NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia/1/ Washington, January 23, 1967, 4:22 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-TUN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sacksteder in AFN and Colonel Kissinger in OSD/ISA; cleared by Colonel Alba in JCS/J-5, Commander Peters in JCS/SAMAA, Litmans in DOD/GC, Dunlap in DOD/ODMA, Malmborg in L/E, Post in AFN, Colonel Megna in AFI, and Meinecke in AID/AFR/NA; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Paris, Rabat for Root and Lang, and USCINCEUR for ECMAP-IA. 123472. State/Defense message. Subject: Tunisian MAP. Ref: Tunis 2653 NOTAL./2/ Tunis 2728 NOTAL./3/ /2/In telegram 2653 from Tunis, January 12, Russell reported a conversation with Bahi Ladgham, Minister for the Presidency, who had stated that Tunisia would like to have the same kind of relationship with and type of assistance from the United States that Turkey did, and the kind of "assurance guarantee" from the United States that it would have if it were a member of NATO. (Ibid.) /3/Dated January 18. (Ibid.) 1. Conversation with Ladgham reported reftel reveals wide difference between GOT and ourselves in interpretations of President Bourguiba's past allusions to a security guarantee. We had believed that Bourguiba viewed such a guarantee as a desirable long-term objective, but would look upon a joint US-Tunisian cooperative endeavor to modernize and strengthen Tunisian armed forces as a manifestation of our interest. It would now appear that Bourguiba regards security guarantee as a prerequisite, or at minimum as an integral part, of US agreement to help improve Tunisia's defense posture. In this respect it is important to point out that our support of Tunisia prior to and since independence (i.e. our willingness to provide carefully designed, well-balanced, economically feasible military assistance program, and preferential economic treatment accorded Tunisia) is clear and convincing evidence of US interest in and support of Tunisia. However, we are prepared to continue full and frank discussion of all aspects of Tunisian security problem during coming months prior to Bourguiba's Washington visit in June, but we must discourage repeat discourage any thought that we are prepared to provide a security guarantee. 2. We recognize language of proposed notes transmitted in State 110563 and 112264/4/ is restrictive and formalistic. This is necessitated by narrow and specific purpose of notes, which intended to constitute military assistance agreement only, and designed to meet certain statutory requirements of US law. Language can be toned down to give better visibility impression. It never intended, however, that these Notes assume character of a security treaty, alliance or guarantee. /4/Neither found. 3. The proposed FY 1967 Military Assistance Program constitutes significant US assistance towards modernizing Tunisian armed forces. Furthermore it emphasizes the need for greatly increased training of military in order to permit efficient and effective absorption of proposed equipment, as prerequisite to deliver. FYI. FY 1967 funds must be committed prior to end of the FY or be lost. Therefore, the current USCINC-EUR "abbreviated plan" for Tunisia will have to be definitized as completely as possible to enable implementation. Balance of funds will be preserved as an "abbreviated plan" on MAP orders. Equipment availability will pose even greater difficulties in the future if identification of items is delayed. For these reasons we believe it is in Tunisian Government's interest to consider proceeding with proposed MAP. End FYI. 4. We are prepared to implement the FY 1967 Tunisia MAP on basis of assurances in 1957 confidential agreement as suggested by Ladgham and Bourguiba, Jr. Would appreciate, however, your specific comments immediately to clarify following; --Is Tunisian concern primarily receiving an assurance from the US and less interest in actual military assistance? --What is the extent of the dissatisfaction with the size and content of the program? --Reasons for one-year limitation clearly stated to GOT. Was limitation a serious factor in Tunisian reaction and would it have been overcome by a multi-year commitment? --Is their principal concern that of being faced with hard decisions on whether to follow through on developing a professional military force and accepting the new position of the military? 5. Review of memcons and Tunis 2653 indicates Tunisians may be under impression that complete fulfillment of all survey team findings necessary adjunct to our providing military assistance. If this true, suggest you reiterate purpose of team report to provide Tunisians balanced evaluation of security situation and requirements for improving military forces and not as a precondition to provision of MAP. 6. Assuming Tunisians desire go-ahead, following conditions would apply: (A) Begin programming training and defense articles for Tunisia against FY 1967 funds on basis of the assurances given by the GOT in the 1957 confidential agreement (FYI and in accordance with the terms of Presidential Determination of 16 December 1966 End FYI). Consideration will be given to capability to absorb equipment effectively prior to delivery. (B) Implement our plan to send a USAF team to Tunisia in February in order to study the Tunisian