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262. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah/1/ Washington, April 14, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66-10/6/66. No classification marking. Dear General Ankrah: Ambassador Williams has transmitted your kind letter of March 24 to me./2/ Its honest, straightforward account of the conditions which led to the change of government in Ghana and its frank assessment of the problems to be solved have left a deep impression upon me. /2/Document 261. I was particularly encouraged to see that you are alert to the dangers of subversion from alien sources. Indeed, we in the United States hail your Government's efforts to wipe out arbitrary rule in Ghana as you reinstate the rule of law and re-establish those institutions essential to democratic government. The swift diplomatic initiatives undertaken by your Government were reassuring and I look forward to the role which an effective and truly independent Ghana can play in the councils of Africa and of the world. You are to be praised for your immediate recognition of the economic problems facing Ghana and the appointment of an able Economic Committee. Praise is also well-deserved for the prompt actions you took at home and abroad to deal with both your short-term and long-term economic difficulties. The United States is acutely aware of the critical state of Ghana's economy and of the immediate needs of the Ghanaian people. Our airlift of twenty-five tons of canned milk last week was tangible recognition of your emergency food requirements. It represents a partial delivery of five hundred tons of milk to help prevent the threatened famine situation you described in your letter. It is our hope that the PL-480 food commodity agreement which our two Governments recently signed/3/ will help substantially to tide you over the critical period ahead. /3/Signed at Accra on April 1; 17 UST 484. I greatly appreciate your expression of support for our common belief in democratic principles and the democratic way of life. This is one of the surest ways of achieving the world peace we so fervently desire. It will be my pleasure to reinforce the ties of friendship which bind the United States and Ghana. Therefore, I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you and I look forward to hearing from you personally from time to time on developments in Ghana. Sincerely,
263. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 8, 1966, 7:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66-10/6/66. No classification marking. SUBJECT At Tab A, for your signature, is a proposed reply to General Ankrah's June 13 letter (Tab B)/2/ reporting on economic progress in Ghana and complimenting your OAU speech./3/ State dragged a bit on the reply--it reached my desk only today--but Ankrah greatly values personal signals from you, and won't mind the delay./4/ We are enjoying a real honeymoon with him and post-Nkrumah Ghana (you may want to glance at the telegram at Tab C)./5/ /2/The tabs are not attached. Ankrah's letter is ibid. For Johnson's reply, see Document 264. /3/Reference is presumably to the President's May 26 address; see footnote 2, Document 211. /4/At the end of the source text is the following notation in Johnson's handwriting: "Why did this take so long. Tell Palmer don't ever let this happen again. From June 13 to July 11 is too damn long and make them realize it. L" /5/Reference is apparently to telegram 23 from Accra, July 5, which reported that Williams had expressed to Ankrah Johnson's appreciation for some items of Soviet equipment which Ankrah had offered to the United States. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66-10/6/66) A June 23 letter from Ankrah, making the offer, and telegram 1454 from Accra of the same date, which transmitted the text of the letter, are ibid. The reply: (1) encourages the Ankrah Government's efforts to clear away the economic and financial wreckage left by Nkrumah, (2) thanks the General for his comments on your speech, (3) notes that some of the actions you suggested are underway--two involving Ghana, and (4) gives regionalism a push, encouraging Ankrah to come forward with his ideas. The reply also refers obliquely--"other gestures of good will"--to Ankrah's recent gift of Soviet anti-aircraft guns and ammunition of the type being used against us in Viet Nam. Ankrah wants to keep this quiet, but our Ambassador reports that he would also like an acknowledgment over your signature. He will get the reference and it shouldn't excite attention if it leaks. Walt
264. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah/1/ Washington, July 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Ghana, 3/24/66-10/6/66. No classification marking. Dear Mr. Chairman: I am profoundly grateful for your recent letter and your other gestures of good will. The warm and generous spirit they reflect is great comfort to me. Close relations between us and between our two countries can only strengthen the cause of freedom in Africa and the world. Your vigorous and effective efforts to revive the Ghanaian economy are most impressive. I am told that your Economic Mission made a splendid impression here, due in large part to the sound economic policies already outlined by the National Liberation Council. My experts share your confidence that the program of economic reforms you are now working out with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will provide a solid basis for a sound combination of stability and growth. I want you to know that we support you in these efforts. I was also deeply gratified by your kind words about my remarks on the third anniversary of the Organization of African Unity. Some of the actions I suggested on that occasion are already underway and others are under active study. I understand