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320. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 17, 1966, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI-US. Confidential. Drafted by Looram of AFNE on October 19 and approved in S on October 26. The conversation was held in the Secretary's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary said that just before his departure for the Far East this morning, the President had asked him to send his wishes to the Somali Prime Minister. The Prime Minister stated he had hoped very much to see the President. He went on to say that over the past three years Somali-US relations had been good, although there were some problems on the horizon. The US seemed to believe that the Somali Government had made its mistake when it sought arms from the USSR for defense and has wrongly interpreted this move as an aggressive intention. The press had also persisted in putting Somalia in a very unfavorable light in this regard by exaggerating the extent of Soviet arms deliveries. The purpose of obtaining these arms, which were of a modest amount, was solely for self-defense in light of the Ethiopian military build-up over many years. The recent delivery to Ethiopia of US supersonic jets, in addition to all the other arms, had bothered the Somalis very much. Nevertheless, the Government of Somalia has tried to maintain friendly relations with the United States Government and has eschewed making public attacks on arms deliveries to Ethiopia. Moreover, the US seemed to consider that Somalia was relatively unimportant in comparison with its neighbors, and, of course, the US had no vital interest in the country. It is hoped that this impression was not true, but there was some feeling that the USG had decided at the time of the Somali-Soviet military agreement of 1963 to "hold up" aid to Somalia. It seemed to the Prime Minister that the USG should take more interest in Somalia and not leave the field to its enemies. The US did not realize its own power, seemed to have a "complex" about Communism and appeared unduly sensitive to the Soviets coming into any area. The Secretary stated that the US wished to have good relations with Somalia and to see Somalia safe, prosperous and independent. If the Ethiopian Government should move across its frontiers into Somalia, all of the United Nations, including the US, would be with Somalia, and vice-versa. There was no US policy to extend its influence in the area by means of a third country. We were satisfied with Somalia's position of non-alignment and wished to be friends with all the states in the region. It was unfortunate that we were dragged into the disputes between these countries, with all of whom we were on friendly terms. The Secretary stated that the United States Government regretted very much the escalation of the arms race in the area, and attached great importance to the need for regional understanding on the level of armaments. Otherwise the escalation would continue with unpredictable results, and the economic burden would increase. As to the Soviet aspect, the Secretary stated that the Soviet Union had made substantial shipments of arms to such countries as the UAR, Syria and Algeria, creating a great sense of insecurity in those regions. He was concerned by a similar development in Somalia. Possibly we did have a "complex" regarding Soviet activities; the cost to the US in money and lives as a result of Soviet activities since World War II had been enormous. The Secretary added that there was no policy of "holding up" assistance to Somalia. There were admittedly problems as a result of the Congress' reduction in appropriations and limitation on the number of recipient countries. Moreover, we would like to see some reduction in the arms race. At the outbreak of Pakistan-India hostilities, the Congress had come very close to enacting legislation prohibiting all assistance to these two countries. Moreover, the West European countries should assume greater responsibility with regard to aid to African countries. US resources were limited, and from a Somalia political point of view, it might be prudent for the Somali Government to have a broad pattern of bilateral assistance. The Somali Prime Minister thanked the Secretary for his views but still felt Somalia was not getting its full share of US assistance. The relative size of the population of Ethiopia as compared to Somalia had been greatly exaggerated. Moreover, the US and others had some responsibility for the arms race in the area. As far back as 1960, the time of Somali independence, Ethiopia created a security problem for Somalia by already having three Army divisions and the Bodyguard. Moreover, Ethiopia did not need to cross any frontier in order to treat the Somali people in a savage and provocative manner. It was not long ago that Somalia's territory was penetrated by Ethiopia bulldozers building a road. The Ethiopians subsequently found they were wrong when the location of the frontier was ascertained but, of course, refused to admit it. The US supply of arms and particularly the F-5s to Ethiopia compelled the Somali Government to rectify the situation. They had not tried to get similar Soviet planes, but would certainly have been justified in doing so. In response to the Secretary's question, the Prime Minister admitted that they had obtained "a very few MIGs." The Secretary concluded by saying that the United States Government hoped very much that all these problems might be settled by talks between the parties concerned in a spirit of goodwill.
