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159. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/46 New York, September 27, 1965, noon. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963-March 1966. Secret. Drafted by O'Neill and approved in S on October 25. The meeting was held at USUN. The source text is labeled "Part 1 of 4." SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Tunisia: The Secretary said he had three or four things to say on military assistance to Tunisia, but he must warn the Foreign Minister in advance that they did not represent a complete answer. They were, however, a beginning. 1. Secretary of Defense McNamara was prepared to send a survey team to Tunisia to assess Tunisia's military needs./2/ /2/Telegram 146 to Tunis, November 12, informed the Embassy that the U.S. Military Survey Team formed to study Tunisia's security requirements would arrive in Tunis on November 29 to begin the survey, which would take about 3 weeks. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-TUN) The Report of the U.S. Military Survey Team (Tunisia) dated February 16, 1966, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 9118.4 (16 Feb 66) IR 5630 Sec. 1A. 2. The U.S. is interested in the area of civic action, which is a constructive one. The Foreign Minister said Tunisia has seen civic action on a small scale and that the people were now accustomed to the idea. The Secretary further noted the contributions of U.S. military forces to the development of the United States, of which there had been a surprising amount west of the Mississippi in earlier days, and not just by the Army Corps of Engineers. He promised to send some material on this subject to the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister observed that the Tunisian army had been trained in a different way, largely as a technical corps. The Secretary observed that the military traditionally look on themselves as warriors and often do not like to perform civilian projects. 3. The U.S. would be glad to arrange with the Tunisian Government fairly regular visits of units of the 6th Fleet. These would be noted where they should be and, in addition, would bring some tangible economic benefits. 4. The U.S. Government is looking into the possibility of increasing the number of training slots in the U.S. for members of the Tunisian military forces. In general, the Secretary added, the two countries should arrange to keep in close touch with developments which could affect Tunisian security. For example, problems might arise when UAR troops returned home from the Yemen. The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary for the USG response and agreed on the utility of maintaining close cooperation. He said the survey team was probably the best way to reach agreement on the amounts Tunisia needed in the military field. The Secretary said the problem of figures was probably a bit tricky and that the U.S. would have to have freedom to arrange this. We needed to consider what were the highest priorities. In view of what might develop in North Africa, the Secretary thought that communications' equipment, including radar, seemed very important. The Foreign Minister agreed on the need for communications' equipment and mentioned the problem created for Tunisia when it sees its neighbors getting jets, tanks and training from eastern countries. The Secretary referred to the experience of the recent Indo-Pakistani conflict and the fact that new anti-tank weapons might be better for some countries than supplying tanks to oppose enemy tanks.
160. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 4, 1966, 2:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-9/68. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 6:15 p.m. Dave Bell asks your approval of a $15 million non-project loan for Tunisia--all tied to US procurement. Fowler and Schultze are on board. This is the bulk of our economic aid program this year, except for a little food and technical assistance. We will release it in two stages to maintain pressure for continued progress on self-help measures. At Bourguiba's urgent request, we are also considering additional military aid, but we will give you a crack at that later since it would be virtually a new commitment. This is an outstanding example of using our aid to bargain for better self-help. Talks leading to this loan began almost a year ago. Rusk promised continued support for Tunisian development, provided the Tunisians made some economic policy changes. Out of those talks came a major new Tunisian procedure for budgeting development resources. Now we and other donors ($30 million) working through a World Bank consultative group are ready to underwrite this year's program. It has been a long pull, but the Tunisians have done a good job. The World Bank has just voted its confidence by setting aside $100 million for the next three years. While this is a sound development loan, there is also strong political justification. As you recall from your last talk with Bourguiba Jr., President Bourguiba has put himself far out on a limb in the Arab world by standing up to Nasser and preaching a peaceful solution for the Palestine problem. He fears Nasser's retaliation by subversion and is desperately looking for somebody to tie to. He's even offered us both naval and air bases (which we don't need) as an inducement for closer ties. We do not want Tunisia to depend too heavily on us; it should look to its natural markets in Europe. But until Bourguiba can smooth deGaulle's ruffled feathers, we have an interest in keeping this effective little enterprise going./2/ /2/A handwritten note in the margin of the source text reads: "When does he come to see us. Check with Rusk & see if we can't coordinate the two--L." Walt
161. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 12, 1966, 11:45 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-9/68. Confidential. In answer to your question (attached),/2/ Rusk does not think Bourguiba can visit Washington until later in the year, since he has a string of tenth anniversary celebrations this spring. So Rusk recommends going ahead with the $15 million Tunisian program loan now and asks your approval for inviting Bourguiba for the second half of 1966. /2/See footnote 2, Document 160. The main reason for not delaying the loan any longer is that the Tunisians have geared their self-help measures for this calendar year to our aid and to the $30 million which other donors pledged at a World Bank meeting in December. We originally promised a decision by the end of December but delayed during our aid review to give it an especially careful going over. The Tunisians have done a good job on their side of the bargain and need to push ahead with their development imports for this year. We're afraid holding off any longer would make us look horribly inefficient and undercut our leverage in bargaining for a new round of reforms. Walt Go ahead with loan/3/ /3/This option is checked on the source text. /4/This option is checked on the source text. On April 18, Assistant Secretary Palmer informed Foreign Minister Bourguiba that the $15 million program loan had been authorized, and confirmed the invitation for President Bourguiba to visit the United States in the latter part of the year. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, POL TUN-US)
162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia/1/ Washington, May 20, 1966, 8:37 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Polk in AFN and approved by Root. 417. Deptel 407./2/ /2/Dated May 14. (Ibid., POL TUN-US) 1. Following are principal points made during May 20 call on Secretary by Tunisian Ambassador Driss./3/ They are FYI, Noforn, and subject revision upon review: /3/Memoranda of conversation of Rusk's meeting with Driss are ibid., POL 7 TUN and ibid., DEF 19-8 US-TUN. 2. Bourguiba Visit US. Referring recent consultations Tunis, Driss expressed President's appreciation for invitation; indicated that if it envisaged as "working visit" and there something to discuss, it possible Bourguiba arrange to come this year. If question protocol or courtesy visit, then next year might be better. However, did not wish leave impression Bourguiba unwilling to come. Secretary assured Ambassador invitation not protocol one, and visit conceived as opportunity for two Presidents discuss informally not just bilateral matters but also wide range international problems--e.g., Africa and Arab world, UN. We do not view visit as connected with any particular problems between our two govts. We working on these separately in hope of early progress. We do not suggest President alter planned European visits, nor on other hand to postpone US visit indefinitely. Perhaps we can find mutually agreeable time this year; however, if not, then early next year. 3. US-Tunisian Relations Amb said Tunisians hopeful proposed visit might be new take-off point in US-GOT relations to even higher plane than presently exists. Expressed GOT concern over Soviet arms to Egypt and Algeria, and Tunisia's obligation to protect economy and political system. While grateful for US aid, GOT unhappy with delays in implementation and with quantities. Driss concurred in Secretary's comment that Tunisia's per capita aid one of highest, but on other grounds he felt it deserves more. Secretary said we would look into ways of reducing administrative delays, but of course procedures and questions involved of necessity take time. 4. Military Assistance Secretary questioned whether Tunisia's security could ever be answered primarily by military means, and whether internal security and support by friends outside not more important. Said Survey Team Report under consideration in high levels USG and hoped transmit results soon to GOT. Driss insisted Tunisia had to be able defend itself during initial attack, friends notwithstanding. 5. Tunisian-French Relations Driss said relations seem to be improving; however, Tunisian cooperation with France would not be allowed to occur at expense of cooperation with US. Secretary said we favored improvement, and do not consider ourselves as rivals of France or Europe in Tunisia's foreign relations. Rusk
163. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 23, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-9/68. Secret. SUBJECT Recommendation: Military assistance for Tunisia has been under close study, and debate, for many weeks. Decisions in favor of a $26 million military assistance program spread over five years have been made, and appealed, through the African Regional Group and the Senior Interdepartmental Group to me. Subject to your concurrence, I have decided to recommend the $26 million five-year arms program subject to the following provisions: a) That we take soundings on the problem from the British, French, Germans and Italians to see how they might be prepared to help; b) That we inform the Tunisians of our intention to take such soundings before deciding on our own contribution; c) That the Department of Defense be asked to undertake maximum training of Tunisians in this country and to keep the number of military assistance personnel in Tunisia down to the absolute minimum; d) That we avoid if at all possible a public announcement of the magnitude of our help and that we phase our assistance gradually over the five years so that for the most part the "non-lethal" hardware is sent first and the more sophisticated arms arrive later. Background: Following an urgent Tunisian request and discussions which you, Secretary McNamara and I had with Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., we agreed about a year ago to provide some limited military assistance to Tunisia. The amount was left to be determined after we had sent a military survey team to study how to meet that country's minimum requirements for security with the least adverse effect on Tunisia's economic development, which we are helping. The survey team visited Tunisia last November and completed its report in February of this year. The team recommended a $26 million military assistance program spread over five years which would provide a minimum deterrent to external attack. The program was approved first by the African Regional Group with A.I.D. dissenting and then by the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). Because A.I.D. dissented in SIG, the matter was referred to me for decision. There are serious arguments pro and con. The Arguments in Favor 1. President Bourguiba is of course an outstanding and courageous leader among statesman in the lesser developed countries and a friend of the U.S. He has given us, for example, strong support on Viet-Nam. 2. While we tend to discount any present threat to Tunisia from its neighbors, Bourguiba is understandably concerned about the danger over the longer run from the massive input of Soviet arms into a still basically unstable Algeria and a unfriendly Egypt on the other side of a weak Libya. 