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190. Memorandum From Lee C. White of the White House Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 28, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64-6/65. No classification marking. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Hold for staff mtg Mon/McGB." SUBJECT While talking to Roy Wilkins the other day on a completely unrelated matter, he took the occasion to indicate that the Negro leadership group has taken a great interest in our African policy. The formal committee, which Roy chairs, met with President Kennedy and Ambassador Stevenson in the fall of 1963 to set forth the views of the members on African policy. During the past election campaign they wrote seeking a meeting with you, but we arranged instead for a meeting with State Department people. I am not certain whether Secretary Rusk was able to meet with them, but my recollection is that he did not. In any event, Roy says that the group is of the opinion that those who are shaping our African policy have missed a few opportunities and perhaps mishandled others, and he wondered whether there was any possibility of the group meeting with you. I told him that, quite candidly, I personally saw some problem in the President meeting with a group of American Negroes to secure from them their recommendations on what our African policy should be. He had no trouble understanding and maybe even agreeing with the point, and we then discussed the possibility of 2 or 3 of the group meeting with Mac Bundy and some of his people on a completely informal and unscheduled basis. He said he would explore the matter quietly and discreetly, and I assured him that I was in no position to commit Bundy or anyone else, but while he was thinking about that approach, I would at least check to see whether there was any thought here that such a meeting might be useful. Although this is obviously way out of my field, it seems to me that there might be some advantage in such a session. I am confident that the organization is not going to evaporate; it would therefore make sense to do what we can to make it an asset rather than an extra burden in this already difficult area. Lee C. White/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
191. Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Africa General, 1967-1968. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the source text. The source text contains minor handwritten revisions and corrections, but there is no indication who made them. The most important of them is the title, to which was added: "IN THE AF AREA." All the changes have been incorporated into the text printed here. REVIEW OF 1964 OPERATIONS IN THE AF AREA Description of Operations Generally speaking, Africa has been a relatively new area for CIA covert action operations. Although the Agency has been in some African countries for quite some time, the expansion of CAS capabilities corresponds roughly with State expansion on the continent--the buildup has occurred largely since 1960. Moreover the Agency started from scratch in most countries, laboring under the handicap of the visibility of the white man, few natural cover opportunities [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and language and cultural differences. [4 lines of source text not declassified] The Agency's AF Division has operated under a philosophy of building carefully and solidly. It has been conservative rather than aggressive as regards political action. Its development of assets has been hampered by the relatively unsophisticated character of many of the African bureaucracies and political leaders with whom it has had to deal. The maintenance of security in particular has posed a considerable problem. However, it is to be noted that the Agency's experience with a number of Africans with whom it has maintained a clandestine relationship appears to be excellent. [1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified] Developments in Africa have forced the pace of covert operations. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The instability of other African states, notably in East Africa, and the evidence of Soviet bloc and Chinese Communist inroads also argued for covert measures on our part. The Agency has been responsive to these requirements. However, there have been indications from time to time that it has done so under forced draft. This is to say that the Agency is not, as some might believe, overflowing with resources and raring to go. On several occasions Agency representatives have alluded to the difficulty of finding the right man for the job. Priorities and limitation of resources have been cited as precluding the opening of new stations. In general the maintenance of security is closely related to the type and size of the operation. [1 line of source text not declassified] This was recognized but nevertheless agreed to because of the needs of the situation. So long as the Agency must engage in paramilitary operations there is a significant element of visibility. The Agency is also wary of crash operations because of the high security risk. Principal Operations in 1964 [Heading and 5 paragraphs (18 lines of source text) not declassified] Angola Covert support for non violent activities of the Angolan Nationalist Movement. [1 paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified] Purpose: To provide covert support to selected individuals and activities of the Angolan nationalist movement in order to develop checks to extremist/communist elements within the movement and to exercise some control over the movement's programs and planning. [1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified] Problems: The program of support to the Angolan Nationalist was a controversial one within the Department, AF strongly supporting the proposal and EUR opposing it. Other considerations bearing on the proposal was the factionalism and in fighting within the Provisional Angolan Government (GRAE). Accomplishments: [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The proposed $20,000 of covert support to moderate leaders was deferred for further justification. In fact it was never approved. In August 1964 another proposal for covert support to Angolan nationalist leaders, [1 line of source text not declassified] came before the 303 Committee after having been the subject of protracted discussion on the "Seventh Floor." At the request of Mr. McCone consideration of the proposal was deferred pending clarification of the Congo situation. It was never revived. The sums provided to LGTA and UNEA probably served to reassure Holden Roberto of the U.S. favorable attitude. However, his ebbing fortunes since that time and his pressing problems as a result of Tshombe's attitude toward him have tended to put GRAE in the shadows. Congo/2/ /2/Documentation on Congo is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIII. Support of Congolese Government [1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified] Purpose: To support the legitimate Congolese Government in the hopes of bringing stability to the Congo and frustrating Communist efforts. [8 paragraphs (11 lines of source text) not declassified] Accomplishments: Covert assistance enabled Adoula [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to buy the support of political and military leaders. Efforts to develop a national party never got very far. Tshombe has also used covert funds to buy the support of political leaders and tribal chiefs. He has not drawn down funds to pay mercenaries, however. Problems: From the outset the Congo operation has had to cope with successive crises on a crash basis. The very nature of the problem has meant that great reliance had to be placed on close coordination between the Ambassador and the Station Chief in the expenditure of funds. Both Ambassadors Gullion and Godley appear to have had confidence in the CIA Station Chief and in his conduct of operations. Although courses of action have frequently been discussed between representatives of the Department and CIA, the bulk of the day to day operational decisions were taken in the field without reference to the Department. A legitimate question is whether the wholesale buying of political [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] leaders is a sound basis for establishing a stable government. In the Congo there appears to have been no feasible alternative. [9 headings and 49 paragraphs (8 pages of source text) not declassified] Bureaucratic Process of Formulating and Approving Operations Proposals for covert operations arise from consultations in the field between CAS and the Ambassador, CIA and the Department, generally in the context of discussions between representatives of CIA and representatives of AF and INR/DDC, or from an initiative of CIA. The larger number of proposals are spawned in the field. The fewest from CIA initiative. In the latter category are proposals for an airline, for instance, or other operations which derive from a requirement more particular to the Agency. Consonant with the responsibility placed by NSC 5412 on the Director of Central Intelligence to carry out covert operations and the operational know how which reposes in CIA/DDP it is the Agency which formulates and drafts the proposal for consideration by the 303 Committee. It is the responsibility of the Agency to get political guidance from the Department. As a practical matter informal guidance is obtained by the Agency during the consultations with the geographic bureaus and INR/DDC and, in the field, with the Chief of Mission. In the case of major projects a formal proposal is submitted to the 303 Committee, with INR/DDC staffing out the proposal with the bureaus concerned before presentation to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Department's representative on the 303 Committee. Following the approval of a proposal by the 303 Committee there is frequent supplementary guidance provided by the Department or the chief of mission in regard to policy questions which may arise during the course of implementation of the operation. In Washington, guidance requests are addressed to INR/DDC or come up during the course of meetings between representatives of CIA and of the geographic bureau. The guidance is generally formalized by a memorandum to the Agency prepared by INR/DDC. In fast moving situations, however, as in the acute states of successive crises in the Congo, guidance may flow from meetings chaired by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs or from the head of a task force or working group organized to handle the crisis. These are exceptions to the general rule, however, resulting from the need for rapid action. The Defense Department is represented on the 303 Committee and, therefore, votes on proposals submitted to that group. Should proposals involve a Defense interest, Defense would be consulted in the formulation stage. In the African area Defense considerations have generally involved technical and operational matters. Therefore the coordination has been done by the Agency directly with Defense. It has occurred, however, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that Defense has sat in on meetings where the use of military force was discussed. One final word might be said regarding the discussions carried on by AF and INR/DDC with representatives of CIA/DDP. Although the regular weekly meetings at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level are held primarily to consider covert action, they frequently turn to discussions of other matters, for example, estimates of situations, exchange of information on developments, expressions of interest by the bureau in obtaining more intelligence about a particular problem, and CAS personnel and administration. These contacts provide an excellent forum for CIA to get the feel of the Bureau's thinking on policy matters and for the Department's representatives to get CIA appreciation of developments.
192. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 6, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64-6/65. Secret. Mac-- The President's reaction to Lee White's memo/2/ was that you (not Busby) should talk to Rusk about it. Rusk should take the main laboring oar since he's particularly good with the American Negro leadership./3/ /2/Document 190. /3/On January 7, Bundy sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk saying that President Johnson hoped that the Secretary would talk with the American Negro leadership because he had a particularly high standing with them. The President wanted Rusk to make the point that the administration did not think it was a good thing to encourage a separate Negro view of foreign policy. He recognized the natural interest of the Negro leaders in African affairs, but hoped they would also be interested in the totality of U.S. foreign policy as Americans. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64-6/65) On substance, Buz says the President feels he's working to make the American Negro fully a part of American society and overcome his segregation from the white community. He doesn't think it at all a good idea to encourage a separate Negro view of foreign policy. We don't want an integrated domestic policy and a segregated foreign policy. The President recognizes the American Negro community's natural interest in African affairs but doesn't think they should make it their special province. They shouldn't become a special interest group but should be interested in the totality of US policy as Americans. In short, I get loud and clear that the President wants to discourage emergence of any special Negro pressure group (a la the Zionists) which might limit his freedom of maneuver./4/ /4/A notation on the source text in Komer's handwriting reads: "Amen." RWK
193. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 4, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64-6/65. Confidential. Note for Mr. Bundy Secretary Rusk's meeting with representatives of the Negro Leadership Conference on Africa was quiet and friendly./2/ /2/Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP; Dr. John Davis, President of the American Society of African Culture; and Theodore Brown, Director of the American Negro Leadership Conference, met with Secretary Rusk on March 3. Concerning the Congo, the Secretary and the Negro Leadership group agreed on the necessity for an O.A.U. solution and for Tshombe to get rid of the white mercenaries. The Secretary indicated that the problems of Portuguese Africa were thorny because of the importance of the Azores to NATO. He suggested that the coming International Court of Justice decision in the South West Africa case might provide the U.S. Government a better "handle" with which to influence the South African Government to moderate its racist and totalitarian policies. He agreed with the Negro leaders that it would be most desirable to see an increase in U.S. aid to Africa. The Secretary himself initiated the discussion of the desirability of having more Negroes in the Foreign Service and invited suggestions from the Negro Leadership as to people who might qualify. Concerning their suggestion that he visit Africa, the Secretary said that it would be difficult to find an occasion around which to plan such a visit and that he wished to avoid offending those countries on the African Continent which he might not have time to visit. It was mentioned in the course of the discussions that Dr. Martin Luther King may go to Africa this spring on his own. None of the leaders expressed a desire to see the President or any one else in the White House about African affairs. All three spoke to the press afterwards for about an hour as "friendly critics" and were interviewed by CBS Television. The meeting was given minimal press coverage and is not likely to give rise to any undesirable repercussions. Rick
194. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer and Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 30, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64-6/65. Secret. A copy was sent to Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Associate Special Counsel to the President. McGB: We're quite concerned over the prospect of an imminent Negro leadership conference to set up an organization to influence US policy on Africa./2/ As I recall the President's view, this is just what he doesn't want. /2/A March 25 memorandum from Haynes to Komer stated that a meeting of the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa would be held in New York on April 1 to create a permanent organization concerned with American Negro influence on U.S. foreign policy in Africa. Haynes recommended doing something to eliminate the raison d'etre of such a group, such as a high-level U.S. friendship tour of Africa. (Ibid., Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65-6/15/66) As I get it, the President's view is since he's working to make the American Negro fully a part of American society, he doesn't think it at all a good idea to encourage a separate Negro view of foreign policy. We don't want an integrated domestic policy and a segregated foreign policy. While the President recognizes the American Negro Community's natural interest in African affairs, he doesn't think they should make it their special province. Rather than becoming a special interest group, they should be interested in the totality of US policy as Americans. Fortunately the conference has been postponed briefly. This gives us a little turnaround time. Only the White House could turn this aside, so we ought to consider putting out discreet high level word to the most responsive of the key people involved, along the lines of LBJ's comment. Who's the best man to do this--Moyers? Hobart Taylor? Yourself? We believe the recipients of our counsel should be: (a) Roy Wilkins and Martin Luther King--the key figures; (b) Phil Randolph; and (c) Dorothy Height. If there is an inevitable trend toward the emergence of a major private organization interested in US policy toward Africa (which may be the case), we should guide this toward a non-racial outcome, i.e. it should include whites as well as Negroes. If we're going to move on this we ought to do so fast. At any rate, the President ought to be informed, given his previous strong views. RWK
195. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 60/70-65 Washington, April 22, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 22. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA/2/ /2/For purposes of this estimate, we have defined this area to include all the countries of Africa except the following: UAR, Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Spanish Sahara. [Footnote in the source text.] The Problem To examine those situations and trends in Sub-Saharan Africa likely to affect the stability of the area and Western security interests over the next three to five years. Conclusions A. Political and social turmoil is virtually certain during the period of this estimate in most of the states of Sub-Saharan Africa. The general trend in the area--to which there are some exceptions--is probably toward more radical policies, and certainly toward more vigorous manifestations of African nationalism, in a variety of forms. (Paras. 1-12, 28-29) B. The various "liberation" movements in white-dominated southern Africa have made little headway despite considerable emotional support elsewhere in Africa. Meanwhile, white resistance has stiffened. Although most independent African states, as well as the USSR and China, probably will step up assistance to the nationalists, it is almost certain that white governments will command sufficient power and determination to contain "liberation" movements at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 36-42) C. Economic growth in most areas will be very slow; indeed, setbacks are probable in a number of countries. There is a desperate shortage of virtually all kinds of technical and managerial skills; indeed, the basic institutions and staff for economic development are often inadequate or absent. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that most African countries will obtain external assistance or investment on anything approaching the scale required for sustained economic development. (Paras. 47-50) D. The Communists have made substantial progress in expanding their presence in Africa, and the situation will provide them with new opportunities. Western influence in Africa will remain important during the period of this estimate, but it will decline, in part because both the UK and France will gradually shed presently expensive commitments. There is a good chance that a few African states will collaborate closely with either Moscow or Peiping, and become, at least temporarily, highly unfriendly to the West. The foreign policies of many, perhaps most, African states on many major international issues during the period of this estimate. However, even the militant radicals prize their freedom of movement, and we consider it unlikely that any African country will become a full-fledged Communist state, or will reject all ties with the West. (Paras. 30-35, 54-57) E. African relations with the US will remain ambivalent and difficult. Nevertheless, we do not believe that in most instances difficulties will decisively affect such material interests as the US has in Africa. No African raw materials or other resources are essential to US security. The US is likely to be able to retain the Kagnew facility at least during Haile Selassie's lifetime. Other less important installations and privileges seem safe during the period of this estimate. (Paras. 58-60) [Here follows the body of the paper.]
196. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, May 18, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65-6/15/66. Secret. RWK SUBJECT /2/Circular telegram 2156, May 6, to African posts noted that the President wanted the Department to undertake a new and critical look at overall African policy, including a country-by-country review, and to evaluate existing programs with a view to reforming and improving them and eliminating unnecessary operations. The telegram requested that chiefs of mission respond by May 10 if possible. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 AFR-US) Here's the weighty thinking of our Ambassadors in Africa on what a "New Policy for Africa" should constitute. With a few exceptions (i.e., Attwood in Nairobi, Korry in Addis), the replies to "Soapy's" telegram did not provoke any new ideas or provide any new insights. The more interesting telegrams are at the top of the pile, marked with a red "X" in the upper lefthand corner. A breakdown follows of recurrent themes and significant points raised in the replies: Political (1) US policy should be "more positive" in its approach to the problems of Southern Africa. (2) Best evidence of LBJ's personal interest in Africa would be a tour of Africa by the Vice President, Mrs. Johnson and daughters or Secretary Rusk. (3) A major shortcoming of US policy in Africa is its "proclivity toward over-close association and identification with traditional conservative leaders" to the exclusion of the Young Turks. AID (1) AID should be used as a political weapon with the major assist-ance going to African friends of the US. (2) AID procedures should be simplified and sped up to meet requirements peculiar to Africa. (3) Future AID programs for Africa should be regional or multinational in orientation. Special consideration should be given to developing a continent-wide telecommunications and transportation network. (4) US should make a sizeable grant to the African Development Bank as soon as