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200. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington September 17, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President's Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. Drafted by Williams' Special Assist-ant, Thomas W. McElhiney, on September 15. Cleared by Bell, USIA Deputy Director of Policy and Plans Burnett Anderson, Trowbridge of Commerce, Frankel, Solomon, Leddy, Walt Rostow, Greenfield, and Lang. SUBJECT Background During a conversation in May, the President asked me to review U.S. policy and implementing actions in Africa and to develop a program with which he could be associated personally. As a first step in meeting this request, the idea of a new African program was discussed in some detail at the Chiefs of Mission conferences held in Addis Ababa and Lagos in late May and early June. At those conferences, there was a consensus that U.S. African policy is sound but that some of the programs which implement it should be strengthened. Specifics for inclusion in a new program were discussed, with particular emphasis on the desirability of (1) personal association with Africa on the part of the President, (2) personal association of the President with the principle of self-determination, (3) the use of economic aid to serve political as well as developmental objectives, and (4) the strengthening of our programs in the fields of information and cultural and educational exchange to promote the U.S. and combat Communism. After my return to Washington, a tentative program proposed by AF was reviewed by representatives of interested bureaus of the Department and other agencies. The attached papers are derived from the basic memorandum prepared in the group these representatives formed. Discussion It is fair to say, therefore, that most careful consideration has been given to the specifics of the Strengthened African Program and that not only our ambassadors in the field but also the interested agencies in Washington agree on the need for the new emphases and directions proposed. Strong positions in the areas of African self-determination and economic development are in any event important to support general U.S. policy objectives in Africa. But they are valuable for two other pertinent reasons, first to secure African support or understanding of general U.S. policy objectives such as Chinese representation, Vietnam, etc., and second, to enable the President to create his own African image. These positions will not buy African votes but they will help create the climate of concern in their problems that will permit us to get a hearing and argue our points. Action in these areas, with manifestation of the President's personal interest through his or the Vice President's visit and a Presidential speech as recommended, will go far to imprint African policy with the LBJ brand. We would have preferred to avoid recommending increases in the funds devoted to the programs in question. However, after consideration of all of the possibilities offered by resource reallocation and reorganization of effort, it was decided that budget increases would be required in certain critical areas if the proposed strengthening is to take place. Against the background of the great disparity between program budgets for Africa versus those for other underdeveloped areas and the decline in program budgets per country in Africa over the past five years, I feel that these modest increases are fully justified. I would also like to emphasize the fact that military expenditures in Africa are very low, as we would like them to continue to be, and that, as the attached descriptive memorandum on the Strengthened African Program points out: "Relatively modest expenditures now for non-military programs in Africa may well provide an extra dividend in reducing or eliminating the seeds of dissension which otherwise, give rise to the need for large security programs." In any case, I am convinced that certain of the more significant new directions and emphases which we propose cannot be introduced unless we have additional resources. And, unless we introduce these new directions and emphases into our programs, we cannot strengthen the climate of trust and respect we need in Africa to gain African support for our positions on specific issues in international affairs and to maintain friendly and effective bilateral relations. I think it is clear, therefore, that at least some additional resources are required to permit us to achieve our objectives in Africa. Recommendation That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab 1) and forward it and its enclosures to him./2/ /2/See Document 221.
201. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 14, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President's Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. SUBJECT Recommendation/2/ /2/There is no indication on the source text whether the President approved or disapproved these recommendations. At your request, Assistant Secretary Williams has undertaken a survey of United States programs in Africa to determine whether they adequately support our policy objectives. Governor Williams' recommendations in this regard, which I support, are: 1. That high officials of the Administration visit Africa, both on a planned basis to the continent and in connection with visits to other parts of the world. 2. That you make a major speech or speeches associating yourself personally with United States policy and programs in Africa along the lines of the attached draft./3/ /3/Not printed. 3. That you approve in principle the strengthening of our African programs in the fields of: (a) information (pages 10 to 11 of the attached memorandum);/4/ /4/Not printed. (b) educational and cultural exchange (pages 11 to 12 of the attached memorandum); (c) economic aid (pages 13 to 16 of the attached memorandum). AID, USIA and the Department of Commerce concur. The Defense Department concurs in the parts of the memorandum and speech dealing with military assistance and related Defense matters./5/ /5/On September 17, Deputy Assistant Secretary Lang sent Williams the Defense Department comments which read: "The Defense Department has reservations about whether the speech will further the principal objective of achieving a peaceful, evolutionary solution to the southern African problem, or have the opposite effect of widening the breach." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 092 Africa) Discussion The attached memorandum, prepared under Governor Williams' direction, describes the areas of activity examined, largely on the recommendation of our ambassadors in Africa, but in cooperation with the agencies concerned. There is general agreement that the basic elements of United States African policy are sound. However, it does seem desirable to introduce certain new directions and emphases into the programs which implement policy, particularly if we are to develop in Africa a climate of trust and respect which both produces African support for over-all United States positions on specific issues in international affairs and also serves to maintain effective bilateral relations. In broad perspective, a political and social evolution is envisaged in Africa which would in time significantly extend the area of freedom in the world, thus making our own democratic freedoms more secure. This evolution begins with self-determination--largely achieved, proceeds through the establishment of economic and social conditions which give meaning to nationhood, and ultimately arrives at societies based on genuinely free institutions. If we are to influence this evolution in our own interest, we must first establish a stronger position in Africa by identifying the United States and its leaders, particularly the President, with legitimate African aspirations, and by contributing to the process of development in ways which more effectively convince the Africans of our interest in them. The situation in Africa provides us with a unique opportunity to project American ideas and use American resources in Africa by means which attract attention to and are consistent with our democratic principles, our commitment to an interracial society, and our concern with human welfare. An important aspect of the proposed strengthening of our programs in Africa is that it emphasizes evolutionary, peaceful progress and mutual understanding. In a very real sense, the greater the effectiveness of our non-military programs in contributing to African economic and social development and to developing African attitudes favorable to the West, the less need there will be for large military outlays to resist Communist encroachments (perhaps "Wars of Liberation") in Africa. This liberal, responsive concept of our relations with Africa would be a particularly appropriate foreign policy counterpart of the Great Society. Our efforts to project this concept abroad would be much more effective and our position in Africa would be considerably strengthened if you would associate yourself publicly with Africa and its aspirations. In Africa, perhaps more than in any other part of the world, relations between governments are viewed as personal relations between leaders. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China recognize this, and top leaders from both have visited Africa. Both also build on this personal high-level attention through programs in the same general categories as ours. Both the Chinese and Russian Communists have over the past year or so stepped up their activities. The action required in this area is a visit to Africa by yourself or the Vice President and a speech or speeches, a suggested draft of which is attached. Other new directions and emphases affect our programs in the fields of information, cultural and educational exchange, and economic aid. While the content of these programs will in general remain the same, they will be used more extensively and effectively. This will require additional funds, but the amounts involved have been kept to the absolute minimum. Even with the relatively modest increases recommended, expenditures for programs in Africa will still be considerably less than for any one of the other four geographic areas. We are convinced, in any case, that in Africa small increases would bring substantial returns. I agree with Governor Williams that the general strengthening of our programs in the fields of information, cultural and educational exchange, and economic aid is needed and should be undertaken particularly to reinforce the benefits we would derive from your association with Africa. The budget increases to permit this strengthening are now estimated at $1.5 million for USIA in Fiscal Year 1966, and $1.7 million for the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in Fiscal Year 1967. In the economic aid program, there would be no increase stemming directly from the Strengthened African Program as such. What would be involved is primarily a shifting of priorities and a reallocation of funds within the limits of the total of $263 million in Fiscal Year 1967, which AID has already been considering for its request to the Congress without reference to the Program. This would be $40 million higher than the amount requested of the Congress for Fiscal Year 1966. The planned United States financing of $20 million in loan projects through the African Development Bank and such humanitarian projects as the measles inoculation program, both mentioned in the attached draft speech, would be covered by Fiscal Year 1966, tentatively planned Fiscal Year 1967, or subsequent year funds If the $40 million increase already being considered is not provided, however, the shifting of priorities envisaged under the Program could not take place without serious damage to on-going projects I would not interpret your approval in principle of the strengthening of our African programs as committing the Executive Branch to these figures. However, I would assume that your approval carried with it agreement to proceed with requests for budget increases of this general order of magnitude for these three programs. Dean Rusk
202. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 23, 1965, 6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President's Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Secret. Attached are Soapy Williams' package proposals for a Strengthened African Program, endorsed by Secretary Rusk./2/ You will recall that this is what you "asked" Soapy for last spring. We have held it up briefly, so as not to burden you with what is regrettably rather a mouse. /2/See Document 201. The chief trouble with his package is that it doesn't have much focus or go far enough. It would simply beef up slightly our existing aid and info programs, and call for high level visits and a speech by you. But we doubt that such measures, necessarily spread over 36 countries, add up to a bold new program Neither a little more aid nor more high level massage--desirable as these are--go to the heart of the problem. In our judgment the success of US policy and the extent of US influence will depend primarily on the position we take on those political issues of overriding interest to the Africans themselves. Over the coming years these issues will inevitably be those of clearing the remaining vestiges of colonialism from the southern third of Africa--Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, and South Africa itself. As is already clear from the ruckus over Rhodesia, these are the issues which Africans themselves will regard as the prime test of who's with them and who isn't. Vietnam, South Asia, or Berlin are far away, but these African issues are seen by Africans as an intimate part of their own struggle for independence of colonialism. Moreover, each of them has racial overtones of black vs. white, so arouse great African suspicions. Without debating all the pros and cons of a positive US policy on these issues (it has many real costs), we can't escape one basic point--African majority rule is sooner or later inevitable and we ought to be on the winning side. The battle was really lost when two-thirds of Africa became independent; the completion of the process is historically inevitable. It will be painful, but there's no stopping it (except perhaps in South Africa for a time). There are other reasons too. As Arthur Goldberg keeps pointing out, we need the 36 African UN votes, and these 36 countries will be looking more at where we stand than at what we give them. They won't be responsive to the case for gradualism, but will be quick to ask whether US opposition to racism at home is also our policy abroad. Such questions are also likely to be asked increasingly by civil rights groups here at home. Finally, we are in competition with the Soviets and Chinese, who will jump to exploit too much US waffling on these issues. Thus, we'd argue that the best and cheapest way to advance US interests in Africa would be a clear US stance on the southern third of Africa. Even so, we see merit in the three recommendations outlined in Rusk's memo (which summarizes Soapy's longer memorandum--also attached but not necessary to read). These are (1) more high level visits; (2) an African speech by you; and (3) somewhat increased info, exchange, and aid programs. The added cost would be only $1.5 million for USIA in FY 1966; $1. 7 million for State (CU) in FY 1967 and $263 million for AID in FY 1967 (some $40 million more than this year). If you agree in principle with both Rusk and us, but don't wish to sign on to specific dollar levels, we suggest the device of the memo to Rusk at Tab 1./3/ Charlie Schultze is satisfied with the phrase "subject to usual budget review." Or if you prefer, we can just give this package the silent treatment. /3/See Document 203. R.W. Komer/4/ /4/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature. Memorandum approved /5/President Johnson checked the first two options.
203. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 28, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President's Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. SUBJECT I have read with interest the Strengthened African Program which you sent to me on 14 October,/2/ and am generally in accord with your three specific recommendations, subject to the usual budget review. /2/Document 201. However, I feel that the prime determinant of US influence in Africa will be the stance the US takes on those political issues of primary concern to the Africans themselves. US concern for African problems must be demonstrated by actions, and in terms, which will have an immediate appeal to the people of Africa. Therefore, I request the State Department, in cooperation with other appropriate agencies, to submit recommendations by 15 December 1965 on: (a) Strengthening the proposed speech to restate more forcefully US support of independence and majority rule in Africa, perhaps using Rhodesia as a case in point; (b) A proposal for an occasion when such a speech should be made; and (c) Other actions which can be taken to help toward peaceful solution to the problems of self-determination in Southern Africa./3/ /3/A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text indicates that the memorandum was sent on November 29. Lyndon B. Johnson
204. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control (Barber) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Yarmolinsky)/1/ Washington, November 29, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 388.3 Africa. Secret. A typed notation on the source text reads: "Mr. McNaughton has seen." SUBJECT Tomorrow, the United States must vote on a resolution calling for the denuclearization of Africa, which has been drafted primarily by African states. Ambassador Yost, calling for Ambassador Goldberg, has said that he believes he can get the first operative paragraph dropped if the US will vote for the resolution. (While the language does not appear troublesome, the resolution, which is reaffirmed, forbids transport of nuclear weapons in the air and seas about the territory of Africa.) Recommendation I recommend that we concur in Ambassador Yost's proposal. I have referred this to the JCS, who have suggested two changes: 1. Striking the first paragraph. This is the condition for US acceptance. 2. Delete the words "or deploying" in paragraph 5. Reason: To avoid implication of interference with transit rights. Discussion I believe this point can be made quite clear in the US policy statement; to wit: we interpret the word "deploy" to mean the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons in the area. As Mr. Vance has indicated that he wished to reserve judgment on this matter until the issue became clearer, you may wish to call him on it. I would appreciate an answer before we close tonight./2/ /2/A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text reads: "Mr. Vance approved (29 Nov. 65)." Arthur Barber/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Barber signed the original.
205. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-849-65 Washington, December 1, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 388.3 Africa. Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "Mr. McNaughton has seen." SUBJECT 1. (U) Reference is made to an oral request by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff related to a proposed UN resolution calling for the denuclearization of Africa. 2. (U) An analysis of the operative paragraphs of the resolution shows generally four proposed actions: a. Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 call upon all UN members to refrain from testing, storing, using, or deploying nuclear weapons in Africa. b. Paragraphs 2 and 3 endorse a treaty under UN auspices whereby African states will undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. c. Paragraph 6 urges UN members possessing nuclear weapons and capabilities not to transfer nuclear weapons or technology to any state which may be used to assist that state in manufacturing or using nuclear weapons in Africa. d. Paragraph 7 expresses the hope that African states will initiate studies to implement denuclearization of Africa and to take the necessary measures through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to achieve this end. 3. (S) [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] [2 paragraphs (32 lines of source text) not declassified] 4. (U) It is not clear to the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether all aspects of an NFZ in Africa are covered by the UN declaration. However, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the reasons set forth above, that the denuclearization of Africa as contained in the proposed resolution would not be in the security interest of the United States and should be opposed. It is recognized that political considerations may not warrant active US opposition to the UN resolution. In such an eventuality, it is recommended that the United States abstain from voting on this resolution./2/ /2/On December 1, the U.N. First Committee approved the proposed draft resolution without change by a roll-call vote of 105 (including the United States) to 0 with 3 abstentions. On December 3, by a vote of 105 (including the United States) to 0 with 2 abstentions (France and Portugal), the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 2033 (XX) endorsing the July 21, 1964, OAU declaration on the denuclearization of Africa. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 369-370. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.
206. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, December 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, President's Speech on 3rd Anniversary of OAU, 5/26/66. Confidential. Drafted on December 10 by Deputy Director for Southern African Affairs Curtis C. Strong. SUBJECT Background On October 14 you sent to the President a memorandum,/2/ prepared in AF, making three recommendations for strengthening our programs in Africa. These recommendations were: (1) that high officials of the Administration visit Africa, (2) that he make a speech associating himself personally with U.S. policy and programs along the lines of an attached draft, and (3) that our information, educational and cultural exchange, and economic aid programs be strengthened along specified lines. /2/Document 201. In a memorandum dated November 28/3/ the President expressed general accord with these recommendations but requested recommendations for: (a) strengthening the proposed speech, (b) an occasion for making it, and (c) other actions which can be taken to help towards peaceful solution to the problems of self-determination in southern Africa. /3/Document 203. Discussion AF has consulted other interested bureaus and Departments and arrived at agreed recommendations. These are submitted in the form of a memorandum from you to the President with three attachments: (a) a revised draft of the proposed speech, (b) a memorandum on an occasion for its delivery, and (c) a memorandum on other actions that can be taken vis-a-vis the southern African problem. Clearances are shown on each attachment. During the course of our consultations a number of suggestions were made, particularly with regard to other possible actions, on which considerably more discussion would have been required to reach agreed positions. They were therefore not included in our recommendations. I propose, however, to submit further recommendations on southern Africa at a later date. In this connection, much will, of course, depend on developments in the Southern Rhodesia problem. Recommendation That you sign the attached memorandum to the President. Attachment Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, undated. SUBJECT Recommendations In response to the requests contained in your memorandum of November 28, Assistant Secretary Williams has submitted the following recommendations, with which I concur, for strengthening our programs in Africa: 1. The proposed speech has been revised to restate more forcefully US support of independence and majority rule in Africa. A copy of the revised speech is enclosed./4/ /4/None of the attachments is printed. President Johnson made his first speech on Africa on May 26, 1966; see Document 211. 2. It is recommended that, circumstances permitting, you consider making the speech on the occasion of Lincoln's birthday, February 12, 1966. A memorandum on this subject is enclosed. 3. Recommendations for other actions to help towards peaceful solutions to the problems of self-determination in southern Africa are contained in the enclosed memorandum. They call for actions in the fields of education for southern Africans, assistance to the former High Commission Territories, assistance to the victims of apartheid, and contingency planning for South West Africa. AID and USIA concur in these recommendations. Dean Rusk/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
207. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, March 5, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AFR. Secret. Drafted by Director of the Office of Inter-African Affairs Fred L. Hadsel and cleared by Rostow. Copies were sent to U, G, and M. The source text bears Rusk's initials, indicating that he read it. SUBJECT Facts Within the past nine months there have been seven military take-overs of political power in Africa (Algeria, June 19, 1965; Congo, November 25; Dahomey, December 28; CAR, January 1, 1966; Upper Volta, January 3; Nigeria, January 15; and Ghana, February 24). In almost every case the younger officers have joined with experienced officials to eliminate a layer of politicians who were either corrupt or ineffective. This new generation of leadership displays more idealism, while also being more pragmatic. It is strongly nationalist without greater xenophobia. It is seeking greater efficiency without necessarily being more dictatorial. Ghana, the scene of the most recent take-over, illustrates this change most clearly. Results The inevitable confusion of this transformation has obscured the significant results. They include: (1) Greater concentration on internal economic and political development. (2) Lesser interest in foreign adventures, especially extra-African issues. (3) Stronger endorsement of honesty in government, and a corresponding lower tolerance of corruption. (4) Greater emphasis on competence, especially in the field of governmental activities. (5) Stronger emphasis on national integrity, with growing antipathy toward Soviet and Chinese subversive activities. (6) Less emotional atmosphere in some cases, permitting more practical cooperation with the former metropoles and the United States. These immediate results all favor our own interests in Africa. We should not, however, be misled into thinking that this new atmosphere will necessarily produce long-term improvement. (1) The new leadership in itself cannot solve the problems facing these new nations. They will remain. Budgets cannot be balanced overnight; economic development is not the automatic consequence of good intentions; external subversion will not cease because communist missions leave a few countries. (2) Although the pendulum of this change has swung in our direction, there is no assurance that the motion will not be reversed if the basic problems remain untouched. Politics, as Walt Rostow observed in his paper of January 26 on The Politics of Development, will continue to assume the form of contention among competing pressure groups, and it is only a matter of time before this occurs in these African states. Economic, educational and social well-being will continue to be the goal of the African people, and frustration of these aspirations could cause another shift in political power. In such instance, the pendulum can only swing away from us. The long-range threat of Communist China, which you often stress, will again be an immediate problem in Africa. (3) The irreducible fact remains that African nations will continue to need significant external assistance. The additive of recent events is a new coalition of forces which displays greater realism in facing up to economic difficulties. These leaders are instinctively more open to sound advice from Western governments or international organizations, such as the IBRD and the Fund. Although continuing to be thoroughly African in their world outlook, they are more prepared to minimize or cut ties with Communist countries. Conclusions While the military take-overs may change the power structure of these nations, they do not invalidate either the need for rapid economic and social development or the general goals of our assistance programs. Thus the Strengthened African Program, which in accordance with the President's suggestion is being revised and is coming to you soon, remains valid. These African nations illustrate in a very particular form the general fear expressed by George Woods in the January issue of Foreign Affairs that the industrialized world might fumble its chance to respond effectively to the underdeveloped world. From every country where a military take-over has occurred, we have received urgent pleas for assistance, which in the aggregate may not be very large but which if deployed rapidly could have significant effect. If we miss the opportunity which recent developments present to capitalize on this new wave of nationalism, idealism and efficiency, we face the real danger of seeing the present atmosphere go sour and of having gained little or nothing from the opportunity presented to us. By contrast, it seems to us that our task is to create an atmosphere in the US Government and elsewhere which by matching the atmosphere in Africa will serve our interests both immediately and in the long-run. An effective initiative on our part will, of course, cost us some money. We urge that this fact be recognized at the highest levels of our government and by the heads of agencies directly concerned. We do not, however, urge a go-it-alone attitude by the United States, or by any one of its agencies. We would recommend, instead, a major attempt to diversify the effort. For example: (1) A.I.D. should be prepared to expand its efforts in these countries. Public safety, transportation, education and selected capital developments appear possibilities. (2) Food for Peace could be more widely used in cases of need and more broadly used as an instrument of economic development. (3) International organizations, especially the Bank and the Fund, should be urged to expand their advice and loans. (4) The European powers should be hit hard to seize the present opportunities to invest in loan and grant assistance to these African nations. (5) The Peace Corps should expand its efforts, especially in Francophone states.
208. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 10, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Haynes Files, CHRONO (Haynes), 3/1/65-6/15/66. Confidential. Outlook in Africa. Aside from the looming black-white issue already on us in the southern third of Africa, our African affairs are moving along quite well. Military coups like those in Ghana and Nigeria are not really a matter of civilians vs. military, but of a dynamic educated element of the new African societies getting fed up with the ineptitude or posturing (or both) of the original leaders of these young countries. Telescoping the historical experience of the older nations of the world, the new nations of Africa are ending the first phase of their modern history. It was one of great popular euphoria--sparked by the end of colonialism and the beginning of independence. Hopes and aspirations were high. The military coups of 1965-66 in Algeria, Dahomey, Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, Nigeria and Ghana signal the beginning of the second phase of modern African history. This latest phase is born of frustrated hopes and aspirations, and disappointment with the performance of the independence leaders. While most of the coups, especially that in Ghana, are a distinct plus for us, there are dangers too because the military coup has left something of a political vacuum in each of the affected countries. The officer corps may in many cases be unable to meet a payroll any better than their predecessors. So it is premature for the US to clap its hands in glee. Nor is it safe to assume that opposition to pro-Communist leanings on the part of leaders like Ben Bella or Nkrumah played a central role in their overthrow. In every case it was primarily internal conditions that caused the coups. In a real sense, this new phase in Africa is a healthy one, because the dreams and myths which accompanied independence are being replaced by the realization that austerity and hard work are required for survival. The problem is to get this notion across to the masses of African people without dashing their faith in their new leadership. Our interest is to encourage internal political stability and enough forward movement in Africa to keep it from becoming a Moscow or Peiping playground, while limiting our own investment in favor of other more critical areas. This seems to me quite feasible, provided we don't get caught on the wrong side of the Rhodesia, Portuguese, and South Africa issues which will essentially determine African attitudes toward the great powers over the next 2-5 years. R.W. Komer
209. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 20, 1966, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3, 4/2/66-5/26/66. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Mr. President--State Dept draft of address seems long to me and needs editing by Moyers. K--5/20. Attached is a draft of remarks/2/ which State suggests you make at your Thursday, May 26, reception for the Ambassadors of the 36-member Organization of African Unity (OAU). (May 25 is the OAU's third anniversary.) We have revised the remarks for style and agree with the substance. /2/Not printed. Your remarks at the reception would (a) get across to Africans, who tend to feel ignored, your personal interest in their welfare, (b) kick off a new US policy initiative in accord with your instruction to us. The proposed approach is as follows: Part I states those principles of the OAU Charter which we share in common with the Africans; Part II cites the developmental progress in Africa to which the US has made a substantial contribution; Part III, holds out the promise of expanded U. S. assistance in the areas of regional economic development, education, health, and satellite communications; Part IV announces that the US has begun studies of a new multi-national approach to aid for Africa and will shortly be consulting with African and other governments, as well as with international agencies./3/ /3/On April 23, Rostow sent Secretary Rusk a memorandum reporting on a review of various foreign policy problems with President Johnson. In this, he noted: "The President wants as soon as possible a design for an African alliance for progress, perhaps involving the expenditure of several hundred million dollars over some years." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Vietnam, April-July 1966) I have the agreement of the Bureau of the Budget to this initiative. If you approve USIA will make a color film of the entire reception (most of the African Ambassadors will be in colorful national dress) for African consumption. Approve/4/ /4/This option is checked. Following your launching of this revitalized US initiative in Africa, State will be systematically enlisting the ideas and support of the various African governments as well as the governments of the UK, France, Belgium, Italy, West Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Japan and Israel, among others, in this new multi-national cooperative aid effort. In addition, similar contacts will be made with the World Bank, African Development Bank, the UN's Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic Community of Eastern Africa and other African regional groupings. We established that serious staff work on this project could only be effectively done--here in the government, with consultants, and abroad--after a kick-off of this kind. It gives you a powerful political initiative, with time in hand to figure out what it will cost and who will pay. Walt Remarks approved/5/ /5/This option is checked with a question mark, and a handwritten notation reads: "Must be cut." [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
