NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
330. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 14, 1967, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65-1/69. Confidential. Drafted by Korry on February 20. The conversation was held at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President stated that he understood that His Imperial Majesty's talks with Secretary McNamara and Acting Secretary Katzenbach were most useful to both sides. He and the Emperor had a better understanding of each other's problems. He wished to assure the Emperor that the promised review of his requests would be thorough and as sympathetic as our restraints permitted. Candor compelled him to state that he did not wish to underestimate the difficulties he had at present with Congress. He wished to emphasize that in his view there were good possibilities of softening the Ethiopian-Somali problem through joint development of shared resources, in particular river basins. He also wished to stress that our conception of the Ethiopian security problem places the focus on internal security measures. However, we will do our best, within the restraints imposed by Congress and available resources, to be as forthcoming as possible. The Emperor replied that he did not wish to convey an impression that he was pressing for immediate responses. He repeated his rationale about wanting a face-to-face meeting with the President. He understood that immediate decisions could not be reached and he was satisfied with the procedures that had been worked out. He wished to emphasize anew his serious concern over the situation Ethiopia was confronting and his hope that the USG would respond in as forthcoming a manner as possible.
331. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State/1/ Addis Ababa, March 1, 1967, 1425Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asmara. 3133. Response to Emperor's Requests. 1. Following are the answers I would wish to give Emperor shortly after his return: A. Spell out the special efforts on MAP including the four helicopters, 17 tanks and accelerated delivery of trucks, APCs and F-5s. State we also seeking acceleration of delivery other items whereon we will have answers later in spring. On helicopters, because of my belief that Iyassu has been discussing terms for more French helicopters and because I am persuaded French will offer what for Paris will be generous credit terms for choppers and other aircraft, I intend to let MOD know that if they wish other equipment in place of helicopters from US for equivalent value, we would be willing to consider it. Rationale is that since air force probably will get more Alouettes from French and since choppers would be new item in US inventory here, it could be advantageous over long run to have French totally responsible for that item. B. Offer arms for police per my memo to AID Administrator Gaud, detailing how delivery would be linked to formation of units with 5,100 initial force goal. C. Indicate that DOD prepared to consider sales for certain items such as equipment for ammo factory here to turn out bigger caliber items and possibly modified C-119s. Rationale is that increased domestic capacity for in-country ammo production would be highly beneficial to our long-term MAP relationship and relieve part of burden of our supplying ammo. Would also be psychologically beneficial to indicate our desire to have IEG self-sufficient in more items. Therefore would urge DOD authorize good terms for this equipment. Any other items DOD would feel justifiable for sales program should be transmitted in response to this msg. D. Indicate in off-hand manner that if we did not have burden of almost US $1,000,000 annually for navy this money could have been diverted to army and air force. Follow up this idea more specifically with MOD as a personal preference while offering the suggestion that the French and the Israelis might wish to assume this commitment. I continue to believe that this approach might conceivably be successful, particularly if the Israelis who are more concerned about the Red Sea than they are about the land or air forces of Ethiopia, push hard with French in event of a French victory in CFS referendum. It would have extra appeal when I tell Emperor that we can do nothing about the navy now and that the replacement of HMS Ethiopia could not be envisaged before fall of 1968 at earliest and then only with a minesweeper carrying crew of 94. E. Detail efforts of AID to meet stated IEG desire for private agricultural investment, for follow-on to Blue Nile survey, for continued support of the university. Give firmly negative response on budgetary assistance. 2. All foregoing will be packaged in the underlying philosophies and restraints well known to the Dept, and more importantly, on stated assumption of continued good rels between our two govts. 3. It would be helpful to know in advance what transpired in Moscow but I doubt we will have benefit of reliable info since IEG will probably seek to influence our responses to HIM by floating scare stories. 4. For the record, I wish repeat that the soured atmosphere created by limited magnitude of our responses could well, although not inevitably, lead to such diverse reactions as recognition of Red China, withdrawal of IEGF representation from Korea, demand for changes in Kagnew SOFA and other harassment of Kagnew as well as personal abuse, the last being promptest and most inevitable consequence. If we remain cool we should be able absorb heat without too much damage to our fundamental interests in the short run. When and if we arrive at a policy for Red Sea Basin, we can review our position. 