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Africa Region
181. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 29, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, East, Vol. I, 1/64-4/64. No classification marking. Chicom Activity in Africa We are concerned by evidence of growing Chinese Communist effort and influence in Africa, involving possible threat to US interests there, shift of African votes on Chinese representation in the UN, and subversion of moderate regimes in Africa. Items of interest include--Chou En-lai's current tour of Africa; the effects in Africa of French recognition of the Chicoms; and possible Chicom involvement in the Zanzibar and East Africa disturbances. There is a variety of evidence that the Chinese are making a major long-term effort in Africa. Even Haile Selassie has now invited Chou En-lai to visit Ethiopia this week, and we may have an issue of Ethiopian recognition of the Chicoms on our hands soon. Averell Harriman is working on these problems--what the Chicoms are up to in East Africa, the Ethiopian issue, how to block the Chinese drive for a "Bandung"-type Afro-Asian conference (we would rather see a neutralist Afro-Asian meeting, excluding the Chicoms), etc. I am following this and will keep you informed; if you agree I might tell Harriman you are interested in a comprehensive State review of the Chicom offensive in Africa and what we can do about it. William H. Brubeck/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
182. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ ADH/B-26 Washington, February 7, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, PM Home Visit Briefing Book, 2/12-13/64. Secret. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs Wendell B. Coote. VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER DOUGLAS-HOME Background Paper East Africa and Zanzibar 1. Recent Developments in East Africa Despite speculation there is no hard evidence at this time that the trouble in East Africa was part of an interrelated Communist plot to take over the area. There was obvious Communist involvement in Zanzibar. The successful Zanzibar revolution undoubtedly provided inspiration to frustrated dissidents in neighboring East African countries./2/ /2/On January 12, African rebels on the island of Zanzibar overthrew the predominantly Arab government and established a republic. The situation in Zanzibar was basically unstable. African antagonism towards the entrenched Arab minority was deep-rooted. While the coup was essentially an African drive to seize control from the Arabs, the African nationalists were assisted in the planning and execution of the coup by pro-Communist forces. A chain of mutinies then swept through the armed forces in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya. The revolt in Tanganyika was an alarming eye-opener to the other East African governments. When Ugandan troops threatened to rebel, Obote requested the British for help. After obtaining signed requests for help from the African governments, the British promptly brought the situation under control. Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya also sought and received British assistance. Julius Nyerere, when convinced that he could no longer cope with his army, fearing trouble in the labor field, and impressed with British action in Uganda and Kenya, readily accepted similar British assistance. 2. Zanzibar Problem. The crux of the Zanzibar matter is to prevent its takeover by the Communists. The new regime is an uneasy coalition of African nationalist and pro-Communist elements, each struggling for power. We are gravely concerned that the role of the nationalists may be deteriorating. The elements of preventing a Communist takeover include: 1. Elimination or control of "Field Marshal" Okello and armed thugs, who represent a continuing threat to order and stability. 2. Development of an independent nationalist government probably built around President Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazis. 3. Political containment of any pro-Communist force, including Babu and Hanga, if they are unwilling to work with Karume. Babu and Hanga have had strong ties with Peiping and Moscow. Nevertheless Nyerere believes in the showdown they are African nationalists who can be and must be worked with. This is questionable. 4. Support and strengthening of Nyerere in Tanganyika and Kenyatta in Kenya. Time Factor. The time factor in any Zanzibar action program is highly important since the vacuum now existing favors Communism. Discussion. The U.K. has a military capability in the area to disarm Okello and his followers and to maintain order. It would do this on its own initiative if British nationals were endangered. Otherwise, understandably, it would desire a written GOZ request from Karume. Only the British can act militarily with adequate effectiveness. Alternatively, the U.K. has non-military capabilities which it might use to get rid of Okello or at least to bolster the chances of a successful conclusion of intervention by covert operations, economic aid, educational help, police training, etc. The U.S. could provide non-military support for either of the above U.K. approaches, through educational and economic assistance, diplomatic support and support at the UN. There are roughly 300 Tanganyikan police already in Zanzibar. Initially these policemen disarmed a number of the local population, but they have not been able to control Okello and his hard-core gunmen. Recent reports indicate that the Tanganyikan police are not now an effective factor. Nyerere indicated to our Ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam that these police might be helpful if the British also were on the