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340. Telegram From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State/1/ Mogadiscio, July 27, 1967, 1040Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 SOMALI. Confidential. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Rome, London, Bonn, the Department of Defense, and Hargeisa. 218. Ref: Mogadiscio 203./2/ /2/Telegram 203 from Mogadiscio, July 25, transmitted the text of a note verbale from the new Somali Government which expressed its sincere desire to find a just solution to Somalia's problems with Ethiopia, Kenya, and France. It asked the U.S. Government to use its good offices with the leaders of Ethiopia and Kenya and to discourage any attempts to rekindle the arms race in the area. (Ibid.) 1. The note from new Egal government transmitted in reftel is in refreshing contrast with strident, polemical tone of communications GSR in habit of sending to us in recent years. Its timing (well ahead of critical confidence vote), contents, and style suggest that Abdirascid and Egal are making serious effort to break out of impasse in which GSR finds itself and have decided to make initial moves without delay. 2. Egal himself has long held strong private convictions about what he considered to be suicidal policies that GSR has followed in recent years. These have in his view neither gained intranational support for GSR nor contributed to internal economic and social development of this country. A patriot, he believes that in the fullness of time there will be changes in Horn in favor of the Somali people, but these will not come about until Somalia achieves more respectable international status and greater internal (social and economic) strength. A critic of the GSR break with Britain in 1963, he now comes to power in a government at serious odds with another major power (France) and two relatively strong African neighbor states who enjoy particularly close relations with Britain and the US respectively. The latter while not completely unfriendly has recently shown its displeasure by conspicuously excluding Somalia from its roster of African states slated for US bilateral economic assistance in the years ahead: and US military ties with Ethiopia interject an additional element of insecurity into GSR outlook. In Africa as a whole GSR realistically sees OAU as weak vessel indeed, and its only African "friend," Sudan, is riven with internal divisions and preoccupations. Whatever be the religious and other ties with countries in both wings of the Arab camp, significance of recent ME denouement has not been lost on new GSR leadership both with respect to the weakness of the Arab states and the prudence (weakness?) of the Soviet Union in this crisis. There had been even earlier a mute GSR disenchantment with the Sovs both in the economic and military spheres. As for China, its internal turmoil and fanatical extremism leave an unfavorable impression here. 3. Such considerations together with the grave financial crisis facing new GSR govt as result Suez Canal closure have no doubt contributed to decision Abdirascid and Egal to embark on new tactical course. They cannot, of course, repudiate Somali irridentist objectives as such, nor is there any assurance given popular sentiments and pressures here and the nature of Somali political institutions that they can succeed in suppressing those subversive and violent aspects of their "cause" that stand in the way of a real detente with their neighbors and elicit the displeasure of powerful and affluent US. Their room for maneuver is limited and whatever initial small steps they venture must be taken in the face of recent official GOK and IEG demands for categorical renunciation by GSR of its irridentist aspirations as sine qua non for normalization of relations (pp 64-65 GOK "White Paper," April 1967 and IEG note of last March in reply Abdirazak letter). 4. Between present state of "cold war" tensions between states in this area and attainment of enduring regional peace and stability are more modest way-houses which, if reached, would have intrinsic value per se and could constitute springboards for further progress. My Ethiopian colleague with whom I recently went over some of this ground has been sufficiently encouraged by his contacts with Egal govt to recommend to IEG that harassment of Somali Emb in Addis Ababa cease. He contemplates working for early exchange of Ethiopian Airways DC-3 long parked without maintenance at Mogadiscio Airport for SNP Cessna in IEG hands and even goes as far as to talk about exchange of "good will missions" between his country and Somalia (would be helpful have Emb Addis comments on reaction there to new tone from GSR). Other cooperative steps short of definitive settlement would be resumption of trade and air communications with Kenya, establishment of diplomatic relations with GOK, arrangements for Somali "trade trucks" to ply between Mogadiscio and Hargeisa through direct Ogaden route, contacts between high police officials on both sides of frontier, efforts by IEG to control their military from unauthorized expropriations of livestock and other property by Somali tribesmen in Ogaden, GOK measure to relax inhumane "villagization" measures in NED and in due course joint economic projects in frontier areas. Somewhere along this spectrum declaratory and concrete evidences of GSR disengagement from present back-up programs for "Shifta" violence would be indispensable requirement. 