321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, November 1, 1966, 5:54 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Looram on October 31; cleared by Palmer, AFE Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs Curtis C. Strong, Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs James W. Pratt, and Andrew L. Steigman of S; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Moscow, and Nairobi. 76805. Subj: Gentlemen's Agreement on Arms Limitations Horn of Africa. Ref: State 50340./2/ /2/Document 315. 1. Dept has carefully considered this matter pending Soviet Ambassador's return Mogadiscio and has come to conclusion we should handle further contacts with Soviet Ambassador on this issue with great caution. 2. In addition reasons given reftel and points made by addressee posts, Secretary brought up subject with Gromyko at opening UNGA, but latter showed no disposition discuss conventional arms question (State 66737 Notal)./3/ /3/Dated October 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LIB) 3. Moreover even if some sort of US-Soviet understanding possible on limitations of arms deliveries in area, likely Soviets would continue support Somali guerrilla action against Kenya and Ethiopia. In fact from reports (if true) that no new Soviet military assistance agreement concluded at time Somali President Aden's visit Moscow, Soviets may have decided that past and future deliveries of conventional arms under original agreement all that Somalia can absorb and support at this time and that guerrilla warfare more appropriate and profitable under circumstances. 4. Despite limited chances of success, believe far preferable (at least for time being) that African states themselves seek arms limitations between each other, rather than Soviets and ourselves trying reach understanding behind backs of countries directly concerned. 5. Therefore should on his return, Soviet Ambassador raise question with you, you should confine yourself to stating: we have taken note of reports if true of no new agreement for Soviet arms deliveries; we are similarly endeavoring curb arms race; however these efforts being undermined by increased Somali guerrilla activities; and request his comments this aspect of current tensions in area. You should not take initiative on matter. Katzenbach
322. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, November 2, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia. Secret. Dear Bob: Our African experts are concerned about the expansion over the past three years of our military communications center at Kagnew Station in northern Ethiopia. Their concern is that by increasing the size of this facility and the numbers of U.S. personnel involved we are giving the Ethiopians a bigger hostage to fortune and a greater leverage on us than they would otherwise have. Since January 1963 the number of U.S. personnel and dependents at Kagnew has gone from about 2,500 to 3,500 and we have recently been asked to acquire considerably more land for the facility. To the Ethiopians such growth is an index of the importance we attach to Kagnew. The price of our tenure could involve us more deeply in the Horn of Africa than our vital interests warrant. I wonder if you might have someone take a look at the military requirements of Kagnew with a view to determining whether we can avoid visible expansion, or even in fact reduce some personnel if possible. Obviously, such a determination depends on a number of facts and upon military requirements that we are not in a position to assess./2/ /2/On November 14, Secretary McNamara responded that the Department of Defense would study the recent growth of operations at Kagnew Station and the prospects for stabilization or personnel reduction at the facility. (Ibid.) Sincerely yours,
323. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, January 13, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, 091.3 MAAG Ethiopia. Top Secret. Dear Nick: Your letter of November 2, 1966 requested that we look into the prospects for stabilization or reduction of personnel at Kagnew Station in Asmara./2/ /2/Document 322. We have now completed the review I mentioned in my interim reply of November 14, 1966. Unfortunately, it does not appear that we can make substantial reductions at Kagnew over the near future unless we are prepared to sacrifice some significant capabilities and products which the Kagnew complex now provides. The geographical location at Asmara is uniquely suited for the Kagnew operations. For some of the most important missions, including the bulk of the security agency missions, we do not have feasible alternative sites. The relocation of certain Kagnew activities is technically possible. However, these moves are unattractive because they could not be accomplished without incurring operational and other costs, and they are not sufficient to make Kagnew Station much less conspicuous. We also cannot foresee any early developments