ground. Duncan Sandys told Ambassador Bruce on February 4 that the British had as yet no grounds for intervention and no action program had been formulated for Zanzibar. In a follow-up to this conversation Ambassador Bruce on February 6 delivered a Presidential message to Prime Minister Home asking what action the British proposed to take to frustrate a Communist takeover in Zanzibar and to strengthen African nationalists./3/ The Prime Minister expressed his great concern about Zanzibar and said he had established a study group to deal with the question. Unfortunately he had no faith in the character or motives of any of the Zanzibar leaders. He would discuss the matter further in his talks with the President. /3/A copy of the President's February 5 message to Prime Minister Home is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Zanzibar, Vol. 2, 2/64-4/64. Every effort must be made to induce the British to take effective action. Since any definitive U.S. action would be based on the extent and type of action by the British, alternative measures the U.S. might take diplomatically, covertly or through economic or technical assistance would best be considered in light of the British program. However, certain minimal actions to prevent the further deterioration of the U.S. position, such as to increase our intelligence capability in the area and to maintain contact with the Zanzibar government must be and are being taken. Neither the U.K. nor the U.S. has recognized Zanzibar yet. Both countries are under increasing pressure from Zanzibar officials to take such action. 3. Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda U.K. intercession has served to check the immediate threat of chaos in East Africa. Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote all seem to be aware that they must be more alert against subversive elements of various origins. The Chicoms have been particularly active of late. President Nyerere plans to explain the seriousness of the situation in East Africa at an emergency meeting of the Organization of African Unity to be held in Dar-es-Salaam on February 12. Despite the short-term stability which the U.K. military presence probably will insure, basic problems will remain, making British disengagement extremely difficult. Dependable African security forces cannot quickly be developed. At the same time, East Africa's leaders will be under mounting domestic pressure to seek early U.K. withdrawal. Domestic and general African pressures could lead to a British withdrawal before internal security forces have been adequately strengthened.
183. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan)/1/ Washington, March 2, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 373.5 Africa. Secret. Dear Frank: I am writing in response to your letter of November 1, 1963 regarding the proposed MATS Survey Flight to Africa./2/ /2/Not printed. Replies are now in from the twenty posts queried on this subject. They are almost uniformly opposed to instituting regular MATS flights or even making a preliminary route survey at this time. Our missions generally believed that little need currently exists for such a service, and that present transportation services are adequate. Thus, the introduction of military flights and attendant support personnel would strain local facilities and be viewed with suspicion by many countries as conflicting with their policies of non-alignment. Radical elements would point to this as a form of Western "NATO and neocolonialist penetration." Most replies indicated that the introduction of regular MATS flights would increase Soviet Bloc pressure for landing rights and would prejudice the case for U.S. commercial airlines attempting to secure landing rights. It was also believed that there would be resentment among local airlines, which would consider MATS to be unfair competition. In addition, some posts indicated that the French would be annoyed at any increase in U.S. military operations in areas in which they have traditionally played the major military role. In light of recent developments in East Africa, I am quite willing to review this matter, should that be indicated. However, a check with the African Bureau has confirmed that in view of the overwhelmingly strong opposition from the field, we believe that the proposal for the survey should be dropped, at least for the foreseeable future. Sincerely,
184. Draft National Security Action Memorandum/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. I 2/64-6/64. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A May 12 covering memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that on April 9, the Special Group (CI) considered a reassessment of internal security in Africa, approved certain courses of action, and suggested preparation of an NSAM incorporating these courses of action. Williams and Harriman had subsequently recommended preparation of an NSAM and a draft was enclosed for Bundy's approval. The Special Group (CI) was a high-level interdepartmental group created to deal with counterinsurgency issues. The April 9 meeting was attended by Under Secretary Averell Harriman, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, CIA Director John A. McCone, NSC Staff member Michael Forrestal, AID Deputy Administrator William S. Gaud, and General Anthis representing JCS Chairman General Maxwell Taylor. TO SUBJECT The Special Group (CI) has considered the reassessment of internal security in Africa and has approved the following courses of action: 1) Continued improvement of US intelligence capability in Africa; 2) Taking into consideration varying African political sensitivities, urge African states in general to rely upon their former metropoles for internal security assistance to the greatest practicable extent and urge metropoles to be responsive to the requirements of African states for internal security; 3) Direct US assistance to African internal security forces (police and military) and economic assistance programs in appropriate proportions to deal with the specific nature of the threat, taking into consideration other foreign assistance and degree of US economic, political, and military interest; 4) Encourage Western European and Commonwealth countries to provide aid to Africa--on a coordinated basis when appropriate and feasible--and pursue coordination of US programs with such countries generally on a bilateral basis. 