests by refusing become advocate this principle. Moreover, S/5481 also reaffirmed that self-determination offers options of sovereign independence, association or integration with independent states, thereby meeting Fonmin's insistence that independence not be posed as sole option. /3/For text of Resolution 1514, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 14, 1960, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 110-111. /4/For text, see ibid., 1963, pp. 161-162. /5/Dated December 14, 1963. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 10 PORT/UN) You should therefore propose to Fonmin and/or Salazar that GOP make early public statement endorsing self-determination in this sense as goal Portuguese policies and programs. If Portugal were to make such a statement, US efforts to bring about resumption of talks and place difficulties in way Chicom penetration would be greatly strengthened. If Portuguese have alternate suggestions which would contribute achievement these goals, we would be pleased receive them. In presenting above proposal you may in your discretion also draw on following: 1. Secretary recently told Nogueira in Paris that we keenly aware progress made by Portugal in Africa last year and we regret GOP not making best case for itself internationally. Continued Portuguese rejection self-determination seems unnecessarily injurious its cause in light current reforms (Luanda's A-107)./6/ /6/Dated November 22, 1963. (Ibid., POL 12 ANG) 2. Weeks ahead will be optimum time for Portugal make unilateral gesture unattributable external pressures. 3. As Secretary made clear at Paris, we strongly deprecate violations of Portuguese territories' borders. Our support of self-determination in no sense implies our support of interventionist or expansionist aspirations or predatory attacks in any form by one nation against territory of another. This position has been set forth publicly and privately. This position, and approaches we have made to Congolese and certain Africans in same sense and to warn of Chicom subversion, are responsive to Franco Nogueira's insistence that US make same efforts with others as we make with Portugal. However, our chances for success in any approaches we might make to Africans would be limited without Portuguese statement on self-determination. 4. In event Portuguese do make a forthright statement accenting self-determination (as defined by UN SC Res S/5481), we would be prepared publicly to welcome this development to urge again Africans participate in discussions with the Portuguese, and to reiterate our view that they should eschew force in pressing for change in Portuguese territories. (FYI) For your background and such use with Portuguese as you may deem appropriate, following is assessment of Congo-Angola interaction: More than 250,000 Africans have moved from Angolan territory to Congo. Border is vast and we assume its control is extremely difficult. As GOP knows we have repeatedly pointed out to GOC our aversion to violent actions and our hope that Angolan problems will find peaceful solution. Congolese leaders have indicated their personal hopes that such solution might be found, but at same time are faced with great internal and external pressures to favor nationalists and hasten settlement. We shall continue make these views known to GOC leaders. However, it must be realized that our capability in this domain has definite limitations; USG in any event convinced that in unlikely hypothesis Adoula and other moderate Congolese leaders were to take strong measures against Angolan nationalists, their Government would be short lived and would be replaced by less moderate regime which would probably soon turn to Communists for guidance and support. Present GOC recently indicated their concern re Chicom involvement with Angolan nationalists and stated that Chicom technicians would not be welcome in Congo. (End FYI) Should Franco Nogueira question you re possibility Portuguese recourse to Security Council, for example, on Cabinda incident, you should reply in accord memo being forwarded you by Cleveland. You should point out that SC might well follow pattern of 1946 UN Commission to investigate Greek border incidents. Commission given broad mandate conduct investigation in all areas concerned and elucidate causes and nature border violations. Africans likely press hard for including authority examine "underlying causes," i.e., issue self-determination in terms reference UN body created to investigate Portuguese complaint./7/ /7/In telegram 591 from Lisbon, January 24, Ambassador George Anderson reported that he had presented all the items in the telegram to Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira that morning. (Ibid., POL 1 PORT-US) Telegram 591 is scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XII, Portugal compilation. Rusk
415. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Scott) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Washington, March 16, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 114, March 12, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler. SUBJECT The minutes of the meeting of the Special Group held on March 12, 1964, contain the following item: "Angola--Covert Support to Angolan Nationalist Movement. "On the Angola paper dated 6 March 1964/2/ and the Mozambique paper dated 28 February 1964,/3/ Mr. Alexis Johnson said he was acting under instructions and that the Secretary of State requested these proposals be referred to a Cabinet-level meeting for resolution. It was noted that other members were in favor of both papers as submitted. A discussion followed in which Mr. Johnson pointed out that State Department has serious reservations because, if the proposals were approved, the U.S. would be almost in a position of joint action with the bloc against a NATO ally./4/ In other words, if Holden Roberto received Soviet and/or Chinese arms and the U.S. provided him with non-military support this would be a form of coincidental collaboration with the Communists against a Western ally. /2/Attached but not printed. The memorandum for the Special Group requested authority to provide covert non-military support to Holden Roberto and selected other Angolan nationalist leaders with whom a secure relationship could be developed in order to influence their political orientation and to exercise some control over their program and planning. [text not declassified] /3/Not attached. /4/A March 10 memorandum from Assistant Secretary Tyler to U. Alexis Johnson stated that EUR opposed the proposal and did not believe that the U.S. Government should support, secretly or otherwise, revolt against an allied government. In a memorandum to Johnson on the same day, Assistant Secretary Williams expressed his "strong belief" that non-military covert assistance should be provided to the GRAE on the grounds that it was only a question of time before the Angolan people exercised the right of self-determination and that when that happened, the nationalist forces at the helm should not be mortgaged or oriented to the Communists. (Both in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 114, March 12, 1964) "Mr. Bundy said he was in favor of supporting the nationalist movement because in the maelstroms of loose power on the African continent, the USSR and China will immediately plunge in if the U.S. remains aloof. Mr. Waller emphasized that the Agency was in a position to deal with many of the other GRAE leaders in addition to Holden Roberto with whom they had been in contact for eight years. There is no alternative to covert subsidies. Withdrawal means abandonment of any guidance and/or influence in the nationalist movement. It was pointed out that Soviet or Chinese arms did not necessarily mean the accompaniment of Chinese and Soviet technicians as experts. Subsidization of moderates might minimize additional bloc inroads. "The Attorney General said he felt it was absolutely essential to maintain contact with these movements and that the wave of the future is with African nationalism and not with Portugal. He felt we must be realistic in these matters. "It was determined that the Angola Mozambique package would be referred next week to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Attorney General with representation from the Special Group."/5/ /5/No record has been found of such a meeting until May 4; see Document 419.
416. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts/1/ CA-9360 Washington, March 16, 1964, 2:14 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 ANG. Confidential. Drafted by Looram on March 10; cleared by IO/UNP, Francois M. Dickman of NEA, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Hugh G. Appling, Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake, and Deputy Director of the Office of West African Affairs Leon G. Dorros; and approved by Williams. Sent to Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Freetown, Lagos, Leopoldville, Monrovia, Ouagadougou, Rabat, Tananarive, and Tunis. Repeated to USUN, Lisbon, London, Paris, all other African diplomatic posts including Cairo, Luanda, Lourenco Marques, Salisbury, Lusaka, and Blantyre. SUBJECT FYI: Department and other Government agencies becoming increasingly concerned absence progress toward peaceful resolution issue of Portuguese African territories, the hardening of Portuguese and nationalist positions and obvious danger that as struggle is prolonged, Angolan and Mozambique nationalist movements will tend become more violent, radical, racist and less disposed toward compromise and/or transitional settlement. As situation now developing, any independent states that might emerge would be likely experience turbulent beginnings and have anti-Western orientation jeopardizing future stability southern and central Africa. At present there is a breathing space before UN Committee 24 takes up issue again. We would hope utilize pause for constructive private African-Portuguese talks before issue subjected to acrimonious debate. Moreover, given present dissension within GRAE and current challenge to Roberto's leadership, Africans may feel less inhibited than heretofore in taking initiatives on their own on this issue. Finally, it is in U.S. interest that African-Portuguese talks be resumed in order to obviate, or at least postpone, head on African-Portuguese collision. End FYI. It is accordingly requested that, unless objections perceived thereto, action addressee post discuss this problem at highest appropriate level along following lines: Reiterate U.S. Government's grave concern regarding absence any forward movement toward settlement. Both Portuguese and nationalists now appear to rely on force as primary means to obtain respective objectives. Both positions rigid thus undermining any chances for peaceful solution. At same time longer the Angolan struggle drags on, the more it will become an increasingly festering sore on large area of continent