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Horn of Africa
275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, January 15, 1964, 4:02 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI-US. Confidential. Drafted by Galanto and Newsom on January 13; cleared by Hadsel, AFE Deputy Director for Eastern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote, and Director of AID's Office of Eastern/Southern African Affairs Willard Muller; and approved by Tasca. Sent by pouch to Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Bonn, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, London, Moscow, and Rome. 341. As March 8 national elections approach, Department believes would be helpful set forth, for Embassy comment and appropriate local use, summary US attitudes and policies toward Somali Republic. We do not intend formal demarche, but do hope salient points can be conveyed to key Somalis in such manner as Embassy believes appropriate and effective. 1. US remains interested in independence and well-being Somali Republic as indicated by our aid program and earlier efforts provide defense assistance. US is in no sense abandoning its continuing interest in close and friendly relations with Somalia. 2. As friend we are disturbed at growing isolation of Somalia in Africa and progressive deterioration of relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. We realize importance in Somali eyes of cause of self-determination for all Somali minorities. At same time in African eyes, colonial boundaries are almost universally recognized even when tribal lines are crossed. Also in African eyes Somali pursuit of claims through propaganda often directed at neighbors appears belie "peaceful and legal means" called for in Somali constitution, creating image of Somalia as trouble-maker, as country swimming against prevailing African currents of legitimacy, territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes. 3. In US view, GSR is neither as directly implicated in supporting dissidence as IEG and GOK claim nor as uninvolved as GSR officials proclaim. We recognize pressures acting on Somali leaders: domestic pressures to further cause of unification of all Somali people; pressures from Kenya and Ethiopia Somalis to support their activities against GOK and IEG. Nevertheless, in broader sense and in African context, we must also recognize that Ethiopia and Kenya possess sound reasons for construing as unfriendly and hostile acts certain GSR activities such as propaganda, acquiescence in use of GSR territory as a safe-haven for dissidents and gun-running, mere existence of which is troublesome regardless of scale. 4. Source of difficulty in sum is Somali irredentism. While US understands GSR cannot forego interest Somali in neighboring countries, active and militant pursuit of territory of neighboring states isolates Somalia, builds dangerous pressures on its economy and security and creates special difficulties for those who have been longest and most active supporters independent Somali Republic. 5. Pressures are growing on US to assist Somalia's neighbors in problem they face. The US does not desire create further difficulties with Somalia, nor add to tensions in Horn, yet to extent GSA appears condoning insurgency in neighboring states, US cannot be deaf to appeals of its other friends. 6. It is our impression Soviet arms program will be increasingly viewed as manifestation of unfortunate concentration of GSR on militant aspects of "Greater Somalia" designs. As we have said in past, we are greatly concerned not only by increase of Soviet influence in Somalia but by detrimental impact military build-up will have on priorities of economic development. We believe it is not too late to slow down pace and effect of Soviet arms program. 7. From Africa and elsewhere observers will look upon Somali elections as turning point which in all likelihood will present GSR with three alternative courses of action: first, continuation of present policies which are characterized by partial support of Somali dissidents across the borders and hesitancy to come to grips with the problem by direct talks with Ethiopians and Kenyans; second, stepped up or all-out campaign in support of Kenyan and Ethiopian Somali separatist movements; or third, demonstration of sincere desire on part of Somali leadership to improve relations with Somalia's neighbors and seek constructive measures for solution or at least alleviation of border and territorial disputes by peaceful settlements and not through force. We believe welfare and acceptance Somalia can be best assured by latter course. Note: Foregoing is Noforn for information posts. Rusk
276. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Moyers)/1/ Washington, January 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Hamilton Files, Ethiopia. No classification marking. We are having a difficult discussion with Ethiopia over the issue of increasing our military aid program there (they already have the biggest MAP in Africa, but we have an important communications facility there). Ambassador Korry in Ethiopia has asked us for a Presidential letter to Haile Selassie because the Emperor is quite unhappy and feels that we have let him down personally./2/ /2/In telegram 666 from Addis Ababa, January 17, Ambassador Korry reported that the rapid deterioration of Ethiopian-Somali relations on one hand and U.S. relations with Emperor Haile Selassie on the other prompted him to request that the Department consider whether an urgent Presidential message to the Emperor would be advantageous. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI) However, we think it better to hold the big guns until we need them more, so the attached cable/3/ simply instructs the Ambassador to soothe the Emperor and tell him the President wants to stay in close consultation with him on African problems. We are also going to ease the strain by giving him a little something in additional military aid./4/ /3/Not attached; reference is presumably to Document 278. /4/Telegram 586 to Addis Ababa, January 21, instructed Korry to inform the Emperor that the U.S. Government had agreed to provide "extraordinary additional aid in FY 1964 of not to exceed $1 million beyond programmed $8.5 million." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-ETH) I don't believe the President needs to see this until we take a step that involves him more substantially. However, I would appreciate your judgment as to whether to show it to him before I clear it./5/ /5/A handwritten notation in the margin reads: "Pres wants a correspondence w/HIM on African problems. WB" Bill Brubeck/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, January 21, 1964, 6:39 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Secret. Immediate. Drafted by AFN Deputy Director James J. Blake and Galanto, cleared by W. Paul O'Neill of AFE, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 353. Deptel 341./2/ Department believes recent manifestations political instability in Tanganyika-Zanzibar area as well as US-Ethiopian bilateral relations require US endeavor impress GSR with growing US concern over threat to stability of Horn region arising out of increasing number reports of GSR arms support for Ogaden Somalis. While not in any sense implying threat, we feel GSR should be aware their pressures on IEG result in counter pressures on US we cannot ignore. Appreciate that depth GSR sensitivities on ethnic Somali parties and particularly sensitive atmosphere preceding March elections may make tactful but nonetheless frank demarche by you difficult. Nevertheless believe recent border incidents, which were subject GSR convocation of Chiefs of Mission January 19, suggest to us increasing tenseness IEG-GSR relations with consequences for Horn area and for GSR which we believe GSR would wish avoid. /2/Document 275. Dept therefore requests you seek appointment with Foreign Minister early next week at which following points should be made in context of US consideration points made by GSR at January 19 convocation: 1. Dept has noted approach made to Ambassador re border incident. While we are not in position make judgments on incidents in area, our position clear to IEG that we do not condone violations frontiers. Somalia's troubles with Ethiopia and Kenya come in juxtaposition with other recent East African events which have focused US concern and attention on this area. Violence of any kind, regardless of whether it is done in furtherance of cause which one side believes inherently and unquestionably just, tends to play into hands those forces working against independence and true sovereignty African countries. 2. Against this background, Dept also wishes express its concern over seeming mounting level incidents in Horn area. 3. Through our Ambassador in Addis, we have been trying persuade HIM that purely military solution not answer to Ogaden question, that economic and social measures to improve lot of Ogaden Somalis, coupled with effort seek areas of agreement, however small, with GSR, offer superior chances achieving long-range solution. Increasing reports of arms support to Ogaden Somalis from GSR side of border can only undermine such attempts on part USG, creating situation in which we cannot afford be unresponsive to pressure for further military assistance from IEG. 4. Reports emanating from Addis Ababa and Nairobi, recent conclusion IEG-GOK Defense Pact, and exchange visits by official delegations indicate serious view Ethiopia and Kenya take on matter of GSR support for activities of Ogaden and NFD Somalis. 5. Reports of GSR arms support to Ogaden Somalis also becoming too numerous for USG to discount and tend belie GSR declarations about adhering to peaceful and legal means in pursuing goal of union all Somali peoples. 6. In Horn and East Africa area, priority objective US policy is maintenance of peace and stability. With each member Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle we wish sustain best possible relations. In this context, we have in spirit of frankness and friendship brought this concern to attention GSR./3/ /3/In telegram 490 from Mogadiscio, January 28, Ambassador Horace Torbert reported that he had delivered the Department's message to the Somali Foreign Minister on January 27 and had also covered it in substance with the President on January 26. Both had denied any official Somali support to the insurrection. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI) Rusk