5) Be prepared, in certain circumstances, to give sympathetic consideration to requests which might entail assistance to an African country that would not be merely supplementary to that provided by the former metropole. 6) Continue to evaluate US-supported education programs for Africans and devise means to enhance their efficacy and general impact. 7) Develop programs to counteract Communist penetration into the African labor field. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs is hereby designated to coordinate the execution of the above recommendations in consultation with the Africa Policy Committee./2/ /2/This NSAM was never issued. McGeorge Bundy/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
185. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-36326/64 Washington, July 10, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 388.3 Africa. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. The following is for your information. 2. The Organization of African Unity will consider at its Cairo conference on 17 July a resolution declaring Africa a nuclear free zone (Tab A)./2/ Our main concern is with that section of Article I which would prevent transport of nuclear weapons in African territory, territorial waters and air space. /2/Tab A is a copy of the "Draft Convention for the Denuclearization of the African Continent"; not printed. 3. Approval of the resolution could adversely affect our transit rights since our policy is neither to confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons aboard our ships or aircraft. We would have to answer, or fail to transit. This could result in a situation similar to that now existing in Ceylon where we have not conducted a naval visit since that country instituted a requirement last January requiring a declaration that no nuclear weapons were aboard visiting ships or aircraft. 4. The JCS have indicated they do not favor a NFZ in Africa and that such would have important security implications (Tab B)./3/ Based on that I have answered Alex Johnson's inquiry on this subject (Tab C)/4/ by forwarding the JCS comments (Tab B) and certain other information the JCS made available to me. My reply is at Tab D./5/ /3/Tab B is JCSM-577-64, July 2, 1964; not printed. /4/Tab C is a June 19, 1964, letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson; not printed. /5/Not printed. 5. State has instructed its embassies in key African countries to approach local leaders and attempt to remove or change objectionable transit clause from the proposed resolution. 6. Recommendation: That we take no action on this problem until we can study the African resolution in its approved form./6/ /6/Secretary McNamara initialed his approval on July 11. T. McNaughton
186. Memorandum From the Department of State's Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 14, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, 7/64-6/65. Secret. SUBJECT The Department's July 6 circular telegram on the draft Convention for an African nuclear free zone/2/ instructed our Ambassadors in selected African countries to approach Heads of Government or Foreign Ministers. The Ambassadors were asked to persuade them to advocate either (a) modification of language which would meet our concern regarding both possible prohibition of transit by US naval vessels or military aircraft and lack of provision in the draft Convention for verification and inspection against production or acquisition of nuclear weapons or their deployment in Africa by others, or (b) postponement of definite action on the draft in order to permit "further study." /2/Circular telegram 28, July 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 OAU) Responses to date have ranged from definitely sympathetic to non-committal, so that as of this writing the Department is not in a position to make a prediction as to the final outcome. It should be borne in mind that we have initially assumed that although the Africans may of their own volition proceed as we would wish, there is little likelihood that our own effort alone will influence a sufficient number of African governments to take one of the courses that we have proposed. There is enclosed, as a separate but related item, a brief resume of the proceedings of the Algiers Conference on Denuclearization of the Mediterranean Area./3/ /3/Attached but not printed. On July 21, the OAU Heads of State Conference at Cairo passed a resolution reaffirming the November 1961 U.N. resolution calling on states to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone and asking for an international treaty to achieve this. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 1096. Marion A. Baldwin/4/ /4/Baldwin signed for Read above Read's typed signature. A covering note from NSC Staff member Samuel Belk to Bundy reads: "Mac: The attached memorandum deals with the current situation on a problem Governor Harriman is following closely. He spoke to me at great length about it and probably will do the same with you. Perhaps the attachment will be of interest. Sam."
187. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64-6/65. No classification marking. Drafted by Lester E. Edmond, Executive Assistant to the Director. SUBJECT African reaction to the passage of the civil rights bill has been highly favorable, although some evidence exists of an increasing impatience with what is regarded as the lagging eradication of racial discrimination in the United States. The significance of the bill's passage has been a major theme at the Cairo meeting of the Organization of African Unity./2/ /2/For text of a resolution adopted at the Cairo OAU Conference, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 739. Guinea's President Sekou Toure, speaking of the civil rights bill's passage, told the African summit conference that "in America, the colored people engaged in the struggle for social progress and racial equality have just won a great victory . . . ." In his conference address, Sudan's President Abboud expressed the hope that the "American civil rights bill be speedily put into execution lest the reactionaries should gain with their right hand what their left has lost." Kenya's Prime Minister Kenyatta, on the other hand, attacked the continued existence of racial discrimination and stated that this was an area in which the United States could learn from independent Africa. Also speaking at the OAU meeting, President Nasser said: "We can complete the siege around South Africa and Rhodesia where hateful discrimination is practised," adding that "one of the promising signs in this connection is the adoption of the civil rights bill in the U.S." President Nasser's comments linking the civil rights bill with the advance of African liberation is a new theme so far receiving only sparse play in African media reaction. Sudan's Al-Telegraph said that the bill indicated U.S. "support for the world struggle against racial discrimination in South Africa" and "the nearing victory of the national forces against the attempts of the white man in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia." President Abboud's reaction expressing concern about U.S. reactionaries was also carried by Ghanaian Radio on July 16, which said that Senator Goldwater's nomination reflected the fact among other things that the "civil rights issue has frightened many Americans who feel that things are slipping beyond their control." The commentator described Goldwater's views as "coinciding with those of the John Birch society--a racist, rightist, America-first political movement whose support Goldwater has never repudiated." The Nigerian Radio, which is ordinarily quite friendly to the United States, expressed the belief on July 9 that previous Presidents could have stamped out discrimination if they had used the full powers of their office. The radio also commented that "President Johnson is the only person who can arrest the present violence in the southern states and effectively enforce the new bill," and that "if he fails to show the necessary courage, the new law can from the beginning be dismissed as a dead letter." In other reaction, African press and radio comment continues to be highly favorable. Africans view the bill as a great tribute to President Kennedy and commend you for securing its passage. They see the bill as giving the Federal Government power to enforce the Constitution and as guaranteeing to Negroes the legal rights hitherto guaranteed only to whites. Some comment has viewed the bill as a challenge to Americans to act in accordance with professed beliefs, while other comment has expressed the opinion that the majority of Americans will obey the law. Comment indicates that Africans are keeping a watchful eye on the bill's implementation. Nigerians, for example, are dismayed by the recent outbreak of violence in the U.S. and what they see as Federal inaction and are alarmed by Senator Goldwater's nomination, which they fear represents white backlash and the increased strength of reactionaries. We can expect the Harlem riots to be given massive coverage and to set in motion a severe adverse reaction that will erode much of the benefit that we had hoped we would achieve with the civil rights legislation. Carl T. Rowan/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
188. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 28, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Africa, General, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/64-6/65. No classification marking. SUBJECT Zambia's attainment of independence last weekend highlights the fact that Africa's march toward freedom continues to be a dynamic political factor in the world scene. Thirty-two new African nations have been established in less than 13 years in a remarkably smooth transfer of power. The wide publicity given to the few cases of violence in independent Africa has overshadowed much of the solid political and economic progress the continent is making. This imbalance makes it imperative that the United States Government base its understanding of the true situation in Africa on a firm foundation of fact. Not a single new African nation has succumbed to Communist domination, although incentives have been provided readily by Sino-Soviet nations. The Soviets and Chinese have been trying to cultivate several African nations as satellites, but African determination to preserve hard-won freedom and our policy and diplomacy--and those of our friends--have strengthened Africa's awareness of the dangers to its independence of external subversion. We understand and support Africa's desire to remain truly non-aligned and independent. Africa's nations have been anxious to cooperate in Africa-wide efforts to solve the continent's problems through African initiatives. They have made important progress toward that goal through the 35-member Organization of African Unity. The OAU played a major role in halting Algerian-Moroccan hostilities, and it is working toward a resolution of the Ethiopian-Somali