and be susceptible to influences extraneous to African interests. It seems to us resumption African-Portuguese talks under UN auspices should be attempted. We aware disillusionment with last discussions and absence any certainty new talks would be fruitful. We also realize Roberto reportedly opposed, as Portuguese probably are, and that Portuguese refusal to date to accept publicly UN definition self-determination poses for Africans formidable obstacle to getting into substantive discussions. At same time it remains our conviction Africans should not give up and instead should persist in exploiting talks, particularly in view advantages of having them under UN auspices. Latter provides unique forum for setting forth reasonableness of demands for self-determination and for showing that Africans disposed explore any and every avenue for negotiations leading to peaceful settlement. Will be recalled that December 11, 1963 SC resolution included all options for self-determination, as well as providing for UN SYG to continue efforts and report June 1. Another possibility which seems to us merits exploring is for certain Africans put out feelers to Salazar or Franco Nogueira with view engaging Portuguese in secret bilateral talks on issue. Possibly chances for some progress more likely in this context. In any event we would appreciate host government's assessment present situation, prospects for progress and particularly its thoughts on foregoing or any other approaches that might be appropriate and effective. We for our part continue our quiet efforts induce GOP accept and implement principle self-determination. Also, we have programs for relief of Angolan refugees and for educating Mozambican and Angolan refugee students. However seems to us this issue principally of African concern and thus appropriate and desirable that African statesmen take lead in trying bring about solution. Curious in this connection that as far as we aware little attention focused on this issue during Lagos OAU meetings. UN debates important and useful forum for pressing African views. However this only one approach. Moreover we doubtful periodic acrimonious debates in public likely advance issue, especially if not supplemented by continuing African diplomatic initiatives in meantime. FYI: While we would be interested in any information volunteered regarding current reports of internal dissension within GRAE or host government's views on Holden Roberto's leadership, including possibilities a different GRAE lineup might have better chance of negotiating with GOP, preferable you yourself not be drawn into discussion this question. If queried as to U.S. views, you should make clear while internal politics GRAE may justifiably be of concern to Africans, not appropriate matter for non-Africans to meddle in. End FYI. For Abidjan: Leave to your discretion how you believe matter should be discussed with Houphouet-Boigny this juncture, given fact he has already made efforts along above lines and our desire while trying to generate bilateral African-Portuguese talks, that GOP not gain impression this is U.S. inspired idea. For African Diplomatic Posts listed as info addressees: Please advise telegraphically should you believe would be useful for you also to discuss this issue with host government. FYI: We planning make comparable approach to GOP. End FYI. Rusk
417. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, March 17, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 121, May 21, 1964. Top Secret. SUBJECT I wish to register an emphatic dissent to the proposal to provide [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to Holden Roberto [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the Angolan Provisional Government (GRAE)./2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 415. In filing this dissent, let me make it clear that I do not admire the methods or policies of the Portuguese Government in Angola. Their stewardship of this area is obsolete, brutal--and probably has no long-term future. In fact, I told Dr. Salazar that I did not think that, without a drastic change of methods, Portugal could retain its influence in Angola beyond a limited span of years./3/ /3/As President Kennedy's Personal Representative, Under Secretary Ball visited Lisbon and met with Prime Minister Antonio De Oliveira Salazar and Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira August 29-30 and September 6-7, 1963. For a record of Ball's meeting with Kennedy to debrief him on these discussions, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, p. 571. Records of Ball's mission are in the Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2301; ibid., Central Files, POL 7 US/BALL, POL 19 PORT, POL AFR-US, and POL AFR-PORT; and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal Subjects, Ball Mission. Ball's own account of his mission to Portugal is in The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), pp. 276-279. I should perhaps point out, however, that I would estimate a longer span than would many of my colleagues since I think the Portuguese are dug in and determined to stay. The French stuck it out in Algeria during seven years of fighting. While Portugal is not France, neither are the Bakongo Algerians. The core of my position is that, in developing an Angolan policy we should not be over-persuaded either by sympathy for the underdog or abstract libertarian principles. We should look at this question hard-headedly in terms