278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, January 21, 1964, 7:22 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOM. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Blake and Newsom on January 20; cleared by George L. Warren of G/PM, AFI Politico-Military Adviser Eric E. Oulashin, Muller, Colonel Heffner in DOD/ISA, Harriman, and Brubeck; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Mogadiscio and POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and to Asmara. 592. Embtel 666./2/ In lieu formal message at this time desire you seek audience HIM Jan. 23 or earliest possible moment. Primary occasion might be presentation autographed photo of HIM with President pouched Addis January 18. Inscription reads "I hope for the benefit of your counsel and for the continued cooperation of our two countries." You should indicate President desires convey his concern to HIM over situation in East Africa (specifically current Tanganyika and Zanzibar situations) which poses threat to stability of regimes elsewhere on continent view apparently successful use violence to achieve political ends. Should state President would greatly value HIM's views and desires exchange information with HIM because of their common interest in orderly development independent, moderate, and politically stable African states. In context of this expression President's interest, desire you obtain HIM's advice and counsel re most recent African developments, particularly Zanzibar coup, Tanganyika situation and chances peaceful settlement Algerian-Moroccan dispute as result upcoming meeting Bamako Commission. /2/See footnote 2, Document 276. During this tour d'horizon desire you also present orally points in supplemental aide-memoire contained separate message (incorporating points contained Deptel 557)/3/ assuring HIM (a) US keenly aware problems IEG faces in Ogaden; (b) in initial aide-memoire/4/ on subject military assistance US sought, in spirit frankness, outline certain problems requiring further action and study. We did not intend convey negative impression and are providing Fonoff supplemental aide-memoire; (c) we working intensively to develop possible answers to problem for IEG consideration; and (d) that IEG and HIM should have no doubt regarding value US attaches to Ethiopia and President's personal interest in Ethiopia as evidenced by your request for audience. FYI--Elaboration point (c) above will be contained in separate message to Embassy hopefully within 24 hours. /3/Telegram 557 to Addis Ababa, January 10, instructed the Ambassador to express the U.S. conviction that a massive military build-up was not the solution to Ethiopia's problems and to suggest talks on the military level to review how Ethiopian resources might be more effectively mobilized. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-ETH) /4/Not printed. Rusk
279. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 10, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Blake. SUBJECT During the period February 6-8 Ethiopian and Somali forces clashed at the border town of Tug Wajale. Although there was a lull in fighting on February 9, reports now indicate that it has been renewed, is continuing and may have spread to two other border localities. Tug Wajale is in the Northern District of Somalia; it straddles the frontier between Hargeisa in Somalia and Jigjiga in Ethiopia. The border clash has caused the GSR to proclaim a national emergency and reportedly to request urgently a meeting of the Security Council to consider a Somali charge of Ethiopian aggression. However, U Thant has appealed to the Emperor and to GSR Prime Minister Scermarche to end the hostilities immediately. The Ethiopians have proclaimed an emergency in the border area and have requested the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to consider their charge of aggression by Somalia at the Ministers' meeting on February 12 at Dar-es-Salaam. We have instructed our Embassies to urge both sides to exercise maximum control over their forces and restraint in their public statements in order to ease the tension./2/ We have informed the Somalis that we believe countries which are parties to a dispute in a region should first use regional institutions to find solutions to the dispute. The Somalis, despite their announced intention to see UN action, have indicated to our Ambassador a receptiveness to OAU consideration of their complaint. We are therefore hopeful that the OAU ministers will agree to consider the Ethiopian and Somali complaints and that this will lead to a disengagement of IEG-GSR forces and commencement of a cooling off period. /2/Telegram 655 to Addis Ababa (also sent as telegram 400 to Mogadiscio), February 11, instructed Korry and Torbert to see the Emperor and President Aden respectively in order to express the deep U.S. concern over the renewal of fighting in the region and to urge prompt action by both Heads of State to provide the basis for a genuine cease-fire and atmosphere for easing tensions. (Ibid.) The clash at Tug Wajale is the second between the GSR and the IEG in less than a month. It reflects the tension caused by Somali nationalism and the Emperor's suspicion that the GSR in pursuit of a "greater Somalia" is encouraging dissidence among the Ethiopian Somalis in the Ogaden by arms and propaganda. This tension will be substantially increased if Ethiopia carries through its announced intention to close the border to Somali herdsmen who have traditional grazing and water rights on the Ethiopian side of the line
280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sudan/1/ Washington, February 16, 1964, 11:01 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Newsom and Galanto; cleared by Tasca; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, and Mogadiscio, and repeated to Nairobi. 