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310. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer)/1/ Washington, February 11, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. Secret. SUBJECT Thank you for your memorandum of February 9./2/ /2/Document 309. Williams presumably received Komer's memorandum on February 9. I share your concern and appreciate your offer to be of assistance. There are certainly reasons enough to worry about coup possibilities, although it is interesting that Ed Korry now thinks that on balance a coup is not imminent (Addis Ababa's A-478, February 2)./3/ /3/Attached but not printed. Ed, on his own initiative, had a long private talk with the Emperor on February 3. You have probably seen his report on it (A-499, February 5)./4/ The conversation merits close study, for Ed made most of the essential observations and the Emperor in reply ran true to form. It is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that anything or anyone can persuade the Emperor at this late stage of his career to do anything against his "better" judgment. /4/Attached but not printed. In responding to Ed, the Emperor said he had "heard all these criticisms," that "time and experience were essentials to all sure progress," and that he would "soon take steps to arrange matters." Ed's comment to us is that he has heard this song before but that his net impression was clearly of a man who after almost 50 years in power was confident he knew how to deal with the present crisis. You may recall that after the 1960 abortive coup we had hopes that the Emperor would see the necessity of instituting reforms. To add to the pressures from his own top advisers (including General Abye Abebe, son-in-law and one of the heroes of the coup days, who fell out of grace as a result), a high ranking British diplomat and long time friend and confidant of the Emperor visited Addis and had a series of private talks with HIM urging reforms. All to no avail. There are similarities with the Shah and King Hassan, but there are also important differences, not the least of which is that the Emperor belongs to a much older generation and has the underlying feel that domestic reforms, instead of strengthening his own position, would strike at the heart of his personal power, as indeed they probably would. Finally, it is of interest that Ed has come to the conclusion that irrespective of all of the obvious dangers, the Emperor will probably stay on top. Obviously we are continuing to watch the situation closely and are looking for opportunities, but I frankly hesitate to use the trump of a Presidential message at this juncture, particularly in light of the latest audience. I suggest we at least wait for a while to see if anything results from the Emperor's statement about "taking steps soon to arrange matters." I certainly remain open to persuasion on making use of White House interests and perhaps meanwhile we might examine with Ed means of enlisting the President's help to best advantage./5/ /5/A covering memorandum from Haynes to Komer argues against this "short-sighted approach" and notes that the question is not "whether" there will be an explosion in Ethiopia, but "when." Therefore, an immediate effort to convince the Emperor to make necessary reforms had to be made, no matter how slim the chances. GMW
311. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Washington, February 18, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65-6/15/66. Secret. A copy was sent to Harriman. SUBJECT I appreciate your reply of February 11,/2/ but feel that our dilemma in Ethiopia is that if we don't take a few risks now we'll risk a lot more trouble later. /2/Document 310. True, past experience tends to indicate that the Emperor "will probably stay on top" over the short-term. But how long is he likely to be around? Moreover, our interests would certainly be better served by a controlled evolution than a chaotic political upheaval when HIM dies, or even before. As Korry too seems to think, the situation calls for an effort now to try and influence events and the risks of moving now seem to me less than those in doing nothing. Why not at least come up with a package of reforms designed to (a) reduce the current widespread disaffection among key elements of the population, and (b) increase the likelihood of gradual rather than violent change? Such a brief would examine such problems as succession, constitutional monarchy, representative government, and economic and social reforms. Then we could decide whether to try out such a brief on the Emperor, perhaps by some high-level personage. It might be a perfect assignment for Gov. Harriman because (a) HIM and Harriman know each other and get along well, (b) HIM considers Harriman his equal in statesmanship, (c) HIM and Harriman belong to the same generation, and (d) HIM would be impressed with our sending our Number One trouble-shooter to see him. I am also mindful of the Gov's success last May in convincing HIM not to recognize the Chicoms. If the present pattern continues in Ethiopia, our stake there will be in serious jeopardy. The lack of alternatives suggests that a timely effort to stave off trouble would be worth taking, even if its chances of success are slight. What would we lose? If Ed Korry returns on consultation, the Harriman trip proposal could be tried out on him. R.W. Komer/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
312. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ No. 5-66 Washington, March 31, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65-1/69. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates. SUBJECT SUMMARY Haile Selassie still reigns as supreme authority in Ethiopia, but his declining vigor, his absorption in external affairs, and the growing complexity of government are leading to general immobility of the Imperial system. The elite of the bureaucracy and the army are increasingly alienated from the regime, and the armed forces are hard pressed to put down insurgencies in the provinces. Even with the inspiration of successful coups elsewhere in Africa, however, the odds are against the Ethiopians turning out their Emperor. Nor is the Emperor likely to change the system in any meaningful way. The outlook is for growing internal discontent, continued insurgency in the provinces, and demands on the US for more military aid. The death of Haile Selassie will probably be followed by a period of confusion, with traditional and modernized elements and factions of the armed forces contending for power. In these circumstances, the Ethiopian social and political order as now constituted is likely to be shaken, and even the territorial integrity of the Empire itself may be challenged. At a minimum, the US may find it harder and certainly costlier to retain the Kagnew Station communications base in the post-Haile Selassie period. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
313. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, June 29, 1966, 7:43 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-ETH. Confidential. Drafted by AFN Deputy Director Matthew J. Looram on June 28, cleared by AFE Deputy Director for Eastern African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy and Colonel Dregne of DOD/ISA, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Khartoum, and by pouch to Asmara. 363. Subject: Somali Note. Ref: Mogadiscio's 716/2/ and 720./3/ /2/Telegram 716 from Mogadiscio, June 25, reported that the Acting Foreign Minister handed the U.S. Charge a 10-page note expressing grave concern over the U.S.-supplied military build-up of Ethiopia, especially U.S. provision of a "considerable number of supersonic military aircraft (type F5A) to the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force," which the note called a grave threat to the security and sovereignty of the Somali Republic and to the peace and tranquillity of East and Northeast Africa and the world. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 720 from Mogadiscio, June 25, transmitted the verbatim text of the Somali note to the Department. (Ibid.) 1. Following are Department's views for reply to note. 2. Note appears constitute for record Somali position in response recent Ethiopian and Kenyan campaign against Malik and Soviet arms to Somalia. In order not stir up public controversy affecting US-GSR relations or increase tensions in area, we prefer it be treated as confidential at least for present. 3. On assumption Abdirazak's Government will probably remain in office, Ambassador Thurston on his return should take up substance note with Abdirazak following clarification government's status as follow up conversation May 29, as well as normal resumption contacts following visit Washington. Hopefully need for written reply can thereby be obviated. 4. In discussing GSR note, Ambassador should make following points stating he speaking under instructions: a. US Government fully shares Abdirazak's concern over increasing tensions, arms race and risk escalation. Moreover we deeply appreciate his wish seek abatement these tensions and find ways resolve problems with neighbors. b. It is our belief three countries concerned basically interested in maintaining peace, have no aggressive intentions and wish reduce respective arms burdens. We cannot speak for Soviets, which is matter for Somalis to handle, but US would certainly cooperate with any regional agreement for reduction of arms. Thus we strongly hope that Abdirazak in keeping his statesman-like qualities will take initiative either directly with neighbors or through OAU or other neutral governments, possibly Sudanese. c. US Government has strong doubts about appropriateness or practicability of it getting directly involved itself in this African regional problem. We have always believed big powers should not meddle in inter-African disputes, which can usually be solved far more readily and satisfactorily by parties directly concerned. d. Nevertheless US Government strongly favors peace and stability in Horn of Africa. Hardly in US interests--much less in interest of countries concerned--to provide economic assistance to all three countries when they feel obliged divert such large proportion scarce resources to security forces. Thus US would be willing lend helpful hand in background and cooperate fully if three