3. We are in any event obligated to provide him at least that portion of the survey team's Report which gives the technical assessment of our military experts on what he requires to meet the threat of attack. 4. Moreover, even with the added local costs of this proposed program, Tunisia's defense expenditures would still be less than 10% of its annual budget. The Arguments Against 1. What we do in Tunisia will effect to some extent the Moroccan demand for increased assistance and the attitude in Algeria towards the U.S. role in North Africa. 2. It is not, of course, feasible to arm Tunisia to the point where it could actually hold off the Algerians for more than a very short time. 3. While we have made sales of military equipment in the past, the new program would put military aid on a different and more important basis, involving some military training. 4. Tunisia's economic resources are already strained and we are not eager to see funds diverted into military expenditures. 5. It would obviously be preferable if we were able to disassociate ourselves from any kind of arms race in the Maghreb. After balancing the above considerations, I have decided to go ahead with a military assistance program for Tunisia, subject to your approval. Dean Rusk
164. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, August 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-9/68. Secret. Prepared by Saunders. Copies were sent to Bromley Smith and James Clark. I received word this morning from the Secretariat of the SIG that Rusk, McNamara and Gaud met several days ago on the Tunisia Military Assistance Program and decided to scrap the July 23rd memo for the President which Secretary Rusk had sent to us./2/ We had been holding that memo since its arrival to let the Presidential Determination papers catch up with it so we would only have to take this issue to the President once. /2/Document 163. The Secretaries decided that it would be too damaging to the AID program in Congress to try for a five-year commitment to Tunisia. They agreed to go ahead as planned for FY 67 but feel we can make no commitment thereafter. Ambassador Palmer's Bureau is now drafting a paper reflecting this new position. The main problem is that the Tunisians are already aware of the existence of the military survey team's report. The debate now will be over how to tell them that we are only willing to sign up for one year. One solution is to tell them forthrightly about our problems, tell them that we are willing to start on a program but admit that unfortunately we can not be sure what the future will bring. I have told State and AID to be sure that the Presidential Determination papers this time come over with the Secretary's memo. I am returning Secretary Rusk's original memo to Bromley Smith, presumably for the dead letter file. H. H. Saunders
165. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 25, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL TUN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Spicer and approved in S on September 1. The source text is labeled "Part I of IV." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Driss referred to his recent vacation in Tunisia and to the conversations he had had there with President Bourguiba and with Foreign Minister Bourguiba, Jr. The Ambassador said that he had already reported his impressions to Mr. Palmer./2/ President Bourguiba was disheartened and had asked many questions; the first of which was, "What was the strategy of the United States toward Tunisia?" "If Tunisia is worthy of being helped, why are there so may difficulties?" The President had noted that he had been waiting since 1964 for an indication of U.S. intent on the military question and that he was still awaiting the results of the Clowes mission. President Bourguiba must consider the total situation and draw his conclusions. The Ambassador said that he had tried again to explain the problems of the American Government to the President, but that, in reply, the President had displayed a press clipping in which members of the Congress were praising Tunisia. In addition, even should the Government of Tunisia understand the problem, it is difficult to placate young people and Party militants. /2/A memorandum of conversation of Ambassador Driss' meeting with Assistant Secretary Palmer on August 15 is ibid. The Secretary said that Mr. Palmer had informed him of the Ambassador's reflections and that we well understood the restlessness about the delay in decisions. There had been no change in our attitude toward President Bourguiba and toward Tunisia. We are still hoping that President Bourguiba's visit can be worked out. The question of military assistance to Tunisia was now under study at the highest, Cabinet, level. All preliminary study had been completed. There is a great problem with Congress; a problem now being discussed in joint committee, and we are hopeful of a compromise. This is a very bitter question, an amendment to the AID bill has been written on behalf of many leading Senators that would limit the number of countries receiving aid. We can make no decisions until we know the results of the compromise, how much money we will have and where it can be spent. The Secretary expressed his belief that some of the problems had been resolved, for example, the delayed ammunition had arrived.
166. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 4, 1966, 9 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-9/68. Secret. SUBJECT Secretary Rusk may raise at lunch one of the trickiest small problems we face--how to answer a year-old Tunisian request for military aid. Our government has divided sharply. Bourguiba wants a closer relationship with us to offset his deteriorating relations with De Gaulle and Nasser and the Soviet-backed arms-buildup next door in Algeria. Last fall, his government gave us a $100 million shopping list. To bring it back to reason we sent a survey team which recommended a $25 million program over five years to develop a Tunisian force that could hold off the Algerians just long enough for outside help to arrive. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have vetoed the five-year commitment and are recommending a one-year slice of the $25 million program. The deciding factor in their minds is that they don't think the Congress will stand for any new long-term commitment right now. However, they feel there are strong reasons for doing something: --Tunisia is a small country next to a big neighbor with a lot of Soviet equipment. --Bourguiba has been remarkably good on Vietnam, and we can't expect our friends to stick up for us if we don't take their legitimate defense concerns seriously. --He has isolated himself in the Arab world by standing up to Nasser, and he is a moderate voice on Israel and African issues. --It doesn't make sense to force Bourguiba to buy arms in the open market while we're helping with his successful development program. He has nowhere else to turn. --We have gone far enough by offering a survey team to lead Bourguiba to expect a positive response. Dave Bell felt strongly that we should not go ahead with this program and appealed right up through the Senior Interdepartmental Group to the Secretary. He argued that: --Tunisia's natural relationship lies with Europe, not with the US. Moving into any long-term program now would reverse our policy of gradually disengaging from Tunisia and nudging it toward its natural partners. --By balancing the Tunisian side of the North African arms imbalance, we would appear to be fueling a Tunisian-Algerian arms race. The examples of India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, Jordan-Israel teach that we should be drawing back from this kind of program wherever possible. --Ambassador Korry's recommendation for your African program capitalize on natural sub-regional groupings like Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. With both neighbors suspicious of Algeria, economic cooperation may be a pipe dream. However, we ought to be urging cooperation--maybe even arms limitation--not undermining it by helping widen the Tunisian-Algerian gap. --Tunisia needs to concentrate every last ounce of talent and money on economic development. The Secretaries' proposal contains one big hooker. There's no sensible military rationale for a one-year $5 million program. We must either go on with the next four years, year by year, or stop before we've finished the job. Cutting off the program a year from now would be harder than not starting at all. So we re talking about a one-year program only for the sake of Congressional appearances. We are all uncomfortable about this program especially if there's any thought of stopping after one year. At best, it's a 51-49 decision. However, on balance I think we ought to go ahead. If we had something promising to offer Bourguiba in the way of arms limitation, I'd give it a try, but there's little chance of that now. In the final analysis, it's tough to tell a friend like Bourguiba that we won't help him defend himself when he has so willingly backed our cause in Vietnam. Walt
167. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, October 13, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-9/68. Secret. SUBJECT It would help greatly if you could clear up the misunderstanding with Secretary Rusk over what the President has approved. AF is putting together the paperwork, and neither we nor the Budget Bureau know whether we should be fighting to keep the President's options open or whether everything from here out is pro forma. The Secretary told Bourguiba, Jr., that (a) we'd transmit our survey team's report; (b) we're ready to go ahead with a "rather significant one-year program"; and (c) we'll put the "most urgent items" (i.e. F-86's and AA guns) into the first year./2/ Implicitly, the Secretary is talking about a $5.2 million program--a one-year slice of the 5-year program recommended by the survey report. /2/A memorandum of Secretary Rusk's conversation with Foreign Minister Bourguiba at the United Nations on October 5 is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-TUN. Whether the President approved or not, the Secretary has committed us. So maybe all we can do is lie down and roll over. However, if there is still room for choice, the alternatives are these: 1. Go all-out with this year's program. The argument is that Tunisians will be disappointed that we're not promising the whole 5 years the survey team recommended and putting the fancy hardware into the first year of the program does our best to make it as politically palatable as possible. This is the Secretary's current approach. 2. Go slow. Don't jump into a splashy program that will look like our share in an arms race with Algeria and will move us into rather than out of Tunisia. Concentrate on training this year and move only simple pieces of equipment. This was the Secretary's line before he reversed himself. We don't want to fight a useless battle to keep option #2 open for the President if you decide, after talking to the Secretary, that the decision is made. But if you feel there's room for maneuver, we'd like to see what option #2 might look like. Hal Give up /3/Neither of these options is checked.
168. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 14, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 17. Secret. SUBJECT After discussing this with you at lunch on 4 October, Secretary Rusk told Bourguiba, Jr. we'd go ahead with a grant program but couldn't commit ourselves beyond FY 1967. However, since this is the first time you've seen a formal recommendation, I want to give you the background. Bourguiba has long wanted a closer relationship with us to offset the Soviet-backed arms buildup in Algeria and his deteriorating relations with DeGaulle and Nasser. Last fall, he asked us for $100 million in military equipment. To bring him back to reason, we sent a survey team. It recommended a $25 million program over five years to develop a Tunisian force that could hold off the Algerians just long enough for outside help to arrive. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara vetoed a five-year commitment. In the attached,/2/ they recommend a one-year $5.2 million program because they don't think the Congress will stand for any new long-term commitment right now. But they recognize that going ahead is in effect starting a five-year program since it is the only militarily sensible approach. Cutting off the program a year from now would probably be harder than not starting at all. Secretary Rusk explained to Bourguiba, Jr. our problems with long-term commitments and suggested we get started this year and deal with the future as it comes. /2/Attached but not printed. They feel there are strong reasons for helping Tunisia: --The USSR has shipped large amounts of Soviet equipment to Algeria, and Tunisia justifiably feels defenseless. Both the Moroccans and Tunisians have tried unsuccessfully to persuade Moscow to lay off. --Bourguiba has been remarkably good on Vietnam, and we can't expect our friends to stick up for us if we don't take their legitimate defense concerns seriously. --He has isolated himself in the Arab world by standing up to Nasser, and he is a moderate voice on Israel and African issues. --It doesn't make sense to force Bourguiba to buy arms in the open market while we're helping with his successful development program. He has nowhere else to turn. --Dave Bell strongly opposed this program. He argued that: --Tunisia's natural relationship lies with Europe. Moving into a long-term program now would reverse our policy of gradually disengaging and nudging Tunisia toward its natural partners. --We might appear to be fueling a Tunisian-Algerian arms race. The examples of India-Pakistan, Greece-Turkey, Jordan-Israel teach that we should be drawing back from this kind of program wherever possible. --Your African program tries to build on natural sub-regional groupings like Algeria-Morocco-Tunisia. With both neighbors suspicious of Algeria, economic cooperation may be a pipe dream. Nevertheless, we ought to be urging cooperation--maybe even arms limitation--not undermining it by helping widen the Tunisian-Algerian gap. --Tunisia needs to concentrate every last ounce of talent and money on economic development. We have all been uncomfortable about this program for the reasons Dave Bell cited (especially if there's any thought of stopping after one year). At best, it's a 60-40 decision. However, I've explored all the alternatives and on balance think we ought to go ahead. If we had something promising to offer Bourguiba in the way of arms limitation, I'd give that a try, but neither the Moroccans nor the Tunisians feel they can do that kind of business with either Algeria or Moscow. In the final analysis, it's tough to tell a friend like Bourguiba that we won't help him defend himself when he has so willingly backed our cause in Vietnam. He told Ambassador Harriman last week that he urgently needs an answer. Therefore, since you have already given Secretary Rusk verbal approval, I recommend you sign the attached determination./3/ Charlie Schultze's memo (attached)/4/ explains the legalities. For signature if you approve./5/ /3/Secretary Rusk's memorandum to President Johnson, December 1, recommending that the President sign the determination authorizing a 1-year $5.2 million military assistance program is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 17. /4/Attached but not printed. /5/Telegram 106134 to Tunis, December 21, informed the Embassy that the President had signed the MAP Determination, and that the Ambassador could notify the Foreign Minister of the U.S. decision to extend military assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-TUN) W. W. Rostow/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
