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350. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 76.1-68 Washington, April 11, 1968. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 11. THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNAL SECURITY IN ETHIOPIA Conclusions A. We estimate that, despite recent improvements in security conditions in Ethiopia, the insurgency in Eriteria will persist and that security problems will continue in other outlying trouble spots. As long as Haile Selassie remains in power, his government will probably be able to keep these problems from getting out of hand. Little will be done, however, to alleviate the underlying causes of the dissidence, because of the rigidity of Haile Selassie's policies and of the Imperial political system. B. The passing of Haile Selassie, now 75 years old, will usher in a period of great uncertainty in Addis Ababa, which could be prolonged and violent. In these circumstances, government forces would probably be unable to maintain control throughout the countryside, at least for a time. C. A reduction in US deliveries of military assistance to Ethiopia, at a time when the Emperor is seeking an increase, would be likely to strain relations. Though the Kagnew communications facility in Eritrea would probably become a specific issue in Ethiopian bargaining for increased aid, we believe that the Emperor would not go far in threatening continued US use of the facility. After he leaves the scene, Kagnew will probably become increasingly a focus of political attention in Ethiopia. The cost of US rights there will probably increase substantially, and there might be a demand to renegotiate the agreement under which it operates. D. The Eritrean insurgents have not attacked US facilities in Kagnew, though over time pressures for such attacks from within the ranks of the partisans and from radical foreign sponsors are likely to increase. If Eritrea were to break away from Ethiopia, the US might not be cast out of Kagnew automatically. The reaction of Eritrean leaders would depend in part on their susceptibility to radical foreign influences and the availability of alternative sources of foreign aid. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, July 12, 1968, 2213Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Looram; cleared by AFE Country Director Nicholas Feld, John G. MacCracken in EUR/SOV, and Lewis D. Junior in G/PM; and approved by AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas H.E. Quimby. Also sent to Mogadiscio and Nairobi, and repeated to London, Moscow, Asmara, and CINCSTRIKE. 201631. Subject: Possible Renewed Arms Race in Horn. Ref: Addis 4680;/2/ Mogadiscio 3620./3/ /2/In telegram 4680 from Addis Ababa, July 10, Ambassador Hall commented that Ethiopia and Somalia were perhaps on the verge of a new arms race, which would further limit both countries' capabilities to progress economically and end hopes for detente, and might lead to another war between them. He agreed that Ethiopia's Canberra deal was bad, but noted that a Somalia MIG deal would make matters worse. (Ibid.) /3/Dated July 12. (Ibid., DEF 19-6 USSR-SOMALI) 1. Fully agree with para one Addis reftel re seriousness situation. Even improvement achieved so far in Somali-Kenyan relations could be endangered by Soviet deliveries of new sophisticated aircraft to Somalia. And unless Ethiopian Government soon makes up its mind on whether or not provide substantive concessions to Egal, Somali Government not likely turn down MIG-21's which Soviets may be offering precisely to finish off detente, Egal, and latter's pro-Western policies. Thus action addressee Chiefs of Mission requested make further efforts convince respective governments of desirability trying make progress on detente now before opportunity goes by the board. 2. Re courses of action suggested reftel, we remain of opinion only Egal, possibly with Shermarke, visit Addis for talks with Aklilou and Emperor can get Ethiopian-Somali relations off dead center and hopefully provide Egal with sufficient concessions to resist Soviet blandishments. 3. However, since Ethiopians have apparently not yet decided give such concessions, we see advantages in Shermarke and Egal proceeding with scheduled visit Nairobi. Such bilateral talks likely result in consolidating progress Somali-Kenyan relations. This in turn might conceivably encourage favorable IEG decisions re Somalia and Somalis may wish request Kenyatta urge IEG in this direction. 4. If Council of Ministers has not made up its mind, still do not see how IEG can provide needed encouragement and assurances to Somali Foreign Minister, should his Addis trip be revived, that visit by PM will bear fruit. 