190. Reference Mogadiscio's 561 to Dept./2/ Reftel being repeated all recipient posts. Desire soonest understanding your host government status acceptance Ethiopian-Somali cease-fire. /2/In telegram 561 from Mogadiscio, February 16, the Ambassador reported that the Police Commandant had told him that Ethiopian troops were attacking all along the border and recommended that all Americans remain home. Torbert said that he had called a "class B alert" until he received confirmation that the cease-fire was actually in effect. He also stated that he did not intend to comment on the rumor that unexploded shells would be publicly exhibited with prominent "made in USA" labels unless he was officially instructed to do so. (Ibid.) For Addis: Your 778/3/ just received. We welcome IEG acceptance and anticipated immediate implementation. While agreeing your 772 to Department/4/ that US should not play active role in OAU cease-fire efforts,/5/ we cannot remain indifferent in view US interests in area, some US identification with Ethiopia and use American equipment by IEG. Desire you continue every appropriate effort enlist IEG cooperation with OAU and Sudanese efforts. Any indication IEG at fault in implementing cease-fire could erode African sympathy for IEG on frontier issue. /3/Dated February 16. (Ibid.) /4/Dated February 14. (Ibid.) /5/The OAU Council of Ministers, meeting in extraordinary session in Dar-es-Salaam, adopted a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire on February 14. Both sides agreed to a truce on February 16, but border skirmishes continued. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 745-746. For Khartoum: Would appreciate receiving understanding GOS of present cease-fire efforts. If you believe it appropriate, you may say we warmly welcome constructive GOS role this matter. For Mogadiscio: Approve your action. Appreciate reserve with which you are handling Somali reports. What is latest word situation Hargeisa area? Re possibility anti-US disturbances, in view what has happened previously in Mogadiscio, Department desires you take all appropriate steps, including if necessary approach to President, to obtain assurances Government will not stimulate anti-US feeling and that US lives and property will be protected. Rusk
281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, February 20, 1964, 11:33 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Ethiopian Affairs Richard St. F. Post on February 19; cleared by Stephen Christmas of AID's Office of Eastern/Southern African Affairs, Colonel Junkermann in DOD/ISA, and Newsom; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Mogadiscio. 693. Department has noted with concern growing number verified reports of penetration by IEG forces, particularly Air Force, into Somali territory during recent fighting. Ethiopian sources for these reports seem feel such incursions fully justified as legitimate acts of self defense. Department does not share this view and feels that apparent IEG adoption this tactic as policy poses grave dangers for future of area and likely prove detrimental both to US and IEG interests. While recognizing approach already made this matter (Embtel 772)/2/ we feel that matter should be taken up by Ambassador preferably with Emperor or with Prime Minister at earliest opportunity and suggest approach contain following elements: /2/Dated February 14. (Ibid.) 1. US conscious grave problems and pressures under which HIM laboring in current crisis. We continue our interest in security and international position Ethiopia. In this spirit we wish raise concern over aspects recent fighting, particularly as friend of Ethiopia involved in strengthening IEG armed forces. 2. US has followed with concern and dismay recent border fighting and its continuance beyond February 16 ceasefire deadline. In discussing fighting we not seeking assess responsibility in absence any such determination by African states although we acknowledge that problem would not exist in present serious form if ethnic Somalis abandoned their goal of Greater Somalia. 3. We have also shared HIM's distress over vicious propaganda emanating from Mogadiscio and have brought our concern to GSR attention. We hopeful OAU cognizance of importance this element in current crisis will shortly result in cessation such attacks. 4. We were gratified by MinInfo statement of February 10 quoting HIM as having "ordered IEG forces not to counterattack into Somali territory despite attacks against them." We welcomed this policy as one contributory to containment conflict and to swift attainment disengagement forces. 5. We also felt scrupulous adherence to this policy demonstrably in interests IEG, which has most to lose from having any doubts cast on inviolability of borders. Furthermore, departures from that policy could provide justification for similar GSR incursions in future. We are not unmindful probability acquisition by Somali of more sophisticated ground and air weapons. 6. We therefore disturbed by qualification placed on policy by MinInfo to effect that if "necessities of military action" forced Ethiopians to cross border, they would soon return afterwards and that if Somali forces persisted in aggressive policy situation would become quite different. We now further disturbed by confirmed reports of IEG penetrations well into Somali territory particularly by aircraft during recent fighting. We wanted to ensure that HIM aware of such penetrations and of our views concerning them. 7. We acknowledge extent IEG provoked in current crisis. We also recognize military desirability and consequent temptation presented military commanders to hit supply lines of opposing forces. Nonetheless past experience indicates world opinion favors side able restrain its military commanders in similar instances. Furthermore, it is questionable whether US equipment involved is being appropriately used for "legitimate self-defense" within terms Article I paragraph 2 of US-IEG military aid agreement of May 22, 1953. Further, US Congress wrote into last foreign aid bill provision requiring grant US military aid to Africa be limited to internal security requirements. 8. We therefore confident HIM will wish ensure strict compliance by IEG military with HIM's order requiring scrupulous respect for borders. Such compliance would be consistent with Ethiopia's stance re inviolability of frontiers and support international law./3/ /3/In telegram 811 from Addis Ababa, February 21, Korry reported that he had made all of the points in telegram 693 to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on February 19, and that he would continue to try to see the Emperor. The Ambassador also conveyed his own impression that the Emperor was no longer in absolute control of events with his military commanders apprising him after the fact. (Ibid.) Rusk