which would permit us to carry out any significant portion of the Kagnew operation by other than land-based techniques. We do not presently anticipate, however, any major new growth at Kagnew beyond the additional antenna and facilities acreage we recently asked the State Department to obtain. With regard to manning, it does not appear that the personnel level should increase by more than 300 (including dependents) over the next 5 years. In evaluating the need for Kagnew, we have kept in mind that its operations are by no means confined to serving the interests of the Department of Defense. On the contrary, a major function of the station is to collect and report intelligence which meets national requirements and which is thus important to the State Department [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. You may wish to go into this facet of the Kagnew operations in greater detail. I have instructed my staff to make arrangements for any briefings on this aspect which you or other key officers of the State Department may desire. Sincerely,
324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, January 18, 1967, 6:49 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Confidential. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Strong and AF Deputy Assistant Secretary William C. Trimble; and approved by Looram. Repeated to Addis Ababa and Nairobi, and by pouch to Khartoum, Paris, and London. 121079. 1. Somali Ambassador Adan contacted DeptOff January 17 expressing dismay and concern on learning press announcement of HIM's imminent visit here. Complained about not being forewarned in order prepare his Government and indicated GSR would undoubtedly attach sinister motives to HIM's coming before French Somaliland plebiscite. He asked purpose of HIM's visit. 2. DeptOff explained procedures of informal visits of Chiefs of State Washington, pointing out not customary discuss such visits with third parties until announcement made by White House. Also noted GSR had not informed us in advance of President Aden's visits Moscow and Peking. 3. DeptOff stated it was largely owing to Somalia's strident irredentist policies and particularly its guerrilla activities that Somalia's neighbors were looking to U.S. for assistance and reassurance which in turn posed most difficult problems for USG. No surprise neighbors deeply preoccupied with whole situation in Horn of Africa. While we recognized faults on all sides, as far as Somalia concerned its current tactics seemed provocative and dangerous and were contributing to undermining U.S. efforts to calm and reassure Ethiopia and Kenya. USG continued believe it was essential that every effort be taken to moderate tensions and search for ways reaching modus vivendi between parties concerned. We believed it was not in genuine interests of peoples concerned for governments of very poor and underdeveloped countries in Horn spend vast amounts for military purposes and thereby neglect badly needed economic development. Somali Government was hardly contributing to U.S. objectives in area. Prime Minister Abdirazak had told Assistant Secretary Palmer in response latter's suggestions for ways moderate tensions there could be no peace until Somalis reunified. 4. Adan urged need for dialogue and said GSR always ready discuss mutual problems but Ethiopians and Kenyans refused. DeptOff asked what there was to discuss if GSR had no alternative proposal to taking over sooner or later one-third of Ethiopia and one-third of Kenya. Adan stated GSR had no choice given popular pressures. DeptOff replied this was exactly what Ethiopians stated when we urged discussions with moderate Somali leaders, such as President Aden and Abdirazak. 5. Adan stressed that President Aden had not gone to Moscow to request more arms and that Soviets were only providing what had been earlier promised. DeptOff wondered if this was the case just why he had gone to Moscow and noted continuous arrival Somalia of Soviet military equipment. 6. DeptOff told Adan he could assure his Government that visit was long standing matter, no one single or immediate issue had occasioned it and that while it would undoubtedly be raised, French Somaliland issue would unlikely be principal subject for discussions. USG's policy remained to favor peaceful settlements and oppose escalation of arms race. Rusk
325. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-20738/67 Washington, February 4, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 333 Ethiopia. Secret. SUBJECT Emperor Haile Selassie is scheduled to meet with President Johnson on 14 February 1967. The meeting is in response to the Emperor's urgent request to express personally his grave concerns for Ethiopia's security. He will point out UAR and Soviet advances in the Red Sea basin and emphasize the Soviet-supported Somali threat to Ethiopian security. In addition to seeing the President, the Emperor has asked to see you and Governor Harriman at Blair House. In preparation for the visit, the Ethiopians have submitted a list of major equipment requirements totaling well over $150 million (including tanks, APCs, antitank and anti-aircraft guns, C-130s, F-5s and helicopters. STRIKECOM has done a comprehensive study of the Ethiopian military capabilities, requirements and the probable threats facing Ethiopia. It is STRIKECOM's judgment and the Joint Staff's that the well-balanced Ethiopian forces will be capable of coping with present and future external threats without an increase in forces and major armaments. They see that the main Ethiopian needs as being in the fields of training and logistics. They also see a need, however, for helicopters (to which the Ethiopians attach the highest priority) and, at a later time, transport aircraft. Our objectives during HIM's visit are to say "no" to his equipment demands and still preserve our good relations with him. If we fail on the latter point, we will run a real risk of unsettling the satisfactory arrangement under which we use Kagnew Station, a key communications-intelligence facility at Asmara. We must do what we can to demonstrate to the Emperor that we are truly interested in Ethiopia's security and we are responsive where his needs are real. In the latter regard, we plan to speed up deliveries of certain key items already programmed under MAP (e.g. APCs and vehicles). We would also propose to furnish four UH-1D helicopters (instead of eight as requested by the Emperor) as soon as Ethiopian crews could be trained (eight-ten months). These are the only two positive gestures that could be made without substantially increasing the level of MAP. The addition of four UH-1Ds and several other minor items would mean an increase of about $1 million each in the FY 1967 and FY 1968 programs. The Chief of Staff of the Army does not concur with the provision of four UH-1D helicopters. Although there would be no need to divert the aircraft from Vietnam units or those scheduled to deploy to Vietnam, the Chief of Staff is concerned about the shortage of engines for the UH-type helicopters. He recommends that all current and future production of the UH-type helicopters be retained under US Army control at least until 1968 to hold as a reserve for Southeast Asia requirements. Against the contingency foreseen by the Army Chief of Staff, we must weigh the risk of being unresponsive to the Emperor in an area where he has a genuine need. STRIKECOM, J-5 and the State Department share our view that an offer of four UH-1Ds for delivery when Ethiopian crews are trained (eight-ten months) is the minimum response we should make. Accordingly, I recommend/2/ that-- /2/A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "I make this recommendation solely to provide the President and you with one 'goodie.' If the Emperor were not visiting us, I would not recommend providing the UH-1Ds." (1) You approve an offer of four UH-1Ds for delivery when Ethiopian crews are trained./3/ /3/McNamara initialed his approval on February 6. (2) You agree to the Emperor's request that you meet with him at Blair House. (Alternate times for your consideration are 1530, 14 February or 0945, 15 February.)/4/ /4/On February 6, McNamara initialed his approval for a meeting at 1630 on February 14, with the handwritten notation, "The time should be 1630 as I may be testifying." John T. McNaughton
326. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 11, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Trimble, Hughes, G/PM Director for Operations Joseph J. Wolf, Lang, and Director of AID's Office of Eastern and South African Affairs Eugene M. Reed. SUBJECT The primary difficulty that will be faced during Emperor Haile Selassie's visit (February 13-15) will be his desire for greater U.S. military assistance. His principal objective is to try to convince you of this need. The Emperor is seriously concerned about external and internal threats to his regime. In addition to his worries about UAR and Soviet efforts to undermine the Red Sea basin in general, he is concerned about the Somali threat in particular. The Somalis have received considerable Soviet military assistance, and they claim the large Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia which is inhabited by Somali tribes. In furtherance of its irrendentist claims, Somalia has sent guerrillas into the northeast province of Kenya (which it also claims) and into Ethiopia. The upcoming French Somaliland plebiscite heightens the tensions. In addition, a Muslim dissident movement in northern Ethiopia has become increasingly serious, particularly as a result of military and financial support given it by various Arab States. (The Emperor will probably gloss over internal dissidence problems.) We cannot and should not at this time satisfy the Emperor's demands for a great deal more military assistance or a possible request for U.S. guarantees of Ethiopia's defense. We are already providing $14 million in grant military assistance to Ethiopia in FY 67, of which $11 million is in equipment. This constitutes a very large share of our military assistance to Africa as authorized by the Congress under the $25 million ceiling for defense articles, which can only be exceeded by Presidential waiver. A similar amount is tentatively planned for the next fiscal year. Even if we could provide Ethiopia with significantly more military equipment, it would seriously aggravate the arms race in the area. Greater military training, better trained and equipped police forces and economic and social development are the answers to Ethiopia's principal problem of internal dissidence--not a great deal more sophisticated hardware. (The West Germans are assisting the Ethiopian police; funds are not available for significantly increasing our own relatively modest police program.) On the other hand, the maintenance of friendly relations with Ethiopia is important to our interests in Africa and especially to the maintenance of Kagnew Station, as essential U.S. military communications installation (with important intercept functions, a fact not to be mentioned to the Emperor) located in northern Ethiopia. There is no alternative site presently available for many of these facilities. Defense is accordingly prepared to provide $2 million more assistance, if possible in helicopters, and to try to expedite shipment of the most important items presently planned for Ethiopia. This will probably not be enough to satisfy the Emperor. If not, there is the risk that he might ask the Soviets for arms (he plans to visit Moscow at the end of the month), harass Kagnew on military jurisdiction questions, or take some other undesirable action. However, despite the possibility of veiled threats to Kagnew, we do not believe that the Emperor would oust us from Kagnew Station completely or affect our operations significantly, given the leverage on us this base gives him. Nevertheless, a special effort should be made to reassure the Emperor of our continuing interest in Ethiopia and to convince him that our present and planned military programs, plus a relatively small additional increment, are sufficient to assure Ethiopian security--and all that we can provide at this time. Our military people are convinced that with our current and planned military assistance programs for balanced forces and particularly with greater emphasis on training, Ethiopia can meet any threat from Somalia. Should there nevertheless appear to be a real danger to Kagnew Station, Defense would be willing to reexamine the situation. Some readjustment in future years programs could be made to accommodate a limited number of additional items. Such changes could be subsequently communicated to the Ethiopian Government through our Embassy at Addis. Dean Rusk
327. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 11, 1967, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, CO 73 Ethiopia (Restricted). Top Secret. SUBJECT Schedule 5:00-5:30 PM Monday: welcoming ceremony. 10:30-11:30 AM Tuesday: alone, with advisers standing by in Cabinet room. Papers Nick Katzenbach's briefing memorandum and suggested talking points are at Tab A./2/ Bob Kintner will send in proposed welcoming remarks and dinner toast. The State briefing book is attached./3/ /2/Not printed. /3/Not attached; a copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie, 2/14-15/67. Substance The Emperor will be taking a careful reading of the temperature of U.S.-Ethiopian relations. In particular, he will be trying to get us to increase our military assistance to Ethiopia, now running at about $14 million per year. Though he probably won't say so, his bargaining leverage flows from his knowledge that our communications base--Kagnew Station--in his country is very important to us. (It is our chief listening post for Europe, the Middle East, and much of the Soviet Union. It contains equipment which could not be effectively operated from any other available location.) Your advisers are agreed that we should not agree to any major increase in military aid to Ethiopia. The Emperor's real security problems are internal. Moreover, any substantial rise in our arms shipments would put pressure on the Soviets to enlarge their deliveries to the neighboring, arch-enemy Somali Republic, thus adding fuel to an already simmering arms race. Finally, an increase would be next to impossible to finance from current MAP appropriations and very unpopular on the Hill. We do not believe that the Emperor will react to this position by giving Kagnew Station a hard time. He is too dependent on the present flow of aid. We have, however, put together a small package of about $2 million in counter-insurgency help over the next two years which will save him the embarrassment of returning empty-handed. The important thing is to give the Emperor a sense that our interest in the future of Ethiopia--and your personal interest in