5. For the record too, foregoing is in keeping with strategy adopted at Chiefs of Mission Conference in Addis and with successful handling of Emperor's visit. However wish to note that Dept has thus far evaded equally important commitment it made at same conference to keep heat on Somalia, particularly in field of aid. In contrast to diminution of aid, Dept has in fact been seeking to increase aid projects which not only contrary to Addis CM Conference adopted strategy, and it has been permitting technical difficulties (Reynolds, lack of local funds) to obfuscate real point of our tactics. Indeed it is wining and dining a Somalia parliamentary delegation which has just passed in the face of US warnings a resolution totally opposed to US policies in Africa. Net effect of such tactics is to continue by our actions to encourage the most extreme elements in GYT into believing their policies can be followed with impunity and into putting more pressure on supposedly more moderate segments of society. Nothing could better demonstrate lack of any influence on GSR by USG than the total failure of this tactic over past four years if anyone would bother to read the cables of that period and measure promise against delivery./2/ /2/Telegram 150563 to Addis Ababa, March 7, approved the course of action proposed by Ambassador Korry. In telegram 3258 from Addis Ababa, March 12, Korry reported that on March 10 he delivered the U.S. replies to the Emperor, who had been "unruffled and non-committal" in his responses. (Ibid.) Korry
332. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 5, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967-1968. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
333. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 6, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967-1968. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
334. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 75/76-67 Washington, April 27, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 27. PROSPECTS FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA The Problem To estimate the implications for the US, over the next two or three years, of growing instability in Ethiopia, Somali expansionism, and the activities in the Horn of Africa of the USSR and certain Arab states. Conclusions A. The likelihood of growing instability in Ethiopia, including the emergency of a potent insurgency in Eritrea, will raise problems for US interests in the Horn of Africa and call into question the future of the US position in Kagnew Station. Haile Selassie will probably retain control of the government and hold the Empire intact as long as he remains reasonably active. We believe, however, that the death or overthrow of the 74-year-old Emperor will usher in a period of prolonged uncertainty, and perhaps violence, in Addis Ababa. In the latter event, government forces would, at least for a time, be unable to maintain control throughout the countryside, and some regions might break away. (Paras. 1-15, 39-42) B. Somali expansionism will continue to aggravate the tensions in the Horn among antagonistic ethnic and religious groups. The Somalia Government will probably continue to avoid provoking a full-scale confrontation with Ethiopia's superior military forces. It will persist, however, in its assistance to dissident groups in Ethiopia, including Eritrea, in hopes of speeding the collapse of the Empire and improving the prospects for obtaining the Ogaden without open warfare. (Paras. 16-20, 35, 37-38) C. Though French security forces in French Somaliland will probably keep any Somali resistance movement from getting out of hand, agitation in one form or another is likely to keep the territory's political and economic affairs unsettled. The French will probably withdraw from the territory by 1970 or so, and perhaps earlier. Since the rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia will persist, the danger of a war over Djibouti will again arise. (Paras. 21-24, 36) D. The USSR, particularly through its military assistance to Somalia, seeks to expand its influence in the Horn and to undermine the special US position in Ethiopia. The USSR apparently believes that the trend of events in the Horn and the Red Sea area generally is running in its favor and will probably be cautious about premature exploitation of the disruptive forces emerging there. The UAR is also seeking to extend its influence in the Horn, but the size of its activities is limited by the strain on its resources of its involvement in Yemen and by its desire not to disrupt diplomatic relations with Haile Selassie. (Paras. 2, 25-31, 43-44) E. The persistence of tensions in the Horn and disorders within Ethiopia will prompt Haile Selassie to demand increased military assistance from the US--the quid pro quo for Kagnew. As long as the Emperor remains in charge, however, the Ethiopian Government is not likely to alter sharply the conditions of our use of the facility, though it may at some time demand new status of forces arrangements. After he leaves the scene, Kagnew will probably become increasingly a focus of political attention in Ethiopia. At the least, the cost of our rights there will increase substantially, and there might be a demand to renegotiate the basic Kagnew agreement. (Paras. 33, 45, 47) F. So far, the Eritrean insurgents have not attacked US facilities in Kagnew, but pressures for such attacks from within the ranks of the partisans and from radical foreign sponsors are bound to increase. If Eritrea were to gain independence, the US might not be cast out of Kagnew automatically. The reaction of the new government would depend in part on its susceptibility to radical foreign influences and the availability of alternate sources of foreign aid. (Paras. 12, 46) [Here follows the body of the paper.]