5. Request Ambassador Thurston discuss foregoing with Egal. In addition covering points in State 196496/4/ and Mogadiscio reftel, Ambassador should explore with latter desirability his (plus Shermarke) visiting Addis following Nairobi, preferably with advance assurances of Ethiopian forthcomingness but even without, given seriousness present situation. Would it be helpful approach Italians on this subject Mogadiscio and/or Washington? /4/Dated July 3. (Ibid.) 6. Request Ambassador Ferguson discuss situation frankly with Kenyan Government on basis our concern continuing stalemate Ethiopian-Somali relations preventing forward movement on detente and weakening Egal's political position particularly in face Somali military opposition to detente and reports of Soviet offers more military equipment. Ask if any way GOK might be able to help. 7. Request Ambassador Hall discuss with FonMin Ketema or at higher level if feasible along same lines and urge that favorable decision on proposed concessions be expedited and word to this effect be conveyed to Somali Government. Explore possibility IEG invitation to Shermarke and Egal visit Addis following their trip Nairobi in order discuss outstanding problems including danger further arms race. If useful you may state you speaking under instructions./5/ /5/In telegram 4784 from Addis Ababa, July 18, Hall reported that he discussed the status of the detente and the danger of a new arms race between Somalia and Ethiopia with Prime Minister Aklilou that afternoon, and urged the necessity of an early meeting to discuss detente and to reassure Somalia regarding Ethiopia's purchase of Canberra jet bombers. The Ambassador warned Aklilou that Egal could not come to Addis Ababa without assurance that he would take back some concrete accomplishment. Hall reported that the Prime Minister said he would ask the Ethiopian Ambassador in Mogadiscio to reassure Egal concerning specific concessions to be made when he came to Addis Ababa and to renew the invitation for a visit. (Ibid.) 8. Posts should repeat significant messages this subject to above addressees. Rusk
352. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State/1/ Addis Ababa, July 29, 1968, 1624Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ETH-US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Asmara. 4904. Ref: Addis Ababa 4755./2/ /2/Dated July 16. (Ibid.) 1. During my audience with HIM today, I recalled that when I had first arrived in Addis he urged that after I had formed some views on Ethiopian domestic affairs we meet to talk over my personal views. I said I now had some impressions and views, purely personal, and I would be delighted discuss at his convenience, perhaps after Nigerian meetings were behind him. HIM laughed and said if we waited until after Nigeria it would be very long time. He went on, however, to say he would be very glad to talk later and suggested I call him when we both had less pressure. 2. HIM then said he also wished to discuss Ethiopia's relations with neighbors and with Soviet Union, and relations of neighbors with Soviet Union. He said recent improvement of relations between US and Soviet Union was a good thing for the world, but he was concerned that in considering its relations with Soviets, US should not overlook the harder line Soviets have been taking with Ethiopia and Soviet provision of arms to Sudan, Somalia and UAR. 3. I replied US sought improved relations with Soviet Union, but said we were proceeding with caution and full regard for Soviet relations with our friends and Soviet attitudes toward such countries as Czechoslovakia. I said US does not intend sacrifice its principles or relations with its friends in interest closer relations with Soviets. I said I would be prepared to talk about these problems when we next meet. 4. HIM said he also wished to discuss changed attitude of Congress on foreign assistance and other US activities abroad. In particular, he wished to talk about certain studies of Ethiopian-American relations prepared by FonOff. (Comment: Min State Tesfaye mentioned these studies some weeks ago. I will seek talk about them with Tesfaye or FonMin Ketema before I meet with HIM.) 5. One final note on audience with HIM is that I observed on his reading table copy of Ayub Khan's Friends, Not Masters. Book mark would indicate HIM was two-thirds of the way through book. Hall
353. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State/1/ Addis Ababa, July 29, 1968, 1625Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Confidential. Repeated to Asmara and Mogadiscio. 4905. Subject: Ethiopia-Somali Relations. 1. During audience with Emperor today I raised Ethiopian-Somali relations, referring to our earlier discussion this subject. I knew he had been concerned about problem and had been pleased with Egal's initiative and wished to reciprocate. I expressed personal view there had been slowdown in progress toward detente. Ethiopia had placed Egal in difficult position and time had come to make a positive response. I recounted my conversation with Egal, including his interest in collaborating on such matters as overflights, exchange of vehicles and lifting state of emergency. I said Egal also had expressed hope for cooperation in development of Webi Schebelli and Juba Rivers and in commerce. 2. HIM reasserted his warm personal regard of Egal and belief that Egal was sincerely interested in improving relations with Ethiopia. He said it intent of Ethiopia to respond to Egal's initiative and noted that IEG had invited Egal to Addis to discuss these matters. The Emperor said there are still problems of Somali agents in Ogaden, guerrilla camps along border and activity of ELF Headquarters in Moga, all of which had aroused increasing concern in IEG. He said IEG feels that progress must be made slowly and must be reciprocal on both sides. He realized Egal's difficulties and said Ethiopia intended to make gesture. 