NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, December 2, 1964, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-ETH. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Colonel Heffner in DOD/ISA, Muller, and Blake; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to CINCMEAFSA and also for POLAD/CINCMEAFSA. 671. As result of interagency and DOD reviews Secretary of Defense has approved dollar level of $15 million for Ethiopia as part of DOD FY 1966 MAP budget request. Since current MAP submission is for $10.2 million, CINCMEAFSA has requested MAAG provide additional programming data for $4.8 million. Ambassador well understands that $15 million level for FY 1966 is subject to congressional action and that exact figure is classified and therefore should not be disclosed to IEG. Nevertheless, we believe SecDef approval of increased appropriation request begins set stage for progress in two important directions in U.S. relations with Ethiopia. First, should reassure IEG re degree importance USG attaches to IEG military requirements; second, should greatly strengthen Ambassador's hand in influencing IEG on Congo, general African issues, ChiCom recognition and other matters of importance in the U.S.-Ethiopian relationship. Believe with appropriately qualified language, and bearing in mind requirements of congressional action including possibility of reduction in amount, Ambassador can now use this decision as positive indication U.S. responsiveness IEG requests in area major concern to latter. We do not wish IEG officials gain impression U.S. possesses limitless budgetary resources and financial ability to respond to IEG requests. Re your 860,/2/ allocation of funds for specific items FY 1966 MAP program, this will be worked out through normal interagency consultations among Washington, MacDill and field. /2/Dated December 2. (Ibid.) Harriman
301. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Newsom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Washington, March 15, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH-SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Galanto. SUBJECT Ambassador Korry's March 11 Talks with IEG Prime Minister Upon hearing that our Ambassador was returning to Washington on consultation, the Emperor instructed the IEG Prime Minister to call in the Ambassador late on March 11 to discuss Ethiopian anxieties over their security and budgetary situation. (Addis' telegram 1299, attached.)/2/ The Emperor's concern stemmed from (1) the substantial deliveries of armor Somalia is receiving from the Soviets; (2) the resulting frustrations in the Ethiopian military which could undermine HIM's authority; (3) fears that Somalia, as soon as it is able to defend its own borders, will resume support of dissidence inside Ethiopia; (4) UAR-Sudanese support of Eritrean dissidence; (5) Ethiopia's critical budgetary crisis, caused by military expenditures "to meet the Somali threat." /2/Dated March 12; not printed. The Prime Minister had been directed by HIM to explore with the U.S. Ethiopia's urgent needs for more military equipment and for U.S. budgetary support. The Prime Minister also mentioned the Emperor's consideration of a "business trip" to Washington to place his problems personally before the President. Ambassador Korry replied with candor that a visit to the U.S. by the Emperor would not be wise, that more military equipment would only aggravate the budgetary situation, and that top IEG military officials agreed that the most essential requirement was to increase the efficiency of the military structure and strengthen it with intensive training. The U.S. was undertaking such action right now. Suggested U.S. Response Against the background of the recent MAP increase from $10 to $15 million, we are not in a good position to provide even more military equipment. We also think the concentration should be on the effective utilization of what they already have. Similarly, we strongly prefer not to get involved in any budgetary support arrangements which are exceedingly difficult to get approved here. We believe nevertheless that in the immediate future certain actions are desired to reassure the Emperor in a situation which obviously causes him serious concern. We propose: 1. An appointment for Ambassador Korry with the President with the recommendation that the President authorize the Ambassador to convey orally to HIM his personal interest and support. 2. An offer to the IEG to send a U.S. intelligence team to brief Ethiopian officials on Somalia's military capabilities, an arrangement similar to the team we sent to Morocco following its border flare-up with Algeria. (Before we make the offer, however, we first want to see a study which INR is preparing on the relative military strength of Ethiopia and Somalia.) 3. An approach to Somali Prime Minister Abdirazak suggesting that GSR President consider a written reiteration to the Emperor of Somalia's dedication to pursue its policies by peaceful means alone. To the GSR we would allude to Ethiopia's increasing pressure on the U.S. for more arms. 4. If in the interim period before Ambassador Korry's return to Addis the IEG approaches us for a reply, we suggest indicating HIM's message has been conveyed by the Ambassador, and that the matter is receiving full attention here. If you approve these suggested actions, we can begin to carry them out at once. Over the medium and long term, we recommend these U.S. positions: 1. Military Aid. Continued adherence to our position that Ethiopia's most critical need is for intensified training and a more efficient military establishment, rather than additional hardware. 2. Consumables. We already have authority from DOD to help out on such consumables as tires and batteries. While Ambassador Korry has been reluctant to use this authority up to now, on the grounds the Ethiopians would then expect such support on a continuing basis, we can nevertheless use it if the situation should so require in the future. 3. Budgetary Support. We look upon this as a last resort. However, in the recent preparation of the new AID strategy towards Ethiopia, AID has indicated its willingness to consider the possibility of assuming local costs for certain projects.
302. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs (Blake) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Washington, March 22, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Somalian Affairs Peter C. Walker. SUBJECT During the past week the situation in the Horn of Africa has grown more serious, as indicated in the telegram traffic. As usual, there are conflicting reports. The Ethiopian Government has recalled its Ambassador in Mogadiscio for consultation, charging that Somali propaganda broadcasts have violated the Khartoum truce agreement and contributed to deteriorating relations. TDCS reports from Mogadiscio and Somali press reports indicate serious clashes inside the Ogaden between Somalis and Ethiopian troops, possible moving up of Ethiopian forces to the border (within the demilitarized zone) and alleged IEG overflights of Somali territory. However, IEG sources deny any substantial clashes in the Ogaden occurred and a MAAG advisor who was recently in Ogaden saw no evidence of unusual activity. Prime Minister Abdirazak has expressed to our Charge his deep concern that the situation may escalate and threaten his government and moderate policies. We have prepared messages to Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio concerning steps that might be taken to calm the situation and have discussed these messages with Ambassador Korry./2/ /2/Telegram 336 to Mogadiscio, March 22, instructed the Charge to express to the Prime Minister U.S. concern at reports of fighting in the Ogaden and U.S. support for direct Somali-Ethiopian talks to calm the situation. (Ibid.) Telegram 1035 to Addis Ababa, March 23, instructed the Embassy to informally contact Ethiopian Ambassador Ahadu to elicit his views of IEG thinking before deciding whether to make an official approach to the Foreign Minister to express U.S. concern and to convey to the Ambassador the U.S. view that the most appropriate channel for working out Ethiopian-Somali problems would be direct discussions between the two governments. (Ibid.)
303. Memorandum for the Files/1/ Washington, March 25, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH-US. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with Mr. McNamara and stated that he wished to summarize several developments that had occurred recently in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa which should be taken into account in US policy toward Ethiopia. These developments were (1) the rapid delivery of substantial quantities of Soviet military assistance to Somalia, particularly armor; (2) the replacement of the Abboud regime in Sudan, with which HIM had had cordial relations, by one which appeared to be supporting the Eritrean liberation movement; (3) continued evidence of the Emperor's interest, dating from early 1964, in the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists; (4) the offer by the Chicoms of substantial budgetary assistance and of long-term no-interest economic credits; (5) indications of Soviet willingness to provide military equipment to Ethiopia if the latter alters its foreign policy; (6) the strain of the IEG budgetary situation caused by the Ogaden dissident problem; and (7) the heightened importance of Ethiopia to the US in diplomatic terms and in military terms as well as evidenced by the increase in the missions given to Kagnew station and the rise in the number of US personnel stationed there. The Ambassador noted that the IEG has a 93% gold and foreign exchange cover for its currency, several months' cover for its imports, an excellent international financial reputation, and a 4.5% annual growth in its gross national product. Thus, despite the substantial pressures that have begun to mount on the regime in the financial and economic spheres, the country still was on a fairly sound financial basis. However, Ethiopian officials, at the highest level had expressed their concern to him regarding the country's financial prospects just prior to his departure for the US. The Ambassador stated that he did not want anything new from the Department of Defense but he did wish to urge DOD to bear in mind the considerations he had just listed in dealing with questions of military assistance for Ethiopia and particularly in handling the delivery of equipment already promised. The Ambassador also asked that these factors be borne in mind in assigning MAAG personnel to Ethiopia. He stressed the importance of staffing the MAAG with highly competent personnel capable of the initiative and imagination needed to work with the IEG. Mr. McNamara asked Mr. Solbert to give him a schedule of what had been promised to the Ethiopians in terms of military assistance, to inform him of any lags in the deliveries, and of any lags that might be expected to occur in the future. Mr. McNamara assured the Ambassador that the Department of Defense would give priority to deliveries of promised military equipment to the Ethiopians. He also agreed with the Ambassador that the MAAG/Ethiopia should be staffed by officers of high quality possessing the kind of imagination and initiative required to do the job in an important country and in a difficult environment. He asked Mr. Solbert to be certain that the MAAG/Ethiopia was given a priority with respect to the assignment of high caliber personnel and specifically asked him to determine whether the new Chief of the MAAG Army Section was on his last tour of duty. Mr. McNamara then alluded to the armor problem described by the Ambassador. He suggested this problem might be solved by delivering M-48s to the Ethiopians, rather than anti-tank guns. The Ethiopian Air Force might also be equipped with materiel that would make it possible for them to counter the Somali armor. He noted Colonel Heffner's suggestion that napalm could do the job. The Ambassador described the reservations that the Department of State had with respect to the supplying of napalm to the Ethiopians. Mr. Blake stated that insofar as AFN was concerned it continued to have strong reservations on this score. Mr. McNamara reiterated his belief that the tank problem could be overcome perhaps by the delivery of M-48's but also in the near term by training the IEGAF drop napalm. He repeated that he did not think that anti-tank guns were the answer to Somali armor. The Ambassador then referred to the mobility problem of the IEGF. Mr. McNamara suggested that the answer here might be the Canadian "Buffalo." He asked Mr. Solbert to look into this. Mr. McNamara stated that the IEGF did not need C-130's to improve its mobility capability. The Ambassador asked about the possibility of meeting IEG military requirements from surplus stocks. He stated that this possibility had never been explored. The Secretary asked Mr. Solbert to look into this matter. The Secretary concluded the meeting by assuring Ambassador Korry that he agreed with the latter that the Ethiopians should be supplied with the materiel that they could operate and maintain in order to meet "the threat that is there, not the one that may be in their minds."