335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, April 28, 1967, 5:33 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Walker on April 27; cleared by Officer in Charge of United Kingdom Affairs Thomas M. Judd, Wolf, and Bader in DOD/ISA; and approved by Looram. Also sent to London, and repeated to Asmara, Paris, CINCMEAFSA, and Moscow. 184357. Ref: Addis 3835 and 3776./2/ /2/In telegram 3776 from Addis Ababa, April 22, Ambassador Korry reported that a British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) salesman was in Addis Ababa to discuss a possible sale of Canberra jet bombers to Ethiopia. The British Ambassador had told him the British Government was offering no subsidies and was staying clear of the discussions, but Korry argued that the United States should try to persuade the British Government to stop the sale. In telegram 3835 from Addis Ababa, April 26, Korry reported that the Ethiopian Chief of Staff had told him his government was now committed to procuring bombers, but that Korry had been trying to stir up "maximum opposition" to the bomber purchases among Ethiopian Ministers interested in development. (Ibid.) For Addis. 1. Very much appreciate your efforts discourage IEG obsession with jet bomber purchases, despite difficulties encountered. 2. In your continuing campaign, assume you will point out: (a) if IEG wants provoke Somalis into asking Soviets for bombers, MIG-21's or SAM's, this is surest way of doing it; (b) we see absolutely no reason or need for "strategic deterrent," as we indicated to General Iyassu during HIM visit; (c) in view MinFin Yilma's request for budgetary aid during HIM visit, and 1966 decline in foreign exchange reserves, not to mention emphasis on economic self-help as basis for US aid, Ethiopian purchase bombers will create most adverse reaction here. 3. For London: Request you clarify apparent discrepancy between assurances from Ambassador Bromley and HMG that normal commercial credit terms being offered and BAC statement that they offering 15-year terms. Leave your discretion whether higher level approach necessary. Depending on information you provide, we considering new approach to UK Embassy here, possibly at higher level./3/ /3/Telegram 189411 to London, May 6, reported that the British Embassy had officially informed the Department that the British Government had decided to allow the BAC to continue its discussions with the Ethiopians, but that the Export Credit Guarantee Department would not guarantee more than the normal 5-year commercial credit terms for such a sale--terms that were "stiff" and might stop the purchase. (Ibid.) Rusk
336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy/1/ Washington, May 1, 1967, 6:08 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 13 ETH. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Walker; cleared by Wolf and William B. Dozier in EUR/FBX; and approved by Looram. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Asmara, and Damascus, and by pouch to Bonn, Cairo, Jidda, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Sanaa, London, and Paris. 185525. Ref: Rome 5666 Notal./2/ Subject: Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). /2/Telegram 5666 from Rome, April 27, reported that an Embassy officer met with former Eritrean Prime Minister Tedla Bairu for an hour on April 26 at the latter's request. (Ibid.) 1. Re your meeting with Tedla Bairu, former Chief Executive Eritrea and now ELF leader in exile, appreciate your non-committal, tactful handling of talk and information obtained. 2. In light danger our contacts with Tedla Bairu and other ELF leaders might leak back to Ethiopians and because we do not wish give ELF leaders impression of undue U.S. interest in them or concern over Kagnew, Department wishes keep contacts with ELF discreet, appropriately spaced, and at working level. However we see no problem if Tedla Bairu requests another meeting in Rome prior his departure, particularly if only one Embassy officer involved. 3. Assume meeting would again be primarily matter of listening to what he has to say. Nevertheless, if required, you may state that while we appreciate problems Eritreans face, U.S. policy has traditionally been opposed Balkanization of Africa particularly since economic development reasons dictate large and viable country units in Africa. You should give no indication U.S. would encourage or approve secession of Eritrea. 4. At same time we interested in any information which can be discreetly obtained on intentions and policies of ELF, including re Kagnew. 5. FYI: Re Tedla Bairu's comment on "total lack of attention in Western press to events in Eritrea" there have recently been spate of articles in New York Times and Washington Post which being pouched Rome. End FYI. Rusk
337. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, May 8, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia. Top Secret. Dear Bob: Since my letter to you of November 2, 1966,/2/ concerning Kagnew Station and your reply of January 13,/3/ the gravity of the Eritrean insurgency situation has increased, and our estimates of the stability of the Horn of Africa and specifically Ethiopia over the next few years have become considerably more pessimistic. As a result, I have been giving further thought to the question of Kagnew's future and what should be done in this connection. /2/Document 322. /3/Document 323. The requirements of Defense and the various other Washington users, including State, and the resultant difficulties in trying to diminish the United States presence in Asmara are fully appreciated. Nevertheless, in view of the continued trend of developments in Ethiopia, I believe we should prepare for performing the Kagnew missions elsewhere. Opinions differ as to how long the Ethiopian Government can hang on to Eritrea or at least maintain some semblance of order there. Ambassador Korry doubts that it can be more than five years. In any event, there is a general consensus that when the Emperor dies (which could happen at any time), severe disturbances throughout the Empire and possibly loss of control of Eritrea by the central government can be expected. Moreover, in the interim there is an increasing likelihood of and capability for insurgent harassment of our station at Kagnew, such as the blowing up of antenna towers which cannot be protected or the cutting of roads, sabotage of the Massawa port and terrorism in Asmara itself. I therefore believe that the risks for continued operations at Kagnew are such that it is only prudent to develop a program of action on the assumption that such operations could be placed in jeopardy at any time. I think, as a result, that we should freeze U.S. presence at Kagnew at current levels and prepare plans for an orderly, phased removal of operations from Kagnew as soon as possible without undue prejudice to U.S. security interests. Specifically, I think there should be no further net increases of personnel (including dependents), that we should suspend indefinitely all requests to the Ethiopian Government for additional acreage, and that there should be no further construction at Kagnew, unless necessary for imperative tasks. Of course, any non-essential tasks or levels of operation should be eliminated. I am very much aware that taking steps to relocate the missions performed at Kagnew face us with real problems in establishing them at other locations overseas, in addition to meaning technically less favorable locations than Kagnew. I recognize that it is inescapable for technical reasons that preferred location sites for many of these missions will be in Middle Eastern countries where there are already existing serious problems as to the U.S. presence, which will thus be increased. I would therefore like to ask you to develop as soon as possible a phased program for relocation from Kagnew Station, together with proposed relocation sites, so that we may together review the best course of action to be taken in seeking to reduce our presence at Kagnew and maintain essential intelligence and communications capabilities in this area of the world to meet not only the Kagnew tasks but all others of importance to the national security. The Department will be ready to cooperate with you at staff level in preparing this study (including the possible relocation of the Diplomatic Telecommunications System missions now at Kagnew) for review. I am sending copies of this letter to Dick Helms and Walt Rostow, in view of their obvious interests and responsibilities. Sincerely yours, /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original.
338. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. Top Secret. JCSM-397-67 Washington, July 13, 1967. SUBJECT 1. (S) Reference is made to: a. A memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 15 June 1967,/2/ subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to any expansion at Kagnew and a phased reduction of Kagnew missions related to the communications, Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS), and contingency missions of Kagnew Station, including Decamere/Gura. /2/Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2467, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia) b. JCSM-770-66, dated 15 December 1966,/3/ subject as above, which noted that it did not appear that substantial reductions could be made at Kagnew in the near future unless the United States was prepared to sacrifice some significant capabilities and products which the Kagnew complex now provides. /3/Not printed. 2. (U) Appendices A and B hereto have been prepared in response to reference 1a and contain a plan for relocation and reduction of missions assigned to Kagnew./4/ /4/Appendices A and B are not printed. 3. (C) The large degree of interdependence and mutual support between the US Army Strategic Communications (Defense Communications System) Station, the US Navy Communications Station, Kagnew, and the intelligence collection activities collocated there and electrically connected thereto must be considered in any review of the missions of this installation. The support relationship was developed through efforts to improve communications-electronics operations, reduce operating costs, equipment and facility requirements, and improve over-all capabilities of Kagnew Station. 4. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) will undertake a review and consolidation of the plans submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Agency. Since the two responses have been produced independently, they probably do not provide a basis for ready consolidation. As pointed out in Appendix B, the amount of mutual support lost through selection of separate locations for the functional activities and the added communications which may be required may be substantial. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their part, were not able to prepare precise and comprehensive plans due to lack of final circuitry requirements of the Director, National Security Agency, and the inability to perform technical site surveys in the limited time available. In addition, it is recognized that there may be political difficulties in obtaining diplomatic agreement to construct facilities in some of the countries which are technically satisfactory for possible relocation. 5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that: a. Relocation, reduction, or elimination of missions assigned to Kagnew Station would seriously prejudice US security interests and would seriously reduce US military capability in the Middle East, South Asia, and Indian Ocean areas. b. A requirement exists for a consolidated and coordinated plan for the contingent relocation of functions performed at Kagnew Station. 6. (S) It is recommended that the National Security Agency, the military services, and the Defense Communications Agency be directed to prepare a consolidated, coordinated plan for the contingent relocation of functions performed at Kagnew Station and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on the plan. 7. (U) Without Appendix B, this memorandum is downgraded to Secret. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, July 25, 1967, 2119Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 ETH. Secret. Drafted by John G. Gloster of AF/AFNE; cleared by Looram; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Asmara, Mogadiscio, and CINCSTRIKE. 12830. 1. Ambassador Tashoma at own request called on Assistant Secretary Palmer July 24 to deliver message from FonMin conveying officially IEG decision to purchase Canberras and to present rationale. 2. In reply Palmer expressed our concern on two counts: (a) We not informed earlier nor consulted only learning of plans from other sources, and (b) Doubtful value of Canberras from IEG's own military viewpoint. Palmer then reviewed fully Ambassador Korry's and MAAG's now familiar arguments, including strong statement on danger resultant escalation in Horn. 3. Tashoma (who accompanied by MilAtt and First Secretary) countered with equally familiar arguments on increased threat from Arab World (particularly light IEG stand in UN) addition Somalia and Sudan. While US, with its global interests, might have difficulty understanding depth of IEG concern, it was to them question of national survival. In concluding expressed hope frank talk taken in spirit of friendship and noted separate arms request still before us. 4. Palmer closed discussion same tone, noting in last analysis Ethiopia's defense her own concern. Our concern only to advise and help where possible. This respect, will continue do our best re arms request within limitations other requirements and priorities. Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
