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Tunisia
145. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, November 25, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-9/68. Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Assistant Secretary Williams, Tasca, and Hutchinson. I spent a pleasant 40 minutes with Ambassador Cecil Hourani,/2/ Bourguiba, Jr.'s advance man. He had no major items to plug. His pitch was that President Bourguiba thought it useful right after our elections to send a few savvy fellows to Washington to get the feel of the new Administration's thinking about Tunisia and US/Tunisian relations. He and I agreed that the relationship was an unusually comfortable one--we had no major bilateral problems. /2/Ambassador Cecil Hourani served as Special Adviser to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. He then got on to what I suspect was his chief message. Tunisia was getting a little nervous about becoming too committed to African causes and the OAU. Hourani thought personally (and implied that Bourguiba felt the same way) that Tunisia had to look out more for its own interests, and not pursue too far whatever the African radicals dreamed up. Indeed, perhaps Tunisia could be more useful to the US in African councils, by discreetly acting as a voice of moderation; of course, this would be a most delicate operation. To appear to be a US stooge would be self-defeating. Bourguiba, Jr. would want to discuss when he came here in December ways and means by which Tunisia might thus serve US interests and its own. I assured him that we'd be most responsive to such suggestions (my hunch is that the Tunisians are looking around for ways of making themselves a bit more valuable to us, so as to insure the continuation of substantial US aid). Though I probed politely about Tunisia's economic problems, Hourani didn't even rise to the bait. He didn't see any major economic issues between us, and failed even to mention either a program loan or Tunisia's balance of payments difficulties. So I volunteered a few comments about the importance of putting Tunisia's economic house in order and showing us that it could meet its current balance of payments problem. I also urged coming up with decent projects for the money we had earmarked. As to relations with France, Hourani doubted they would improve much until DeGaulle died. The great man had a deplorable habit of remembering old grudges. I suggested that perhaps Tunisia could get back into the French market most successfully via the EEC. He agreed. Hourani expressed some dubiousness about our Nasser policy, to which I gave the standard replies. I pointed out to boot that Tunisia too seemed to feel the necessity of playing ball with Nasser to an extent these days. Indeed we hoped that Tunisia would be more of a voice of moderation in Arab as well as African councils. As he left, Hourani mentioned that he had delivered to the Vice President's office a letter from Bourguiba, Jr. The latter also was interested in inviting Humphrey to Tunisia as soon as he could come. I suggested that the best thing to do would be for Jr. to raise this matter with the Vice President-elect when they got together. Naturally, the new VP had received a large number of feelers and would hardly be able to respond usefully for a while yet. Therefore, the more low-key the approach the less potential embarrassment to Tunisia and the US. He got the point. R.W. Komer
146. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, December 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscelleanous, 12/63-9/68. Secret. Prepared by Komer. Copies were sent to Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, Williams, and Newsom. I had a good hour-and-a-half with Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr. (along with Ambassador Driss) on 19 Dec. When I commented on our plethora of problems, including our troubles in Pakistan, Bourguiba asked jocularly, "Which would you rather have--friends or allies?" (I said, "Friends".) In brief, he made a strong pitch for aid, while I urged Tunisia to speak with an even stronger voice for moderation in Africa. Bourguiba began jokingly by saying he thought stability was becoming a liability and perhaps he should generate a little turmoil to get Tunisia on the "emergency list." What he really wanted was a "green light" from top US echelons to treat the successful building of the "Tunisian showcase" as an urgent matter. He cited the recent 3-day bridge-building operation by US and Tunisian military engineers as an example of how quickly things can happen when the top level gives a push. He wished the whole Tunisian aid and development program could get that kind of steam behind it. In the discussion which followed, these specifics emerged: 1. He'd be happy to receive more US military engineers any time it would help get a job done. I pointed out the limited scope of their activities but agreed we would look into whether military engineers, either US or Tunisian, could reasonably help further with Tunisian development. 2. Bourguiba said his government is now willing to receive US experts to help plan and document projects to speed up loans. At first, GOT had wanted to do this for itself to learn how but now felt confident enough to seek help. I suggested that private firms like Checci and Nathan have been good at this elsewhere. 