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290. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain African Posts/1/ CA-9629 Washington, March 21, 1964, 10:32 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ETH-US. Secret. Drafted by Post and Newsom on March 17; cleared by Fuller in CIA, Colonel Heffner in DOD, Deputy Director of AID's Office of Eastern/Southern African Affairs David E. Alter, Warren, Charles R. Stout of EUR/WE, Coote, Sol Polansky of EUR/SOV, and Herbert V. Olds of AFI; and approved by Tasca. Sent to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Khartoum, Lagos, Asmara, Mogadiscio, Dar-es-Salaam, Cairo, Accra, Aden, London, Rome, and POLAD/CINCMEAFSA. SUBJECT REF /2/Telegram 859 from Addis Ababa, March 2; telegram 904 from Addis Ababa, March 11; telegram 633 from Mogadiscio, March 8; telegram 634 from Mogadiscio, March 9; telegram 1450 from Nairobi, March 9; none printed. (Ibid.) The following text of a memorandum reviewed by the Secretary is provided as a guide to current Department thinking on the problems of the Horn of Africa, but should not be treated as an action document. Actions required to implement policy decisions will be specifically requested in action communications. I. The Problem A. The basic problem for the US is to maintain our strategic interests in Ethiopia while preventing a substantial Soviet foothold in Somalia. Full support of Ethiopia in a conflict with a Soviet-armed Somalia would only aggravate the basic ethnic and tribal tensions in the area without solving them. The best hope lies in finding, preferably within an African context, a modus vivendi between the two countries which will create an atmosphere permitting an approach to the basic social and economic problems of the region. B. The problem in the Horn arises primarily from pressures for a Greater Somalia, stemming from the secessionist aims of Somalis in Ethiopia's Ogaden Province and Kenya's North East Region (NER) and actively supported by the Somali Republic. The problem is aggravated by the recent outbreak of violence and evidence of mounting Soviet interest in the area. Despite general African opposition to boundary changes, Somalia is not without some growing African sympathy for its position. C. The pressures on the US are particularly heavy in Ethiopia, host to a US military communications facility, Kagnew Station, and the recipient of over $80 million of US military aid since 1954: (1) Inadequate US support for Ethiopia in the current crisis could tempt the Ethiopians to offer to remove Kagnew in exchange for reduced Soviet support of Somalia. (2) Substantially increased US support for Ethiopia at this juncture could stimulate accelerated Soviet efforts on behalf of Somalia, engender African resentment at great power intervention, polarize the conflict in a Cold War context, and increase US political and financial involvement in a most intractable problem. Even a full Ethiopian victory over Somalia, if it were possible, would not solve the problem of the Somalis and would further increase the pressures within the Empire. II. Background A. Somalia Republic: Western failure to support Somalia unification aims and a concurrent increase in ChiCom and Soviet aid have resulted in the elimination of the UK presence and a steady decline in US and Italian influence. The Soviet Union, building on a $60 million economic aid program, has recently gained both through the offer of a $30 million military aid program (not yet delivered) and through active diplomatic efforts tending to favor Somalia. Elections scheduled for March 30 have intensified Somali Government militancy on the Greater Somalia issue; at the same time they represent a possible opportunity for more moderate elements. B. Ethiopia: Nine months of unsuccessful campaigning against Somali guerrillas in the Ogaden has sapped resources and the morale of the security forces. Military leaders are chafing at the Emperor's refusal to unleash them for a punitive expedition intended to choke off aid to Ogaden insurgents (but which would further overextend Ethiopian capabilities). Somali propaganda incites Ethiopian masses to revolt. Ethiopian concern is intensified by Moslem dissident activity in Eritrea. While somewhat shaken by events, the Emperor nonetheless still has the situation under control. C. Kenya: While dissident activity in the NER continues, at the moment the focal point of the problem is in the Ogaden and along the Somali-Ethiopian border. D. Organization of African Unity: OAU aid was sought by both sides when the situation deteriorated into a border war. The OAU has called for direct talks between the Somali Republic and its neighbors. At the moment an uneasy cease-fire prevails and efforts are being made to find a basis for direct talks, possibly in Khartoum. OAU Chiefs of State will consider the problem at their July meeting in Cairo. E. Soviet Union: While its position in Somalia has been enhanced by the current crisis, the Soviet Union has not yet given the Somali cause its full support and appears to be uncomfortable over the possible serious damage to its position in Ethiopia, Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. III. Current US Objectives and Policies (Directed