Air Force's immediate requirements to enable it to utilize jet fighter aircraft. Require immediate response to preclude cancelling plans for assembling USAF team. (C) Select and assign initially to the Amembassy Tunis, Office of the Defense Attache, personnel that will form nucleus of US military training mission. (D) Acceptance by the GOT of above-mentioned proposals shall be evidenced by letter of agreement from the GOT stipulating that GOT reiterates the assurances it gave the US Government in the 1957 confidential agreement, and that it will receive a military training mission to be assigned to the Amembassy Tunis. The US Defense Attache may continue initially to assume responsibility for Military Assistance Program. The Chief of the military training mission shall be accredited to the Secretary of State for National Defense, and he and members of his staff shall be authorized direct access to the component units of the Tunisian defense establishment as may be required for the proper fulfillment of their mission. FYI. Embassy should note that "token payment" provisions of 1957 agreement are not applicable to delivery of grant aid funded from FY 1967 funds. End FYI. (E) Acceptance by the GOT of training and defense articles under the assurances given by the GOT of the 1957 confidential agreement shall not be considered by the US as a commitment to accept the terms and conditions of the military assistance agreement proposed in State 110563 and 112264./5/ /5/On February 9, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow told Driss that although the United States had mutual security commitments with a number of countries, such as those in NATO, U.S. public opinion was hostile to other such commitments. Driss said that President Bourguiba thought it necessary for Tunisia's security that some form of alliance with the United States be arrived at, and Rostow said that the U.S. Government was willing to study this. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-TUN) Rusk
170. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 4, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Confidential. Drafted by Sacksteder and approved in S on March 13. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Driss said he had received telegraphic instructions to accept the date of June 6 for the beginning of President Bourguiba's visit to Washington. He had originally requested a meeting with the Secretary to review a series of questions in U.S.-Tunisian relations prior to returning to Tunis, but would only discuss one question: the character and content of President Bourguiba's visit to Washington next June. The Ambassador said Tunis was very interested in the program we were proposing for the President's visit and in this connection wanted to know if the visit would be a State visit or an official visit. The Secretary assured the Ambassador that the President was looking forward to seeing President Bourguiba and that he would extend to his guest every appropriate courtesy. The Ambassador asked if a joint communique announcing the visit could be issued making the character of the visit clear. The Secretary said that the Department would work with the Ambassador and the White House to draft a suitable announcement for simultaneous release in Washington and Tunis. The Ambassador then said that President Bourguiba was most anxious to have an opportunity to speak to the Congress. The Secretary replied that he hoped the Tunisian Government would not attach too much importance to an address to the Congress. The Congressional leadership has told us that we should not consider joint sessions to hear foreign Chiefs of State a part of visits to Washington. The Ambassador insisted that President Bourguiba had important things to tell the Congress--for example, how a small poor country like Tunisia was making excellent use of American economic aid. The Ambassador hoped the Secretary would try to convince Congress to receive Bourguiba. The Secretary replied that he was not saying no, and that he would look into it but that he did not want to be encouraging because he felt he knew what the reply would be. The Secretary also reminded the Ambassador that there were other more effective ways to reach the American people, such as a television interview on a program like "Meet the Press". Ambassador Driss said that they had contacted "Meet the Press" about the possibility of an interview but that he hoped President Bourguiba could speak to our lawmakers as well as to the people. The Ambassador referred to the fact that the Congress had recently invited President Marcos of the Philippines and President De Valera of Ireland to speak before it. The Secretary agreed but he reminded the Ambassador that the Philippines had been under U.S. rule for many years and that in inviting Ireland's "grand old man", the Congress was paying tribute to the millions of Americans of Irish ancestry. The Secretary assured the Ambassador that he would nevertheless look into the possibilities with the Congress and that the Department would find out if a suitable reception by the Congressional leadership could be arranged. Ambassador Driss then referred again to the character of the visit, saying that what he meant was whether the visit was official or not. The Secretary said that he believed all of the