3. He asked whether there was any chance of our loosening up on tied US procurement. I saw little until our payments gap disappeared. He reiterated the usual arguments about US equipment often being high-priced and the difficulty of integrating it into systems standardized on European equipment. 4. He commented that oil and gas exploration in southern Tunisia had turned up hopeful signs. One Italian firm is already talking to GOT about a pipeline. The biggest boon of real discovery would be the reduction in power costs, which would release money for further development 5. When I underscored the importance of re-establishing decent economic relations with France, he animatedly described how far GOT had gone to meet French desires in every respect. But De Gaulle feels personally insulted and little can be done until the air clears. After a point, "Tunisia is too weak to bend," he said. He made clear he'd welcome help, but I pointed out that our currency is none too good in Paris these days either. 6. Taking up my comparison of Tunisian project preparation with Moroccan ineptitude, Bourguiba outlined his impressions of the Moroccan situation. He said (interestingly, since I'd pressed the idea with Amb. Bengelloun in October) that King Hassan during his recent visit to Tunis had pressed his ministers to learn all they could about Tunisian development techniques and even left several of them behind to continue their study. He also invited Tunisian specialists to Morocco to study Moroccan problems, and to bring back to Tunisia selected Moroccans for further training. From a private visit to Morocco last summer, he deduced that the big Moroccan political problem is the court coterie which isolates Hassan as a sort of cult of adulation; men like Oufkir poison the King's views. He also said Hassan "is a man 35 with the body of a man 50" and has serious stomach trouble. When Bourguiba asked what I wanted to say to him, I hit two points: 1. More and more, US policy is turning on the Congo, and--for better or worse--causing the USG to re-examine our relations with African radicals like Nasser and Ben Bella. (He smiled, and I acknowledged he'd been warning us for years about Nasser.) I said we really couldn't think too harshly of the new East African governments because they are so inexperienced, but Nasser and the old-timers know better. We also are coming around to feel that we're entitled to more backing from our friends; we want the moderate Africans to stand up and be counted. 2. We hope for Tunisian moderation on the Israeli question, which I felt could heat up over the next 3-4 years. We couldn't expect GOT to change its position--we understand its views. But we have been encouraged by the willingness of the Lebanese, for instance, in keeping UAC forces out of its territory. All we ask is for reasonable Arabs to realize everyone will get hurt if there's a showdown. It used to be that the Western Arabs ignored Palestine, but Ben Bella has now attracted to them the wrath of anti-Arab lobbies and other critics in the US--all of which makes it increasingly difficult for us to carry on a reasonable Maghreb policy. Responding to my first point, he described at length his efforts the day before in New York and his disgust that most of the OAU foreign ministers won't stand up for what is obviously right, even in their own longer term interests. Nigeria was the only other member not ready to follow the crowd. Bourguiba claimed credit for stiffening the spines of the Moroccans and Malagasy. He pointed out the delicacy of the Tunisians' effort as white Africans to stay moderate without discrediting themselves. He said he had argued at some length with one Sudanese delegate at least to admit facts (e.g. radical arms shipments through Khartoum), but he threw up his hands at trying to force reason on Maghoub. A discussion of Ben Bella developed out of my comments on BB's role in getting the Western Arabs into the Israeli issue. He felt that BB is not the most radical Algerian; BB has trouble with extremists in his own government, notably Bouteflika and Boumedienne. He cited specifically how Bouteflika had tried to undermine a Bourguiba, Sr.-BB agreement in Cairo to solemnize an Algerian-Tunisian border settlement (milestone 233) during Bourguiba's visit to Algiers in May. He also commented on BB's penchant--like Sukarno's--for "externalizing his problems." I said BB is fooling around in the Congo because he's revolutionary at heart. All he knows is how to promote revolutions. Before leaving, Bourguiba stressed another major fear: What will happen to Tunisia if Libya collapses? He said--as I mentioned one possible Libyan leader after another--that there's no one in Libya after the King dies whom we can deal with. He even said the Tunisians had to consider moving into Libya when the King dies to pre-empt Nasser (though I suspect this comment was more to dramatize his point than a serious thought). I told him we're very much concerned--he quipped, "You're concerned; we're scared"--and said we'd continue to think hard about staving off the problem of a Nasser push into a Libyan vacuum. RWK
147. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gaud)/1/ Washington, March 25, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963-March 1966. Secret. Also sent to Hutchinson and Williams. My initial concern over how we handle our next aid round with the Tunisians (my London 4561)/2/ was to avoid slapping Bourguiba just after he's stuck to a responsible line on Palestine./3/ However, entirely apart from this we face the problem of how to capitalize on gains from past aid as we begin talking about their next plan. /2/In telegram 4561 from London, March 22, Komer warned that AID's plan to advise Tunisia that the U.S. Government was not prepared to make a quantitative commitment to a new Tunisian long-term plan would be "political folly" at a time when the United States wanted all the moderate Arab support it could get. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 524 from Amman, March 9, reported that President Bourguiba, who was on a visit to Jordan, had declared at a March 6 press conference in Jerusalem that Arabs could cooperate with Jews. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN) There's a special obligation to use tact because we made such a big thing of our multi-year commitment three years ago. I realize multi-year deals aren't as appealing to us as they were in 1961-62. But if we're going to shift back to annual programming, it would be inexcusable not to do it gently. After all, we're the ones who sold the Tunisians on long-term aid planning and multi-year commitments. I'm not judging the merits of a multi-year pledge. What I'm worried about is how to present whatever decision we make to the Tunisians without jeopardizing the confidence we've built there. So I think we ought to be looking for a formula for telling the Tunisians how far we'll go in supporting their next plan. Just to get us started, what about saying something like this to Bourguiba and Ben Salah: "We'll continue aiding Tunisian development at substantial levels. Our interest is as great as ever. To improve the effectiveness of our aid, we would like to suggest some new techniques developed from our experience since 1961. For instance, one device we think offers promise is the annual development budget, which provides the most accurate guide to amounts and types of aid required. So we'd like to begin working with Ben Salah on such a budget and will gear our aid to that as soon as precise needs become clear." This is much better than telling them right off we're not going to make a quantitative commitment to the new plan. The point is that this is both a political and an aid problem and we need a formula that serves both needs. Above all, we can't afford another fiasco like the Title I blowup in December, especially on something as important as this. R.W. Komer/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
148. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, April 14, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963-March 1966. Confidential. Prepared by Komer. Copies were sent to Williams and Hutchinson. Amb. Driss and his new press attache (Ferid El Mouldi) came in this morning to lay the groundwork for the coming visits of Bourguiba, Jr. and Ben Salah. After an exchange of comments on President Bourguiba's performance during his recent trip, Driss made four points: 1. Bourguiba, Jr. has asked to see the President; he will have a letter to deliver from his father. I said I'd do my best, though I did leave us an out by mentioning the President's busy schedule. 2. After a few generalities about the new Four-Year Plan which Bourguiba, Jr. and Ben Salah will be discussing, Driss made a pitch for a non-project loan this year. He made it clear that the Tunisians will view this as a purely political decision on the part of the US. He intimated politely that he didn't feel our decision in this case should be governed by the economists and aid technicians. 3. He said GOT is very anxious to have a four-year commitment to support its new plan. I assured him there is no question of our continued aid for Tunisian development and warned that, if we would prefer not to quantify this commitment in principle, the GOT should not read our act as a loss of interest. I pointed out that our massive programs in India, Pakistan and Turkey run on the basis of yearly pledges. He suggested that the consortium framework gives those programs a continuity that Tunisia must seek bilaterally. We didn't get into detailed discussion of the merits of multi-year commitments because Driss seemed more intent on what he was going to say next than on taking in my points. 4. He asked us to help GOT turn the Consultative Group into an effective organ. Saunders suggested it would be important for Ben Salah to give members of the Group as soon as possible the substance of the presentation he'll make in Washington so they can do their homework. I underscored this by pointing to the trouble we'd had getting the Turks to become their own chief advocates in their consortium. Driss got the point but reiterated that everyone looks to the US for leadership. In this connection, he said that relations with France are improving. I said we had pondered trying to persuade the French to let bygones be bygones but had decided our words wouldn't help much. We agreed that the Germans could be helpful, especially right now in the afterglow of gratitude for President Bourguiba's Middle East stance. I jokingly suggested the way to get de Gaulle back into Tunisia would be for us to cut off aid and he, only half jokingly, agreed. I confined myself to reassuring him of our receptivity and interest, with the thought that we'd want to save any answers for Bourguiba, Jr. and Ben Salah. RWK
149. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, April 27, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 TUN. Secret. Drafted by Charles J. Nelson, Director of the Office of Mediterranean Affairs in AID's Bureau for Africa, on April 24. The source text was attached to an April 27 briefing memorandum Williams sent to Rusk prior to Rusk's meeting with Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr. on April 28. The memorandum of conversation of their meeting is ibid., POL TUN-US. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO TUNISIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT It is suggested that in your meeting with the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Habib Bourguiba, Jr., you include the following points on U.S. assistance to Tunisian economic development. Talking Points: 1. Tunisia is one of the seven countries in the world to which the United States Government will continue to provide major support under its economic assistance program. Further, the United States Government affirms its support of Tunisia's economic development within the context of the new Four Year Plan. The unutilized portion (roughly $80 million) of the past U.S. commitment of $180 million will continue to be available in connection with Tunisia's development efforts. 2. In addition to major support from the United States, the successful execution of Tunisia's development program and the realization of an adequate long-run rate of growth, will involve (1) Tunisia's association with the EEC; (2) increased self-help measures; and (3) greater participation by other aid donors. 3. We are encouraged by the recent report that the EEC Council has indicated its willingness to open formal negotiations with Tunisia and that a negotiating mandate is to be prepared by June. Early association with the EEC should enable Tunisia to develop a more viable economy and an expanded volume of trade with Western Europe. 4. The United States will support the World Bank in its efforts to take a more active role in strengthening the Consultative Group and will encourage the individual member nations to enlarge their participation in Tunisia's development efforts. This we believe to be in conformance with the desires and interest of your Government and we hope that you would pursue a similar course. 5. The review of the Four Year Plan and the strengthening of the Consultative Group will take time. We recognize that the Tunisian balance of payments situation may require the provision of interim assistance. The United States Government is prepared to provide such assistance as a supplement to the foreign exchange resources that Tunisia can obtain through additional drawings from the IMF. After a review of the Four Year Plan, including the current state of the Tunisian economy, with Minister Ben Salah next month, the requirements for interim assistance can be determined.
150. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, December 1963-September 1968. Confidential. Habib Bourguiba, Jr., now Tunisia's foreign minister, is coming in briefly to deliver a letter from his father. Simply knowing that you appreciate Tunisia's stance will give Bourguiba, Sr. a big boost. He has gone way out on a limb in recommending that Arabs and Israelis negotiate a Palestine settlement. Even though this is unworkable now, it took courage to be the only Arab leader to recognize that Israel is here to stay. Other Arabs have criticized him bitterly. Bourguiba has also publicly supported our position on negotiation without preconditions in Vietnam. To be honest, Tunisia's forthright stand is partly designed to generate maximum US backing for its next development plan. It wants (1) a pledge of specific support--we're giving a general assurance but don't want to make another multi-year commitment; (2) a $30-40 million foreign exchange cushion to start the next plan. We'll help meet the need but, again, don't want to talk amounts until we figure out how much is required. In sum, we want to be as re-assuring as possible, both to show it pays to be friendly and because Tunisia is using our aid well (Tunisia is one of the seven countries AID is concentrating on). Possible Talking Points are: (1) You hope his father's courageous stand on the Palestine issue will win followers among the sensible Arab leaders when the initial shock wears off; (2) you're aware of Tunisia's effective development effort and can assure him that, even though we don't want to commit ourselves to a specific amount of aid now, we will support Tunisia's development during its next 4-year plan; (3) it's important to get the Western Europeans more heavily involved in Tunisian development, not to get ourselves off the hook but because Tunisia's most profitable natural economic relationship is with Europe; (4) your best wishes to his father./2/ /2/Attached to the source text is a typed note that reads: "Mr. Bundy: I saw him and it went fine. LBJ/mf, 4-29-65, 2:45p"; see Document 151. McG. B.
151. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 29, 1965, noon. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Tunisia, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, December 1963-September 1968. Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Russell on April 30. The meeting was held at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Bourguiba expressed his appreciation to the President for receiving him at a time when the President is greatly concerned with difficult and fast-moving world problems. He said he had been asked by his father, President Bourguiba, to express his warm greetings. President Bourguiba has had the privilege of knowing personally President Eisenhower and President Kennedy and he looks forward at some time to becoming personally acquainted with President Johnson. In the meantime, he was asking his son, the Foreign Minister, to say how close the Government of Tunisia feels itself to the principles and objectives of American foreign policy. Both countries have their special problems and preoccupations which may make for minor differences in policy from time to time but as a general matter and especially when the chips are down, the United States will find Tunisia at its side. Tunisia may not be a large or important country but it places great importance upon democratic beliefs, integrity, and courage in pursuing its ideals. The President said that Tunisia is important. What it stands for and what it has done, both internally and in its foreign policies, has been observed and appreciated by Americans. We want to do all we can to help it. There is a question as to what Congress will do with the foreign aid bill that has been sent up. There may be some cuts but the President thinks that the bill will come through successfully. Mr. Bourguiba said that his government would like to make Tunisia a model of a democratic, progressive country working closely with the West and especially with the United States. It has just worked out its Four Year Program following the initial Three Year Program. The new program calls for a contribution by the Tunisian people of 60% of the development budget as compared with only 50% in the Three Year Program. However, there is a limit beyond which the people will not go in making sacrifices. If you try to push them too far you have to resort to totalitarian measures and you defeat your democratic goals. The Minister said that national security has become increasingly a problem for Tunisia as the result of developments of the past month and the misunderstanding, very largely an inspired misunderstanding, of what President Bourguiba was suggesting for a rational and pragmatic solution of the Arab-Israeli question. He expressed the hope that the United States could help the Government of Tunisia to make its Army more efficient. They do not wish to increase its size and they hope that some arrangements can be made with the United States for improving the equipment of the present army without cutting into the Tunisian economy and setting back the development effort. The President said that he would ask his people to look into that question. Congress has practically cut out the military assistance portion of the Aid Program and it has become very difficult to give assistance of this kind. He said, however, that he was sympathetic to Tunisia's problem and he would see what we could do.
152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell)/1/ Washington, May 10, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) TUN. No classification marking. Drafted by Nelson in AFN. SUBJECT During my recent talks with Tunisian Foreign Secretary Bourguiba, Jr.,/2/ he raised the question of a cash loan to build up Tunisian resources. I told him that a cash loan would be difficult under present circumstances. However, I assured him that we would view sympathetically Tunisia's short-term economic needs and how we could most effectively assist his country within the limits of our aid procedures and balance of payments problems. In this context I welcomed AID's agreement to assist the next Tunisian Four Year Plan. /2/The memorandum of the Secretary's conversation with Foreign Minister Bourguiba is ibid., POL TUN-US. Tunisian Secretary of State for Plan and National Economy Ahmed Ben Salah will arrive this week to discuss details of Tunisia's economic assistance needs. I am profoundly interested in continuing our support of Tunisia. To this end, I hope you will assure that to the extent possible our responses to Ben Salah's requests are in consonance with our close relations with Tunisia, especially in the light of its recent helpful policies on a number of international issues. Dean Rusk/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
153. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Trimble) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, May 21, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL TUN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Chase. A note on the source text indicates Secretary Rusk saw the memorandum. SUBJECT In a speech on May 21 before the National Council of the Destourian Socialist Party, President Habib Bourguiba expressed defiance of the efforts of Nasser to impose his doctrines on Israel and the Cold War on Tunisia. Bourguiba said that "if the countries of the Arab League wish to join the Soviet camp, that is their business. But we cannot accept their efforts to force us to work against the Americans in the name of solidarity with Nasser." With reference to Israel, Bourguiba said he doubted that, as Nasser has suggested, the Arabs could mobilize two or three million soldiers and push Israel into the sea. He said that campaigns of denigration will never solve the problem and can only strengthen Israel. Comment: President Bourguiba seems now to have made a complete break with his fellow Arab Leaders on two most sensitive issues: Palestine and Arab solidarity, and nonalignment. It is extremely unlikely that even moderate Arab states can follow him on the Palestine issue. There will be few of the moderate Arab or African states which will follow him away from nonalignment.
154. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, June 3, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 091.3 Tunisia. Secret. Dear Bob: On April 28 during his visit to Washington, Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., raised privately with me the possibility of some additional assistance to Tunisia's armed forces. Having informed the Foreign Minister that his request would be given early consideration, I asked members of my staff to explore the possibility of an initial equipment sales program for Tunisia of about $2 million in FY 1966 with repayment in local currency. I understand that our respective staffs have since been in touch on this matter and that it has been brought to your attention. In mid-May, the Foreign Minister again raised the question of U.S. military assistance with Ambassador Russell in Tunis and referred to his discussions in Washington on this subject. On May 18, the Tunisian Minister-Counselor called on the Department to inquire when our decision on this problem might be expected and to express the hope that we would be responsive to the Foreign Minister's request. I am aware of the major current pressures and limitations on our military assistance funds and the need for their careful utilization in terms of our worldwide requirements. I would hope, however, that the Department of Defense, in its approach to this problem, will give full weight to the constructive position that Tunisia has been taking on a significant number of international issues of direct concern to the United States and that we will be able, in the very near future, to give a positive response to Foreign Minister Bourguiba. We have been very strongly impressed by Tunisia's willingness to withstand the heavy criticism and pressures on it to modify the positions it has assumed. We believe that an early and favorable response to its request for military aid will fortify its resolve to maintain those positions./2/ /2/On June 11, Secretary McNamara responded to Rusk's request in a letter stating that he had approved the addition of $2 million in grant aid funds for the FY 1966 Tunisian Military Assistance Program. (Ibid.) Sincerely yours,
155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia/1/ Washington, June 20, 1965, 12:40 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-TUN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Blake and McClanahan on May 27; cleared by Black in AID/PC, Colonel Dregne in DOD/ISA, Trimble, Warren in G/PM, and Rusk; and approved by Carol C. Moor in S/S. 443. From Secretary to Ambassador. Request you convey following to Foreign Minister Bourguiba as my response his approach re security equipment during recent Washington visit: 1. We continue our close interest in independence and territorial integrity of Tunisia. While as you recognize Tunisia must, in time of grave threat, look to United Nations and to friends, we understand desire for adequate defense force. 2. In assessing what we can do in present circumstances, we are mindful of our common desire to avoid increased burden on Tunisian economy and diversion funds from commendable development plans, as well as major current pressures on US military assistance funds. 3. Nevertheless, we are prepared consider limited immediate assistance, preferably in anti-aircraft or anti-tank fields, dependent on consultations our military experts. We are prepared send officer immediately to confer on this basis. 4. As suggested to you when you were in Washington, German equipment compatible with US and we would suggest approach to Germany which we would be prepared endorse if this would be helpful, although appreciate current problems. 5. In meantime in response to your request, we will explore possibility for minimizing the burden of old programs. FYI: Though not stated in Secretary's response, program we envisage would not exceed $2 million actual MAP expenditures, would be funded from FY 1966 MAP and would be on nominal sales basis, with repayment in local currency (in recognition of Tunisian budgetary situation and fact US is large holder of Tunisian dinars). We would seek, during discussions leading to agreement on such program, to secure GOT assurances that GOT will permit adequate US end-use checking and information on past and future equipment deliveries to insure satisfactory maintenance and use of material in which US dollars are invested. End FYI./2/ /2/In telegram 671 from Tunis, June 21, Russell reported that he had conveyed the substance of telegram 443 to Foreign Minister Bourguiba, who expressed appreciation but asked the Ambassador to convey his plea to Washington that U.S. aid not be too little and too late. Mentioning events in Algeria, the Foreign Minister said such assistance should be considered in a political rather than a "limited technical" framework. The United States would suffer the same loss if Tunisia were overrun as it would if Vietnam or the Dominican Republic were lost. (Ibid.) Rusk
156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia/1/ Washington, July 28, 1965, 5:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 TUN. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan and Blake on July 27; cleared by Lang in DOD and by Warren; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Tripoli, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 38. Ref: Your 34./2/ Embassy should convey to President Bourguiba or other high-level Tunisian leaders following points concerning US position on Libyan situation as raised by President Bourguiba in his conversation reported in reftel: /2/In telegram 34 from Tunis, July 16, Russell reported a conversation with President Bourguiba, who declared that he was convinced that Nasser was contemplating moving into Libya on the pretext of assuring stability, most likely after King Idris' death. Noting that Nasser's enmity toward a Tunisian regime friendly toward the West was implacable, Bourguiba said that having Nasser on the Tunisian-Libyan border would be intolerable. Tunisia wanted to be in a position to protect itself by drawing a line somewhere in west Libya if Nasser were to cross its eastern border, and he hoped for U.S. understanding of this position and material support so Tunisia's security could be assured if this occurred. (Ibid.) 1. US welcomes opportunities afforded by excellent US-GOT relations for frank exchanges re political and security situation in area. President's wide experience and forthright appraisal of regional problems, both current and future, are particularly valuable to USG in developing its own policies and programs for areas. 