5. Considered "bad boy" of the Horn, Somalia has shown in recent weeks a remarkable capacity in African terms to transfer power from one group of political leaders to another in democratic and orderly fashion and has while making moral gestures of support to its Arab friends in their travail over Israel remained carefully aloof from the emotional campaign of abuse and violence against the US unleashed in the Arab world during the ME crisis. Now its new govt has taken another step, modest and tentative, in the direction of reduction of international tensions in the Horn and has asked US Govt to make these glad tidings known in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. It has also requested US Govt "to endeavor to discourage any new attempts to rekindle the armaments race in the area." While this exhortation is obviously aimed in the first instance at curbing any further arms build-up in Kenya and Ethiopia, it also opens the door for a meaningful dialogue about further buildup of Somali military forces from Soviet or any other conceivable sources. 6. My recent conversations with Abdirascid and Egal and the GSR note under reference, together with foregoing considerations and analysis, thus pose challenging and timely questions which I strongly suggest call for more than routine consideration in Washington. In last year or two we have probably been wise to refrain from formal replies to the several polemical GSR notes that have come our way on the problems in the Horn and from assuming undue risks as an intermediary in what Under Secretary Katzenbach told former Prime Minister Abdirazak last May were insoluble frontier problems. Now the hard-pressed and well-intentioned Egal has provided an opening, the possibilities of which I believe he should explore prudently and in full recognition of the risks and responsibilities involved. The regional frictions are old and perhaps insoluble in toto, a not unusual description of the human condition generally, but there are new circumstances, new motivations and new personalities on the local scene to be taken into account. It is time for a fresh but not too protected look at the situation in this area--and for action. 7. Accordingly I recommend that this Emb be instructed to deliver a response to the GSR note along the following lines: A. An enduring solution to the problems raised must be worked out directly between Somalia and its neighbors. B. However, in view of the constructive tone and intentions expressed in the GSR note and without engaging ourselves in any formal good offices role, we are passing on the substance of the communications, as requested, to the IEG and GOK. C. It is our belief that in such disputes as this all parties concerned must contribute to a solution by concessions and modifications of the positions that have led to the disputes and related tensions. D. Without, therefore, wishing to impute to the GSR unilateral responsibility for the unsatisfactory relations which now unhappily obtain between itself and its neighbors, it is the belief of the US Govt that direct talks with the GOK and IEG can lead to positive results only if the GSR is prepared to demonstrate by deed as well as word that it is prepared to live in peace and cooperation with its neighbors. The cessation of support of hostile activities within the borders of those states is in our view a prime requisite of the detente the GSR states it desires. Inflammatory exhortations in press and radio are also detrimental to the objectives set forth in the GSR note. It would be expected, of course, that should the GSR find it possible to reconsider its position in these respects, similar responses on the part of other govts would be forthcoming, and a stabilized situation would prevail. Under these circumstances US Govt would be prepared to consider how it might best help parties concerned to come together for fruitful consideration of their other mutual problems. E. Re second point in GSR note USG shares GSR concern over arms race in Horn of Africa and has worked to effect an end to this costly and dangerous development whenever and wherever its influence could be brought to bear for this purpose. The establishment of friendly and cooperative relations between GSR and its neighbors would be a major contribution towards halting the arms race in the area and might hopefully lead to understanding among the states concerned that would limit acquisition of arms to levels strictly necessary for internal security and defensive purposes. Should the GSR and its neighbors find it possible to devote appreciably smaller financial resources to the military portions of their national budgets, the US Govt would be disposed in concert with other friendly states and international organizations to find means of matching those savings with equivalent amounts of external assistance for economic projects in the countries concerned. 