282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, February 20, 1964, 4:31 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL SOMALI-US. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Galanto, cleared by Newsom, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Lagos, and Nairobi. 424. Ref: Mogadiscio's 580./2/ Department agrees that disturbing situation in Somalia warrants extensive round of approaches suggested reftel. We differentiate between two problems, primarily African one of Ethiopian-Somali crisis for which burden should be shifted to Africans, and problem of deteriorating US-Somali relations. /2/In telegram 580 from Mogadiscio, February 20, Torbert described his protests against the continuation of vitriolic propaganda broadcasts in violation of the propaganda moratorium that was a vital part of Somalia's cease-fire commitment. The Ambassador also stated his intention of making an urgent round of representations to moderates in the Somali Government unless the Department instructed him that this would conflict with current U.S. efforts to shift the burden to the Sudanese and other Africans. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI) As for that part of Ethiopia-Somalia problem relating to propaganda truce, believe further US approaches to seek GSR observance now becoming counter-productive. Accordingly we prefer to see Sudanese and other Africans assume this responsibility. Per your request, however, Department has made arrangements for you, Addis and Khartoum to receive broadcasts by cable direct from FBIS London for one week trial period. Concerning US-Somali relations, recommend you include following in your conversations with GSR officials: 1. GSR officials have often expressed in recent months their desire for continued US friendship and understanding. We share this desire. US-Somali friendship cannot help but be eroded, however, by growing and disturbing wave anti-US sentiment within Somalia, a development at least partially abetted by GSR. To mention but a few signs of this feeling, we refer to (a) article and statement in "Unione" of February 7 to effect "Ethiopia has encouragement and support of US in policy hostility and aggression against Somalia"; (b) false intelligence re US operational support; (c) rumors US "stimulating Ethiopian attack against Somalia"; and (d) inferences contained President Aden's radio speech February 17. 2. Anti-US campaign is precisely type of vicious propaganda which sometimes emanates from and strengthens those forces having vested interest in driving wedge between Somalia and Americans. Believe both US and GSR should be on guard against these pernicious and divisive forces. 3. USG can well understand degree to which recent hostilities have produced tensions and atmosphere of crisis in Somalia. However, we do not believe answer these tensions lies in unwarranted attacks on third countries. 4. USG does not have influence over actions another government such as IEG may take in its own interests, regardless of aid program. We have intervened vigorously on both sides to obtain cease-fire, end to fighting, lessening of tensions, stopping of propaganda and facilitation of OAU considerations. USG stands to gain nothing either from violence in Horn or deterioration in Somali-Ethiopian relations. We earnestly hope GSR will appreciate our true position lest US-GSR relations be gravely and permanently damaged. 5. US interests in Ethiopia, which we freely admit are important, do not deter US from stand of impartiality re Somali-Ethiopian dispute. FYI: We would welcome further suggestions for actions US might take to allay Somali suspicions. We are particularly concerned at President Aden's attitude. End FYI. Rusk
On February 20, 1964, the Special Group approved a political action program aimed at bringing about the election of government and parliamentary officials in Somalia favorably disposed to the West and allocated $200,000 for this purpose. (CIA Memorandum for the Special Group, February 19, 1964; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 112, February 20, 1964; Memorandum from H. Bartlett Wells, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Llewellyn Thompson, July 22, 1964; ibid., Somali Republic, 1963 Thru) During the 1964-1967 period, subsequent funding for the Somali program was approved periodically by the 303 Committee despite the lack of any demonstrable success in achieving the plan's objectives. (Memorandum for the Record, August 13, 1964; ibid., 303 C. 9, August 20, 1964; Memorandum from Joseph Palmer to U. Alexis Johnson, July 22, 1966; ibid., Somali Republic, 1963 Thru; Country Summary prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, March 6, 1967; ibid., Africa General, 1967-1968) The program was terminated in 1967 following the Somali general election in June. On November 7, 1967, Ambassador to Somalia Raymond L. Thurston sent Assistant Secretary Palmer a memorandum arguing that covert financial assistance alone had little chance of success unless it was part of an overall U.S. policy of economic and political support to the forces the United States was backing, and that responsible political leaders, particularly in a democratic system, ultimately would have to make their decisions based on domestic political realities and not any secret understanding with a foreign government. (Ibid., Somali Republic, April 1967)