countries wish and if there are genuine prospects for mutually acceptable formula. e. Re US supplying military assistance to Ethiopia, it should be recalled that US military assistance predated Somali independence and neither was nor is directed against Somalia. US purpose has been to assist Ethiopia in maintaining internal security and undertaking collective security roles, i.e. Korea and Congo. Although we fully aware strong Somali feelings this matter, must be frankly recognized that public Somalia statements re status Ogaden and NEP, Soviet military assistance, and tribal and guerrilla activity across borders have given rise strong fears both Ethiopia and Kenya. Will be recalled US Government warned GSR at time it decided accept Soviet military assistance that this would inject cold war element in purely African controversy and lead to arms race. As example, Ethiopian military especially concerned now about arrival new Soviet tanks Somalia and there are indications we will receive strong demands for greater US military assistance. It should be noted this connection that Somali estimates on Ethiopian forces greatly exaggerated, notably size of army and police, tanks for police, destroyers for navy, etc. Similarly size of Kenyan police force distorted. Moreover US does not provide any military assistance to Kenya, yet according reports coming to us armed Somali tribal activity has increased over past months in poorly defended NEP which has obviously preoccupied both Kenya and Ethiopia and which was bound provoke strong reaction. Ball
314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, August 26, 1966, 8:28 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-ETH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Looram; cleared by Lang and Herman Kleine, AID Assistant Administrator for Africa; and approved by Palmer. 36666. Ref: Addis Ababa 713,/2/ 641/3/ and 545./4/ /2/Dated August 19. (Ibid., POL ETH-US) /3/Dated August 15. (Ibid., POL 1 ETH-US) /4/Dated August 9. (Ibid., POL 1 US-VIET S) 1. Appreciate your comprehensive expose of dilemma and complex difficulties confronting or about to confront us re imminent Ethiopian demands for more military assistance. Moreover you are to be commended for effective presentation U.S. position to Aklilu. 2. Following is guidance on some of questions you have raised to extent it can be given in advance of receipt Ethiopian request: a. Our primary short and long term objectives in Ethiopia are first maintenance Kagnew and second stability of Horn of Africa area including avoidance arms race. (Objectives are in consonance but admittedly means cannot always be.) b. We do not wish do anything at this juncture which would in your opinion provoke Ethiopian expectation of payoff in hardware request and thus aggravate arms race in region. This includes requirements for more Kagnew land if you deem preferable postpone this request for time being or if you prefer handle land package (Dept's CA-994)/5/ in increments, in which case order of technical priority would be (1) 300 acre easement area, (2) one and half acre conversion to exclusive use, (3) 100 acre exclusive use area adjacent Tract E (which itself acceptable in increments). /5/Dated August 4. (Ibid., DEF 15 ETH-US) c. If Embassy's efforts fail dissuade IEG from presenting shopping list (and we suggest you use every opportunity to continue these efforts) we will examine list carefully together with your recommendations and estimates of likely Ethiopian actions in response turndown before making obviously difficult decision. However, we would be very reluctant contribute to further escalation arms race. Moreover apart from problem of Viet Nam priorities, at this juncture we see no probability of any fund increases above planned program. d. We would not be prepared nevertheless take lying down Ethiopian "vindictiveness" on international issues, Soviet military assistance and advisors, Viet Nam, etc. After all Ethiopia currently receives well over half of all U.S. military aid to Africa and current plans envisage continuation substantial program. Total AID assistance remains considerable with Ethiopia largest African beneficiary development loans for FY 66. e. Re statement on Western support Somali military buildup by economic assistance, presumably you are referring to Italian budgetary support. U.S. programs are limited and exclusively developmental, would not necessarily have otherwise been undertaken by Somalis and thus do not necessarily provide savings to Somali budget but in fact additional charges. Re U.S. assistance to Somali police, amount of arms involved minimal and we recently turned down Somali request for modern weapons for police special force. Whether IEG appreciates it or not, fact is that maintenance of at least some U.S. influence in Somalia remains in Ethiopian interests despite admitted lack success so far in abating tensions and arms race. However, we have not given up and are pleased with your initiative in urging Ethiopian-Somali dialogue to Aklilu. We plan further moves in this direction. Rusk