of the United States national interest. In those terms, I should like to set out my objections to the current proposal. First, I object to this proposal as a destructive moral precedent for the American Government. The doling out of this money will constitute double-dealing on the part of the United States Government. You have on at least two occasions (in Lisbon and Athens in 1962) assured the Portuguese Foreign Minister that we engaged in no activities with Holden Roberto that we could not disclose to the Portuguese. You did tell the Foreign Minister that we had had for some time an intelligence arrangement for Holden Roberto [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Pursuant to my instructions, I categorically assured Dr. Salazar that we were not providing assistance to Holden Roberto--and, by implication, that we did not intend to do so. To embark on a covert program of aid to Holden Roberto at this point would be a direct violation of confidence. I cannot believe that it is either good morals or good policy to put the United States Government in that position. We all recognized at the time of the Cuban missile crisis that the United States could not act out of character without losing something of its own self-respect. If it was true then, it is true now. And there are practical considerations as well. The question of good faith cannot be considered solely in the framework of United States-Portuguese relations. If we break confidence with Portugal--an acknowledged ally--we shall contribute to a general mistrust of our government that can cause us irreparable damage in the whole area of our international relations. Second, I do not believe that the United States should undertake a joint venture with the Communists to undermine a Western ally. The Agency presentation states: "In January, 1964, Roberto announced his willingness to receive military aid from the Bloc but insisted that such aid be given without commitments". In arguing for the proposal, the presentation states: "Nationalist leaders intend to seek Bloc arms in order to satisfy the military wing of the movement, upon which their ability to retain leadership ultimately depends. As long as Bloc military support can be controlled by a friendly Congo move, and Bloc personnel excluded, this presents no immediate danger to United States objectives." The United States role under the proposal would be to provide "constructive" assistance, including the "administrative expenses incurred by the" Provisional Government, "travel and representational costs", etc. From this I take it that the proposal assumes that the Communists would provide the military weapons while we--as the junior partner--would provide the costs of administration of the Provisional Government. With our combined help Roberto and his colleagues would set about trying to undermine our ally. I do not find this an attractive posture for my country. Third, I believe it wrong to assume that we can exercise "leverage over the direction of the Angolan nationalist movement and . . . strengthen our relationship with its leadership,"/4/ by providing money for administrative support on a covert basis. /4/The omitted word in the quotation is "to." The quotation is from the March 6 proposal cited in footnote 2 above. The proposal assumes that United States involvement would not become known except to Roberto and his immediate associates. If this be the case, then the bulk of the Angolan nationalists would be fighting with arms known to be provided by Bloc sources, while only Roberto and one or two of his colleagues would know that the United States had helped at all. How would this give us effective leverage? I doubt that the United States can build much influence in this manner. At the moment, I understand that Roberto's hold on the movement is precarious. He is, I am told, a poor administrator and a rather indifferent leader. According to a report received today, he may be ousted by his colleagues on the grounds he is an "American tool". One accusation against Roberto is that he has been unable to raise adequate funds. What would be the result if he suddenly appeared with substantial funds? Against the background of accusations already made wouldn't it be evident that he was getting money from the United States? If so, wouldn't this become promptly known to the Portuguese? If, on the other hand, his followers assumed that he was getting money from the Bloc, wouldn't this strengthen the Communists? Fourth, I do not believe it in the United States interest to encourage a state of terror in northern Angola. At the moment, the military situation in northern Angola is at a stand-off, and the Portuguese are feeling increasingly confident. The Agency presentation states: "The Portuguese military over the past year has succeeded in containing the nationalist forces, but it has been unable to put down the rebellion or put an end to rebel activities." Our administrative funds will not significantly alter the military balance. Portugal has 40,000 troops in Angola. I think it is prepared to fight to the finish (although it may withdraw from Mozambique and concentrate in Angola). Under these circumstances, it is almost certain that--without regard to whether or not we give him financial help--Roberto will in time be driven to terrorist methods. This happened in 1961. It will surely happen again as the struggle grows more bitter--and, with increased bitterness, becomes more racist in character. I put, therefore, what