304. Letter From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to Ethiopia (Korry)/1/ Washington, April 26, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65-1/69. Secret; Personal; via Classified Diplomatic Pouch. Dear Ed, Have just finished reading your reports on talks with PM and HIM. If even 10% of our other Ambassadors were as forthright and straightforward in stating the case as you are, our relations would be in a much healthier state worldwide. I've long felt that candor was the secret weapon of our diplomacy, but diplomats are by definition pre-disposed to caution. In general, we are much too defensive about our policies and about the way we see the world--which is certainly a more sophisticated view than these little countries can command. In the case at hand, I also share what I take to be your view that we ought to straight-talk the Ethiops a bit. If we don't, we're in for nothing but trouble. The idea that other countries get a lot more US aid than Ethiopia is ridiculous. For the last three years, it's gotten more dollar aid than Nasser has. If Ethiopia needed more food, we could provide it (as we do to the UAR). In fact, I believe I'm right in saying that no other African country but Nigeria gets as much solid US dollar aid as Ethiopia. (Tunisia technically gets more, but our three-year $180 million dollar commitment has ended up about $80 million short--moreover, a high proportion of it is surplus food.) So I find the Ethiopian doctrine that they can shake us down for more a thoroughly pernicious one and delight in you stamping on it. More power to you. In fact, any point in my informally calling in Ambassador Dinke and making some of the same points you have? I don't know whether Dinke is worth talking with and would, of course, check with AF. But a little added counterpoint here (particularly an indication that the WH is aware of the situation) might be salutary. Cordially, /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
305. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State/1/ Addis Ababa, May 25, 1965, 1800Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Asmara. 1648. During three and half-hour audience and lunch with Emperor, PriMin, MinFinance and Acting FornMin, Harriman presented keen interest of President in Ethiopian position in Africa and his personal concern over US world problems, particularly course relations other nations with Communist China. Presentation by Harriman at outset of picture of President with warm personal inscription from President launched discussion in most cordial atmosphere. Believe meeting achieved initial objectives of reinforcing Ethiopian awareness US interest and postponing for present Ethiopian recognition Communist China. Ultimate policies IEG this and other matters will undoubtedly depend on outcome subsequent conversations with Ambassador on economic subjects. Hutchinson invited but ill and unable attend meetings. Gov Harriman opened placing present problems in context Emperor's historical position as leader against aggression and emphasizing President's present deep concern over aggression in Vietnam and demonstrated Communist influence in Dominican problem. Gov Williams stressed Emperor's constructive leadership in Africa, indicating this was one important reason continued US assistance, and importance US attached to territorial integrity, to OAU and Emperor's personal role in progress African unity and frontier disputes. Harriman pointed to advance constructive elements and contrasted with efforts ChiComs undermine independent countries. President he said would be deeply concerned in face such ChiCom efforts and despite confrontation in Vietnam if other African countries were to recognize Communist China. Emperor, reading in part from notes prepared by staff, stressed importance upcoming Afro-Asian meeting Algiers, problems caused by states such as Somalia, need for moderate non-aligned state play significant role, and his continued interest OAU and African unity. Then he posed question whether US was not itself helping countries which were tending toward Communism, referring particularly to Nasser and his belief confluence US aid and Soviet aid enabled Nasser intervene in Yemen with great suffering to innocent. Gov Harriman responded, pointing out US policy was to help those nations desiring remain independent and fact Nasser despite acceptance Soviet aid had suppressed local Communist Party. US, however, had protested actions of UAR in Yemen and Congo and has taken most unusual step of holding up for the moment fulfillment