visits scheduled for June--and there were many because numerous Chiefs of State were going to Canada for the Exposition--were being considered informal working visits. The Secretary said this permitted us to cut down a little bit on unnecessary and purely formalistic protocol in order to enable the President and his visitors to devote maximum time to substantive discussions. Ambassador Driss said that President Bourguiba attached importance to formalities. He said the rest of the world, Tunisia included, would judge the status of Tunisia in American eyes by the manner in which its Chief of State was received. The Ambassador said Bourguiba had come to the U.S. several times before, first as a leader of an independence struggle and, last, as Chief of State. He had always been warmly received, the last time with all of the honors of a state visitor. The Ambassador thinks that public opinion in North Africa and elsewhere would interpret any significant change in the manner of Bourguiba's reception as evidence of a change in U.S.-Tunisian relations. This was why he was so insistent about the character of the visit which he thought had to be at least the official visit specified in President Johnson's invitation. The Secretary asked Mr. Sacksteder if he recalled what exact invitation had been. Mr. Sacksteder said that the Secretary, at the request of the President, had issued an invitation on April 19, 1966 to President Bourguiba to make an official visit to the United States during the second half of 1966 for two days in Washington and several additional days in other parts of the U.S. The meeting concluded with the Secretary reassuring the Ambassador that President Bourguiba would be satisfied with the visit to Washington and that we would inform him of the possibilities of arranging something suitable on the Hill. The Secretary then gave the Ambassador a personal letter to Foreign Minister Bourguiba Jr. and requested that the Ambassador give this to the Foreign Minister when he returned to Tunis.
171. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 21, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Cables & Memos, 5/15-16/68. Confidential. SUBJECT President Bourguiba suffered a heart attack on 15 March. Shortly after, we arranged for General Mattingly, formerly of Walter Reed Hospital, to fly to Tunis for consultation with Bourguiba's doctors. This gesture was extremely well received in Tunisia. Doctors tell us President Bourguiba stands an excellent chance of making a complete recovery but he must have absolute rest for some time. His doctors feel that he should not come to Washington for his planned visit in June. However, they have not yet told him he must postpone his visit. He is anxious to see you and may want to try to come anyway. Therefore, his doctors and the top officials of the Tunisian government hope you might suggest postponing. Since this visit has already been put off for nine months, another few won't make any difference. From your point of view receiving him in the fall when there are not so many visitors lined up as we have for June would be better anyway. We can give him better attention then. State is tentatively considering a State visit the last half of September for planning purposes, but we will be back to you later on that. There is no need to be that specific in this letter. If you approve this tack, we would send the attached message telegraphically./2/ It would be nice to get it off before you see Bourguiba, Jr. at the funeral next week since he has asked us informally for this help in slowing his father down./3/ /2/Attached but not printed. Telegram 180670 to Tunis, April 22, transmitted President Johnson's message to President Bourguiba. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 TUN) /3/The source text indicates the recommendation was approved. W. W. Rostow/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia/1/ Washington, June 8, 1967, 12:39 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret; Priority; Noforn/Limidis. Drafted by Root on June 7 and approved by Palmer. Repeated to Rabat. 209164. 1. Following FYI uncleared summary of Tunisian FonMin Bourguiba's meeting with Secretary afternoon June 7: 2. FonMin expressed regret for "shame" mob action Tunis including destruction at American Embassy. Emphasized steps GOT undertaking make amends and reestablish control. 3. Explained background Tunisian attitude toward Palestine problem, going back to 1946. GOT considered birth of Zionist state colonial solution imposed by force. Injustice then committed will remain as focus of unrest until rectified. In 1965 Tunisia proposed new approach based on UN legality but this rejected by both sides. Since then Tunisia has in effect been saying to Nasser your policy not serious--you are promising but not producing. 4. When showdown actually came, Tunisia had no choice. It had to express support for the general Arab cause for two reasons: (1) to maintain its reputation and credibility with the Arab states; and (2) by continuing to demonstrate that it remained a member of the Arab community to be in a position to help pick up the pieces when the present trauma is over. Tunisia was appearing to offer help, but we would notice that its "troops were hastening slowly." 