3. HIM then expressed concern about Soviet-Somali relations. Referring to recent visit of Defense Minister to Moscow and said he felt it may indicate reversal of previous trend in Somali-Soviet relations. HIM wondered whether Egal was not, in fact, now encouraging closer Soviet-Somali relations. I said in my view Somalis preoccupied with vastly superior Ethiopian military strength. When I mentioned Canberra purchase as giving Somalis concern, HIM laughed and said the Canberras were not directed against Somalia. I said our recent supply of additional F-5's and tanks had also caused concern. Although Egal continued to resist pressures to go to Soviets for more arms, it was questionable how long he could maintain present position. HIM then reiterated his desire improve relations with Somalia and again said he like Egal personally and that IEG would have to make some gesture to reassure him. 4. Comment: From our conversation, it seems probable that Ethiopian intelligence has picked up Soviet-Somali meetings and their discussions of increased training and equipment assistance. As result those skeptical of Egal's intentions within IEG appear to have effectively planted doubts in HIM's mind. 5. HIM at the moment is so preoccupied with Nigerian problem that even though I believe he sincerely intends to press ahead on detente, progress will be slow. He clearly considers Nigeria more important problem for Ethiopia and rest of Africa. We will continue to press IEG and may be agreeably surprised, but I doubt that any action will be taken until after the completion of Nigerian talks here. Hall
No. 705 Washington, September 6, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH-SOMALI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted as a memorandum from Director of INR Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk. SUBJECT Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Egal's September 1-4 visit to Ethiopia has broken the deadlock between the two countries. The Ethiopians, who had hinted that concessions were in the offing, have agreed to suspend emergency measures in the Somali-inhabited Ogaden, long a stumbling block to improved relations. Ingrained distrust and technical details remain to be overcome but for the first time in many months the detente first offered by Egal in July 1967 has begun to gain momentum. The Ante. According to the communique signed September 4 by Egal and Ethiopian Prime Minister Aklilou Abte Wold, emergency measures will be relaxed on September 16. Ethiopia will return confiscated Somali vehicles with compensation for damages. It has given permission for flights between Mogadiscio and Hargeisa to overfly the Ogaden area of Ethiopia (see map)./2/ The two governments agreed to negotiate cultural, telecommunications, and trade agreements. A joint ministerial consultative committee was set up for the periodic discussion of problems between the two countries. /2/Not printed. Earlier Omens. The break-through ended a summer of deteriorating relations, marked by raids, counter-raids, and mutual recrimination. Egal--faced with doubters in Parliament, threatened by the coming March 1969 elections, and under pressure from his army--badly needed proof of Ethiopia's good will. In Somali eyes Ethiopia's posture was unyielding and signified an attempt to exploit Egal's move toward detente to build up Ethiopian military might. It led Egal to consider purchasing additional Soviet arms. There were mutterings within the Somali Army of a possible need for the military to take over the government. In these circumstances Ethiopia, aware that Egal is its best hope for stabilizing relations with Somalia, at last moved to help Egal with much-needed concessions. Why the Change? Ethiopian action on the detente has often bogged down in acrid dispute between moderates and hardliners. Emperor Haile Selassie, preoccupied by the war in Nigeria, had evidently given little consideration to meeting Egal halfway. Detailed proposals for concessions were, however, submitted to him by Chief of Staff Gen. Iyassu Mengesha on August 14. The US weighed in strongly in favor of a forthcoming response. Shortly afterwards, the Emperor invited Egal to visit Addis Ababa. Changing Signals. Hawkish Ethiopian civil servants and army officers, long conditioned to a philosophy of external threat, have already reacted to the talks by grumbling about a "sellout to the Somalis." A few higher officials are apparently even assuring them that the measures can be rescinded, blaming the US for pressing Ethiopia to make the concessions. While the Ethiopian negotiators did not insist on a quid pro quo, they will be scrutinizing Egal's handling of anti-Ethiopian organizations in his country. His actions, and his countrymen's reactions, will determine how fast Ethiopia moves in following through on its commitments--in particular, in tackling the thorny problems of how it polices the border areas. The Emperor can be expected to throw his weight behind the peacemakers headed by Prime Minister Aklilou, but the actions of lower officials and army officers anxious to throw a monkey wrench into the peace machinery could still create difficulties. Next Steps. The success of the Egal mission, well covered in Ethiopian news media, has given rise to heady optimism in Addis Ababa. Enthusiastic Somalis predict a meeting between the Emperor and Somali President Abdirascid Ali Shermarche, perhaps at the September 13-16 Algiers Summit. Ethiopian officials are allegedly considering secretly financing Egal's campaign expenses. Prime Minister Aklilou has said that, once the problems of border controls are settled, he is ready to negotiate the elimination of customs duties, and to enter into the joint development of the water resources of the Juba and Webi Shibeli rivers. Egal arrived in Addis Ababa with reservations about Ethiopian sincerity; he left convinced the Emperor supports the detente. The question is now whether the euphoria will be succeeded by concrete accomplishment.
355. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, September 6, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Ethiopia, 000.1--1968. Top Secret. Dear Nick: I am writing in response to your request that the Defense Department develop a program that could serve as the basis for a plan of action for relocating our current activities from Kagnew Station in Ethiopia. Alternate sites for the activities now located at Kagnew have been identified, together with costs and time it would take to develop alternate facilities. The activities at Kagnew consist of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] STRATCOM and Navy communications facilities, and a small atomic explosion detection site. The duplication of these activities would entail enlarging existing facilities in Spain, Morocco, Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Iran; building a new facility on Crete (or Cyprus) and a new Navy communications station in the Indian Ocean area; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The over-all cost of duplicating the Kagnew facilities would be about $116 million, with completion about four years after funds are made available. The proposed relocation sites would result in little loss in our communications capabilities, [13-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in commenting on the alternative arrangements, concluded that the functions presently being performed at Kagnew could not be relocated without entailing serious risks to US security interests. I believe the impact of relocation--the financial costs, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the lack of relocation sites which would improve our prospects for tenure--will have to be weighed carefully against the uncertain political situation in Ethiopia before any decision can be made for a phased relocation from Kagnew. In order that your staff might study these factors more carefully, I am enclosing a copy of the telecommunications plan./2/ [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (The changing political situation mentioned above, which has occurred since the preparation of these plans, will require some modifications in the proposed alternate sites.) /2/Not printed. In view of the difficult situations confronting our continued presence at Kagnew and other facilities elsewhere as well, I have directed the development of a five-year plan [2 lines of source text not declassified] due in September 1969. In the interim, in order to reduce our presence at Kagnew, I have directed the following: --A joint manpower survey to determine what reductions (in addition to those resulting from current budgetary actions) can be made and that until completion of that survey present personnel strength be established as a ceiling. --The cancellation of $1 million in previously approved construction projects. Future construction will be limited to that which you and I agree is essential. Moreover, the Defense Communications Satellite System which is expected to be operational by mid-1971, should enable us to make a substantial reduction in acreage and personnel. Consequently, I have directed a study to assess the feasibility of reconfiguring the Defense Communications System facilities at Kagnew with a view toward reducing the number of high frequency radio systems, and a survey of the utilization of real estate tracts with a view toward consolidating functions where technically feasible. This review will be coordinated with the Department of State to insure that the over-all world-wide Defense Communications and Diplomatic Telecommunications Systems are not impaired. I have requested that your staff be kept fully apprised of the results of these surveys. Sincerely, /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Nitze signed the original.
356. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)/1/ Washington, December 16, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but a typed note indicates the letter was redrafted in U. Dear Paul: I want to thank you for your letter of September 6 on Kagnew Station./2/ A great deal of work has evidently gone into this study. I am sincerely grateful. /2/Document 355. We have weighed the various factors--first and foremost our security interests and also the volatility of the political situation in Ethiopia and the Horn--in trying to work out the most prudent course of action. Our objective is to find ways of dealing with the heart of the problem: Ethiopia is too uncertain a location for an installation as important as Kagnew. We could decide to accept the risks of being expelled, either by political pressures or by deterioration of the security situation, and try to hold on until that time, or at least almost until the point where we would have to provide troops to protect our people. Alternatively, we can begin a progressive phase-down of our activities at Kagnew, stopping any additions and sorting out those already there as you have suggested, and plan for various contingencies in the future. An early phasing-down of some Kagnew activities would lessen the apparent value of the Station to the U.S., and could thus increase the chances of retaining its most important functions over a longer period; both the IEG and the dissidents would be less inclined to believe the Station provides them with strong leverage over the U.S. Consequently, I propose the following: 1. We confirm our present policy of adding no more functions to Kagnew, undertaking no new construction, and acquiring no additional land. 2. We pursue vigorously a sorting-out of present activities in order to reduce or eliminate marginal ones; select out and reallocate those that could be performed by other systems now or in the next few years; and identify those remaining ones which must either continue to be performed at Kagnew or be relocated, probably with overlap to assure continuity. I recognize that the last category listed above is the most difficult. Therefore, I propose singling out activities which should be continued elsewhere to avoid interruption and those which could be handled temporarily without new construction now at other sites in the event of forced withdrawal. 3. Meanwhile, we should continue to refine our planning for an eventual withdrawal so that we can soon have in hand a scenario that will permit us to carry out an orderly phase-down, if necessary, well before our present agreement expires in 1978. The preparation of such a plan should put us in a better position to anticipate the problems should such a contingency arise. If you concur, I propose that our staffs continue their work and prepare an annual report on progress made toward the objective. Sincerely, /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