that negotiations are now in progress with your own Government to include Ghana in the program to eradicate measles and smallpox in West Africa. I was also pleased to authorize our AID Mission in Accra to talk with your people about exploring the feasibility of a telecommunications system linking your capital with Lagos, Cotonou, Lome, and possibly Abidjan. I hope that success in these enterprises will lead to many more programs of regional cooperation for the common economic good. I would be delighted to have your thoughts and suggestions concerning these and any other promising projects of a similar character. It is a great pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to exchange views and ideas with you. I hope that we can remain in close personal touch. As you press forward with measures to advance social and economic development, you may be certain that you have my personal best wishes and the continuing sympathy and support of the United States. Sincerely,
265. Country Summary Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Washington, March 7, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa General, 1967-1968. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
266. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 11, 1967, 10:40 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66-10/68. No classification marking. Mr. President: In the attached, Messrs. Gaud, Schultze and Fowler recommend that you approve $35 million in AID loans to Ghana during this calendar year. This would be the U.S. share (about one-third) of a multilateral effort to help the post-Nkrumah government pull itself out of the economic chaos left by Nkrumah. Charlie Schultze's memorandum (Tab A)/2/ is a good short summary of the case for the loan and the Ghanaian self-help record. Bill Gaud's memorandum (Tab B)/3/ provides more detail. Joe Fowler has signed off on the measures we would take to minimize the impact on the balance of payments. /2/Not printed. Budget Director Charles L. Schultze recommended a $20 million program loan in addition to $15 million in P.L. 480 aid in his May 8 memorandum to the President. He noted that the Ghanaian Government had cut expenditures drastically, that imports had been cut 25 percent, and that others, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and the World Bank, were expected to provide an additional $69-$75 million in aid. (Ibid.) /3/AID Administrator William S. Gaud's April 24 memorandum to the President is not printed. The new Ghanaian government has taken really impressive measures to put a very disorderly house into some reasonable economic order. In terms of short-term politics, this government is very pro-American and it is very much in our interests to help it along. In the broader sweep, helping Nkrumah's successors to clear away the wreckage will go down very well in Africa and throughout the less developed world. On the donor side, we would be providing no more than our fair share in a 9-country donor club which also includes the World Bank, the OECD, and the UN Development Program. In my view, this is a textbook example of the right way our new emphasis on multilateralism should work. I second the recommendation that you approve the loan. Walt Approve loan/4/ /4/This option is checked.
267. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State/1/ Accra, May 16, 1967, 1910Z. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-S Files: Lot 68 D 453. Confidential. 3412. Subject: Under Secretary's Trip. 1. Under Secretary, Fredericks and I had 45-minute meeting with Lt. General Ankrah afternoon May 15. Only other person present was E.C. Quist-Therson, DepSec to NLC. 2. Ankrah was in excellent spirits. Extended warm welcome to party and expressed great delight that such high-ranking official had come to Ghana. Said NLC very much appreciated speed with which USG had responded to Ghana's needs immediately following February 1966 coup. But for this support he stated there would have been confusion and unrest and NLC could have had difficult time to "get going." 3. Ankrah also expressed gratitude for PL-480 help and for leadership shown by US Delegation at April Paris meeting of donor countries. Said several countries had already responded, and disclosed that UK will extend pounds 4 million ($11.2 million) loan (understand that pounds 3 million is balance of Volta Dam loan which never used). Ankrah remarked this a welcome turnabout for HMG, which up to now had not been too helpful or forthcoming. Cited as example failure UK to release GOG of obligations on frigate. 4. On subject AID program loan, Under Secretary said while he not able give firm commitment since "paper work" not completed, he confident loan in neighborhood $20 million would be agreed upon. 5. As anticipated, Ankrah brought up cocoa and urged once again that we bring pressure on industry representatives to accept a reasonable minimum price. 6. On civilian government, Ankrah indicated he had no confidence in politicians and NLC would not step down until country ready for it. Said NLC wants make certain that constitution truly reflects wishes of Ghanaians. Adoption constitution therefore could take "quite some time." 7. Ankrah noted he will visit Canada in October, and plans visit Washington, where he hopes it may be possible see President Johnson. Comment: If Ankrah does come to Washington, which need not be State visit, I hope it may be possible for President to see him. Ankrah is great admirer of President, and during Under Secretary's visit General expressed once again his vigorous and strong support for President's Viet-Nam policy. Williams
268. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ No. 5-67 Washington, July 19, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66-10/68. Secret. SUBJECT /2/This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research in the Directorate of Intelligence. [Footnote in the source text.] SUMMARY Ghana's ruling military-police junta is grappling with the economic and political mess left by Nkrumah. But economic problems are piling up and the government is unsure of how to return to constitutional rule. The junta relies heavily on US aid and advice, and looks to the US for increasing economic support. Yet even with greatly increased US aid, Ghana is not likely in the next several years to make substantial progress toward economic growth and political stability. Indeed, a regime decidedly less friendly to the US might come to power as a result of the slow pace of national reconstruction. I. Introduction 1. Under Nkrumah, Ghana commanded headlines as pacesetter of independence in West Africa, and as one of the leaders of the radical nations of the Third World. But in the process Nkrumah, like Sukarno and Ben Bella, made a shambles of his nation's political and economic foundations before he was called to account. He squandered Ghana's $500 million foreign exchange reserves (derived largely from cocoa sales at high world prices in the early and mid-1950's), and ran up new foreign debts of some $700 million for prestige projects, a variety of unsound state enterprises, and political and diplomatic activities designed to further his own continental ambitions. Now, a year and a half after his ouster, the consequences of his follies have become clear, and Ghana is resuming a character more in keeping with its limited resources and prospects. For Ghana, while better endowed with natural resources and trained personnel than most of its hapless West African neighbors (e.g. Togo), still is essentially a one-crop economy, with a per capita national income of only about US $200. 2. From the outset, the ruling National Liberation Council (NLC), a military-police junta, has sought aid and advice from the US in a multitude of economic, financial, administrative, and security matters. In large measure, this stems from the NLC's strong pro-Western political inclinations and from its disappointment over lack of support from other Western countries. Its close rapport with the US was dramatically demonstrated during the abortive coup in April, when high ranking Ghanaian officials sought refuge or assistance in US official residences. More recently, the US has considerably increased its aid commitments to Ghana and is considering the scope of future assistance. II. The Current Situation and Short Term Outlook A. Economic 3. To some extent, Ghanaian political stability hinges upon the NLC's success in attacking the national economic mess. Over the past five years, economic growth has barely kept pace with the increase in population (about 2.6 percent per year). The NLC has made some progress. By trimming the budget, canceling prestige projects, lopping off some notoriously unprofitable state enterprises, and tightening control over others, it has helped curb inflation. Yet the rehabilitation of Ghana's economy has scarcely begun, and there was substantially no increase in economic output during 1966. 4. The most pressing problem is to obtain sufficient foreign exchange to pay for food imports ($50 million a year) and the raw materials, spare parts, and machinery needed for the restoration of production and efficiency in industry and transport. In 1966, export earnings ($270 million) were no higher than in the 1950's and fell short of imports by over $80 million. Ghana's cocoa exports doubled in volume from the early 1950's to the early 1960's, but earnings stagnated because of the decline of prices in the world market. In recent years, production has failed to rise because pesticides and fertilizers have not been available and because prices paid to cocoa farmers by the government marketing board have been low. Other export industries (timber, gold, and diamonds) are in the doldrums because of depleted resources, obsolete equipment, or rising production and transportation costs. 5. At the same time, foreign exchange reserves are depleted and additional short term borrowing is limited by terms of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Loans of the type permitted by the IMF will help to reduce this year's foreign exchange gap, e.g., the US is providing about $35 million in PL 480 and commodity import loans. Nevertheless, Ghana will probably not be able to afford the increase of imports it has planned for 1967. 6. Economic prospects over the next few years are scarcely more encouraging. Though there will be some improvements in the picture, in particular the increased production of aluminum from the new Kaiser-Reynolds VALCO plant, there appears to be little prospect for any very substantial increase in export earnings. Moreover, Ghana now has a foreign debt of some $800 million, of which over $100 million is due in FY 1969 alone. It will need much more external assistance than is now in sight to meet these payments and at the same time finance essential imports. Some relief can be expected by the rescheduling of debt service payments, already envisaged by the IMF; but Ghana will almost certainly look to the US for increased financial support over the next few years. B. Political 7. The April coup attempt, though it collapsed of its own ineptitude, raised questions regarding political stability and the role of the NLC. The junior officers who directed the coup were inspired by personal ambition, grievances over neglect of the army, and suspicions of corruption in the regime. Insofar as the public was aware of a coup, it sided with the NLC, though some 1,000 die-hard Nkrumah supporters were subsequently jailed for prematurely "jubilating" over its demise. However, allegations of corruption are widely believed, and an undercurrent of disillusion pervades the scene. 