5. Tunisian position is not comfortable. Only yesterday there were comments from Algiers suggesting that Bourguiba Jr in Washington plotting with his friends in USG to break the back of Arab unity. Tunisia remains very worried about its neighbor to the west. Algeria now completely in tow of UAR. After Arab defeat disgruntled Arab government might begin to look for a diversion. 6. Reminded Secretary Tunisian pleas for military assistance--more wanted then ever now. For present Tunisia had to be cautious about relying too openly on U.S. support. Effects of present events will certainly last for months if not longer. Tunisians look to Turks as perhaps closest friends in Mediterranean area. Understood from President Sunay during recent visit that perhaps possible GOT obtain surplus US military equipment which Turkey now releasing, if US agreed. Bourguiba said Tunisian need is more for feeling of security than security itself. (Secretary promised look into question.) 7. Neither Bourguiba Jr nor father, with whom he spoke yesterday on telephone, believes Egyptian charges US and UK aircraft involved in Near East crisis. This clearly smoke screen by Nasser to cover up his setback. Tunisia not going to break relations with US. However, will not take public position on Cairo charges and will pretend go along with Arabs in order "keep our credit for future." 8. Secretary said there were certain things he wanted both FonMin and his father to know. USG used every argument at its command with all parties, particularly Israel, to dissuade them from initiating hostilities. What we had done in this sense with Israel, USSR agreed do with "other side." We were aware situation extremely tense, particularly after closing Strait of Tiran, and that Israelis concerned about passing of time. (FonMin interjected that "objectively" Israel had to fight--time moving against them.) Egyptian troop movements into Sinai and repeated Cairo announcements time had come for destruction of Israel added to tension. Nevertheless, we were relying on commitments from both sides they would not initiate hostilities. We had absolutely no advance information hostilities would begin. 9. There was absolutely no truth to charges by Cairo about US military involvement. No one knows this better than USSR. Their destroyers 500 yards from our carriers. (Bourguiba emphatically agreed.) 10. Difficult understand what Nasser thought he was up to. By closing Strait of Tiran and moving troops he was handing Israel casus belli. Difficult to understand why he went on forcing Israel toward life and death decision when he so poorly prepared for consequences. (FonMin's comment: "Bluffer is bluffer." Like Hitler, Nasser did not know when to stop.) Nasser did not expect U Thant remove UN troops from Sharm-el-Sheikh. When this happened he felt obliged move in and then impose blockade. 11. As result 1957 settlement obtaining removal Israeli troops from Egyptian territory, US committed insist on right of free passage US ships through Strait of Tiran and we recognized similar right for Israeli vessels. We thus bound not only by our general commitment to principle free passage in international waters but by this specific commitment. 12. Difficult also understand Soviets. They had been equipping and training UAR army. They presumably were in position analyze Egyptian military capabilities. Moreover there were differences in what they had been saying to us privately and what they appeared to be saying to Arabs. (FonMin said he was sure Soviets would not press for showdown in this instance. It was not in nature of Soviet regime to come to "rescue of defeat.") 13. Secretary wondered where we go from here. There increasing evidence revulsion to Nasser tactics setting in in Arab world, even in Egypt. There were some very difficult problems ahead and within USG we were already beginning study of what might be done after immediate problems are over on such basic issues as economic and social development in area, development of water resources, some form of arms limitation, and problem of Arab refugees. 14. In shorter term, opening of Strait again will be very difficult problem. Moreover, difficult to imagine situation in which Israel would agree neighbors could exercise rights of belligerent. Something must be done stabilize frontier situation. On these vital points it will be difficult for anyone outside have much influence on Israel. 15. FonMin pessimistic about early change in attitude of present Arab governments despite resounding military setback. Too much of Arab world still thought emotionally, not rationally. Practically all Arab governments except Tunisia (which announced support to Arab League) had lined up with Nasser and would now have to go along with his policies whatever the consequences. Nasser would continue refuse to admit his defeat, would struggle to retain his power, and other Arab governments would be bound to him. Feelings in Arab world on what had happened should not be underestimated. Even in Tunisia patient work of President Bourguiba over past twelve years had not proved enough to prevent emotional outbreak. Frustration over Palestine would be widespread and remain so. As result present trauma months to come would be very difficult. Tunisia's aim was to remain part of Arab community so that its influence could be used constructively when the day for this arrived. 16. Secretary emphasized that Arab leader like President Bourguiba had responsibility and would have opportunities do just this. We appreciated FonMin's exposition Tunisian actions at this time and he could be sure of our understanding. Rusk
