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130. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 7, 1967, 10:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 20. Secret. SUBJECT Secretary Rusk wants to discuss with you at lunch the three attached North African decisions./2/ The two Moroccan decisions--one food and a $14 million military credit sale--are relatively easy and should be made before King Hassan arrives Thursday. The third is an Algerian PL 480 deal which the Secretary has added to the package because he would like to see us keep a foot in all North African doors. /2/None of the tabs was attached. We have also scheduled an NSC discussion on North Africa tomorrow to give you a picture of all our interests there and the whole complex of problems we face. You may want to give us a preliminary OK on the Moroccan programs and then hold the Algerian decision until after the NSC meeting if you still have reservations after the lunch today. The attached bulky package boils down to this: Tab A: The Secretary recommends you approve the $14 million credit sale of arms King Hassan has asked for. Bill Gaud would prefer no sale on the grounds that these countries can't afford drain from economic development and that we should be trying to build regional cooperation in North Africa--not get into an arms race. We all sympathize with his view but, with $180 million in Soviet arms next door in Algeria, it's hard to refuse Hassan permission to buy this small amount over 2-3 years. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, in endorsing this recommendation, recommended that we attach appropriate conditions to avoid disruption to economic development and to make sure the arms are primarily defensive. Go ahead /3/Neither of the options is checked, but a handwritten note in the margin next to the paragraph reads: "President OK'd." Tab B: The Secretary recommends that you make a finding that it is in the national interest to make grain sales to Morocco under PL 480. If you approve, he would go ahead with negotiation of 167,000 tons of wheat ($11.3 million, 50-50 between local currency and dollar credit financing). The determination is necessary because Morocco still trades its phosphates for Cuban sugar. King Hassan will give you his personal assurance that Morocco will continue to phase down its Cuba trade to meet the requirements of the Findley amendment./4/ /4/A handwritten note in the margin next to this paragraph reads: "President OK'd." Morocco has suffered from drought this year, and you approved sale last fall of a similar amount for the first half of the year. Morocco is overhauling its agriculture, and the King is behind a pretty decent program to increase cereal yields. Besides, Morocco is a good friend. If you approve, we ask you to sign the determination at the signature tab. [Here follows discussion of a dollar credit sale of wheat to Algeria; for text, see Document 33.] W.W. Rostow/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
131. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 8, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Visit of King Hassan, 2/9-10/67. Secret. SUBJECT King Hassan sets especially great store by his meeting with you. When he saw President Kennedy in 1963, they negotiated the terms under which we stayed on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at our naval [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] commo base at Kenitra after closing down our big SAC bases. He has more reason than many of our smaller-country visitors for figuring that the way to do business with the U.S. is to sit down with the President. From our point of view, there is no such burning issue as the base question this time. The visit is mostly his initiative. From his point of view, however, the visit will be crucial in determining where his big-power support will come from. He is at odds with De Gaulle, his former mentor. German economic and military help has been disappointing. He disputes Spain's claim to the phosphate-rich Spanish Sahara. He doesn't trust the USSR, which has sent $180 million in military equipment to Algeria. A closer relationship with the U.S. seems his best remaining bet. [1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified] He probably won't expect you to take him up on this, but the offer is a measure of his worry. His main interest in talking with you is to discuss the Algerian threat. He'll probably settle for an OK on his request for $14 million in military sales, but he may probe pretty hard to see how far we'd go in coming to his aid. In answering this pitch, you can explain your political problems with such commitments. You can tell him of our willingness to sell military equipment to the amount of $14 million, which he requested. You can say we'd be deeply concerned by any attack on him. However, it would also help if you could outline our hope for North African regional cooperation. You might describe the spirit of regionalism you found in Manila and elsewhere on your Asian trip. With all of their resources and advanced economic base, it would be tragic if the North African nations let suspicion undercut what they could accomplish together. This is why we are reluctant to see Morocco spend too much on arms. You'll have to concede that Algeria is a problem, but you may find a way to point out gently that both Algeria and Spain are seriously worried about Morocco's own territorial claims against them. Hassan will also want to discuss food, and you can tell him you've approved his wheat sale for the second half of the year (167,000 tons). In doing so, you might want to give him your picture of the world food problem and your own political difficulties in continuing food aid. Morocco suffered drought last summer and has launched a crash fertilizer project (which we're helping with). But population growth is still ahead of food production, and encouragement from you would help. The King wrote you a good letter last fall on what Morocco is doing in agriculture, but he's still in the stage of talking a better game than he plays. The same is generally true of his whole