three-year commitment on food aid while suspending other aid. US did not yet know what outcome would be but policy under serious review. This evoked obvious interest on part Ethiopian participants. Emperor concluded formal audience by stating he has confident areas of cooperation between US and Ethiopia expanding; he had just received letter from Chief MAAG (ref A-708)/2/ with him on military cooperation which, at first reading, was pleasing and which he wished study further. He hopes this presages further cooperation in economic field. /2/Dated May 20. (Ibid., DEF 19 US-ETH) In general luncheon conversation PriMin made lengthy statement Ethiopian policy in Africa which emphasized four principles: 1) Right of people to choose own leader, 2) Territorial integrity, 3) Non-interference internal affairs, 4) Right of true independence. Harriman replied US subscribed fully these principles. He re-emphasized US awareness Ethiopian needs and stated Amb would receive instructions enabling him discuss these further with IEG. In final comment, Harriman stressed once more importance to President of Vietnam issue and recognition of Communist China. In wind up, Emp said he was satisfied with conference and responses to specific questions and remarked that talk was almost as if he had been able to speak with the President himself. In personal conversation with PriMin at lunch, Amb stated he hoped Emperor and IEG understood from Harriman's statement President's intense interest and personal preoccupation with ChiCom threat and opposition to ChiCom recognition which was matter of highest priority to USG and people. PriMin responded succinctly "we understand clearly." PriMin added he very grateful for actions USG appeared prepared to take in response IEG's needs. Korry
306. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 25, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI-US. Confidential. Drafted by Walker on August 16. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Ahmed paid his first call on Governor Williams in the course of which he outlined certain basic Somali attitudes toward the problems of US-Somali relations. He said he thought that the fact that Somalia was a successful working democracy, which had resisted the temptation to adopt the dictatorial form of government of certain of its neighbors, was not sufficiently appreciated in the United States. Governor Williams replied that we were aware of the democratic institution in Somalia but that our appreciation of this fact had sometimes been over-shadowed by our feeling that Somalia was coming under the influence of the Russians and by the irredentist policy of the Somali government. Ambassador Ahmed stressed that the desire for unification of all Somalis was an underlying political factor in his country which no Somali government could afford to ignore and long survive. He said that the Somali people considered that the Ogaden was under the colonial rule of Ethiopia just like any other colonial territory. Mr. Walker remarked that President Aden had recently told him that he considered the problem of the Ogaden to be primarily a human problem and that, if the Ethiopian government were to take proper steps to satisfy the political, economic and cultural aspirations of the Somali people in that region, the Somali government could have no quarrel with the situation. With regard to US policy toward Ethiopia, Ambassador Ahmed said that Somali people felt that the US was helping Ethiopia to maintain its hold on the Ogaden and for this reason there was a popular feeling of hostility toward the US. He referred specifically to a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor which he said stated that the US Army Special Forces were training Ethiopians to put down Somali insurgents in the Ogaden. Governor Williams said that our general position was that until the legal sovereignty of a given piece of territory was changed that it was the right of the central government to administer that territory and to maintain peace and order in it. In this respect, therefore, our policy was probably in conflict with the position of the Somali government. The question of the current Ethiopia-Somali propaganda war was discussed and Governor Williams expressed the hope that it would be possible for both sides to agree on calling a halt to such tactics. In parting, Ambassador Ahmed said that he felt it necessary and desirable to speak frankly about some of the problems in US-Somali relations and Governor Williams agreed that a frank exchange of views was always useful.