HIM--remains strong. He is extremely proud of his stature as a world leader and a spokesman for Africa. Butter, strategically applied, can make up for many tons of undelivered guns. Tactics Ed Korry predicts that unless the Emperor has reason to believe that you know something of his problems he will begin with a long, formal statement. It could last 30-45 minutes (add equal time for translation). If your patience and schedule permit, you may wish to hear him out. If you would rather try to cut the lecture short, you might open with the following points: --You have followed developments in the Red Sea Basin, and know the depth and gravity of the problems the Emperor faces--the continuing tension with Somalia, the uncertain future of French Somaliland, the imminent British withdrawal from Aden, and the Moslem dissidence in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea. --We stand firm in our recognition of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. (This point is important to HIM because of Somali irridentist claims.) --The strong and continuing U.S. interest in Ethiopia is reflected in the very substantial economic and military aid we have provided her for many years. (A total of more than $60 million in 1966, more than $300 million overall.) --We are aware of the internal security problems the Emperor must deal with, and are prepared to look into the possibility of modest additional assistance in that area. --However, we are determined to avoid promoting arms races in Africa. We believe that current programs are sufficient to insure Ethiopia against any external threat. An increase would only serve to expand the pressures for a fruitless and wasteful armed confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia. This would be a great tragedy, not only for the cause of peace, but for both peoples (among the poorest in the world), who desperately need to apply their assets to economic problems. --The best hope for a safe passage through the problems of the Red Sea area is the wisdom and restraint of the Emperor himself. You are confident that he will continue to explore every avenue of possible accommodation and cooperation with his neighbors. Session with Ed Korry Korry thinks it would be useful if he could spend ten minutes with you before the Emperor arrives. I have no strong feeling either way. If you approve, I will arrange a time with Marvin. Walt Approve prior Korry appointment /4/No decision is indicated on the source text. The President's Daily Diary contains no record of a meeting between Korry and Johnson on February 14 or 15. (Ibid.)
328. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 14, 1967, 11:34 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65-1/69. Secret. Drafted by Looram on February 16. The conversation was held at the White House. The time and place for the meeting is from ibid., President's Daily Diary. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President The Emperor of Ethiopia Mr. Walt Rostow Dr. Minassie Haile, Ethiopian Minister of Information Mr. Toumayan, Interpreter (US) After an initial exchange on the value of personal contact between Chiefs of State, the Emperor began the discussion with a review of the mutual benefits of the long association between Ethiopia and the United States. He pointed to the contributions of his own country in support of UN collective security efforts and to the fact that Ethiopia had not recognized Communist China, thus associating itself with the U.S. despite criticism. The Emperor then outlined at length the security problems confronting Ethiopia arising from: Somali irredentism supported by "massive" Soviet military aid; the political influence in Somalia of the USSR and Communist China; the danger to Ethiopia if Djibouti fell into hostile hands; Arab states' assistance to Somalia; Nasser's efforts to extend his influence into the Gulf of Aden, with Soviet collusion, and the threat of UAR dominance in the area after the British withdrawal. The Emperor said Soviet military aid to Somalia, which had given the Soviets control over the situation in that country, was excessive for purposes of national defense or internal security. He cited comparisons: The Soviets were arming 20,000 Somali soldiers, one for every 100 inhabitants; in contrast, Ethiopia had one soldier per 625 inhabitants. Somalia had more artillery and armour than Ethiopia. The Emperor also referred specifically to the action of the Somali National Assembly urging Government recognition of rebel forces in Ethiopia and Kenya, stating that Somalia assumed direct responsibility for these forces. The Emperor then requested the following: (a) the US military "commitment" to Ethiopia, undertaken many years ago and until now averaging ten (sic) million dollars annually, to be raised to twenty million; (b) military weapons in hand to be replaced by more modern equipment, in view of Soviet arms aid to Somalia; (c) some sort of direct support for the