315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, September 20, 1966, 2:01 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 AFR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Looram and Walker on September 16; cleared by Lang, Chief of ACDA's International Relations Bureau's Political Affairs Division Robert H. Kranich, Hamilton at the White House, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs Malcolm Toon, and Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson; and approved by Fredericks. Also sent to Addis Ababa, Moscow, and Nairobi and repeated to Dar-es-Salaam, Paris, and USUN for the Secretary. 50340. Ref: Mogadiscio's 596/2/ and 651/3/ (not repeated Paris). /2/In telegram 596 from Mogadiscio, September 9, Ambassador Raymond Thurston reported that he discussed the arms race in Africa and how it absorbed the inadequate budgetary and technical resources of these countries with Soviet Ambassador Diukarev, who had asked why the United States had recently given F-5s to Ethiopia. After pointing out the large deliveries of heavy Soviet military equipment to Somalia during the past year, Thurston asked Diukarev if there was anything their two governments could do to stop this escalation. Thurston then suggested a "Gentleman's Agreement" under which the two countries would agree to supply no more arms to either Ethiopia or Somalia. (Ibid.) /3/Dated September 16. (Ibid.) 1. We find your talk with Soviet Ambassador Diukarev on arms race in Horn of Africa interesting. As you know, we have believed on basis previous approach to Soviets with regard arms limitation in Middle East that Soviets would probably not be interested in any "Gentleman's Agreement" on Horn of Africa arms freeze. Still remains to be seen to what extent Diukarev's proposal was simply tactical probing our position on his part although we inclined agree he would probably not have put forward idea unless it at least consonant with his view of Moscow's disposition. 2. We, like you, see possible jokers in Soviet Ambassador's proposal. Moscow may have decided it does not wish provide any more sophisticated equipment to Somali Army and is willing concentrate on insurgency training and secret deliveries of light weapons, at same time obtaining concession from us on US military aid to Ethiopia. This would tie in with recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report that 20 Somalis from Kenya's Northeast Province had departed by air for 6 months training in USSR. 3. You have pointed out other pitfalls such as possibility Soviets figure arms moratorium would put relatively more strain on US-Ethiopian ties than on Soviet-Somali relations. Military assistance has been a major element in our overall relations with IEG and the cessation of our aid would have to be handled in a fashion in which it would be clear to IEG that it is in its overall interest. 4. Another difficulty in implementing any arms limitation agreement with Soviets in recent IEG request to French for some $10 million worth of tanks and other equipment, outcome of which we have little control over. 5. Difficult conceive how both US and Soviet Governments on basis mutual understanding could cut off fairly sizable ongoing arms programs to Ethiopia and Somalia without consulting governments concerned and persuading them it would be in their interest to accept such proposal. HIM might resist any arms limitation now, insisting that Ethiopia achieve clear preponderance before agreeing to arms freeze. Soviet position vis-a-vis Mogadiscio probably more tenable since quantities of equipment, supplies and ammunition delivered are commensurate with size of present and foreseeable forces. US on other hand considerably short of achieving Ethiopian objectives in vehicles, parts and ammunition. Foregoing could possibly be rationalized depending on degree of routine follow-on support envisaged under Soviet overture, i.e. prohibition on lethal armament but permissive attrition support. 6. Obviously would be preferable if at all possible for Africans themselves take initiative in limiting arms rather than US and Soviets trying impose it on them. 7. On balance, there seems considerable merit your continuing to explore how serious Soviets are re possible arms moratorium in Horn of Africa with your Soviet colleague in Mogadiscio. Of course, we feel it necessary to obtain Emperor's reaction, at some point, since otherwise we could seriously jeopardize our position in Ethiopia. Certainly we could not afford assume Soviets would not leak this information or that it would not get back to IEG through other sources. 8. Before deciding how to proceed, however, we would appreciate comments from action addressee posts, which should keep in mind President's interest in new initiatives in Africa as outlined in May 26 speech. Ball