284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, February 21, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. SUBJECT 1. We have two sets of problems in connection with the present Ethiopian-Somali dispute: (a) how best to use our influence in bringing about a cease-fire and a more permanent settlement within an African context; (b) how to prevent serious deterioration in our relations with either party. 2. In connection with the dispute, itself, we have: a. Encouraged the nations of the OAU which gave preliminary consideration to the problem at Dar-Es-Salaam and are considering it in greater depth at Lagos on Monday./2/ We have provided guidance to Embassy Lagos on our views. /2/February 24. b. Encouraged the interest of the African states who have moved individually to mediate. These include the Sudan, Tanganyika and Morocco. The role of the Sudan was the key to arranging the present cease-fire. Both to commend this and to encourage continuing Sudanese interest, we have proposed a Presidential message to General Abboud. We have also proposed to the Sudanese that they suggest the creation of a frontier observation team and the creation of an African group to examine the longer-range aspects, perhaps through the use of some internationally prominent person. 3. Our relations with Ethiopia are in mild jeopardy because of the Emperor's feeling that we should take his side completely in the dispute. We have, accordingly, proposed a Presidential message to him emphasizing the priority we attached to an end to the fighting./3/ /3/See Document 286. 4. Our relations with Somalia are seriously jeopardized because of a growing belief, even among moderate elements including the President, that we are giving undue aid to Ethiopia. Wild rumors are being passed by the Soviets, Chinese Communists and the Egyptians that the US is backing "aggressive policies by Ethiopia." We have instructed our Ambassador to make demarches to leading figures on this matter and are proposing a message to President Aden./4/ /4/See Document 285.
285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia/1/ Washington, February 21, 1964, 5:53 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom, cleared by Harriman and Brubeck, and approved by Tasca. Please deliver following message from President Johnson to President Aden: Dear Mr. President: I have followed with deep concern events in the Horn of Africa during the past two weeks. I have been very disturbed to learn that these events may have created misunderstandings in the Somali Republic regarding the position of the United States. We have, as you know, a long history of friendship with Somalia. We value that friendship. We continue our interest in the independence, development, and democratic institutions of your country. Suggestions to the contrary come only from those who seek to disrupt our relationship. The fact of our friendship with Ethiopia in no way lessens our desire for continuing friendship and understanding with you and the Somali Republic. We have expressed strongly to your government our hope for an early end of the hostilities in the Horn. We have made equally strong expressions to the Government of Ethiopia. We are gratified that, through the efforts of other African governments, an approach to peace has been made. We hope that the Lagos meeting of the OAU Foreign Ministers will result in the establishment of a still firmer basis for understanding. I am fully conscious of the serious problems which disturb the peace of the area. We are sympathetic and we will give our full support to sincere efforts to find peaceful and mutually satisfactory solutions to these problems in order to make possible concentration on development of the area in ways that truly benefit the peoples of the region./2/ /2/Telegram 434 to Mogadiscio, February 22, instructed the Ambassador to insert at this point a sentence reading: "We cannot be sympathetic with efforts to employ force in territorial disputes." (Ibid.) Please accept my personal good wishes during these difficult times and my strong hope that we may increase that understanding which is the key to friendly relations between nations. I should be pleased to have your further thoughts on these matters and on the means through which your interested friends might assist in furthering the peace and welfare of this region./3/ /3/In telegram 586 from Mogadiscio, February 22, Torbert reported that he had delivered the President's "most helpful message" to President Aden Abdullah that morning, and that Aden had asked him to express his great appreciation to President Johnson and to state that Somalia would welcome any form of international inspection or presence along the border. (Ibid.) In telegram 597 from Mogadiscio, February 27, Torbert reported that he had delivered the revised version of President Johnson's message with the additional sentence personally to President Aden that morning. (Ibid.) Lyndon B. Johnson. Ball