2. As Tunisians no doubt are aware US has expressed interest in Libya's security and territorial integrity, which are matters of importance to USG. This continuing interest stems from our long-standing friendship with Libya and the extensive US relations with Libya which have grown up over past years. We believe Tunisians, with whom US has similar ties based on mutual confidence and interests, will appreciate soundness this US approach to Libya. 3. We believe that assistance to Libya from friendly countries should, of course, be with the consent of GOL in order avoid unfortunate and unintended misunderstanding among friends and to insure maximum effectiveness such assistance as may be requested. 4. US is not in a position to provide such assistance to Tunisia with any understanding or implication that the assistance was to be used in circumstances such as those alluded to by FonMin. FYI--Use of US-supplied equipment in third countries would of course require consultation with USG and latter's prior consent. End FYI. 5. Our own impression of situation in Libya is that political atmosphere is possibly receptive to closer cooperation with Tunisia. Re para 5 above, we would appreciate Embassy assessment as to probable GOT reaction to suggestion that Tunisians consider direct approach to GOL on such contingency subjects as GOT has raised with US. FYI--With respect to current GOT arms request Embtel 39,/3/ at this juncture we believe it preferable as next step that ARMA merely listen to forthcoming Tunisian explanation of plans and requirements. Following this presentation, which was promised for May, we will know better scope of Tunisian needs and areas where we could best assist. End FYI. /3/Dated July 19. (Ibid., DEF 19 US-TUN) Rusk
157. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, September 17, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Tunisia, December 1963-March 1966. Secret. RWK-- Tunisian shopping list is the big document on the bottom (summarized at the clip)./2/ DOD hasn't fully analyzed it yet and won't definitively until they have a team take a look at present forces. (McNamara promised to consider sending the team when he saw Bourguiba, Jr. at 4:00 p.m.) /2/Not attached. Key features are: a new tank squadron, a group of anti-tank guided missile squadrons, amphibious landing capability, 12 jet interceptors and radar, doubled ground transport, doubled ground force strength. Bourguiba saw Rusk this morning for 45 minutes/3/ until interrupted by Nehru; Rusk agreed to continue discussion tomorrow. Most of today's talk ran to Vietnam, Pak-India, etc. Bourguiba only repeated his father's request for a team and said he'd even go as far as an alliance if necessary (Tunis 157 attached)./4/ He did acknowledge importance of economic program and it sounds as if he'll be happy if we send a team. Rusk will reply tomorrow. /3/A memorandum of conversation of Secretary Rusk's discussion of the Tunisian arms request with Foreign Minister Bourguiba on September 17 is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 TUN. /4/Not attached. You've written the general pitch, but here are some specifics to bolster it: 1. $100 million program over 5 years would absorb 80% of Congressional MAP ceiling for all of Africa ($20-25 million a year). So we can't afford anything that big. 2. A $20 million annual MAP would be larger than in any other country away from the Communist perimeter (except Spain where base rights are all-important and anti-Bloc). 3. Such a large MAP would wreck economic program. We couldn't afford it, and Tunisian budget costs (doubled) would wipe out budgetary surpluses which finance local costs of development plan. 4. You may want to say a private general word about our concern for Libyan independence. You remember, he told you Tunisians were even thinking of need for a pre-emptive strike if Libya crumbled after Idris' death. H.
158. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 18, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-TUN. Secret. Drafted by Blake on September 22 and approved in S on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The source text is labeled "Part II of III." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Foreign Minister referred to his meeting the previous day with Secretary of Defense McNamara/2/ and to his conversation earlier that same day with the Secretary. From these talks he had drawn the conclusion that the essential question was whether the US agreed with his analysis of Tunisia's security. /2/The memorandum of conversation is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 331 Tunisia. The Secretary stated that there were some elements in the Foreign Minister's presentation on which he would appreciate clarification. An attack on Tunisia by the UAR or Algeria would clearly require "big battalions" which Tunisia with a population of four million could not meet with "big battalions" of its own. On the other hand, the assumption that such an attack could be made from the UAR side overlooked the existence of Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya. Wheelus would not be overrun or bypassed by the "big battalions". The nature of the threat, how it could materialize, and how it could be met, were not clear. The Secretary further noted the Foreign Minister's reference to Tunisia's interest in establishing a "special relationship" to the US. It was not clear to him what kind of relationship the Foreign Minister had in mind. The US had entered various military alliances but only to prevent Communist aggression. The type of threat described by the Foreign Minister did not appear to be a Communist threat. Parenthetically, he noted that US alliance relationships were now being subjected to substantial criticism because of some of the basic misunderstandings that had arisen among the partners, virtually from the outset, regarding their purposes. For example, the US and Pakistan were partners in SEATO. We regarded SEATO as a bulwark against Communism in Southeast Asia, but Pakistan from the beginning saw