307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, September 2, 1965, 5:22 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ETH-SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Hugh Campbell of AFN and Galanto, and approved by Blake. Also sent to Addis Ababa, and repeated to Nairobi and Rome for Ambassador Torbert (Hotel Victoria). 51. Ref: Mogadiscio's 101./2/ Ethiopian-Somali Relations. /2/Telegram 101 from Mogadiscio, August 31, reported that the Somali Prime Minister had informed the Embassy that the Ethiopian Prime Minister had given the Somali Ambassador for his government's consideration: 1) a draft bilateral agreement governing cessation of hostile propaganda on both sides and 2) a proposal for a bilateral conference to deal with economic problems on which agreement might be reached. (Ibid.) Department welcomes developing dialogue between PriMins. Difficulties which GSR sees from apparent IEG pre-condition against raising territorial problems would perhaps be overcome by verbal rather than written assurances. Further assurance that unacceptable topics not arise might be secured by establishment of agenda to which talks could be strictly confined by mutual agreement either written or oral. Re economic agreements, history of Ethiopian-Somali relations makes it understandable that each side mistrusts other. On other hand, Department considers that very fact of IEG willingness enter discussions on possible areas of agreement in economic field is of itself significant. As talks progress, GSR will certainly be in position to safeguard its interests. FYI: Although USG has been urging these courses of action on IEG for many months, we consider it preferable not discuss present demarche in Addis unless raised with us by IEG. Recommend, however, that Emb Addis check with Burney of IBRD for info and assessment of IEG thinking in field economic cooperation with GSR. End FYI. In event IEG discusses its reported approach with Emb Addis, would seem appropriate point out that any gesture to lessen present tensions would go long way as earnest of intentions, e.g. return of Somali police plane. Emb Mogadiscio may wish same point to GSR. Rusk
308. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 3, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 ETH. Secret. Drafted by Galanto and Blake on November 2. SUBJECT Background Shortly after ex-Ambassador Dinke resigned in mid-June,/2/ we recommended to you that we delay making a recommendation to the Immigration & Naturalization Service on his request for permanent residence until we had had sufficient time to assess the Ethiopian Government reaction to his defection and determine whether his permanent presence in this country might prove politically embarrassing to us in our relations with the IEG. You approved our recommendation on July 28. Since then Dinke has sent critical letters to high IEG officials, distributed anti-regime literature and obtained a small amount of publicity in the American press. As a result, we have had several protests from the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister and their new Ambassador to the United States about Dinke's "political activities." The Emperor called in Ambassador Korry on October 1 to say he could not understand how the United States, in the interest of good relations, could permit Dinke to carry on activities against a friendly government. The Acting Foreign Minister told the Ambassador on October 16 that the IEG would object if the United States granted permanent residence to Dinke. /2/On June 15, 1965, Dinke asked the U.S. Government for political asylum. (Telegram 1336 to Addis Ababa, June 15; ibid., POL 17 ETH-US) We have emphasized two points to the IEG: (1) while residing in the United States, Dinke benefits from the same right to freedom of speech as Americans; hence we cannot legally silence him; and (2) if we try to force him to leave, the resultant publicity could damage the Ethiopian and United States Governments. Recent Developments On October 18 IEG's Ambassador Tashoma called on me at his request. He reiterated then the IEG's grave concern over the political activities of Dinke in the United States (while discounting his effectiveness) but asked that we take no action on Dinke until he, the Ambassador, had had the opportunity to examine instructions he had just received on the subject, after which he would discuss the matter further with us. To date, Ambassador Tashoma has not requested another appointment regarding Dinke and during a recent call on the Department in connection with another matter, he did not raise the Dinke question at all. Ambassador Korry now thinks the Emperor may be somewhat more relaxed about Dinke than in previous weeks as a result of his discussions of the problem with him. Under the circumstances, we will postpone making further recommendations to you on the Dinke case until we have had the opportunity to determine whether the Emperor's possibly more relaxed mood is permanent or transitory./3/ /3/On August 5, 1966, Secretary Rusk approved informing the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the Department of State had no objection to approval of Dinke's application for permanent resident status. (Memorandum from Palmer to Rusk, August 1; ibid., POL 30-2 ETH)
309. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Washington, February 8, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ethiopia, Vol. 2, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65-1/69. Secret. A copy was sent to [text not declassified]. Soapy, it seems apparent that the rule of the Emperor in Ethiopia is in growing jeopardy. Criticism at all levels--even from hitherto loyal sources--is widespread. Coupled with the Emperor's reported lack of concern, don't we have some of the essential ingredients of another coup? Would there be any merit in a quiet US campaign to convince the Emperor of the need for some quick domestic reforms designed to eliminate the most threatening complaints? We've had success in the past in convincing people like the Shah and King Hassan that they ought to be modern reformist monarchs. Doing so with HIM could buy the time during which more fundamental reforms could be started. If the situation warrants, some gentle advice from President Johnson to the Emperor, as one statesman to another, might provide just the nudge that is needed. I'd be willing to suggest to the President that he write a letter, if you'll provide a text. A useful preliminary might be to give a frank appraisal of the situation, as we see it, to the Ethiopian Ambassador here (if he has the Emperor's confidence). In any case, AF might work up a brief for Ed Korry to use in his talks with the Emperor--perhaps including suggestions for reforms and ways in which the US might help carry them out. Given our Kagnew installation and reports of the Soviets building radar installations and a military base in Somalia, I'm sure you'd agree that political stability in Ethiopia is most important to us. I'd be happy to join you in finding ways to help maintain it. R.W. Komer/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