it is established. (5) US foreign assistance should be re-channelled into an international consortium approach in which the UK, Western Europe, the Commonwealth Nations and others are represented. In any case, there should be greater coordination between Free World foreign assistance programs. (6) AID should explore the use of counterpart funds for development purposes in Africa. Education (1) The US should support more local vocational training in Africa. (2) US should establish a scholarship program for secondary school education in African countries (as distinguished from abroad). Psychological (1) US public concern for the Cold War ("Chicom threat", etc.) should be downplayed in Africa. "Wild!" (1) US should distribute the National Geographic magazine throughout Africa as it does an excellent job of presenting "the US image." (Ambassador Dumont, Burundi). Rick Haynes/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
197. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 5, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64-6/65. Confidential. Copies were sent to Komer and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff. McGB SUBJECT Summary The AF Chiefs of Mission Conferences in Addis Ababa and Lagos were a "qualified" success. Insofar as they provided a feel for the political and economic climate in the various African countries, the conferences were a success. They were also successful in breaking down the parochialism of most of the AF Ambassadors who tend to see US foreign policy interests in terms of US relations with their countries of assignment only. However, both conferences failed to generate significant, new or imaginative ideas around which a "New Policy for Africa" could be built. Recognizing their own shortcomings, the AF Ambassadors urged that "Soapy" substitute the term "strengthened" for "new" as the appellation for their policy recommendations. I came away from both conferences convinced that the US should not announce a "New" or "Strengthened" Policy for Africa unless it has the substance of a Marshall Plan or of an Alliance for Progress. This is not possible under the President's mandate to "Soapy" which calls for the reform, improvement or elimination of existing programs to better achieve our foreign policy objectives and which cautions that substantial increases in US foreign assistance expenditures are not envisaged. With such limitations, the announcement of a strengthened policy for Africa would only encourage African aspirations which the US could not possibly meet. The resultant disillusionment would be a major setback to US-African relations. The consensus at both conferences was that US relations with Africa today are generally good. Therefore, I feel strongly that the US should take advantage of this favorable climate to build a reserve of credit to see us through some of the predictable crises we will have to face on the African continent in the future; e.g., the growing crisis in Southern Africa. The best way to build this credit is by responding to key African needs and problems on an ad hoc basis with specific American solutions, all bearing the "LBJ" label. Significant Policy Observations Made by Conferees 1. AID-- a) should be used as a political weapon with more aid going to our friends than to our critics and a minimal aid presence in all African political units; b) while aid for long-term economic development is sound, an increase in "impact" aid pays higher political dividends; c) procedures should be simplified and speeded up and criteria tailored to African capacity to develop projects. 2. USIA-- a) the Voice of America devotes too much of its African-oriented broadcasting time to race relations in the US; b) USIA's output is generally too "ethnocentric" and is based on American, rather than African, tastes; c) the Voice of America signal is weak or spotty in many parts of Africa: d) with these reservations, both conferences had the highest praise for USIS performance in the field. 3. Cultural Affairs-- a) US scholarship programs for undergraduate study in America create dissatisfied, misfit elites in many African countries. 4. Political-- a) the toughest potential problem involving US-African relations centers around self-determination for the black populations of Southern Rhodesia, South and South West Africa, and the Portuguese territories; b) until his voting rights speech, LBJ did not have what was described as a "positive image" in Africa; c) crises involving the US in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic are not big issues in Africa where preoccupation with African problems takes precedence over all else; d) the US should be more subtle and circumspect in pointing out the dangers of Communism to Africans as the latter are anxious to keep the Cold War out of Africa at all costs; several Ambassadors complained of instructions requiring them to belabor African Chiefs of State and Foreign Ministers on every little Communist issue; e) Ethiopia was acknowledged to pose problems calling for special attention because of the serious threat to US strategic interests caused by the large and unpopular US military presence and increasing anti-Americanism in that country. Policy Recommendations Although many complaints were heard and problems raised by the AF Ambassadors, few policy recommendations were proposed--certainly not enough for the US to present as a new or strengthened policy for Africa. The following is a selective summary of the better policy recommendations. 1. The US should make every effort to achieve greater coordination of policy and action and to eliminate competition by the nations of the Free World in Africa on both political and foreign assistance matters. Annual meetings on African affairs should be held with those friendly Free World nations with African involvements: e.g., France, Nationalist China, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Canada, Spain, India, Pakistan and the Scandinavian countries. Similar efforts already undertaken to coordinate US policy with the British, Germans and Belgians have proven successful. 