Ethiopian defense budget to help finance petroleum, housing, etc.; (d) expansion of areas of economic assistance. The Emperor mentioned his visit to Moscow at the end of February, indicating he had wanted to come to Washington first and stating the purpose of the Moscow visit was to ascertain why the Soviet Government was extending so much military assistance to Somalia. He doubted he would get a satisfactory reply. The Soviets had always replied to Ethiopian protests by offering to give them arms also. However, the Emperor stated, he had no wish to embark on military assistance ventures with the USSR. The President stated we stood firm in our recognition of Ethiopia's territorial integrity. We were aware through Ambassador Korry of the Emperor's concerns and we shared them. Our interest in Ethiopia was reflected by substantial U.S. economic and military assistance totaling more than a quarter of a billion dollars thus far. However, the President pointed out the current difficulties with the Congress particularly with regard to military aid. He stressed the importance of avoiding an arms race. The President said he looked to the Emperor's statesmanlike restraint in dealing with the situation in East Africa and African problems in general. We shall consider helping Ethiopia further in a modest way with its internal security problem, depending on Congressional appropriations. With regard to Djibouti, the President said we would take stock after the forthcoming plebiscite and be prepared to work through the UN toward internationalization, if that seemed the wise course. On other points, the President suggested they be taken up with the Secretary of Defense and Acting Secretary of State who would meet with the Emperor on the afternoon of February 14. The Emperor could be confident of the friendship of the President and the American people, but candor required him to state what the situation was with regard to Congress. The Emperor replied that it was an excellent suggestion to discuss the details later on and that he also looked forward to meeting with the President again that evening. Moreover, although he was aware of the difficulties the President had with the Congress, the Emperor felt that the President carried a great deal of weight and could influence the situation.
329. Memorandum From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, February 14, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie, 2/14-15/67. No classification marking. WWR: SUBJECT McNamara and Katzenbach had a 1-1/2 hour, friendly meeting with the Emperor this afternoon./2/ HIM opened with an abbreviated version of his speech to the President. Again, his specific requests were for a doubling of our MAP and a new program of budget support--amount unspecified. McNamara replied: /2/Another record of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-ETH. 1. The Ethiopian army is well-trained, well-equipped, and three times the Somali forces. 2. The long Ethiopian-Somali frontier is difficult to defend, but the Emperor's army seems well up to it. 3. In our view, a larger force would be an impossible burden for the Ethiopian economy to carry if it were to improve the standard of living at the same time. 4. There may be some problems of maintenance and utilization of present equipment. We may be able to help some in these areas. (McNamara did not spell this out; he apparently means a speed-up in deliveries of current commitments.) 5. It is a fact of life that the Congress looks upon increased military aid with great displeasure. Katzenbach added that we are already supporting the Emperor's budget through revenues from PL-480 shipments of cotton. He urged the Emperor to seek political solutions to his problems with the Somalis. HIM replied that his hand is always out to Somalia, but that they always refuse it. In summary, it was agreed that: 1. The Emperor would submit their requests and rationale in writing. 2. McNamara, Katzenbach and Korry would undertake a careful personal review of this whole range of issues, and 3. Korry would then give them our replies in detail when the Emperor had returned to Addis Ababa. (The Emperor goes to Sudan and Turkey after leaving here; he won't be home for a month.) I would suggest the President take the following line in any conversations tonight: 1. He understands HIM's talks with McNamara and Katzenbach were most useful to both sides--each of us better understands the other's problems. 2. Assure the Emperor that the promised review of his requests will be thorough and as sympathetic as our restraints allow. 3. Emphasize that we believe there are real possibilities of softening the Ethiopian-Somalian problem through joint development of shared resources--particularly river basins. 4. Repeat that our conception of the Ethiopian security problem stresses internal security and that we will do our best to be as forthcoming as possible. EH [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