particularly at period between now and OAU Chiefs of State conference in July) A. International: To support both OAU efforts and those of individual African nations to find a basis for a cessation of violence and a modus vivendi between Ethiopia and Somali by: (1) Lending good offices, if necessary, to facilitate direct talks within the context of the OAU resolution at Lagos; (2) Support efforts toward a modus vivendi, including, if necessary, logistic support and equipment for border observation teams; (3) Furthering, where possible, joint economic development efforts in the Horn of Africa area (e.g., the Webi-Shebelli River Basin). B. Ethiopia: To retain Kagnew Station, our major strategic interest in the area, maintain the stability and integrity of Ethiopia, foster a continued useful role for the Emperor in Africa, and prevent further influence for the communists at our expense by: (1) Continuing military aid, including prompt but unostentatious delivery of special supplementary help to meet problems of the Ogaden, while refraining from activities in Ethiopia which might provide substance to Somali charges of US intervention on Ethiopia's side of the dispute; (2) Continuing economic assistance, now running in excess of $5 million per year, in an effort to assist Ethiopia's modernization; (3) Being prepared to consider projects which might help stabilize the Ogaden population; (4) Maintaining close consultation with the Ethiopian Government, both on the question of the Horn and concerning internal reforms essential to the continued stability of Ethiopia and the effectiveness of its security forces. C. Somalia: Retain measure of western influence by: (1) Continuing economic assistance (now running in excess of $3 million annually), including significant help to the Somali Police Force; (2) Continuing diplomatic efforts to keep Somali interpretation of US objectives and actions in perspective; (3) Lending discreet support to moderate elements; (4) Encouraging continued Italian efforts in Somalia, especially Italian leadership in western economic assistance, utilizing DAC and local consultations for this purpose. Rusk
291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, April 1, 1964, 6:20 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 31-1 ETH-SOMALI. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Blake and Newsom and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Khartoum, POLAD CINCMEAFSA Tampa, and Mogadiscio. 832. Addis Ababa's 985./2/ For Ambassador. Department strongly supports your prompt expression of concern to IEG officials over Hargeisa bombing raid. We are seriously disturbed by apparent irresponsible character of attack involving US MAP-supplied equipment, by possibility IEG military may be taking matters in own hands, by implications for Khartoum arrangements, and by effect on situation in Somalia, including formation new government. /2/Dated March 31. (Ibid.) While we appreciate risks to US position in Ethiopia of appearing assume IEG culpability such incidents, we believe seriousness this one requires expression our displeasure at highest levels. Unless, therefore, you see overriding objections, request you seek audience with HIM and convey following prefacing your remarks with reiteration US support Ethiopian territorial integrity and independence: 1. US has, of course, been aware growing strain and tension in Ethiopia as result of Ogaden insurgency problem. Nevertheless, had hoped some relaxation might result from Khartoum talks to which we attached great importance. Therefore, confirmed reports of attack on Hargeisa which laid to IEG following successful conclusion those talks received here with sharp sense of shock and disbelief. 2. HIM must be aware serious complications utilization by IEG of US-supplied equipment in such raid. US has always maintained its MAP to Ethiopia was conditional on IEG undertaking to use equipment solely for defensive purposes. IEG must also be aware Congressional requirement that grant US military aid to Africa be limited to internal security requirements or civic action purposes. 3. Ethiopia remains largest recipient US military aid in Africa. This, we believe, indicates importance we attach to Ethiopia as major factor working for African stability and as symbol African responsibility. Our ability to continue to be responsive to IEG requests for help obviously is not helped by such actions as the Hargeisa attack. 4. US hopes Emperor can assure actions such as Hargeisa attack and border crossings by IEGF do not recur. Failure of Ethiopian armed forces to maintain tight command and control over their air and ground elements, in what is admittedly difficult and often provocative situation, could raise serious questions regarding situation in Ethiopia and intentions of IEG. 5. In frankly conveying foregoing US views to HIM, Ambassador has been specifically instructed to reiterate that US continues to attach great value to Ethiopian friendship and remains deeply appreciative of serious internal security problem with which Emperor is confronted. US therefore believes that tangible US evidence of that friendship and of its support for broadly conceived solutions to insurgency problem should not be made more difficult by such developments as Hargeisa attack. Department has taken into account considerations contained Embtel 988/3/ just received and continues believe approach by you desirable. /3/Dated April 1. (Ibid.) Rusk
292. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 75/76-64 Washington, April 29, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the source text, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 29. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA The Problem To examine the current disputes involving Ethiopia, the Somali Republic, French Somaliland, and Kenya; to consider the nature of Soviet and Chinese policies toward them; and to assess the implications for US interests. Conclusions A. The Somali Republic's campaign to bring under its rule the half-million Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya has embroiled it in controversy with these two states. Within the past year the situation has worsened as insurgency, border incidents, and propaganda attacks have intensified. (Para. 1) B. In Kenya's Northeastern Region, Somali tribal dissidence, thus far kept under tolerable control, may become increasingly troublesome if, as now intended, the UK withdraws backing for Kenyan security forces. In the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Somali insurgency, encouraged and supported from Mogadiscio, has more serious implications. The Ethiopian army is finding it difficult to cope with the rebels, and Haile Selassie faces the dilemma that failure to take firm action would encourage disaffection both among Ethiopia's many disparate tribal groups and within the army, while a buildup of the army's capability and prestige would strengthen a force that could threaten his regime. Prolonged and intensified insurgency in the Ogaden could endanger the Emperor's political position. In the best of circumstances the Horn is likely to remain a trouble spot for many years. (Paras. 17, 19, 21) C. The Soviets, by agreeing to supply the Somali Republic with some $35 million of military aid, have partially supplanted Western influence in Mogadiscio and are increasing their presence in the Horn in a way which may be useful to them as future opportunities arise. Moscow will probably urge restraint on any large-scale Somali adventure; if open war should develop, it will probably seek to avoid actively taking sides. (Paras. 9, 22) D. Haile Selassie regards the US communications facility at Kagnew as his prime bargaining counter to gain US support for Ethiopian policies. We do not believe that the Emperor will seriously press for US evacuation of Kagnew, but will use African sentiment against foreign military bases to bargain for greater US military and economic assistance. (Para. 23) [Here follows the body of the report.]
293. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, June 5, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 091.3 Ethiopia. Confidential. Drafted on June 5 by William M. Leffingwell, Deputy Director of Military Assistance in DOD/ISA. Copies were sent to Sloan and General Wood in DOD/ISA, Ambassador Korry, and to the Offices of Plans and Programs and NESA Region in ISA. SUBJECT Ambassador Korry met with Mr. Sloan at 1730, 4 June, to discuss U.S. policy with respect to Ethiopia and particularly future military assistance plans for that country. Ambassador Korry pointed out that our present programs are based solely on assuring continued use of Kagnew. The Ethiopians recognize this and therefore continue to press for more assistance. Ambassador Korry thinks this situation will get worse instead of better and that even if we continue to raise the ante every time the Ethiopians press us, there will eventually come a time when this type of haggling will break down. Our relationship with Ethiopia will inevitably deteriorate unless we change the basis for our programming. Ambassador Korry recommends that we base our program on the development of effective Ethiopian military forces which would be useful in United Nations operations such as the Congo and at the same time would satisfy the Emperor's and the forward looking Ethiopian officers' desires for effective forces. Ambassador Korry concedes that this change would probably cost more than we are presently putting into the program, but not more than we are going to have to pay if we continue as at present. I pointed out that such a change would require a change in the national policy paper with respect to Ethiopia and also in the military assistance objectives as stated in the Military Assistance Manual. At present, there is nothing in the Manual which relates to effective forces and there has never been any military justification for military assistance to Ethiopia. Mr. Sloan directed that the NESA Region, in conjunction with CINCSTRIKE and ODMA, review the guidance for Ethiopia in light of Ambassador Korry's recommendations and, if appropriate, recommend changes. In case, however, that the State Department will not accede to such changes, Mr. Sloan directed that the Region develop recommendations for a minimum program that would at least temporarily satisfy Ethiopian demands. Wm. M. Leffingwell/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates Leffingwell signed the original.