2. Personal relationships between Chiefs of State are important in Africa. For US policy objectives to be advanced, it is desirable that African leaders be made aware of the US President's personal interest in African affairs. All of the Ambassadors urged a high-level tour of Africa by a personal representative of the President whose sole purpose would be to generate good will for the US. (Bob Komer has informed me that the time is not yet ripe for such a trip to be undertaken.) Barring such a trip, the continued exchange of letters between the President and African leaders was considered most helpful. 3. Occasions should be exploited for the President to pronounce himself on matters of interest to Africans. Too many US public statements on African affairs refer to positions taken and comments made by President Kennedy. Few identify President Johnson with African interests in his own right. (How about Bundy-Williams and Bundy-Rowan memos on this subject?) 4. The use of the $25,000 Self-Help Fund made available to AF Ambassadors by AID should be completely discretionary with the Ambassador in consultation with his Country Team. Its use should be based on the sole criterion of whether it produces a desirable "impact" (i.e., conspicuous, readily identifiable as coming from US, meets an immediate local need of the people rather than a privileged few). The amount available for the Self-Help Fund should be raised to the $50,000 level as in Latin America. All of the Ambassadors endorsed the fund with enthusiasm. 5. AID should be instructed to make a study and come up with recommendations as to the use of counterpart or surplus currency funds in a coordinated US foreign assistance program. For example, such funds might be used to pay (or top off) the salaries of friendly third-country technicians and advisors, for procurement in friendly third-countries or for scholarships for Africans to study in friendly third-countries. 6. The US should phase-out its scholarship programs of undergraduate studies for Africans in American colleges and universities. Concentration should be on US assistance to secondary school education and vocational training within African countries. Scholarships for study in the US should be limited to the graduate level. This would broaden the educational base, provide required skills and eliminate competition with emerging African institutions of higher learning for the best students. Attachments Attached are copies of some of the working papers from the two Chiefs of Mission Conferences./2/ Of special interest are attachments numbered 1 and 2. Attachment number 1 contains "Soapy's" proposed (still subject to change) action recommendations to the President and Secretary of State for a "Strengthened African Program." I would appreciate it if no reference were made to this document in discussions with AF. Attachment number 2 contains the "basic elements of US policy in Africa" which the Lagos conferees evolved. Attachment 3 is a summary of the Addis Conference; attachment 4 is a summary of the Lagos Conference. /2/Not printed. Rick
198. Memorandum From Ulric Haynes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 15, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65-6/15/66. Secret. Copies were sent to Komer and Saunders. SUBJECT At his request, I met with Bill Moyers this morning to get from him the President's thinking on African affairs. Bill explained that he was discussing this with me because both you and Bob Komer were swamped with more pressing matters. In the course of a dinner conversation with Bill last night, the President expressed his concern that the US lay a solid foundation for good relations with a continent which will become increasingly important. The President's night-reading on African affairs had aroused this concern. The subjects of his special interest are summarized below: 1. African Telecommunications System--A proposal made by Ambassador Korry (Ethiopia) struck the President as worthy of consideration. The Ambassador recommended that the US establish a continent-wide telecommunications system for Africa utilizing a telecommunications satellite. Korry's proposal came to the President's attention by way of a letter from the Ambassador to the President and an Embassy telegram (attached)./2/ /2/Not attached. If, in fact, the cost of such a telecommunications set-up would only be in the area of $10 million, the President considers this "nominal" in view of the potential advantageous continent-wide impact. I informed Bill that AID is currently doing a study on this subject. Bill asked me to inform AID that the President wanted to see the results of the AID study and recommendations as soon as possible. 2. Tanzania-Zambia Railroad Study--The President has come around to the point of view that the US should cooperate with the British in doing a survey of the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad. However, this involves no commitment on the part of the US to construct a railroad. 3. African "Problems on the Horizon"--The President is aware that we are in no real trouble in Africa at present. However, he is anxious to be kept informed of the "problems on the horizon." Bill asked for a one-page memo for the President on this subject. (Komer-Haynes will prepare and submit for your approval.)/3/ /3/Document 199. 4. Presidential Trip to Africa--the President feels that of all the places he would like to visit abroad, perhaps an African visit would pose the least problems and get the greatest return. Bill and I discussed the possible timing of such a trip for the late fall just prior to the convening of the UN General Assembly. Bill stressed that such a trip was still very much in the "thinking stage." 