I regard as a relevant question: All sentiment aside, is it in the interest of the United States to become an accessory to terrorizing Portuguese settlers in Angola? Isn't it rather in our interest to discourage such a state of affairs in the heart of Africa? Or, if we cannot discourage it, shouldn't we at least avoid associating ourselves with it? To put the question in larger terms, is there any hurry about Angola? Left by themselves, the Portuguese will probably be able to sustain a military stalemate for several years. While this may be a continuing source of frustration to the other African states, I don't see why it need concern us except in the United Nations. Fifth, is it in our interest to stimulate a Portuguese invasion of the Congo? The Portuguese are known to have mobilized a substantial cadre of Katanganese gendarmes. If nationalist activities grow more intense, I think they will almost certainly move to destroy the nationalist camps in the Congo--particularly if they feel we are helping the nationalists. This can create major problems for us and the Adoula Government. Sixth, I do not think that a payment to Roberto is either necessary or useful. I do not think we have to run and get ahead of each nationalist movement in order to keep it out of Communist hands. Genuine nationalist movements have shown themselves resistant to Communist domination, and the test as to the direction of a regime is much more likely to occur when the revolution is completed and the new nation is being established. For this reason, I question the thesis that underlies the present proposal--that we must give covert financial aid to the Angolan Nationalists if they are to be friendly with us after independence. We have regularly supported the principle of self-determination in the United Nations and in our continuing dialogue with the Portuguese. I think we should persist in that course, which is in our great historic tradition. It is because of our open adherence to this tradition that we have won the leadership of the newly-emerging nations. To assume, however, that there is any direct and inevitable relation between financial help to revolutionaries and our relations with a post-revolutionary regime is not borne out by the historical facts. During the Second World War we helped Ho Chi Minh in Indochina and he is no friend today. We have, for the most part, established useful working relations with the new governments of Asia and Africa, yet we did not supply them covert support during their revolutionary days. What we have done is to help the new nations that have emerged from revolutionary struggles, and our continuing help is to a considerable extent the basis of our relationship. One lesson can be clearly read in our recent experience: If the question, "What have you done for me lately?" reflects political reality, it also reflects the reality of our relations with the less-developed countries. Finally, I think it unrealistic to assume that, over a period of time, Portugal will remain unaware of our financial assistance to Roberto. The dossier prepared for you by the Portuguese Foreign Minister describing the Angolan camps would indicate that their intelligence is competent. Once the Portuguese are morally certain that we are providing financial help--even if they cannot prove it--our credibility will be wholly destroyed. The question of credibility again is not limited to US-Portuguese relations, since the Portuguese will make it known throughout NATO circles that we have been treating them dishonestly. My conclusion from all this, therefore, is quite clear. I see no objection to looking after Angolan refugees or even providing them with scholarship grants--provided we tell the Portuguese. But I am against furtive aid directed at undermining the interests of our ally. While the observations in this memorandum have been addressed to the proposal to provide funds to Holden Roberto, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. George W. Ball/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
418. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, April 29, 1964. /1/Source Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. I, Cables, 11/63-7/64. Secret; Special Handling. Drafted by Looram on April 28. Sent through Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. A May 3 covering memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Attorney General Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and McGeorge Bundy reads: "Attached is a paper prepared by the Bureau of African Affairs at the request of Secretary Rusk as a basis for the discussion on the foregoing subject at the meeting, 4:30 p.m., May 4. In addition to the considerations with respect to Africa, as set forth in the attached paper, Secretary Rusk suggests that consideration will also need to be given to the effects on our NATO relationships with [sic] and our military interests in Portuguese territory, as well as the place of Portugal in the NATO alliance." SUBJECT Summary The issue of the Portuguese African territories remains stalemated--the present courses of action followed by the Portuguese Government and the nationalists respectively have led to a blind alley. The threat of the rebel movements, our own efforts with Salazar and the attitudes of some of the NATO members have thus far resulted in only limited movement by the Portuguese. At the same time, rebel activity has not met with notable success. Guerrilla actions