it as an instrument of its own policy against India. The Secretary wondered whether some kind of a regional defensive arrangement might not be the answer to Tunisia's problems, but one which would leave the US in the background. The Foreign Minister stated that a regional grouping was not possible because of the political and economic weakness of Morocco and the political and military weakness of Libya. Moreover, the Libyans were so frightened of the Egyptians that they would hesitate to engage in any kind of an arrangement that would become known to Cairo. Besides, he asked, to whom could one speak in Libya with confidence on such a sensitive subject? The Foreign Minister stated that a further complicating problem was posed by France whose ambitions, he believes, extend to Libya as well as to the three Maghreb states. He expressed the opinion that any security arrangement in the region would be weakened by the willingness of France to play up to Nasser for its own purpose in North Africa and elsewhere. The Secretary said that the problem described by the Foreign Minister had to be examined in terms of the risks that must be catered to or put aside. He could not say whether Tunisia's assessment of the threat to its security was accurate but it was clear that the military solution envisaged by the Foreign Minister to contain that threat would create very grave problems for Tunisia by diverting resources which would otherwise go to economic development. In his judgment Tunisia would have to face the fact that Tunisia could not compete militarily either with Algeria or the UAR. Moreover, the threat described by the Foreign Minister was not one that would develop overnight; as change in the political atmosphere would precede it. The Foreign Minister agreed that Tunisia could not afford an expensive military establishment and that it would have to give priority to the allocation of its resources to economic development. This was precisely why Tunisia had included the cost of maintenance in the military assistance request it had submitted to the US. Moreover, all it hoped to do was to establish a force sufficiently strong enough to withstand the first shock of an attack and to hold off the aggressor until Tunisia's friends came to its assistance. In this connection, he discounted any possibility of help from the UN. The Secretary described the mounting criticism the Kashmir problem had provoked of military assistance programs, even among people who had been supporters of those programs. He noted that it would be dangerous for Tunisia to rely exclusively on one country for its military security. The Secretary then referred to the Foreign Minister's indication early in the year that a certain amount of discretion would be desirable in connection with any military assistance by the US. He asked whether this was still the Foreign Minister's view inasmuch as it would be difficult to be discreet about a military assistance program of the size suggested by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister replied that his earlier interest in discreet US military assistance had been overtaken by events; the important thing was that Tunisia needed military assistance because of the threat it faced. He declared it would be a mistake to regard Nasser as less dangerous because of his recent political and military reverses. He remains dangerous in the same way that a wounded boar remains dangerous. The UAR is basically expansionist. Population pressures require it to expand. Nasser himself is a crude, unsophisticated, immature colonel who still does not reflect fully before he acts and does not assess in advance the possible consequences of his actions. The Secretary asked whether the evidences of continued French interest in Algeria might help to stabilize the Algerian situation and make the GOA more responsible and moderate in its external policies. The Foreign Minister replied that it was difficult to make any judgment on these points. The one thing that was clear was that France was pursuing its own nationalist ambitions in Algeria and was concerned primarily with the preservation of its economic interest in that country, and the exploitation of its petroleum resources. Algeria's foreign policy would be no concern of France if it did not place those interests in jeopardy. The Foreign Minister reverted to what he regarded as the central issue: whether the US agreed that the threat to Tunisia was real. He had posed the same question to Secretary McNamara and he would like to have the Secretary's views. The Secretary stated that he recognized that Tunisia's anxieties were proper and understandable. This did not mean that every risk the Foreign Minister envisaged could be catered to; certain risks would have to be put to one side. The problem then became one of the degree of any US assistance. He reminded the Foreign Minister that we had already agreed in principle to be of some assistance, but stated that he would have to review this matter more fully before providing an answer regarding the extent to which we might be of help. He would discuss the problem with Secretary McNamara in terms of priorities as well as requirements and would provide the Foreign Minister with an answer before the latter's return to Tunis. The Secretary expressed the opinion that any such assistance should in some way support the Tunisian economic development effort. Perhaps this could be done by including a civic action component in US military aid. The Foreign Minister noted that Tunisia was already using its armed forces for economic purposes, such as road construction and in the technical training of youth; Tunisia would welcome military assistance that included civic action elements. The Secretary asked whether some of Tunisia's anxieties would be eased by other things we might do, for example, by scheduling regular visits by the Sixth Fleet. The Foreign Minister replied that such visits would be very helpful. The Foreign Minister concluded by telling the Secretary that Tunisia felt that it could trust the US. It has no fears of an American presence in Tunisia, and it would welcome a closer association with this country. The Secretary assured the Foreign Minister of the substantial US interest in Tunisia and of US good will toward Tunisia. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