173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia/1/ Washington, June 15, 1967, 2:57 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Sacksteder and Palmer (text revised in the White House); cleared by Battle, Harold Saunders, and Eugene V. Rostow; and approved by Herbert B. Thompson of S/S. 211328. Ref: Tunis 4774, State 209980./2/ /2/Both dated June 9. (Ibid.) Telegram 4774 transmitted a letter from President Bourguiba to President Johnson. 1. Please deliver the following message, dated June 15, 1967 from the President to President Bourguiba: "Dear Mr. President: I fully understand the deep concern expressed in your urgent message of June 9. As you know, we had tried hard to prevent war. Once it started, we energetically supported the efforts of the United Nations Security Council to achieve an effective cease-fire as a prelude to a lasting peace. As we attempt to mend the torn fabric of relations in the Middle East, your prestige as an advocate of moderation and your consistent support of peaceful solutions to international problems give you an important voice which must be heard. I am pleased to hear from your son that you continue to regain your strength. I deeply appreciate the message of friendship and understanding which he brought to Secretary Rusk and to my Special Assistant, Mr. Rostow. With my warmest personal sentiments, Lyndon B. Johnson" Rusk
174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia/1/ Washington, March 1, 1968, 0021Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 9 TUN. Confidential. Drafted by Baron in AFR/NA and by Root, McClanahan, and Post; cleared by Straus in AA/AFR, Meinecke in AFR/NA, and SIG Staff Director Arthur A. Hartman; and approved by Palmer. /2/Beginning in 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 122856. Joint State/AID message. Refs: Tunis 3202, 3223; Aidto 740; Toaid A-549./3/ Subj: FY 68 Program Loan Level. /3/Telegram 3202 from Tunis, February 21, reported that the Embassy was deeply concerned over reports that serious consideration was being given in discussions of FY 1968 aid to cutting the level of the program loan for Tunisia from $15 million to $5 million, and noted that this would be a particularly bad time to announce such a sharp cutback. (Ibid., POL 7 TUN) Telegram 3223 from Tunis, February 23, is ibid. Aidto 740 and Toaid A-549 have not been found. 1. We recognize problem, which arises solely from reduced Congressional aid appropriations. Tunisia remains major country of concentration and total assistance level for FY 68 of $42 million compares favorably with levels of previous years. Tunisians were alerted at time of FY 67 loan to expect reduction in FY 68 and with lag in drawing down previous loans real need for high level new Program Loan at this time is difficult to justify. 2. Because of psychological effect sharp loan reduction on GOT and possible repercussions on contributions other consultative group donors, extent of reduction was discussed February 15 by Under Secretary, AID Administrator and Assistant Secretary AF who agreed to consider possibility of raising loan level to $10 million if adequate funds became available, primarily through prospect deobligations from other African programs. This was basis for Administrator's statement to Ambassador Driss February 19 (State 118410)./4/ /4/Not found. 3. While we think there is good chance eventually of raising loan level above $5 million presently earmarked, we do not at this time want to raise Tunisian expectations unduly. You should therefore limit yourself to telling Tunisians that some deobligations elsewhere seem probable and you are confident that if additional funds do become available Tunisia will certainly be among favored candidates for receiving benefits. 4. Our impression is that Tunisian Embassy Washington understands and accepts this position in belief that if USG finds any practical way of increasing the Program Loan it will do so. Would appreciate learning whether you find this impression borne out in Tunis. You should in any event report telegraphically any significant GOT reactions to Program Loan question to assist Department in preparing position papers for Bourguiba State visit. Rusk
175. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 14, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Cables & Memos, 5/15-16/68. Secret. SUBJECT You will recall that you yourself proposed inviting Bourguiba in 1966 at a time when you were particularly impressed by one of his statements supporting our policy in Vietnam. His heart attack and the Arab-Israeli war delayed his visit. However, our purpose is still as it was then--to show our approval of this rational and like-minded statesman. Although there are some questions about the level of our economic and military assistance we do not expect Bourguiba to dwell on these bilateral programs. He will probably talk on a high plane about his need to assure Tunisians progress and security and his view of our role in securing world peace. The main points we expect to come up are: 1. Tunisian security. The buildup of Soviet weapons in