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, June 18, 1964, 3:28 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-ETH. Secret. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Colonel Junkermann in DOD/ISA and Christmas, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Mogadiscio and CINCMEAFSA. 1029. Joint State-Defense Message. Ambassador is authorized, at next opportunity, to inform HIM as follows: 1. The US has observed with appreciation and support the leadership which the Emperor and his country are exercising in African affairs and in providing for Ethiopian participation in international collective security efforts. The US is interested in Ethiopia's further role in supporting such efforts and in continuing to assist the IEG in building an efficient army and air force capable of maintaining internal security and legitimate self-defense which would permit Ethiopia to participate as appropriate in defense of the area or in UN collective security arrangements and measures. 2. While in Washington, the Ambassador discussed fully the US military assistance program to Ethiopia. On the assumption that the USG and IEG share the same objectives, the US reiterates its firm resolve to continue to contribute, through its assistance program, to the improved capability and efficiency of the Ethiopian military forces. 3. To this end certain key items have already been expedited, including the shipment of ammunition by air and sea. 4. The US continues to operate under Congressional limitations in military assistance funds. To the extent funds are available, the US will continue to deliver items to equip a 40,000-man Ethiopian force when this force can, to the satisfaction of the MAAG, operate, utilize and maintain the equipment. 5. To assist in this aspect, the US is ready to accelerate training assistance to Ethiopia and in particular to continue the already successful MTT tactical training program, and to provide advisers for the IEG MOD. 6. The US is prepared to consider accelerating items already funded in approved programs, in accordance with current Ethiopian capabilities. 7. The US is examining the Ethiopian Air Force requirements and has determined thus far that planning may proceed on the basis of an additional F5 jet squadron of 12 F5 aircraft over the next several years subject to the Ethiopian ability to operate, maintain and utilize and the continued support of the F-86 and T-28D squadrons. CH MAAG will provide MOD with details./2/ /2/In telegram 1303 from Addis Ababa, June 23, Korry stated that he had conveyed the contents of the telegram to Haile Selassie when he and General Paul Adams, Commander in Chief, Middle East/South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara (CINCMEAFSA), met with him on June 22. The Ambassador reported that General Adams discussed with the Emperor ways in which a reorganized U.S. MAAG could help improve the Ethiopian military establishment. (Ibid.) Rusk
295. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-591-64 Washington, July 11, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 381 Ethiopia. Secret. SUBJECT 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed US policies and programs for Ethiopia in the context of comments and recommendations received from the US Ambassador to Ethiopia and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA and of discussions in Washington during the period 1-5 June 1964. This review has led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that a substantial and prompt increase in US political, economic, and military assistance to Ethiopia is justified by: a. The importance of Ethiopia to US politico/military interests. b. The recent deterioration in US-Ethiopian relations. c. Sino-Soviet progress in efforts to influence and subvert East African countries. 2. CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA has proposed a military assistance program for Ethiopia which includes the following: a. Dollar ceilings (in millions): FY 1965-18.24; FY 1966-20.44; FY 1967-19.56; FY 1968-12.15; FY 1969-10.13; and FY 1970-12.02. b. MAAG manpower ceilings (including training teams): FY 1964-126; FY 1965-231; FY 1966-542; FY 1967-246; FY 1968-246; FY 1969-221; and FY 1970-121. 3. Specific findings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are provided in Appendix A/2/ hereto. Appendix B hereto contains background information and discussion of the problem. /2/The appendices are not printed. 