286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, February 21, 1964, 5:59 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newsom and Post on February 20, cleared by Brubeck and Harriman, and approved by Tasca. 709. Please deliver the following message from President Johnson to the Emperor: Your Majesty: Since Your Majesty's most considerate and deeply appreciated visit to the United States at the time of President Kennedy's funeral, I have wanted to exchange thoughts with you on several matters of common interest. I regret that the present occasion for doing so is one involving a dispute between two African nations. I have followed with deep concern recent events in the Horn of Africa affecting Somalia and Ethiopia. I want to assure you that the United States remains, as stated to Your Majesty in the past, fully sympathetic with Your Majesty's desire to maintain the integrity and security of Ethiopia. I have personally emphasized to the President of the Somali Republic that we will fully support efforts to find peaceful and mutually satisfactory solutions to problems such as those now disturbing the Horn, but that we cannot be sympathetic with efforts to employ force in territorial disputes. In the past two weeks, our primary objective has been to encourage efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The continuation of armed conflict not only drains vitally needed resources, but gives opportunities to those who would undermine leadership friendly to peace. We were gratified that means were found through African intervention to bring about a cease-fire. We hope that the Lagos meeting of the OAU Foreign Ministers may find further means to decrease the tension in the Horn of Africa area, although we recognize that the seriousness of the problems in the area makes for no easy solution. During this difficult period, I wish to assure you of my continued personal interest in Ethiopia and in Your Majesty's health and welfare. We deeply value our relations with Ethiopia and the opportunity to cooperate in furthering its security and development. We will remain sympathetic and give full support to efforts to find mutually agreeable solutions to the problems of the Horn of Africa. The American people have been particularly impressed with your great efforts toward the establishment of peace in the conception and founding of the OAU--a step of historic importance. We have welcomed, more recently, your successful effort in the Moroccan-Algerian problem. You may be assured, Your Majesty, of my continued personal interest in the furtherance of our close and friendly relations./2/ /2/In telegram 814 from Addis Ababa, February 22, Korry reported that he had delivered President Johnson's message that morning to Haile Selassie, who asked him to convey his appreciation to the President. The Ambassador said that he had also raised the question of Ethiopian use of U.S.-supplied planes over Somalia, but that the Emperor denied any such use, saying that if Ethiopia were going to use an air assault, it would be accompanied by an all-out land attack. (Ibid.) Lyndon B. Johnson Ball
287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, March 6, 1964, 4:59 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Ben M. Zook of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Bloc in INR; cleared by Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs John C. Guthrie and Chief of the Soviet Bloc International Political Activities Division in INR Helmut Sonnenfeldt; and approved by Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Bloc in INR Howard Trivers. 2637. INR sent following Intelligence Note to Secretary March 6 on Soviet intervention in Ethiopian-Somali dispute: Sov Dep Foreign Minister Malik's second visit Addis Ababa in slightly over a month and two Khrushchev letters to Emperor Selassie on Ethiopian-Somali dispute within roughly same period underscore Moscow's effort to play "peacemaker" and exercise predominant influence in Horn of Africa. Khrushchev in effect maintained pro-Somali stance by urging Ethiopians to assure peaceful settlement of conflict with Somalia while ignoring latter's irredentist activities which are cause of dispute's eruption into hostilities. Soviets probably calculate, and with apparent accuracy to date, that their economic-military support of Somalis will soften Ethiopians up to Soviet overtures rather than alienate them and thus enhance Moscow's influence with both disputants. Khrushchev's February 22 letter to Selassie expressing concern over Somali allegations that Ethiopia was carrying out air attacks on Somali territory from French and British airfields may have been partly motivated by Soviet concern, reinforced by that of Somalis, over past bombing-strafing and possibly future Ethiopian moves of even greater magnitude against Somali territory. Recent report Soviet technicians in Somalia will participate directly in defense planning work along Somali-Ethiopian border suggests effort by Moscow to reinforce Somali position as well as gain firsthand knowledge of situation in border area. Khrushchev letter still stops short of open endorsement of Somalia's territorial claims on Ethiopia, and there are cogent factors impelling Moscow to maintain this position. Open Soviet espousal Somali irredentism would cut across Khrushchev's circular letter December 21 on peaceful settlement all frontier disputes and deprive Soviets of flexibility they now using so successfully in dealing with both disputants. In addition, it would jeopardize Moscow's relations with many African countries which are wary of irredentist causes and, even more so, of outside interference in African affairs. Soviets probably see their interests best served by continuation Somali-Ethiopian dispute, but below crisis level that would either create heavy pressure on Moscow to involve itself directly in support of Somalia or lead to internationalization of dispute and curtailment of Soviet role as arbiter. Rusk