Algeria on one side and Nasser's power across Libya to the other have made the Tunisians feel highly vulnerable. Bourguiba and his son, now the Foreign Minister, have for several years been talking with us about the possibility of a US security guarantee. We are providing limited military aid. But the plain fact is that, without a military establishment it couldn't possibly afford, Tunisia will have to rely on outside help if it is attacked. To gain some assurance of such help, Bourguiba has gone so far as to offer us secretly the use of his naval base at Bizerte in return for such an assurance. We believe the Bourguibas are too well informed not to realize that a formal US guarantee is impossible in today's Washington. However, he may discuss with you this problem at some length. Your best response is that we have given Tunisia as much military aid as Congress has made possible. We regret it can't be more, but we just don't have the appropriations. We are doing what we can with advisors to help Tunisia adopt the most modern techniques to get the maximum defense capability out of its limited expenditures. If he presses hard for a security commitment, you will have to explain honestly the limits imposed by Congress on your ability to make any such commitment. 2. Arab-Israel. Although Bourguiba has always taken a moderate position on Israel's right to exist, he feels very deeply about the injustice the Palestinians have suffered. He has even recently made veiled statements favoring Arab terrorism as the only way to force Israel to withdraw. Some of this stems from his own revolutionary experience against France. In general, he has no time for radical Arab solutions, and he has said publicly he thought Nasser ought to resign. Because of his moderation and his antipathy for Nasser, Bourguiba carries little weight with the more powerful Arabs. However, it would be well for you to make unmistakably clear to him that our position has not changed since your speech last June 19. The problem is that we can not make peace for Jordan and the UAR if they--especially Nasser--can't find a way to engage in peace talks of some sort. 3. Economic development. Since Tunisian independence, we have provided over $500 million in aid. Our three year development aid commitment in the early 1960's gave Tunisia a needed boost at a time when its serious economic planning was just getting under way. Recently, we have provided loans at the level of $15 million a year along with other economic aid. This year we will have to reduce this to $10 million (a formal recommendation will be on your desk later this week). We would like to stay at $15 million, but Congressional cuts make this impossible. Bourguiba doesn't know exactly what the level will be, but he must realize that the cut does not indicate any dissatisfaction with the way Tunisia uses our aid. We only wish more aid recipients would do as well. (Vice President Humphrey was extremely impressed by what he saw in Tunisia.) You will be interested to know that one of our major aid efforts in Tunisia now is to help adapt the miracle wheat strains to North Africa by developing them in experimental areas in Tunisia. This could become the basis of a sub-regional program involving Morocco and Algeria if it goes well. We have also furnished PL-480 aid. Last September you approved a $21.7 million program for Tunisia and in March an additional $1.3 million. 4. Vietnam. If you have time, it would be worthwhile for you to look over again the letter (attached)/2/ Bourguiba sent to Ho Chi Minh urging him to negotiate and pointing out the importance of a settlement with the United States. Bourguiba all along has recognized the importance of our commitment to stop Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. You will find him receptive to your point of view, but he will be deeply interested in your reflections on where you hope to go from here. /2/Not attached. Telegram 4104 from Tunis, April 24, transmitted an English translation of President Bourguiba's March 20 message to Ho Chi Minh. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5. Soviet influence. Bourguiba is especially sensitive because his two main threats--Algeria and the UAR--stem partially from the Soviet-backed military in these two countries. He may be particularly interested in the buildup of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and may gear his pitch to you for possible security guarantees to the Soviet buildup and offer of the Bizerte Naval Base for our use. Our only answer is that we are, as usual, watching the Soviet Fleet carefully. In sum, Bourguiba will want to discuss his security and development problems with you. He will be equally interested in your view of the world. He will be pleased to share his views of major problems with you. I will give you a check list of talking points in the morning./3/ I recommend you read Nick Katzenbach's memo and attached talking points in the attached book (red Tab A under "General")./4/ /3/Attached but not printed. /4/Not attached. Briefing material is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Visit of President Bourguiba, Briefing Book Folder. Walt
176. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 15, 1968, noon. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63-9/68. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Edmund S. Glenn. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled "Part I of III"; memoranda of conversation of other portions of the discussion of the Middle East and Bourguiba's visit to Canada are ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Tunisia President Johnson invited President Bourguiba to select the topic of conversation which would be of the greatest interest to Tunisia. President Bourguiba said that the Tunisian positions on world affairs are well-known. In regard to Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa, the two countries are in complete agreement. A few points might be made in regard to bilateral relations. These relations are excellent. Tunisia understands full well American preoccupations with a number of trouble spots and, in particular, with the war in Viet Nam. Nevertheless, President Bourguiba expressed the wish that the United States not forget Tunisia, a country whose geographical position is dangerous as it is surrounded by countries who have opted out of the free world. In consequence, Tunisia needs to be reassured as to her security and the security of her economic development. In this respect Tunisia has made a request to Turkey, a country with which it shares the bonds of the common history in the past and common friendships in the present. The Turks have indicated that they would be glad to help with some materiel, provided the authorization of the United States could be obtained. President Johnson asked President Bourguiba for information as to the kind of materiel needed. President Bourguiba said that the Foreign Minister of Tunisia, his son, had the detailed list of materiel and would place it before any person designated by President Johnson. President Johnson suggested that the Foreign Minister communicate the list to Assistant Secretary Palmer. President Bourguiba said that the question was primarily psychological and not one of engaging in an arms race. There is no question for Tunisia of asking armaments comparable to those supplied by the Soviet Union to Egypt and Algeria, but simply obtaining a minimum, without which Tunisia cannot face the harassment of which it is the object. The President said that the United States does not intend to lose interest in Africa, the Middle East and, in particular, Tunisia, and intends to do whatever can be done. Unfortunately, we have serious difficulties at home and it is even conceivable that there might be no aid bill at all. Nevertheless, the President was hopeful and it is clear the United States intends to pursue the same policies it has been carrying out so far. President Bourguiba said that he fully understood the situation. Tunisia counts mainly on her own efforts and understands the difficulties of her friends. It is asking only what is in the realm of the possible, but understands fully that some things may become impossible.
177. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 16, 1968, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63-9/68. Secret. Drafted by Root. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text is labeled "Part I of II"; the memorandum of conversation covering the remainder of the discussion, which concerned Vietnam, is ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Americans President Johnson asked whether President Bourguiba was satisfied with the Joint Communique which had been submitted for their approval./2/ President Bourguiba said he was. /2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1968, pp. 753-754. President Johnson said he had been informed of President Bourguiba's discussion with Secretary of State Rusk earlier in the day/3/ and was in agreement with their exchange of views regarding Tunisia's security and development. As regards the Tunisian desire to obtain U.S. arms from Turkey, he saw no objection in principle, but there were certain legal problems. We would be in touch with the Tunisians on this matter in due course. /3/No record of this conversation has been found. President Johnson said President Bourguiba's statements had been warmly welcomed and the warmth of his message was greatly appreciated. President Johnson said he had heard a number of favorable comments about President Bourguiba's toast at the White House dinner. He wanted to thank President Bourguiba sincerely for his public and private statements. President Johnson said he had much respect for President Bourguiba's opinions. President Johnson said he did not know what the future would hold, particularly as regarded action by Congress. We were having difficulties with the Tax Bill and having to deal with a record-breaking deficit of $31 billion. There were problems with Congress over our foreign aid programs, which he himself considered to be in the best interest of the U.S. He could assure President Bourguiba that the United States would always consider what served the best interests of Tunisia and the U.S., as the U.S. is aware of Tunisia's problems and has full confidence in President Bourguiba's leadership. President Bourguiba assured President Johnson that, in stating Tunisia's concerns, he always takes into full account the difficulties experienced by the U.S. Tunisia is aware of our difficulties with Congress, such as those of taxes, which are quite normal in a democratic country, particularly