developmental effort. He's done a lot of basic work in the foothills but hasn't begun to climb yet (see attached charts)./2/ However, AID has picked Morocco as one of its concentration countries. That doesn't mean we'll be spending a lot of money there. It does mean that our aid has dropped sharply from the artificially high level (over $70 million at the peak) [1 line of source text not declassified] and is now seeking a more appropriate level (around $10 million). /2/Not printed. In connection with our food aid, you'll want to note the restrictions Congress has put on the program. The Findley amendment causes us special trouble with Morocco, which barters phosphates for badly needed Cuban sugar. We've tried--so far without success--to help the Moroccans find a better deal elsewhere. Nevertheless, Hassan is ready to give you his personal assurance that he will phase this trade down. It's on the basis of his assurance that you will be signing the Findley waiver. Leonard Marks would like you to ask for a firmer tenure (now year-to-year) for his Voice of America relay transmitter. If he could nail that down, he might delay building a new $25 million facility in Spain. However, State feels we ought to let sleeping dogs lie. In negotiating our stay at the naval commo station, President Kennedy mentioned five years, which would expire in 1968. Nevertheless, we're in a better position not raising the subject and making the Moroccans ask us to leave. If the King raises the subject, you could express our appreciation and confirm our desire to stay. I ought to warn you that these talks are more likely than most to take an unexpected turn. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] He may, for instance, press hard for an answer on the security guarantee and, when you don't give him one, ask to come back and see you again Friday. (He got an extra meeting with President Kennedy.) You will sense how to handle him, but forewarned is forearmed. The King may also press for a communique, which we don't normally include in this simpler visit format. My solution to this would be to ask George Christian at his Thursday afternoon briefing to make a fairly formal statement of subjects discussed which we might check with the King's party. He could announce the PL 480 deal then and perhaps a couple of smaller loans that are ready to go. He could even invite one of the King's party to be present. State's briefing memo is attached./3/ Secretary Rusk's involvement with Brandt has so far kept him from signing the original. However, this does represent the Department's recommendation. I believe our discussion at lunch Tuesday gives you most of the background you need so doubt you will need to look at background papers. I'll have a last-minute talking paper for you in the morning. /3/Attached but not printed. Walt
132. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 9, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-7/67. Secret. The source text is labeled "Part II of V." The conversation was held at the White House. Memoranda of conversation of President Johnson's discussion of other topics with King Hassan on February 9 are ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States: The King stressed that while he would prefer to be concerned only with problems of economic development, he must worry about the security of his nation. One reason for concern, for example, is the effect which will be produced by the return to Algeria of 2,000 young officers who are being trained in the Soviet Union. It has been shown that sometimes two hundred well organized officers can carry out a political takeover. This is a disquieting factor, whatever may be the relative moderation of the Algerian leaders. Another point of concern is the progressive erosion of Algerian independence. The enormous armaments which Algeria has received have decreased Algerian freedom of action in the diplomatic field. They have tied the Algerian economy to Soviet production plans. The King said that he had to worry about the security of his nation. In addition to a military danger, Algeria is a source of subversion. If the armaments being brought into Algeria were of a type which would be used purely for internal purposes he would not worry, but Algeria's tanks and missiles are not appropriate for a mountainous country and can be used only for aggression. Algeria has assembled armaments beyond the Moroccan border which include a number of supersonic jet bombers, 40 MIG 21s, 800 artillery pieces (against the 80 in the hands of Moroccans), 450 tanks (against the less than 120 in Morocco) and an army of 60,000 men (against 35,000 in Morocco). Algeria can be encouraged to use its armaments for aggressive purposes if it knows there is no counterforce capable of opposing it beyond the Tunisian and Moroccan borders. Morocco does not wish to enter into an arms race with Algeria; all it needs is enough weapons to hold for three days, enough time for the Security Council to gather and demand cessation of military action. During its long history Morocco has always been able to defend its borders and its honor. It has never sought to conquer alien territory. Morocco would fight with empty bottles if necessary but empty bottles would be useless against the Algerian arsenal. The King said he was told by Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow that the latter would not like Morocco to become entangled with such friends of the USSR as the UAR, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, Somalia, Tanzania, Syria and Yemen. Under the circumstances, Morocco must turn towards friendly, like-minded, richer countries to ask for help. The President said that the United States recognizes Morocco's concern for its security, and for this reason the President has approved the sale of $14 million of military equipment, subject to the usual proviso in American policy that the materiel in question be used exclusively for defensive purposes. A further proviso is that the purchase of this equipment would not hurt the Moroccan economy. It would also be wise to play down the already over-publicized question of military aid.