8. By and large, the political vacuum left by Nkrumah's ouster persists. The NLC appears uncertain of how to regain public confidence. Most members are well-intentioned and fairly honest, and appear to understand generally the country's plight; yet they find it difficult to ignite any spark of enthusiasm for civic or economic action. They are disappointed with the lack-luster performance of the civil service, a body well regarded by its British mentors at independence, but degraded and demoralized under Nkrumah. The NLC is installing a kind of sub-cabinet of civilian special commissioners to direct some of the ministries, in the hope that this will revitalize the bureaucracy and at the same time allay the mounting pressure from the educated elite for a restoration of civilian rule. 9. Despite the NLC's ban on politics, some thinly veiled political activity goes on, but no figure has yet appeared who has popular appeal or could lead the country. Most of the older politicians either are tarred with the Nkrumah brush or, like the former leader of opposition to Nkrumah, Dr. Kofi Busia, have lost their touch and most of their following during their years of exile. General Ankrah and one or two others in the NLC would probably run for office if constitutional procedures were restored, but they would find it hard to overcome popular suspicions of corruption and criticism for the sluggish performance of the economy. For these reasons, it is now very difficult to foresee when a civilian successor regime may re-emerge or who might lead it. 10. Nonetheless, there is little likelihood that the NLC will be threatened by popular uprisings or civilian plots, at least for the next year or two. The current high level of urban unemployment poses little immediate threat to the regime, for the traditional African system of extended family obligations alleviates some distress. The civil service and the labor unions grumble, but are unlikely to formulate or join plots against the government. 11. Problems posed by the army are more likely to trouble the NLC or any civilian successor which might emerge. The 15,000-man force, largely created by Nkrumah as a prestige symbol, serves little useful purpose. The NLC has not found a role for the army to play in national development, nor is it willing to disband any substantial part of the force, in part because of the scarcity of jobs elsewhere. Indeed, because of worries about the loyalty of the army, the NLC may decide to allocate even more funds to the military from a tight national budget. The fact that a military coup easily turned out Nkrumah, and that the haphazard attempted coup of last April against the NLC caught both the government and the bulk of the military by surprise, may encourage other military figures to new adventures. III. Longer Term Prospects 12. Over the next three to five years Ghana's prospects for economic growth will be largely dependent on a rise in cocoa earnings, a substantial increase in domestic food production, a greater popular acceptance of economic and civic tasks, prolonged forbearance by principal foreign creditors, and a continued high level of external economic aid. 13. It would be unrealistic to expect all or many of these developments in Ghana during this period. Foreign creditors will probably reluctantly agree to debt postponement, because they will have little other choice. Continued large-scale external assistance, if forthcoming, would further ease foreign exchange stringencies, but political and economic rehabilitation will have to come largely from within. Even if capable and dynamic national leadership emerges, the economic malaise is likely to persist for some time. That is to say, there can be scant assurance that over the next few years even with greatly increased external economic assistance, Ghana will be much more than a debt-ridden West African coastal state with uncertain political stability and orientation. 14. The NLC or almost any likely civilian successor will continue to look primarily to the US for help in a variety of ways, but many Ghanaians have exaggerated expectations of what the US can do for them. Hence part of the blame for slow progress will fall on the US. Popular demagogues or disaffected military leaders will then likely claim that the US is not sufficiently attentive to Ghanaian needs, and that more radical solutions are needed. In these circumstances, a regime less friendly to the US, certainly more nationalistic, and probably more radical, could come to power. For the Board of National Estimates:
269. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman of the National Liberation Council Lieutenant General Ankrah/1/ Washington, August 11, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 37. No classification marking. Drafted by Edward Hamilton of the NSC Staff with revisions by President Johnson. The letter was transmitted in telegram 20706 to Accra. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 GHANA) Telegram 644 from Accra, August 21, reported that the letter was delivered that day. (Ibid., POL 7 GHANA) Dear Mr. Chairman: I was very pleased to receive your recent letter./2/ Under Secretary Katzenbach has given me a full account of his extensive conversations with you and your associates during his visit to Accra./3/ Your letter and his report confirm my impression that Ghana is pressing forward with the critical business of progress for her people. /2/General Ankrah's June 27 letter to Johnson commented on recent developments in Ghana and in international affairs. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 37) /3/See Document 267. I want you to know that I appreciate how difficult many of these steps are for you. The courageous decision to devalue your currency is a particular case in point. I am told that this step, together with the other measures in your economic stabilization program, have already resulted in growing interest in Ghana on the part of foreign investors. I very much hope this trend will continue. General Conway has also reported to me on his conversation with you./4/ I understand that he discussed with you the rigorous legal and budgetary limitations on our military and related assistance programs. Ambassador Williams will be in touch with you on this matter in the near future./5/ /4/Telegram 3565 from Accra, June 3, reported on General Theodore J. Conway's visit. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 7 GHANA-US) /5/A September 21 memorandum from AFW Director Melbourne to Assistant Secretary Palmer recommended that the President tell General Ankrah that the U.S. Government preferred to confine its assistance to the economic field, and that Ambassador Williams should be instructed to make an effort to dissuade Ankrah from raising the subject of military assistance with the President. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 GHANA) Your remarks about regional cooperation were particularly welcome. We too were greatly heartened by formation of the West African Economic Community. I think all of Africa's friends in the world were also encouraged by your response to President Mobutu's request for aid in the current difficulties in the Congo. Ghana's action is bound to strengthen the sense of mutual alliance among African nations. We in the United States could not wish for any more constructive evolution in African affairs. Your interest in international affairs beyond Africa's borders has also been most constructive. I was pleased to note that our two UN delegations were in harmony during the Special Session of the General Assembly on the Middle East crisis. I also note with appreciation your interest in our efforts to bring a just peace to Vietnam. We continue to make every effort to move the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table. So far, despite our very best efforts, we have received no response whatever. Like you, I deeply hope and trust that we can make progress in this area in the months ahead. I understand that Americans are to have the pleasure of your company in October. If your schedule permits a stop in Washington, I would very much like to see you and to discuss the many vital matters with which we are both concerned. Ambassador Williams will be in touch with your office to work out the details. Mrs. Johnson and I look forward to the pleasure of meeting you. With warm personal regards. Sincerely, /6/Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.
270. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana/1/ Washington, September 25, 1967, 1956Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GHANA. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Melbourne, cleared by Palmer, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Conakry, Lagos, Kinshasa, London, and CINCSTRIKE. 43150. NLC Vice Chairman Harlley met morning September 23 with Under Secretary. He was unaccompanied. AFW Director Melbourne was also present. Conversation was in relaxed atmosphere and lasted some forty minutes. Harlley expressed appreciation on behalf NLC for help US had given Ghana and asked that message be conveyed to Secretary who engaged in OAS meeting this weekend. Under Secretary replied that US wished that it could do more since Ghana apparently using its assistance well and hoped US could continue what it is doing. There is budget problem however, problem with Congress over extent of aid, and financial burden of Vietnam. Other countries also could do more to help developing countries. Harlley expressed his understanding of problems facing US and that it seeking to do all it can. He said NLC is appreciative of US role in Vietnam. Ghana in its way wants to try to keep Communist influence from spreading in Africa and is sensitive to what some West African states are doing to let Soviets come in. Ghana was somewhat concerned about Nigeria since regime there had not had experience with Soviets. To Under Secretary's query concerning Nigeria Harlley replied that at this time best result hoped for by African states would be for Nigerians to stop fighting. Harlley made passing reference to US aid to Guinea to which Under Secretary responded that amount of assistance was minimal to show Guinean people US interest in their country. US was looking at relations from long range as it had done in completing Volta Dam in Ghana in face of increasingly hostile Nkrumah regime. Harlley appeared satisfied. Turning to subject of Ghana police, Harlley said there was need for modernizing this force and that requests for various kinds of assistance for whatever could be done would be made through US Ambassador and AID Mission in Accra. He emphasized importance of an effective police in Ghana to which Under Secretary responded by saying that we would examine what requests were received but limitations on US help as mentioned earlier were applicable. In response to a query regarding the Congo Harlley asserted that Mobutu was under certain pressures to accept Communist aid such as Cuban mercenaries from Brazzaville and he hoped Mobutu would continue to resist. Ghana had lent some pilots to Congo in effort to help. He thought it curious Castro was active in Africa while OAS also trying to contain him in Latin America. Under Secretary interjected that Castro had never done anything for black Cubans and in fact had discriminated against them at home. He speculated that Castro may be using black Cubans in Brazzaville to keep them out of the way. As for progress toward eventual restoration of civilian government in Ghana, Harlley said Electoral Commission drawing up new constituencies and that new voter lists were needed. Constitutional Commission can proceed to formulate proposals for constitution. By December 1968 he believed election for Constituent Assembly would be near. This Assembly would examine constitutional proposals and if accepted, no referendum would be needed. Country could go straight to general elections under constitution. Under Secretary observed that introduction civilians into government most helpful to NLC since it necessary for Ghana to use all its available talent. He believed NLC was doing well and it had US good wishes. Katzenbach
271. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 9, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Visit of General Joseph A. Ankrah, 10/10/67. Secret. SUBJECT /2/No record of this meeting has been found. Other briefing material for Ankrah's visit is ibid. and in Department of State, Visit Files: Lot 68 D 475, V-44. Schedule 12:15--Informal arrival at diplomatic entrance (no remarks) 12:20-1:00--Alone, with advisers standing by in Cabinet Room 1:00--White House Lunch Papers At Tab A is Under Secretary Katzenbach's memo./3/ /3/The attached tabs are not printed. At Tab B are State's Talking Points. At Tab C is biographic information. Setting This is primarily a courtesy call after Ankrah's visit to Expo. He is fiercely pro-American and wants to have a close personal relation with you. His National Liberation Council has made real progress cleaning up the mess left by Nkrumah. They have introduced an (unpopular) austerity program to try to make the country solvent. They have turned Ghana away from a mischievous and blustering foreign policy, and become good neighbors toward the rest of Africa as well as the West. Ghana is now a voice for reason and moderation in the UN and the Organization of African Unity. (Ankrah is a prominent and respected member of the OAU mediation team on Nigeria.) The General's only problem with our policy on Vietnam is that it is too soft to suit him--he may well ask you why we are not using nuclear weapons. Most important, Ankrah and his colleagues haven't behaved like the usual military dictatorship. They've restored some political rights; they've convened a citizen's committee to draft a new constitution, looking toward free elections and a civilian regime. Ankrah doubtless aspires to be the first president of a successor government--and meeting you will surely boost his prestige. It is not at all clear whether he will emerge as the long-term political leader in this new Ghana. Others on the Council have looked stronger in recent months. But he is pretty firmly in the saddle now and a reasonable bet to survive. Substance 1. Economic Assistance--Ankrah will be telling you the job of reconstruction is only started, and that he needs more economic assistance in the years ahead. He says he will not present you with a shopping list. But he will give you some indication of what he will need. This year a group of donors (led by IMF) underwrote Ghana's foreign exchange with nearly $100 million. Our share was one-third. The World Bank estimates that Ghana will need $100-$125 million in aid each year for at least the next five years if Nkrumah's damage is to be undone. You might say: --We are pleased by Ankrah's belt-tightening economic policy. We are certainly aware of the political costs and risks of such policies. --We'll try to hold up our end of the aid effort, though the current atmosphere on the Hill makes it impossible to make any guarantees. We'll also keep after the other donors. --We've just released the second half of our $20 million program loan (authorized by the President in May). This accurately reflects our confidence in Ankrah and in Ghana. 2. Military Aid--Ankrah might say he needs military aid: (i) to insure against an Nkrumah comeback; (ii) to defend against the "threat" of Soviet MIGs now in Guinea, Mali and Nigeria; and (iii) to raise the low morale of his army. You might say that we understand Ankrah's security concerns. But the whole range of arms aid is now a terribly tough business on the Hill. We're not even sure we'll have any authority to make credit sales. 3. Cocoa--Ghana is the largest cocoa producer in the world. We are the largest consumer. We've been working for several years to get a cocoa agreement which will stabilize Ghana's foreign exchange earnings and head off the tendency to grow more cocoa than the world market will support. We had word last week that terms have finally been worked out in Geneva so that an agreement can be submitted for final negotiation next month. You might say: --We're delighted that the groundwork has at long last been laid for the agreement. --There will probably be some opposition from our domestic industry, but we'll do our best to get a reasonable agreement ratified. --We very much appreciate the constructive role Ankrah and Ghana have played in working out the agreement. 4. Intelligence gift from Ghana--Ankrah might mention his personal gift to you of a Soviet ZU-23 anti-aircraft weapon, a sizeable sample of Soviet ammunition, and other intelligence finds. These have been extremely valuable to us, particularly in Vietnam. Even if he doesn't mention it, you'll want to thank him for this extraordinary gift. 5. Nigeria--Ankrah is one of six African heads of State on the OAU Consultative Mission to mediate the Nigerian conflict. It doesn't look as if the Mission will get to Nigeria before the last of this month. By then the fighting may well be over, with nothing left to mediate. You might say (if asked): --We were delighted the OAU took this initiative. We are hopeful the conflict will be settled soon with no more bloodshed. --It was entirely appropriate that Ankrah was chosen for a prominent role in the OAU effort, since he has been a major force for peace throughout the unhappy history of this conflict. --In whatever job is left for the Mission, we certainly want it to succeed. We hope it can get on with its work--the sooner, the better. Walt