5. "Soapy's" Africa Policy Memo--The President has read "Soapy's" African policy memorandum/4/ and his comment was "carry through quickly." Moyers shares our concern that the memo lacks specifics although no one can argue with the platitudes it contains. Bill urged that we light the fires under AF to get them to move forward with more preventive diplomacy to avert crises. He advised that where State seems to be falling short in protecting and advancing the President's interests in Africa, the NSC staff should not be reluctant to take the initiative. /4/Not found; for the final version, see Document 200. Bill was also as worried as we that "Soapy's" recent extended absences (speech-making, etc.) are causing a slow-down of AF momentum. 6. Presidential Pronouncements on African Affairs--Bill agreed that the President was anxious to make his own mark in Africa. Therefore, we should (even on our own initiative) find more opportunities for the President to pronounce himself on matters of interest to Africans. Bob Komer and I will contact the appropriate agencies to get cracking on the President's request and/or to inform them of his specific interests. Rick Haynes/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
199. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. Secret. A June 21 covering memorandum from Bundy to the President states that this summary of the African problem was worth reading. Bundy added that his only reservation concerned the memorandum's endorsement of "Presidential noisemaking" about the Portuguese and the South Africans, commenting, "I think we have to be very careful with this and speak much more in sorrow than in anger." (Ibid.) Our African Affairs. This responds to your request via Bill Moyers./2/ First off, we've recovered a good deal from the low point of the Congo paradrop last fall. The back of the Congo rebellion has been broken, though cleaning up may go on for months. More and more African states are beginning to do business with Tshombe. Meanwhile, a surprising number of countries are adopting a more pro-Western stance--Kenya, Guinea, Mali, Uganda, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and now perhaps Algeria. Our biggest problem at the moment is the backlash from Vietnam and Santo Domingo, although our parochial African friends are not too responsive to Communist propaganda on these affairs. /2/See Document 198. Problems on the Horizon. Looking ahead, what will mostly agitate Africans over the next few years will be the "liberation" of the southern third of Africa, which the new African countries regard as their chief unfinished business. In Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, Southwest Africa, and South Africa itself white minority governments are sitting repressively on volcanoes. These issues will provide the chief test of outside sympathy for African aspirations in 1965-70. So I'm convinced that the stance we take toward them will have greater weight in determining our African image and influence than any "Marshall Plan for Africa" or similar grandiose schemes. The Soviets and Chicoms have a big advantage in this competition; they preach violent revolution while trying hard to pin on us guilt by association. This is true in a way. The Azores base makes us chary of seeming too anti-Portuguese, and we and the UK have major investments and trade ties with Rhodesia and South Africa. So we do have assets we could lose. Proposed US Stance. The more we can stay ahead of the game on southern African issues, instead of being dragged reluctantly toward the inevitable, the better we will get along with Africa. In any case we want to press the intransigeant white regimes to modify their repressive policies before there are explosions which the Communists will exploit. Ideally, we want evolution not revolution, which will minimize the likelihood of violence and of risk to our assets in the area. The way to start is by a more forthright declaration of US policy, initially in general terms. This can come best from the White House itself. US Aid Policy. Soapy Williams and our country teams all tend to see the African problem too much in terms of US aid. We are already investing about $145 million in economic aid and MAP, and $150 million in food. I don't see us going up very fast. Nor do I think we'd buy much. The new African countries are mostly in such a primitive state of development, and are so hipped on internecine quarrels that I doubt whether even a massive US investment now would show a commensurate result. In any event, there are more profitable ways to spend our aid money. So I'd argue for only a gradual increase in US aid, with concentration on such dramatic impact projects as the communications satellite idea (if it proves feasible). Tactical Disengagement from the Bad Guys. Our Africanists tend to run too fast after the radical Africans. They overstate the risks to us from a degree of Chicom or Soviet influence in certain countries. Our experience to date has been that most African states which have tasted the fruits 'of Communist support in the first flush of independence have tended to get a stomach ache (Morocco, Guinea, Mali and Kenya are cases in point). So I'm against rushing in too fast to bail out radical regimes in trouble. Let's keep a foot in the door everywhere, and let's be decently responsive where opportunity offers, but let these wayward countries come to us rather than courting them too eagerly. The above is the bare bones outline of what I see as a sensible new policy toward Africa. I'd lay heaviest stress on deliberately showing greater sympathy for the remaining independence movements, even if it breaks some crockery. A few rousing speeches will buy us more than $200 million in aid. R.W. Komer [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