316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, October 1, 1966, 2:13 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Looram and Walker on September 30; cleared by Richard W. Aherne of EUR/FBX, Warren, Philip Megna of AFI, Lang, and Donald R. Morris of IO/UNP; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Asmara, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Paris, Khartoum, Nairobi, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 58209. 1. We assume HIM has several motivations in wishing visit Washington so urgently:/2/ /2/In telegram 1162 from Addis Ababa, September 22, Korry reported that the Emperor had requested that he ascertain if President Johnson would receive him for "only a few hours" in Washington or New York so that he could explain personally the problems facing Ethiopia, including a "second Suez." (Ibid.) During a short private conversation with Secretary Rusk following Rusk's September 24 luncheon with African Foreign Ministers at the United Nations, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Ketema said that the Emperor had instructed him to ask for a meeting with President Johnson at the President's earliest convenience. (Telegram 1008 from USUN (Secto 22), September 24; ibid.) a. Given Ambassador Korry's very effective argumentation against need and desirability of more arms for Ethiopia, Emperor wishes make appeal at higher level in view Soviet arms deliveries to Somalia; b. Emperor desires discuss world problems; and c. HIM particularly worried by possibility French Somaliland plebiscite may lead to Somali take over and further Soviet penetration Red Sea area. Re latter we note Aklilu saw De Gaulle Sept. 27 and assume he received some assurances re likelihood French Somaliland may opt for continued association with French which should calm HIM somewhat. 2. We wish steer clear involvement Djibouti dispute, despite fact seems preferable French presence continue in some form owing danger Ethiopian-Somali hostilities and strategic importance Djibouti at entrance Red Sea. Our position in Committee 24 is maintain silence as matter primarily for Africans and French resolve. We have so informed Somali Ambassador here. When we see what if any specific resolution emerges, we will decide how vote. Ambassador Thurston's interesting suggestion re territorial swap (Djibouti to Ethiopia, Ogaden to Somalia) now complicated by French commitment to plebiscite and in any event situation would probably have to get much worse before Ethiopians would be willing consider such critical decision. Same applies for present to idea of establishing "Free City" under UN auspices which might turn out to be least bad solution, should it appear later on that territory not likely opt for continued association with France. 4. Re Emperor's tactic of putting squeeze on us for arms: a. We remain strongly disinclined to contribute to further aggravation arms race in region, particularly when in our judgement current Ethiopian military forces capable of coping with foreseeable Somali threat and there is no need for any substantive build-up of Ethiopian capabilities in the categories mentioned by General Iyassu. b. Still believe bi-lateral Ethiopian-Somali negotiations or through third African party desirable objective to continue working toward, despite obvious Ethiopian reluctance. Despite Sadeq's recent statement Ambassador Weathersby he did not intend pursue mediation idea at this time and Ethiopian suspicions of Sadeq, believe he could be helpful, possibly during forthcoming OAU meeting. We are considering other alternatives. c. We strongly concur with Ambassador Korry's recommendation to attempt get forthcoming OAU Summit conferees focus on Africa's arms races. Separate tel being prepared on this. We have doubts, however, re advisability of any USG message to OAU conference emphasizing importance this issue inasmuch as USG would then appear behind what we hope will seem strictly African initiative. d. We see some advantages in trying to buy time and to reassure HIM by discussions on force goals and re-emphasizing desirable overall security structure IEG should concentrate on. Fact is however we will thus have been maneuvered back into position of discussing Ethiopian arms demands, when it looked as though Ethiopian request to French had gotten us off the hook. Moreover, as Ambassador Korry had originally suspected, clear that Ethiopian demands far greater than anything we could meet at this time or that they could support. Presently planned Ethiopian FY 67 MAP program already totals $14 million out of limited funds available for Africa, and funding any additional equipment is highly improbable. Substitution of new items for those already planned would require elimination F-5's, vehicles, ammo or other materiel which Ethiopians presumably want and which would make more sense for Ethiopian security. Moreover, items raised such as 105's, APC's, anti-aircraft, M-48 and UH-1D in terribly short supply and M-41's frozen. UH-1D helicopters cost $300,000 plus per copy and are questionable with respect Somali threat. Furthermore, open terrain in Eritrea and Ogaden would make helicopters vulnerable, particularly in the attack role where there would be a long exposure time. Ambassador Korry may wish convey to General Iyassu that his requests: I. Far greater than anything we could meet. II. Far exceed what they can support. III. Far beyond what is required to meet foreseeable threat. e. In meantime also concur with Ambassador Korry's intention obtain clarification of status IEG arms request to French, pointing out USG assumption that French should be able supplement an already