272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana/1/ Washington, October 12, 1967, 0048Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GHANA. Confidential. Drafted by Melbourne on October 11, cleared by Hamilton at the White House, and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE. 52667. Following is FYI Noforn based on uncleared memcon subject to revision on review: 1. Following White House luncheon Oct 10, Under Secretary Katzenbach, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Palmer and Ambassador Williams, called on General Ankrah at Blair House. Talk lasted some 45 minutes in excellent atmosphere. 2. Ankrah said he wished reiterate, as he had said to President, his thanks for what US had done in Ghana's time of need. In next year he expected country would be out of woods, stabilization period would be over, and Ghana could then plan for economic progress. This also would be accompanied by turnover of government to civilians and he hoped there would never be another necessity for a military coup. 3. Unemployment was country's current economic problem. Ghana receiving some help from donor countries but it insufficient. Anything US could do would be appreciated. PL-480 assistance helped at start NLC regime to meet this problem, but it needed concrete, substantive development to employ people to produce. Feeder and trunk roads development under US aid was fine project, but disproportion of such funds for feasibility studies was out of phase now. Start should be made on roads already surveyed. 4. Drawing on Ghana's experience with communists, Ankrah said they had employed large numbers, who did and produced nothing. Gave example of factory where they had not planned how to move one part of product elsewhere. Under Secretary smilingly interjected that they had made no feasibility study. Ankrah appreciated sally and continued that Ghana would welcome anything US prepared to give or efforts to encourage US investors in Ghana to handle unemployment. 5. Under Secretary said US respected and admired what Ghana has done. US however has serious problems, with AID programs in Congress being severely cut. Present is difficult time, with large federal deficit and heavy Viet-Nam budget. It not question of being opposed to aid or help to individual countries. Because of admiration for it in Congress we have been able to do what we could for Ghana. While he personally believed US spending too little on aid to developing countries, Congress will provide still less this year. President has asked for tax increase and Congress wants cut government expenses. Under Secretary believed there little that could be cut from budget, but it hard to say where cuts will come. 6. Ankrah said he considered Ghana in vanguard of all African countries. He could see no use in letting country go back to where it was. When NLC prepared turn over to civil rule, it was determined at that stage country would be able make a go of it. Other countries trying to copy other regimes. Ghana had unique position in this respect. Other OAU states had become convinced that NLC aim was to help Ghanaian liberties. He wanted US, when considering what NLC did, not to think of other African states in preference to Ghana. Regionally Ghana was working with its French speaking neighbors on projects which, in making them more independent, would make them more democratic. Ghana soon would be out of forest, but needed help. 7. Under Secretary thought that PL-480 had some possibilities for help to Ghana. Ankrah said he would appreciate this, but it would cause problems if Ghana had to follow rigidly all PL-480 requirements. He thus urged that terms be flexible. Under Secretary concluded by saying US would seek to do what it could in Ghanaian aid. Rusk
273. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State/1/ Accra, January 4, 1968, 0230Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Confidential; Priority. 2174. Vipto 58. Subj: VP Trip to Africa. Ghana: Conversation With Gen. Ankrah, Jan. 3. 1. The hour long conversation with General Ankrah opened with his giving Vice President his warmest welcome and sending his best regards to President Johnson./2/ He read with pleasure President's personal letter. As part of his introductory remarks, he expressed appreciation for US assistance during past two years and stated his confidence that Ghana would be able see through the economic difficulties left by Nkrumah. /2/For Vice President Humphrey's report to President Johnson on his African trip, see Document 231. 2. Southern Africa. In very measured way, Ankrah expressed understanding for US position re South Africa and Portuguese Territories. In latter connection he hoped that US, being member of NATO Alliance with Portugal, would be able persuade it change its colonial policy. With respect Southern Rhodesia, he thought sanctions were not biting deeply enough. He had told PriMin Wilson they should have to be more effective or else force would become inevitable. He hoped US would exert strong pressure solve this problem. VP replied with eloquent assurance that US opposed to principles apartheid abroad and at home. US supported self-determination and majority rule in Africa and elsewhere. In fact, trip to Zambia was for express purpose demonstrating our support of President Kuanda in his difficult situation. 