288. Memorandum for the Files/1/ Washington, March 17, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. Copies were sent to Edward Little in the Office of Secretary, William Lewis in INR, and Wendell Coote in AFE. SUBJECT Governor Williams and I met with the Secretary on March 12 to discuss the Horn of Africa. The Secretary asked the following questions which were answered as indicated: 1. What do we mean by a modus vivendi between Ethiopia and Somalia? Does this mean recognition of Somali territorial claims? A: We conceive a modus vivendi to embrace, first, an African peace keeping effort, including an observation group, which would stabilize the situation on the frontier and provide some breathing space for efforts at a broader settlement. The seeds of a broader settlement lie in the possibility of more moderate elements in power in Mogadiscio and in the possibilities of economic development in the general area, including particularly the Webi Shebelli valley. 2. Have we made clear to Kenya where we stand on Somali claims? A: Yes. This has been done. The Secretary made the following comments: 1. We should try to take advantage of the Soviet activities to strengthen our position in Ethiopia. Consideration might be given to informing the Emperor that two ships had arrived in Somalia bearing arms and stating that we were disturbed by the Soviet intrusion since we favored solving the problem in an African framework. The Soviets seem to be supporting Somalia. We might tell the Emperor that, if pressures developed from a Soviet-backed Somalia, we would come to his assistance provided he did not move across frontiers. (The point was made to the Secretary that we had, on many occasions, stressed to the Emperor our interest in the integrity of Ethiopia.) 2. He was leery of the US offering good offices in this situation. The matter should remain in an African context. He did not object, however, to our offering to lend equipment to the OAU for the purposes of a border patrol or observation mechanism.
289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia/1/ Washington, March 18, 1964, 4:06 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 ETH-SOMALI. Confidential. Drafted by Post; cleared by Galanto, Officer in Charge of Sudanese Affairs Robert N. Stookey, and Newsom; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Mogadiscio and Khartoum, and repeated to Asmara. 793. Ref: Khartoum's 388./2/ Department has welcomed reftel indications Ethio-Somali negotiations now scheduled proceed on or about March 24. Would appreciate confirmation and comment Embassies Addis and Mogadiscio and, if confirmed, conveyance to respective host governments our satisfaction that this further step toward peaceful settlement their differences under OAU aegis has now been taken. /2/Telegram 388 from Khartoum, March 16, reported that both Ethiopia and Somalia had agreed to begin negotiations in Khartoum on or about March 24. (Ibid.) For Khartoum: Department desires do all it appropriately can both through parties to dispute and through Sudanese to further successful outcome without becoming involved in active good offices of in any way assuming basic African responsibility for solution to present problem. In discussions of matter with Sudanese, if it would seem appropriate within above context, you may indicate our interest in successful talks and state we have studied problem for considerable period, as have Sudanese. First step, in our opinion, should be to get confirmation of willingness both sides preserve cease-fire and propaganda moratorium. Beyond this you may express view that failure past efforts at talks due in part to attempt at outset attack basic territorial/border problem and that better prospects might result if effort were made find areas where understanding and cooperation were possible, apart from basic issue. To extent Sudanese have opportunity discuss conduct talks with the two participants, they may find useful our own thoughts on problem. You may mention that some possibilities which have been mentioned and to some extent explored in past are: 1. Mutual agreement to pursue actively with international agencies (e.g., UN Special Fund) and other interested parties possibilities for joint development Webi Shebelli River Basin. 2. Exchange of air rights (e.g., traffic rights at Mogadiscio for Ethiopian Air Lines in exchange for overflight rights for Somali civilian aircraft on direct Mogadiscio-Hargeisa run). 3. Somali agreement permit Ethiopian use Somali ports (Chisimaio, Mogadiscio, Berbera) on preferential basis. 4. Ethiopian agreement permit Somali civilian motor transport transit Ethiopian territory via most direct route between Hargeisa and Mogadiscio when Ogaden security situation permits. 5. Somali agreement permit pipeline construction across Somali Republic territory should oil be discovered inside Ethiopian territory. Should progress these matters establish proper atmosphere, it might then be possible proceed to discuss: a. Agreement establish joint committee to study and make recommendations for improvement liaison in border areas and for regularization border-crossing arrangements. b. Agreement establish joint commission to demarcate on ground provisional administrative line between Ethiopia and ex-Italian portion Somalia. Would appreciate further suggestions along above lines which Embassies Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio might wish provide./3/ /3/In Khartoum, the two sides negotiated a cease-fire beginning April 1 and agreed to establish a Joint Somali-Ethiopian Border Commission to control the movement of troops displaced along both sides of the border. The Commission began its work on April 8. Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