4. Consideration has been given to advice from Ambassador Korry and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA concerning the possible appointment of a British military advisor to the Emperor. Diplomatic efforts should be undertaken to discourage such an appointment. If these efforts fail, action should be taken to insure that the UK-Ethiopian relationship is consistent with US interests. In any event, the problems of a British advisor and US support to Ethiopia should be treated as separate issues. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The planned review of the National Policy Paper for Ethiopia/3/ be expedited, and that such review reflect increased US interest in the development and security of Ethiopia. /3/For the National Policy Paper on Ethiopia, December 19, 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, pp. 486-489. b. Priority action be taken to secure approval of a separate, basic US national objective as follows: to organize, equip, train, and support an effective 40,000-man Ethiopian Army and minimum, but effective, Air Force and Navy forces as rapidly as Ethiopian capabilities permit. c. The plan proposed by CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA be approved, in principle, subject to refinements resulting from detailed planning and discussions with the Ethiopian Government. d. Service and Military Assistance Program manpower and dollar ceilings be increased as required to support the proposed plan./4/ /4/In telegram 131 to Addis Ababa, August 13, the Departments of State and Defense informed Ambassador Korry and the Chief of MAAG, Ethiopia, that there was an estimated global shortfall in FY 1965 MAP funds of at least $170 million. MAP funds for Ethiopia were currently set at $9.9 million and the possibility of any increase in FY 1965 was unlikely. The agencies were aware of the problems this created at the present juncture in the U.S. military aid relationship with Ethiopia and still hoped to give fullest consideration to the long-range policy approach discussed during Korry's consultations in June. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-ETH) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Deputy Director, Joint Staff
296. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Wells) to the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) Washington, July 22, 1964. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Somali Republic, 1963 Thru. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, September 1, 1964, 6:03 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-ETH. Secret; Priority; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Blake and Newsom, cleared by Lang and G/PM Director for Operations Howard Meyers, and approved by Tasca. 238. For Ambassador. Embtel 262./2/ We have given consideration very valid points raised and have discussed with DOD/ISA on confidential basis. Deep appreciation present IEG role Congo as well as close past relationship give Ethiopia favorable position in allocation both present and future MAP funds. IEG willingness provide contingents for wider African political stability will also be factor in considering over-all aid level. Fact remains, however, world-wide funds are limited and we must do maximum maintain momentum with what is available, emphasizing training and equipment which Ethiopians clearly able utilize and maintain. We remain keenly aware this entails possibly serious risks of IEG pressures and disappointments but alternative is less desirable prospect of backing away from new approach you have so effectively presented. /2/In telegram 262 from Addis Ababa, August 27, Ambassador Korry noted that as the U.S. aid package was unwrapped, the United States would have continued difficulties with the Ethiopian Government, particularly after urging dispatch of Ethiopian troops to the Congo. In a broader context, he noted that if the United States were serious about its basic theme that African problems should be solved by Africans, it should be giving some thought to developing politically independent African "fire brigades." The Ambassador pointed out that currently Ethiopia (or any other African state) was capable of furnishing only the most modest effective military assistance to other African countries. (Ibid.) With additional training, additional funds and F-5's believe we will have provided significant evidence US responsiveness to IEG requirements. We see benefit, also, in maintaining momentum our discussions reorganization MinDef. View these factors and possibly adverse effects delayed presentation Adams' memorandum to HIM, request you deliver memorandum soonest. Other comment follows: 1. IEG Armed Forces: Dept continues recognize significant role IEG armed forces have played and can play in promotion African political stability. Also well aware IEG would expect concrete US recognition of Ethiopian role that stability, particularly if made in response US demarches. Believe fulfillment existing US MAP commitment to IEG, (i.e., support for 40,000-man force geared to IEG capability absorb support) rather than US support for building special IEG contingents for international use, remains best means for meeting both situations. To extent we can encourage more limited forces without political damage we should do so. We believe Washington Agencies might be prepared reexamine problem overage soldiers as part arrangement for reducing over-all size forces. 