in an election year. He felt sure that eventually good sense and the general interest would prevail in Congress as elsewhere. The U.S. could be proud that it has always done what is right, even though at times there may be some delay in our action. It is to be hoped and expected that a majority in Congress and among the American people would support constructive action. He looked to the future with optimism, as Tunisian security and development really coincided with the interest of the U.S. The U.S. can always count on Tunisia as a true friend. Tunisia knows that the U.S. gives fair consideration to Tunisia's needs and does what is possible and is right. The relations between the two countries are good, very good, and will remain so, whatever may come. President Bourguiba said that the ideas he had expressed yesterday are those he has previously expressed in Tunisia--before students, responsible political leaders and the people in general. In speaking to his countrymen, he was never engaged in demagoguery. He can speak honestly to his people because his popularity has been solidly established by 35 years of struggle. All he wants for his country is peace, security and development. President Johnson said he agreed with the thoughts expressed by President Bourguiba. He had personally felt strengthened by President Bourguiba's visit. He was happy with the present state of U.S.-Tunisian relations and looked forward to their continued consolidation.
178. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 24, 1968, 7:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63-9/68. Confidential. SUBJECT Attached is Bill Gaud's recommendation for this year's program loan ($10 million) for Tunisia./2/ As you know from your talks with Bourguiba, this is justifiable on economic grounds alone, but it will also be another demonstration to Bourguiba that your expressions of friendship during his visit here are backed by action. /2/Attached but not printed. Our past program loans have run about $15 million a year, but we don't have that much money this year. The Tunisians, as Bourguiba told you, understand our problem so there shouldn't be any serious reaction to the cut. In fact, we told them at one time we might have to cut all the way down to $5 million. The loan will be used to finance imports essential to Tunisia's development program. Judging by their past performance and what the Tunisians told us last week, they will use the loan well. There are no difficulties for this loan with the Conte-Long amendments. Charlie Zwick is aboard, and Secretary Fowler is satisfied that there will be no major adverse effects on our balance of payments. I recommend you approve./3/ /3/The approval line is checked on the source text. Walt
179. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 27, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 84. Secret. SUBJECT The attached determination/2/ would permit us to go ahead in FY 1968 with the second slice ($2.7 million) of our 5-year program for Tunisia. It's a routine determination such as those you've signed in past years for Tunisia--not one of the new Conte-Long determinations. Charlie Zwick's memo (attached)/3/ outlines its contents. /2/Attached but not printed. President Johnson signed the determination on June 28. /3/Attached but not printed. You will recall President Bourguiba's understanding of our shortage of funds but his hope that we would help as much as possible. Three years ago, we laid out a $25 million program over five years designed to do no more than enable the Tunisians to hold off the Algerians for 2-3 days until help could arrive. We had to tell them frankly that they couldn't handle more than that now. After Congressional cuts, we've had to cut even that minimum program in half. The equipment involved is mainly defensive--anti-aircraft, vehicles, ammo, spares. We would like to get this out today if you approve in order to get these items on Defense's year-end procurement list. Attached determination for your signature if you approve. This program has been approved in the Senior Interdepartmental Group and is recommended by Nick Katzenbach with Defense and Budget Bureau concurrence. W.W. Rostow/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
180. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 19, 1968, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 TUN. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan on September 20 and approved in M on October 2. The source text is labeled "Part 2 of 2." The meeting was held in Rostow's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Ambassador Driss said that Tunisia, having withdrawn for good from the Arab League, now feels isolated like a star in the sky. They hope their friends understand them. What was the best thing for Tunisia to do about its security in the present situation, when they have no treaty with anyone? Mr. Rostow observed that U.S. policy since the 1950's has been to support the independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East. The Congress even declared it to be our policy in 1957. That policy had been the basis of our support for Israel, of the UAR in 1957, and it was our general line of policy. President Eisenhower even landed troops in Lebanon in 1958. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