continue, but they have been contained to a large degree by the Portuguese military at considerable financial cost. Eventually Portugal will have to reach an accommodation with the nationalist movements. In the meantime, however, the nationalists are becoming increasingly radical; they have just admitted extremist and pro-Communist elements into the organizations. The most immediate problem in the overall issue is, therefore, to try to prevent the nationalists from mortgaging their future to the Communists and from reaching a stage where they will no longer be disposed to negotiate a moderate and evolutionary settlement when Portugal finally comes around to offering one. United States long-term interests require that a new approach be made to the issue in order to unblock the present stalemate and thus prevent the future situation of the Portuguese African territories--and with them the future of central Africa--from being gravely jeopardized. We should accordingly propose that the nationalists alter their tactics and develop a political action program with the objective of significantly expanding their political organizations and activities within and outside the territories. Broad-based support and participation would be sought among the populations concerned for campaigns in favor of self-determination. The United States would be prepared to provide clandestine assistance for this purpose. Discussion Current Trends in the Nationalist Movements The rebel leaderships of both Angola and Mozambique are now passing through a critical phase. Frustrated by Portuguese military containment and Salazar's refusal to concede any steps toward self-determination, they have also become embittered by the lack of UN, Western and even African support. The various War Games played at the Department and JCS have shown that as the Angolan conflict was prolonged, the more racist, violent and extremist the rebel movement became and the more the chances for an evolutionary settlement were compromised. Thus we are witnessing today the development of internal dissension within the Angolan nationalist leadership, the emergence of strongly anti-Western tendencies, and overtures for Communist help. Adoula recently told Governor Harriman he was very much concerned about the possibility that Holden Roberto might soon be ousted by extremists. It is now reported that Viriato da Cruz, a pro-Chicom leader of a rival nationalist group, has just been admitted into Roberto's organization. This is now a critical juncture. If present trends continue unchecked, I fear that the nationalist movements will become more extremist and anti-white, with a possibility of strong Communist influence. Should this occur, there would be little chance for peace and a Portuguese-African compromise solution until and unless Portugal wearies and decides to cut its losses. Under these circumstances the future of Angola and Mozambique would be seriously jeopardized, and with them, the future of central Africa. At the same time, it is probably unlikely that these nationalist movements would become so blatantly dominated by Communist elements as to alienate African support. Despite the reservations of moderate leaders, their fears of another Congo-like situation developing in Angola, and their often-expressed hope (albeit privately) for a peaceful and gradualistic solution, the nationalist cause has such wide African appeal that the African leaders really have no choice but to back the Angolan and Mozambique nationalist movements if they are to survive politically themselves. Thus, almost irrespective of the political coloration and actions of the nationalists, their struggle is likely to remain a burning issue in Africa and a touchstone in our relations with the Africans until the issue is finally resolved. Portuguese Government Attitudes The Portuguese leaders give every sign of being convinced that they can ride out the storm and that if the rebellion can be eliminated within the next few years, they will be safe home. There are reports of returning soldiers being fed up with the struggle and feeling it is hopeless. Moreover, military expenditures are taking up a large portion of the budget at the sacrifice of public investments in the domestic economy. I suspect, however, that Salazar is being told mostly what he wants to hear, and Admiral Anderson reports that there is no indication of any give in Salazar's position. As in the case of French attitudes toward the Algerian struggle, Portugal will in all probability come around eventually to seeing the hopelessness of trying to maintain the status quo and will make an accommodation with the nationalists. There are those who contend that it is futile to try and move Salazar, at least at present, and that we should wait until the moment is ripe for us to exert pressures. The flaw in this theory is that if we stand by and do nothing until rebel violence finally forces the Portuguese to face realities, by that time the nationalists will probably have reached a point of no return and no longer be disposed to working out with Portugal a compromise settlement. U.S. Objectives Our objective is to bring about an evolutionary settlement of the issue, which will ultimately provide stability for the territories and for the adjacent areas. This requires meeting the nationalist aspirations and at the same time permitting the maintenance of Portuguese presence in some form. Thus the settlement requires African-Portuguese cooperation. In order