3. Ankrah then turned to problem of cocoa, noting it major problem for his govt, because it represented 60 percent of exports, he said that some measure of price stabilization was absolutely necessary if country were to make intelligent plans for economic development. In very frank but firm manner, he recalled that last Oct he had asked President Johnson's help in achieving a cocoa agreement. The recent cocoa negotiations, however, went well until end of conf when US Delegation refused to move forward with an accord. He had been shocked by what appeared to be pressures of US manufacturers, and he could not help but feel this action was "real stab in back of Ghana." He then presented aide-memoire on subject (septel)/3/ and concluded with very strong plea to VP to seek reconsideration US stand this matter. VP sympathetically endorsed principle and value cocoa agreement. Noting he had helped push through coffee agreement when in the Senate, he also wished state very frankly that approval for cocoa agreement would face serious obstacles and pressures from US interests. Nevertheless, Executive Branch of USG supported idea of cocoa agreement. He promised to inform President of deep disappointment Ghana in this matter. /3/Telegram 2170 from Accra transmitted the text of the aide-memoire. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY) 4. Ankrah went on to make clear his regret over withdrawal of Abbott Labs but to indicate he and GOG had no ill feeling about matter. He strongly hoped US would tell other American industrialists not be discouraged about Ghana because of this incident. In fact, there might be provision in new constitution encouraging foreign investment. VP expressed understanding of Ghanaian Govt attitude. Knew Abbott Company was responsible firm but not experienced foreign affairs. Perhaps in due course, Parke Davis or Pfizer, for instance, might be interested. VP agreed that it extremely important this matter not cloud prospects for private investment, which should be encouraged by every possible means. 5. VP then commented on current restrictions in US AID capabilities due Congressional cuts. He personally supported AID levels two to three times those at present. But under circumstances he thought it wise study all possibilities of external assistance, e.g., IBRD, IMF, EX-IM Bank, UNDP, ADB and very importantly PL-480. In times financial stringency, he believed it essential that more ingenuity be displayed in external assistance. Within its limits, however, the US would do everything it could to help Ghana. The more reasonable the request, the easier it was to be of assistance. 6. In relatively brief discussion concerning Vietnam, Gen. Ankrah expressed his continued understanding for our general objective in Southeast Asia. He expressed strong hope that Hanoi could be persuaded come to the negotiating table during coming year. If this proved impossible he favored stronger mil action. The Vice President expressed appreciation Ankrah's sympathy to our position and noted that there were varying views within US concerning method prosecuting war in Vietnam. 7. Meeting closed on note of warm cordiality. Participants then adjourned to nearby room for signature of PL-480 agreement between US and Ghana./4/ /4/For text of the agreement, see 19 UST 4645. Williams
274. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 15, 1968, 8:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66-10/68. Confidential. SUBJECT Herewith Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Zwick recommend a $7 million PL-480 sale to Ghana./2/ The package is mainly cotton textiles and dry milk. State and Treasury are on board. /2/Copies of the October 4 memorandum from Freeman and Gaud to Johnson and the October 10 memorandum from Budget Director Charles J. Zwick are attached to another copy of Rostow's memorandum. (Ibid., Saunders Files, Presidential Decisions, Africa, 4/1/66-1/19/69) This sale would supplement the $12 million PL-480 deal for Ghana you approved in January. Their demand for textiles has been stronger than expected, and they need this cloth soon to keep the mills open. This agreement, however, will not add to our budgetary costs or total assistance to Ghana this year. As Zwick explains (Tab A), AID will simply hold back until next year the second tranche of the $15 million program loan you authorized in April./3/ This balances out to an even trade of a PL-480 sale Ghana needs and can use readily in place of AID money, which we will have in figuring next year's very lean loan proposal. /3/In an April 10 memorandum for the President, Rostow seconded Zwick's and Gaud's recommendations for $15 million loan to Ghana. Johnson marked approval of this recommendation. (Ibid., Country File, Ghana, Vol. III, 3/66-10/68) Whether PL-480 or a loan, the effect is to give General Ankrah crucial balance of payments help in rebuilding Ghana after the Nkrumah mess. The new government is doing a good job of self-help with reforms and devaluation; and our share in the Ghana aid group--ten other donors plus the IMF--is dropping. Last year we did 60%; this year less than half; and next year would have to be lower still. There are no Conte-Long or Symington problems with Ghana, since Ankrah is keeping a tight rein on arms spending. You may recall that Charlie Schultze had some misgivings about the relatively new use of textiles in PL-480 when you were deciding the first Ghana package in January. Charlie was concerned then about budgetary costs and inviting pressure from the textile industry. Your advisers agree now that those problems haven't materialized. Our main textile customers (Indonesia and the Dominican Republic as well as Ghana) haven't run up the cost of the total PL-480 program. In this sale to Ghana, for example, holding the AID money would make a simple budgetary swap. Moreover, the textile people have not been on us to inflate our shipments. The appeal comes straight from the Ghanaians, who badly need this temporary support to get back on their feet. I vote you approve the sale. Walt Approve/4/ /4/This option is checked. Handwritten notations on the source text indicate that the Bureau of the Budget and Saunders' office were informed on October 17. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