very large US MAP. 5. HIM's desire visit Washington under urgent consideration and separate message will be sent. 6. In sum, we naturally continue attach high importance to US-Ethiopian relations given international stature HIM, our desire contribute to stability Horn of Africa and our interests in Ethiopia, notably Kagnew. However, we obviously not position give satisfaction on French Somaliland and our flexibility re meeting Ethiopian arms requests very limited. Therefore, despite HIM's increasing and understandable concern over developments in region, Ambassador Korry should continue his excellent efforts point out realities of situation faced by USG./3/ /3/In telegram 1274 from Addis Ababa, October 4, Korry rejected the Department's thesis that Ethiopia was capable of dealing with threats to its security, and argued that it was a mistake to view the problem solely as a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Referring to the Emperor's view that U.S. preoccupation with Vietnam was permitting the Soviets and "their chosen instruments" to move with impunity in the Red Sea basin, the Ambassador pointed out that he had warned for 42 months that the Soviets and their friends would attempt to create chaos in Ethiopia and force the United States out of Kagnew. Korry asked for authorization to negotiate the lowest possible price without making any commitments. (Ibid.) Johnson
317. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 1, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-ETH. Secret. Drafted by Buche on October 4. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru said he had come to Washington at the behest of the Emperor in order to clarify the situation concerning the Emperor's request to see the President. The Foreign Minister said the Emperor was deeply concerned over Ethiopia's security and desired to speak to the President as soon as possible, preferably before he went to Moscow (toward the end of October after visiting Cairo). Ketema offered two possibilities on the timing, either before October 7 when HIM leaves on his Middle Eastern trip or November 9-13 between the OAU summit and the arrival of the Czech President. Assistant Secretary Palmer explained how crowded the President's schedule was in the immediate weeks ahead but assured the Foreign Minister that the Emperor's request was being given the highest consideration and an answer should be forthcoming the first part of the week. Ketema stated there appears to be a basic misunderstanding between the United States and Ethiopia concerning Ethiopia's security needs. Ethiopia could not accept parity with Somalia which the MAAG mission seemed to be urging on the IEG. He stressed that Ethiopia's internal security problems and external threats, not only from Somalia but from other Moslem powers, made it imperative that Ethiopia have a stronger security force. He said Ethiopia reckons its needs at 48,000 men and the US insists that 36,000 are sufficient. He said the Somalis were already superior to Ethiopia in tanks, APC's, artillery and antiaircraft weapons and that the Somali soldiers are armed with automatic weapons in comparison with the M-1's of the Ethiopians. In addition the USSR was giving Somalia a year's supply of POL--which some Ethiopians regarded as evidence of offensive intentions on the part of the Somalis.
318. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 12, 1966, 8:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ethiopia, 9/1/66-5/31/67. Secret. SUBJECT At Tab A, Nick Katzenbach recommends that you politely decline Haile Selassie's request for an early Washington meeting with you./2/ At Tab B is a proposed message which attempts to do this as gently as possible, offering to send a personal representative if the Emperor thinks it would be useful./3/ /2/Memorandum from Katzenbach to Johnson, October 7; not printed. /3/See Document 319. Selassie is worried about two related problems: possible Somali domination of French Somaliland, which contains Ethiopia's major outlet to the sea; and fear that the Russians are providing more sophisticated weapons to the Somalis than we are to the Ethiopians. There is some cause for the first worry. The second is primarily a tactic to get us to give him more MAP. Both are the latest manifestations of an old blood feud between Ethiopians and Somalis which is reminiscent of the India-Pakistan problem. Ed Korry has handled the Emperor very well. (You may want to glance at the cables at Tab C.)/4/ Essentially, we are trying to keep the lid on--to avoid violence over French Somaliland and/or an escalation of the arms race. There is some evidence that the Soviets are in fundamental agreement at least on the latter. The proposed message (1) avoids a crash meeting which could worsen things by stirring up the Somalis, (2) pushes Selassie toward a less bellicose position, and (3) notes in passing that the real answer might be regional disarmament plan for Africa. (President Nyerere of Tanzania has already suggested this.) /4/Telegram 1162 from Addis Ababa, September 22; see footnote 2, Document 316. I recommend that you approve the message. Walt Approve/5/ /5/This option is checked.