to make such an objective realizable, some progress has to be made in the meantime, namely before the African and Portuguese positions become wholly unreconcilable and before the orientation of the nationalists becomes such as to preclude a moderate and transitional settlement. A New Approach--Political Action Program In order to avoid a further deterioration and bring about some progress toward settlement, we believe that the nationalists should alter their present tactics and concentrate their energies, with our clandestine assistance, in setting up an extensive political organization within and outside the territories. This organization should be based on non-racial principles and obtain the adherence of as many elements as possible of the populations concerned--the various tribes, as well as the white and mulatto segments of the population. Once set up, the organization should endeavor to set in motion forces favorable to the cause of self-determination and capable of bringing pressures to bear on Portugal to change its policies. Inside the territories, this would consist of political campaigns designed to bring about a political consciousness and manifestations of public support for self-determination. If the nationalists could thus succeed in showing that they did in fact reflect the will of the majority, their cause would evoke significant international sympathy and impress on world public opinion the urgent need for a solution. Under such circumstances, the American public would be prepared to back the nationalists, and our NATO allies might be more disposed than they are now to help cope with the issue. Even the Portuguese might feel obliged to face up to realities, and the nationalists' emphasis on non-violence might make it more palatable for the Portuguese Government to come to terms with the rebel leadership. Admittedly there is no guarantee that the nationalists, particularly the Angolans, would accept the concept of non-violence when their whole strategy is based on guerrilla warfare. Even if they were to accept it, they might not be able to carry it out. The Angolans and Mozambicans do not have a tradition of passive resistance or, more importantly, a British colonial police to contend with. The nationalists would have to be extremely adept in building up an effective and extensive underground organization that could successfully elude the ubiquitous Portuguese secret police (P.I.D.E.). Similarly, great courage and enormous sacrifices would be required of the indigenous peoples in carrying out passive resistance in the face of ruthless counter-measures by the police. (In the past P.I.D.E. has dealt brutally with any Africans suspected of being involved in strikes, not to mention the treatment meted out to the ring-leaders.) It should also be kept in mind that if the nationalists were to engage in political campaigns, it would probably be unrealistic to expect that all violence and guerrilla operations could be stopped. Roberto has a trained force in being of five to seven thousand men, and for him to try to keep them "on ice" for an extended period of time or attempt to adapt all of them to non-violence tactics could easily lead to his overthrow. Extremist elements in the organization are unlikely to accept a complete change to non-violent tactics. Similarly Algerian-trained guerrillas of Mondlane's FRELIMO have just returned to Dar, thus adding to the pressures for immediate military action. By the same token events have probably gone too far to persuade the nationalists to turn down all offers of Communist support. (Were they to do so might indicate the existence of our own support.) We would, nevertheless, with our assistance, be in a position to limit the extent of nationalist involvement with the Communists, at least for a certain period of time. Despite these obstacles, the present guerrilla operations have not met with notable success, and an effort should be made to persuade the nationalists to undertake new tactics. Essential of course would be our commitment to provide them with assistance for this purpose. We should, moreover, try to get the support and direct involvement of those African leaders who have an influence over the nationalists. [7 headings and 17 paragraphs (5-1/2 pages of source text) not declassified]
419. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, May 4, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, 303 Committee Meetings, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Jessup on May 5. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, Attorney General Kennedy, McCone, McGeorge Bundy, and U. Alexis Johnson. SUBJECT PRESENT Mr. Rusk opened the meeting by stating that he thought it was time to have an overall look at United States policy toward the Portuguese possessions in Africa. He made three essential points: [1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines) of source text not declassified] Second, this would be counter to the African tradition of relatively peaceful solutions to self-determination. Granting that Algeria and Indonesia were exceptions, Mr. Rusk stated that 90% of the new nations, including those in Africa, had attained their independence through non-violent means. Mr. Rusk then stated that as Secretary of State he had serious responsibilities vis-a-vis Portugal as an ally and specifically for retaining our position on the Azores base. He said he felt the United States support should be directed toward a political program which allowed for a number of choices. For example, the Lusitanian Commonwealth concept for the Portuguese African territories with Brazil as an influential partner might be acceptable. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Rusk elaborated on his concept of a more mature approach by the Angolan movement which would have wider appeal throughout the rest of the non-African world. He emphasized that the current violent trend of the Angolan movement was producing minimal results for them. Adoula was nervous over the trend of Roberto's movement. Mr. Rusk also pointed out that the present course could well lead to Portuguese punitive incursions into the Congo. Mr. Rusk felt that if Adoula [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could be interested in the moderate approach they might exert influence on Roberto and his colleagues. There ensued a discussion of how the United States could emerge from the impasse, whether any control factors existed over the Angolan movement after extension of financial aid and to what extent violence could be discouraged. No one present was particularly sanguine about the prospects of averting terrorism. The question of whether the present Angolan movement had any true national base was also explored. Mr. McCone expressed his doubts about Holden Roberto's long-term stayability as a leader. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bundy restated the problem by saying that it was in the United States' interest not to abandon this movement in the face of Soviet and Chicom competition. He cited the pressure of continent-wide African support and the folly of a stubborn adherence to an antique Portuguese policy. The Attorney General felt strongly that we could not abandon the movement and felt that contacts throughout the movement should be developed and maintained. [1 paragraph (4 lines) of source text not declassified] Mr. Rusk commented that Portugal had been on notice that the United States was officially sympathetic to principles of self-determination. In response to a question by Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara stated that it was "possible to live" without the Azores base. He felt this base problem should not dictate our foreign policy and that keeping the USSR out of Africa was more important than holding Azores base rights. He felt that stronger ties with Spain could obviate the losses of Moroccan transit bases and the possible losses of Wheelus and the Azores. Mr. Bundy said he agreed with the thrust of the African paper and asked for Mr. McCone's opinion. Mr. McCone said the [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Mr. Rusk conceded that Roberto might be totally unable to make the shift to non-violence. Mr. Rusk cited certain other factors which did not make the situation inflexible. He noted that Salazar policies were not entirely popular in either Lisbon or the colonies. He referred to conversations between Nogueira and the Committee of Nine in regard to an eventual solution. He felt perhaps the Africans were a bit shortsighted when they promptly rejected any outward association with Portugal in a possible settlement. He then noted that African prime ministers, in his experience, were more moderate in private talks than they could afford to be for domestic consumption. Mr. Bundy returned to the thesis that we should buy a larger share in the movement and retain full tactical flexibility. The Attorney General advocated funneling monies for non-violent activities such as refugees and students until the situation can be re-examined next January. This was approved in principle subject to passing specific proposals through the Special Group mechanism. The exchange of views continued and resulted in a general agreement to proceed with an approach to Adoula [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with the idea of sounding them out and persuading them that a non-violent, multi-faceted political program would be the best path toward self-determination for the Portuguese territories. It was decided that a letter of instruction in considerable detail would be issued to Ambassadors [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Godley in the Congo for initial approaches to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Adoula, respectively. Depending on their responses, additional steps for covert discussions and support could be initiated. Mr. Rusk suggested that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the idea of the OAU making a public statement against the intrusion of the Soviets and Chinese in African self-determination matters could be explored. Lastly, the Attorney General noted that Stanislaus Radziwill had mentioned that, in a conversation with Salazar, the Portuguese President had indicated a slight flexibility toward the principle of self-determination for the territories in question. Messrs. Rusk, Johnson, and Bundy thought that this was worth verifying promptly and if, in effect, Salazar had indicated a relaxation, Ambassador Anderson might be advised to re-explore this avenue. Mr. Rusk also indicated that the attitudes of the new Brazilian government should be explored as an auxiliary weapon. He noted finally that the Spanish Foreign Minister had been talking with the Portuguese for some time to suggest a more realistic approach to their collision with African nationalism, albeit with no discernible effect. Peter Jessup [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