9. Above recommendations are based on assumption that Egal govt will succeed in obtaining vote of confidence prior to August 15 and that formal reply to GSR should be delayed until that time. However, it would be helpful have in interim instructions ASAP for encouraging verbal reply to Egal./3/ /3/Telegram 18567 to Mogadiscio, August 10, instructed Thurston to inform Egal that the U.S. Government was greatly encouraged by his "statesmanlike note." If Egal survived the initial vote of confidence in the Somali Parliament, the Ambassador could say that the U.S. Government believed an enduring solution to the problems raised must be worked out in direct talks with Kenya and Ethiopia, but that such talks could lead to positive results only if Somalia was in a position to demonstrate that it was prepared to live in peace and cooperation with its neighbors. Telegram 364 from Mogadiscio, August 12, reported that the Somali National Assembly confirmed the Egal government by a vote of 119 to 2 with 3 deputies absent. (Ibid.) Thurston
341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, August 16, 1967, 1622Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH-SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Palmer on August 15; cleared by AFE Country Director Nicholas Feld, Gloster, and Gordon R. Beyer in AFNE; approved by Palmer. Also sent to Addis Ababa, and Nairobi, and repeated to Rome, Paris, London, and Bonn. 21655. Ref: Mogadiscio 203./2/ Following recommended written and oral reply to GSR note under reference: /2/See footnote 2, Document 340. 1. Text aide-memoire to be left with Egal as follows: Complementary opening. (A) USG has studied with interest and encouragement recent Somali Note expressing desire normalize relations with Kenya and Ethiopia. (B) USG believes an enduring solution to problems raised must be worked out directly between Somalia and its neighbors. (C) USG believe that any formal extension of good offices would be premature. Nevertheless, in view of constructive tone and intentions expressed in GSR note, USG is, as requested, willing pass on substance of GSR views to IEG and GOK and do what it can to encourage dialogue. (D) It is our belief that in such disputes as this all parties concerned must contribute to a solution by concessions and modifications of positions that have led to the disputes and related tensions. Complimentary close. 2. Following points for oral presentation only: (A) Without wishing to impute responsibility of part of any of states concerned for unsatisfactory relations which now unhappily obtain among them, it is belief of USG that direct talks with GOK and IEG can lead to positive results only if GSR in position to demonstrate that it prepared to live in peace and cooperation with its neighbors. Willingness to cease lending support to actions of a violent and hostile character within borders those states is considered to be a prime requisite for detente. Inflammatory exhortations in press and radio are also detrimental to objectives set forth GSR Note. It would be expected of course that if GSR found it possible to reconsider its positions in these respects, similar responses on part of other governments would be forthcoming and an improved atmosphere would result. Under these circumstances USG would be prepared consider, in consultation parties concerned, how it could best help them to come together for fruitful consideration of their more fundamental mutual problems. (B) Re second point in GSR Note, USG shares GSR concern over arms race in Horn of Africa and has worked to encourage an end to this costly and dangerous development whenever and wherever its advice and influence could be brought to bear. The establishment of friendly and cooperative relations between GSR and its neighbors would be a major contribution toward halting arms race in area and might hopefully lead to general understanding that would limit acquisition arms to levels strictly necessary for internal security and minimal defensive purposes. Should GSR and its neighbors find it possible appreciably to reduce financial resources devoted to military portions their national budgets, USG would be disposed to consider, in concert other friendly nations and international organizations, means by which it could most helpfully promote economic development and stability in region to benefit of all states, including particularly inhabitants of present areas of tension. 3. Acknowledge receipt this telegram./3/ /3/In telegram 405 from Mogadiscio, August 17, Thurston, reported that he had delivered the U.S. response to Prime Minister Egal that day. (Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH-SOMALI) Rusk
342. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 22, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Looram and Beyer on August 21, and cleared by John P. Meagher in AFE. SUBJECT Summary: The new Somali Prime Minister seeks to improve his country's relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. In light of past pitfalls, as well as the insoluble territorial issue, we are guardedly optimistic about the chances of some success. At the same time, we do not wish to get caught in the middle. Nevertheless, normalization of relations could make such a significant contribution to greater stability in the Horn of Africa, we plan to give a helping hand where appropriate. Background: Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Egal requested our good offices to normalize relations with Kenya and Ethiopia and to reduce the arms race in the Horn of Africa by an official note dated July 23, 1967./2/ We replied in an aide-memoire dated August 7 (see Deptel 21655 attached)/3/ that an enduring solution to the problems raised should be worked out directly between Somalia and its neighbors and any formal extension now of our good offices would be premature. In view of the constructive tone and intentions expressed in the Somali Government's (GSR) note, however, we agreed, as requested, to pass on the substance of the GSR initiative for a detente, together with our reply, to the Ethiopian and Kenyan Governments. Under instructions, Ambassador Thurston orally put forth to Egal the need for Somalia to stop giving materiel and training to Somali dissidents who operate within Kenya and Ethiopia if a detente is to succeed. Were Somalia to reconsider its policy and Kenya and Ethiopia to be similarly forthcoming, the Ambassador said, the United States Government would consider how it could best help all parties concerned to come together to discuss their mutual problems. The Ambassador noted that the establishment of friendly and cooperative relations between Somalia and its neighbors would be a major contribution toward halting the arms race in the area. /2/See footnote 2, Document 340. /3/Document 341. Prime Minister Egal commented that our response was helpful and encouraging; that he was going to make a serious effort to halt "violent" actions by Somali dissidents in Kenya and Ethiopia; and that though the GSR could not control fully Somalis outside the Republic, his Government would make a maximum effort. Egal realized the GSR had to take the initiative to stop hostile Somali actions, but he hoped Kenya and Ethiopia would find it possible to respond by better treatment of ethnic Somalis living in their lands, Egal said he would try to reduce GSR military expenditures and make more use of the army for national development purposes. If the detente materialized, he hoped to reduce the size of the army significantly. Our Embassies in Addis and Nairobi have since conveyed the substance of this matter to the Ethiopian and Kenyan Governments. (Ambassador Ferguson hopes to discuss it shortly with Kenyatta.) While the Ethiopian Prime Minister voiced the usual suspicions, his reaction was not unfavorable and the Emperor's was reportedly positive. New Somali Prime Minister: Prime Minister Egal, who was selected for the premiership by the new Somali President, Abdirascid Ali Scermarke, won a nearly unanimous vote of confidence in his new Government on August 12. Egal has long been known in Somalia for his pro-West politics and told us many times before his election that if he were named Prime Minister, he would reduce Somalia's ties to the East and would seek our help. Relatively young (38 years old) and British educated, Egal, who has never visited the United States, desires to meet with the President either at the outset of the UNGA in September or in the first months of 1968. We have recommended he be invited by the President at the later date. Comment: We believe we have probably done all we can at the moment (apart from Ferguson's talk with Kenyatta). The next steps, i.e., first talks by Somalis with Ethiopians and Kenyans and disbandment of guerrilla training camps in Somalia, are up to Egal. There is a good possibility Egal will take the opportunity of his attendance at the OAU meeting in Kinshasa or at the opening of the UN General Assembly to meet with Ethiopian or Kenyan officials. (Of course in all this Egal is courageously bucking a strong political tide of popular support for active irridentism and his efforts could be jeopardized at any time by internal pressures.) If Egal succeeds in getting talks started with his neighbors and in reducing tensions in the area, we and other Western donor countries will likely be asked by the GSR for additional economic assistance. In line with the ideas expressed by the Under Secretary in talks with Kenyan and Somali leaders during his recent trip to Africa, we recommend an affirmative response in terms of possible regional and multi-donor projects. Moreover, we shall be on the watch for any other ways in which we might give discreet encouragement or assistance to Egal's initiative.
343. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Somali Republic (Thurston) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) Mogadiscio, November 7, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Somali Republic, April 1967. Top Secret. 11 pages of source text not declassified.]
344. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, November 7, 1967, 2314Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-ETH. Secret. Drafted by Gloster and Colonel Kissinger in DOD/ISA; cleared by Colonel Alba in JCS/J-5, Colonel Atkinson in JCS/SAMAA, Colonel Heffner in ODMA, and Looram; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Asmara, USCINCMEAFSA, CHMAAG Ethiopia, and CSAF. 66144. Joint State-Defense Message. Ref: (a) Defense 9939;/2/ (b) Addis 1314, 30 Oct 1967 IN 78500./3/ Subject: Delivery F-5 Aircraft. /2/Not printed. /3/In telegram 1314 from Addis Ababa, October 30, Ambassador William Hall stated that both he and the Chief of MAAG agreed that it would be advantageous to U.S.-Ethiopian relations to have at least one and preferably two F-5s delivered in December 1967 to complete Ethiopia's F-5 squadron. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-ETH) 1. State and Defense have given extensive consideration to Embassy MAAG recommendations, but regret we have reluctantly decided that there no choice but delay delivery of final two F-5s (FY 68 program) at least until Feb 68. Prospects for early resolution of Congressional impasse on FY 68 MAP authorization and especially on appropriation bill are still uncertain. Going forward with two F-5s in FY 68 program now simply not feasible in view strong possibility of significant reduction in entire MAP program. 2. We recognize difficult position of Embassy and MAAG and understand IEG pressures continue unabated. On other hand, we must reiterate hard, cold facts that further legislative restrictions on Africa MAP and significant reduction in over-all level of MAP funds appear inevitable. It is necessary therefore to begin now to look at some of the very tough questions we will face this year working with reduced FY 68 levels and the strong possibility of similar level for FY 69. 3. View of foregoing suggest you use appropriate opportunity to apprise IEG (in low key) of great difficulties MAP facing in Congress. Purpose of approach would be purely to alert IEG officials to realities. Priorities among competing equipment deliveries must be adjudged within final Congressional fund limitations. 4. Subject of F-5 delivery should not be raised again with IEG. If pressed for answer you should inform IEG final word must await results of FY 68 legislation. 5. FYI: In recent mark-up of FY 68 MAP appropriation act sub-committee has proposed a reduced DOD worldwide MAP from $596 million requested excluding NATO HQs to $365 million, including $24 million for NATO headquarters. Furthermore, Continuing Resolution Authority has not been renewed as had been expected and Defense unable to obligate any FY 68 funds at this time. End FYI. Rusk
345. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 5, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somalia, Vol. I, 1/64-5/68. No classification marking. Drafted by Rostow, Hamilton, and Roger Morris. Mr. President: SUBJECT This is a brief handshaking-photograph meeting./2/ Thurston wants the Somalis to know he saw you personally to report on the very encouraging progress being made in the East African detente between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. /2/Ambassador Thurston met with the President from 5:45 p.m. to 5:49 p.m. on December 6. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The detente is the first real break in a long-standing quarrel between these three countries over common border areas. The dispute heated up to an undeclared border war several times, but the situation has cooled off considerably in the last few months. The real push for the detente has come from Somalia. They've pulled back the guerrillas who were raiding disputed areas in Kenya and Ethiopia, and they've stopped hostile propaganda. The Somali Prime Minister had a good meeting with Haile Selassie and Jomo Kenyatta a few months ago. All three countries have resumed diplomatic relations. And only a couple of days ago, the Somali Parliament gave the Government a solid vote of confidence on the policy of detente. All this is very good news for us. We've been trying to encourage a reconciliation for a long time, and Thurston has done an able job. If you take a moment to chat, you might tell him: 1. We're very pleased with the progress of the detente, and especially the show of statesmanship by Somalia. 2. There are bound to be ups and downs in this problem. We know the border dispute is old and deep. 3. But the Somalis have made a very good start toward reconciliation. Thurston and his Mission should keep up the good work of quiet encouragement. W.W. Rostow/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
346. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 12, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somalia Republic, Visit of Prime Minister Egal, 3/14-15/68. Confidential. A handwritten notation in the margin reads: "Orig. was attachment to WWR memo 3/13." Rostow's memorandum is Document 347. Attached talking points are not printed. SUBJECT Prime Minister Egal Egal, 39, took office last summer. He speaks English fluently and, though a Muslim, enjoys a drink. He is a pragmatic African moderate and is pro-West. He has few interests outside politics. Egal has completely reversed Somalia's policies in the last nine months. Somali irredentism dominated past Government policies. Egal seeks peace and cooperation with neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia. He is pushing for greater economic development at the military's expense. Somali Republic Somalia is a semi-arid land--much like our South-West. Poor in resources, it has gone in primarily for raising livestock. However, uranium and itrium have just been found near Mogadiscio. If there are large reserves of these metals, as an