319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, October 14, 1966, 6:14 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted at the White House and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. Repeated to Mogadiscio, and by pouch to Nairobi, London, and Paris. 66484. For Ambassador. Ref: Addis 1162./2/ Please deliver the following Presidential message to the Emperor:/3/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 316. /3/In telegram 1409 from Addis Ababa, October 15, Korry reported that he had delivered the President's message to the Prime Minister's office that morning. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ETH) "Your Imperial Majesty: Ambassador Korry has kept me fully informed of your recent conversations, and has conveyed to me your desire that we meet as soon as possible. I certainly understand the importance of the matters which prompt your request. Although these issues are, of course, of primary interest to the countries directly involved, they also affect the general peace and welfare of Africa and the world. Thus, under ordinary circumstances I would be most happy to receive you here to discuss them personally and at length. However, as you know, I am leaving on Monday for 17 days in Asia, and I understand that you will also be away from your capital until late this month. My schedule for the period immediately following my return is already crowded well beyond capacity. I am afraid that I must, therefore, suggest that we postpone a personal discussion at least until I have worked my way through the urgent matters which will accumulate during my absence. In the meantime, if you would find it useful, I should be pleased to send a personal representative to Addis Ababa to discuss these matters with you and your associates./4/ I would choose a man in whom I have great personal confidence and who could accurately reflect my views. Perhaps it would be most to our mutual benefit if he were to come after you have an opportunity to talk these problems over with your colleagues at the upcoming meeting of the Organization of African Unity. However, I will be happy to bow to your judgment on the matter of timing, as well as on the question of the usefulness of such a representative. /4/Telegram 68168 to Addis Ababa, October 18, requested Korry's views on a proposal that Governor Harriman, as special Presidential emissary, visit Ethiopia around November 1 on his return from the Manila Conference. In telegram 1455 from Addis Ababa, October 19, the Ambassador concurred; telegram 69173 to Addis Ababa, October 19, instructed him to proceed. In telegram 1470 from Addis Ababa, October 20, however, Korry reported that the Prime Minister had refused to discuss the possibility of such a visit before the Emperor returned to Addis Ababa on October 29 and also believed that the Emperor would prefer to wait for an opportunity to see the President himself. (Ibid.) In any event, I hope Your Majesty understands that this reply does not reflect any lack of American interest in the problems which concern you. Ambassador Korry has well conveyed my own thoughts, which are the products of lengthy deliberation and a strong interest in the reduction of tensions in Africa and around the world. I fully recognize your high sense of responsibility for the security of Ethiopia and its trading outlets. But it seems to me of immense importance to Ethiopia and her neighbors that every effort be made to avoid any further escalation of the arms race. Indeed, it appears that all interests could well be served by movement in the direction of a regional armament agreement, perhaps administered through the OAU. All of us need to dig deeply into our reserves of goodwill and imagination in dealing with this kind of problem. Nobody is more aware than I of the complexities involved in dealing with this kind of issue, particularly when there is an absence of mutual trust between the parties to the negotiation. However, with time and patience and self-restraint, progress on the most difficult issues is often possible. I have every confidence that Your Majesty's leadership and statesmanship will be equal to the challenge of this most critical of the issues facing Ethiopia and her neighbors. If you and your colleagues can work out your differences in a manner which assures peace and stability, your example will be an inspiration not only to Africa, but to all mankind. We stand ready to serve that cause in whatever way we can be useful. My deepest apologies that I must postpone our meeting. Please let me know your views on a personal representative. I want you to know that my thoughts are with you in these difficult days. With warmest personal regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson." Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