2. Delivery of F-5's: It remains US objective to deliver F-5's to IEG at earliest possible date consistent with their availability and IEG ability to absorb. C-130's involved in Congo not transferred to GOC were sent on purely temporary basis, and continue to be US owned. 3. MAP Funding: Ethiopian program now $9.9 million. Program conceivably could be higher when final allocations made. However, I view serious shortage MAP funds, we have no choice but to squeeze maximum political mileage out of what is already largest African MAP. Funding for MTT's provided for in addition to $9.9 million MOD advisers will also be funded in addition to $9.9 million. Rusk
298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, November 10, 1964, 9:36 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-ETH. Secret. Drafted by Galanto; cleared by Williams, Newsom, Warren, Lang, Muller, and General Pinkston in ODMA; and approved by Harriman. 546. Refs: Embtels 689 and 698./2/ Following is for use in your next audience with Prime Minister for purpose discussions US military aid to Ethiopia: /2/Both dated November 6. (Ibid., POL 2 ETH and DEF 19-3 US-ETH, respectively) 1. During November 6 meeting Prime Minister and Ambassador discussed series of matters pertaining to US military aid programs Ethiopia, matters which simultaneously receiving maximum attention US Government agencies concerned in Washington. 2. Already before November 6 meeting USG had decided send to Addis for purposes consultation Pentagon official who among most knowledgeable re Ethiopia program. Col. Charles C. Heffner arriving Addis November 10. 3. F-5's. You may inform IEG in writing US readiness deliver squadron of twelve F-5's over next several years, with three to four aircraft to arrive during March-June 1966 time frame, subject to IEAF completion their required F-5 preparation as described part two Embtel 483./3/ You may inform IEG orally that US is attempting to get additional FY66 funds from Congress which would enable funding 2 to 3 more aircraft for Ethiopia along with a small number of additional aircraft each for other high priority countries such as Korea, GRC and Turkey. These additional aircraft for Ethiopia if funded would normally be delivered in early 1967. FYI: Any earlier delivery must compete with these other high priority countries mentioned above. End FYI. /3/Dated September 28. (Ibid.) 4. C-130's. In order to meet what IEG has set as highest priority needs (F-5's and support for IEGF) USG because of our own fund limitations not in position provide commitment on C-130's. 5. MIG problem. You may inform IEG orally USG aware of problem and will take into consideration types of jet fighters USSR delivers to Somalia. USG would expect consult fully with IEG, including exchange of intelligence and estimates, concerning resultant GSR air capability. 6. Re remainder items your 698, suggest you report progress along lines you have already described. Expect you will continue put pressure on IEG for matching performance in readiness to absorb, maintain and utilize. 7. Heffner prepared discuss all these questions in detail with Ambassador and Chief MAAG. Suggest you hold off next week's return appointment with PriMin until you have had opportunity talk with Heffner. 8. Department appreciative way you handled general policy issues between US and IEG as well as military aid questions in your talk with PriMin. We have found your analysis and suggestions for action on various military aid items most helpful. Ball