American company now claims, they could have an enormous effect on the economy. Somalia is one of the few democracies in Africa. Governments and presidents have changed normally since independence in 1960. The country's tragedy is that European-drawn frontiers have divided the Somali people. Its population is two and a half million; an additional one million live outside the borders, in eastern Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya. Somali irredentism has accordingly plagued the stability of the Horn of Africa. Somalia has a non-aligned foreign policy. Because of U.S. military aid to Ethiopia, it has leaned in the past somewhat to the USSR, which has supplied large amounts of military and economic assistance. What Egal Wants U.S. help with Ethiopia and Kenya in getting them to be more responsive to his efforts to improve relations with them. More U.S. economic assistance in general and designation of Somalia as an AID emphasis country in particular. (Both of these he feels are needed in order to prove the soundness of his new policies to the Somali electorate.) What We Want To strengthen his position and encourage his policies. (His efforts toward regional peace and economic development, at the expense of the military, exceed our most optimistic expectations, and have won more support within Somalia than appeared possible. We should do all we can to assist this most encouraging development.) To demonstrate our interest in one of the few African democracies. Assistant Secretary Palmer will accompany the Prime Minister on his call on you, and Ambassador Thurston will be available at the White House during the meeting. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
347. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 13, 1968, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 66. No classification marking. Drafted by Edward Hamilton and Roger Morris. SUBJECT Schedule: 11:30 AM: Arrival at diplomatic entrance (arrival statements and full military honors) 12:00 Noon: Alone (Egal is fluent in English) advisors standing by in Cabinet Room 8:00 PM: White House Dinner Papers At Tab A is Katzenbach's briefing memo./2/ /2/Document 346. At Tab B are State's Talking Points./3/ /3/Not printed; briefing material for Egal's visit is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somali Republic, Visit of Prime Minister Egal, 3/14-15/68 and Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 SOMALI. At Tab C is biographic information on Egal./4/ /4/Not printed. Setting Somalia is a poor dry country on the upper east coast of Africa between Kenya and Ethiopia--the "Horn" that juts out into the Indian Ocean just below the mouth of the Red Sea. It became independent in 1960. It is, despite its economic backwardness, a model democracy by African standards. The major factor complicating U.S.-Somalia relations is the very serious tension and arms race between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as a milder form of the same problem with Kenya. We are prime arms suppliers to Ethiopia. The Russians supply Somalia. Until Egal's election last July, both sides rattled sabers with abandon. The basic problem is tribal irredentism; more than one million Somali tribesmen live in Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia's traditional policy has aimed at annexing all areas populated by ethnic Somalis--by force if necessary. How Egal handles the border problem will make or break his political future. He has put his chips on a turnaround from belligerence to detente with Ethiopia and Kenya. Over the past few months, with our quiet applause, Egal has begun peace talks with Haile Selassie and Jomo Kenyatta, pulled back the Somali guerrillas raiding the border areas, and cut his military spending. With each of these steps he is walking on eggs in his Parliament. Everybody in Somalia has some clan relative living on the other side of the border. If the detente doesn't blossom, or if Egal stumbles, the dispute will slip back into the old bitterness--probably all the worse for the failure of this effort. Talking Points 1. Border Problem--You might open by telling Egal how much we admire his courageous efforts to reduce tension with his neighbors, and ask for his views on the prospects for the detente. He will probably give you a lengthy rundown on what he has done and how hard it has been to carry along his own people. He may ask us to work on the Ethiopians and Kenyans. And there is likely to be a strong hint that we make things tougher for him by continuing to supply arms to the Emperor. You might reply that: --We understand his problems. Vice President Humphrey put in a good word for Egal's policy when he saw the Emperor and Kenyatta in January. --We will continue to give discreet encouragement to all sides. --But only the parties themselves can solve this dispute. Our influence as an outsider is very limited, and a push by us might even be counter-productive. --We don't think the Emperor has aggressive designs on anybody. We'd hope that the detente will eventually lead to an agreement to limit arms in the area. In the meantime, we are very pleased with the cuts in military spending that Egal has made. 2. Aid--Egal is concerned about our aid cut-back in Africa. Somalia is not one of our concentration countries. Bilateral U.S. aid is scheduled to phase out over the next four years in favor of multilateral and regional projects. This will not affect food or the Peace Corps. Egal may make a strong pitch that he needs aid more than ever to hold the line against his hawks by presenting a credible development alternative. You might say: --We are not withdrawing from Africa in general or Somalia in particular. Congress willing, we hope to put more--not less--aid into Africa in the future than in the past. --We have put more than $70 million in Somalia since 1960, almost $20 million last year alone. --We hope Somalia will join with her neighbors to put together regional projects which will be eligible under our new policy. We know this is tough. But we think it is terribly important. --In any event, the new policy will not affect food aid, the Ex-Im Bank, the Peace Corps, or projects done jointly with other donors. --We are delighted to inform the Prime Minister that we are now ready to sign a $1.1 million PL-480 agreement. This is evidence of our concern. 3. Vietnam (Egal has been silent.) W.W. Rostow/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
348. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 14, 1968, noon. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Somalia, Vol. 1, 1/64-5/68. Confidential. Drafted by Looram. The conversation was held at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Republic of Somalia (This conversation followed a private talk between the President and Prime Minister Egal.) The President said that the Prime Minister and he had discussed a number of things together, including developments in the Horn of Africa. He had expressed to the Prime Minister his pleasure at the reception given the Vice President in Mogadiscio and his pleasure that the Prime Minister had been able to come over to visit this country. He had also asked the Prime Minister to extend his warm regards to the President of Somalia. They had discussed, the President stated, the questions of AID and the Peace Corps. He had told the Prime Minister of his problems with the Congress with regard to AID and the continuation of bilateral assistance. He had noted, however, that, if funds were available, the United States Government was interested in assisting regional projects. Moreover, we were prepared to conclude a PL-480 agreement with the Somali Government. The President went on to say that the USG was discreetly supporting efforts to achieve a detente in the Horn of Africa, although this was best handled by the parties directly concerned. We were most interested in the Prime Minister's constructive work. We appreciated that some difficulties remained, and we were following these developments closely. Prime Minister Egal stated that he had wanted to give an overall picture to the President and not bother him with details. He planned to take up more detailed matters with the Secretary and Mr. Palmer. United States Participants: The Honorable Raymond L. Thurston, American Ambassador to the Somali Republic Somali Participants: H.E. Haji Farah Ali Omar, Minister for Foreign Affairs
349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, March 16, 1968, 0123Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Palmer, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Lucius D. Battle, Ambassador Thurston, and Steigman; and approved by Looram. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Asmara, and USUN, and by pouch to Paris, Rome, and Bonn. 131425. Subject: Egal Visit Washington. 1. Following is summary of Secretary's talk with Somali Prime Minister Egal March 15: 2. Detente in Horn of Africa: In response Secretary's expression interest current developments, Egal stated progress continuing particularly with Kenya. Somalia still waiting for Ethiopians cancel security measures Ogaden. Establishment joint border commissions with both Ethiopians and Kenyans highly significant. 3. US AID: Egal made strong pitch on both political and economic grounds for U.S. contribution to Juba River Project and construction road linking Addis-Nairobi highway with Port of Chisimaio. Said indication of favorable U.S. decision essential for him politically as well as for his efforts obtain Italian and West German participation these projects. Egal stated he had held up discussing road link project with Kenyans until he got U.S. reaction, but sure Kenyans would be in favor. Secretary stated USG interested Somali economic development and cited PL-480 agreement to be signed today but pointed out Administration's difficulties with Congress as well problem of Congressional limitation on number AID recipient countries. Believed Somalis would do well look to international institutions particularly World Bank, as well Europeans, for assistance. However suggested Egal discuss further with AID Deputy Administrator. 4. East African Community: In response Secretary's question whether Ethiopia and Somalia would join, Egal said Somalis definitely would, although there would have to be transitional period of economic reorientation. Community had just appointed negotiating team for discussions with Somali Government. Secretary expressed hope in development regional community whereby national political controversies could be readily resolved or disappear as now case in Western Europe with old issue of Ruhr. 5. U.N.: Secretary stated USG valued active Somali participation in U.N. affairs and opined that Somali delegation in most instances demonstrated moderation and constructive action. 6. Middle East Crisis: Secretary believed formula developed by Ambassador Jarring could be accepted by both sides but feared present delay did not serve peace. Egal stated Somalia supported Arabs and emphasized main obstacle to settlement was question prestige. Irrespective substance, formula would have to appear give concessions to Arabs in light their great humiliation and reluctance any one of Arab leaders make first compromise step. Suggested unconditional Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. Egal fairly sure USSR not urging Arabs reject any settlement. Stated Somali economy had suffered at outset from Suez closure but fairly satisfactory readjustment had since been made, thanks to Italian help. Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