border dispute. In addition, African states cooperated to provide police assistance in Tanganyika when that country asked for help following the troop mutiny earlier this year. The OAU is now undertaking to assist the government and people of the Congo in its present internal difficulties and to improve the relations between the Congo and its neighbors. The Economic Commission for Africa is becoming a prime factor in African economic growth. That body has created an African Development Bank, an Institute for Economic Development and Planning, and is developing proposals for regional economic growth. We support those efforts wholeheartedly. Many significant economic gains are being recorded by individual countries. Heartening growth of gross national products can be found in Liberia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Nigeria, to name only a few. Agricultural production--Africa's chief economic pursuit--in the last 10 years has been doubled in Ivory Coast, has increased 50 percent in Kenya and has risen 29 percent in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country. Libya, Algeria and Nigeria are rapidly becoming important centers of oil production. American private interests have been instrumental in developing vital minerals, such as iron in Liberia and Mauritania, manganese in Gabon, copper in Zambia and bauxite in Guinea. Another measure of progress--electric power production--is rising in many countries. In this growth also, American loans and technical skills have been important elements, supplementing substantial assistance from European countries. Emphasis has been placed on the need for education and technical training in every country and notable progress is being made in this formidable task. An impressive share of Africa's advancement is due to the dedication of many African leaders to the welfare of their people. There is no doubt that Africa needs external help during this period of development just as we did in our early days, but determined African leadership is making good use of such aid to hasten the political and economic transformation of the continent. Averell
189. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-1068-64 Washington, December 24, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 352 Africa. Secret. SUBJECT 1. There is ample evidence of a critical need in Africa for professional military training. Developing African states are confronted with internal security problems in a climate conducive to insurgency. In most areas, military elements are emerging as the principal guardians of national sovereignty. To cope with this situation and to counter Soviet and Communist Chinese exploitation, it is desirable for the United States to contribute to the strength and authority of all pro-Western elements within state power structures, particularly the military elements. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that while there are military programs designed to support US interests in Africa (e.g., Military Assistance Programs, an Officer Leadership Training course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and a five-year university program) a Pan-African Military School, supported as appropriate by the United States and possibly other pro-Western nations, would be a new initiative in Africa that is worthy of further consideration. Such a school, in Ethiopia or Nigeria for example, may have the advantage of obtaining participation from countries that for political or other reasons shy away from offers of training in the United States or other pro-Western countries. Establishment of this school could serve to enhance the concept of creating US positions of influence in Africa. The attendance of students from other African nations hopefully would spread Western philosophy and ideals, and would contribute to offsetting the training and political orientation offered by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The initial motivation for this school could come from the United States; however, the prime impetus should be developed among pro-Western African sources. 3. It is envisioned that students in a Pan-African Military School would consist of junior military leaders. Though possibly more basic, the training offered at this school could be similar to that of the Officer Leadership Training Course, Fort Knox, Kentucky, i.e., military concepts, fundamental tactics, weapons instruction, counterinsurgency, civic action, discipline, and morale responsibility. 4. A report on this subject submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA is attached as Appendix B/2/ hereto. This report includes comments on the concept, control, sponsorship, host and third country participation, type of training, and possible school sites. Further elaboration of these and other major considerations is contained in the Annex to Appendix A. In general, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with this report but recommend against the sponsorship of this school by the Organization for African Unity. /2/The appendices are not printed. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that the establishment of a Pan-African Military School merits further consideration. They recommend that: a. In the context of the over-all African problem the views of the Department of State on such a school be requested, including views on the appointment of a joint State/Defense team to conduct a comprehensive study to aid in making a final determination on the feasibility and desirability of establishing the school. b. The memorandum in Appendix A hereto, together with its Annex, which reflects these ideas, be forwarded to the Secretary of State./3/ /3/The CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA report was sent to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William E. Lang on January 15, 1965. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 352 Africa) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