299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, November 20, 1964, 8:16 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-ETH. Secret. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Blake, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Mogadiscio, Asmara, and CINCMEAFSA, and by pouch to Nairobi, London, and Rome. 620. Department has carefully studied your account November 6 meeting with PriMin (Embtels 689 and 698),/2/ your talks with Merid and other recent reports from Ethiopia and Somalia. Department appreciates not only tactful way you handled Ethiopian charges but also your resort to frank language when you deemed situation warranted. On theory ounce of prevention worth pound of cure, Department believes this is opportune moment for further frank talks with high IEG officials about Somalia and U.S.-Ethiopian relations. Following talking points for your use in such talks to supplement items you plan bring up yourself. /2/See footnote 2, Document 298. 1. USG is struck by similarity in expressions of alarm we are hearing from both Ethiopians and Somalis about each other's worrisome intentions. IEG PriMin has described Somalia as determined bring down Ethiopia by attack and subversion, has referred to hundreds of Somali pilots, officers, technicians being trained in Soviet Union and modern military equipment arriving. From Somali side, General Daud and others, we hear reports about IEG troop reinforcements and digging of fortifications along border, fears that Ethiopia will attempt pre-emptive strike at Somalia and speculations that increase in U.S. military aid to Ethiopia has led to harder IEG line towards Somalia. Note also GSR message to HIM about Ethiopian violation demilitarized border strip (Mogadiscio's 227)./3/ We believe climate of mutual mistrust and fear created by endless repetition of charges dangerous to both sides because it leads to false assumptions which can produce disastrously wrong courses of action. /3/Dated November 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 KENYA-SOMALI) 2. On question radio propaganda, USG has in past instructed Ambassador Mogadiscio to express to GSR view such broadcasts, especially in Amharic, are inflammatory and damaging to GSR-IEG relations. We are prepared reiterate this view to GSR in future if circumstances warrant. While we do not condone tone and content of most recent Mogadiscio emissions, we do believe there is some connection between them and HIM's press conference at Asmara October 25. Moreover, before weighing in with GSR, would be helpful to know whether IEG has protested broadcasts either through Somali Ambassador in Addis or Ethiopian Ambassador in Mogadiscio. If IEG took such initiative, what was GSR reaction? 3. Re question arms build-up in Somalia and threat it may pose to Ethiopia, we note that Embassy Mogadiscio has been sending Addis substantial volume reports about Soviet deliveries, USSR military adviser activities and relationship to Somali capabilities. Used selectively and pulled together, believe this information could give IEG officials better perspective on what Somalia can and cannot undertake militarily. We would also have these additional observations: (a) GSR presently facing financial crisis of grave proportions--Communist China has not renewed its budgetary assistance; (b) on Somali side wounds of February-March fighting far from healed; (c) GSR seems to be following policy of generally keeping army away from border--responsibility for maintaining security on Somali side largely vested in police; (d) GSR military establishment presently showing typical weaknesses and strains caused by conversion former weapons and tactical systems (Anglo-Italian) to new system (Soviet). 4. Since both sides are deeply concerned with reported reinforcements and alleged preparations for aggression, moment would appear opportune for reactivation joint Somali-Ethiopian commission to inspect demilitarized border strip per Khartoum Agreement of March 1964. 5. On subject possible IEG preventive action against Somalia, we aware of recurrent pressures from within IEG military for move this direction. Politically, such a move would be tragic and a terrible blemish on HIM's reputation as African peace-maker. Most serious consequence, however, would be fall of Abdirazak and his certain replacement by figure far less moderate. We would encourage Ethiopians think more thoroughly about present Somali Government and implications its continued existence or possible demise. US has had frequent occasion to work closely with Abdirazak, first as Interior Minister, later as Minister Public Works. Basis our experience we view him as moderate whose policies aimed primarily at achieving progress on domestic scene--government and administrative reforms, economic development, raising living standards Somalis in Republic. Externally Abdirazak appears desirous downplay pursuit of Greater Somalia objective. His ability walk this tightrope by no means certain. His numerous and powerful adversaries favor a much harder line towards Ethiopia and far more aggressive pursuit of Somalia's territorial claims. Ethiopians should be encouraged reflect on what sort of government they would expect to succeed Abdirazak should he fall. Additional material on military issues follows by separate cable. Ball [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