133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, February 13, 1967, 5:23 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Root on February 11, cleared by Landau in EUR/SPP and Saunders, and approved by Palmer. Also sent to Algiers, Madrid, Paris, and Tunis and repeated by pouch to Cairo, London, and Tripoli. 136042. 1. King Hassan of Morocco departed for New York this morning after two-day informal visit Washington Feb 9-10 as guest President Johnson. King and party will be private visitors New York until departure for Morocco by plane late evening Feb 17. 2. King Hassan had about hour's conversation with President on Feb 9 and made brief farewell call on President Feb 10./2/ King continued substantive discussions with Secretary morning Feb 10. Fuller details of discussions will be provided you in due course, but following are highlights (based uncleared memcon and for your background only) of meeting Feb 9 with President: /2/President Johnson's conversation with King Hassan on February 10 was recorded in three memoranda of conversation; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-7/67. a) President told King US attached great importance Moroccan self-help efforts in field of agriculture (King affirmed economic development, particularly in agriculture, his most important concern). Meanwhile, to help Morocco over effects serious drought US prepared to provide Morocco further PL-480 sales of 167,000 tons wheat./3/ /3/A memorandum of conversation of President Johnson's discussion of P.L. 480 wheat sales to Morocco with King Hassan on February 9 is ibid. b) President informed King that in view Morocco's concern for its security US prepared make $14 million credit sales military equipment for defensive purposes, details to be worked out subsequently. (Deliveries will be spread out over several years.) President said this assistance predicated on use for defense only and on Moroccan dedication to peaceful policies. c) King emphasized what Morocco hoped to achieve next four years in agricultural development, through extensive irrigation and other improvements. He said he could nevertheless not neglect Morocco's security and had responsibility as Moroccan monarch take into account disturbing developments in Algeria next door. He dwelt at considerable length on future dangers implicit in Algerian arms buildup and return 2,000 Soviet-trained Algerian military personnel. Morocco had to be able defend itself against attack for at least few days (until Security Council could act). d) King said of course he had no choice but to turn to friends who thought as Morocco, had necessary resources and could help. (He obviously appreciative offers arms sales and wheat and did not seek further specific commitments.) e) On Kenitra naval communications center and VOA Tangier, he assured President our use these facilities could continue./4/ /4/A memorandum of conversation of President Johnson's discussion of the U.S. facilities at Tangier and Kenitra with King Hassan on February 9 is ibid. f) President and King of course referred to problems of peace in world generally, with President stressing particularly our efforts achieve peace Vietnam but finding so far no serious response from other side. President expressed appreciation Morocco's understanding and support this matter. 3. In addition foregoing, U.S.-Moroccan cultural agreement was signed Feb 10 at Moroccan Embassy by Secretary and Moroccan Foreign Minister in King's presence. (Agreement is standard form for its kind and carries no immediate or explicit obligations.) 4. Comment: Moroccans seemed highly pleased with visit and it went off well from US viewpoint. We are anxious of course to downplay arms question and in answer to press inquiries are giving following background guidance: "There will be limited expansion of our present program of modest arms sales to Morocco for purely defensive purposes. Categories of defensive armaments remain to be worked out. None of this should be construed as sudden infusion of military support for Morocco, but is merely part of our ongoing program". 5. If you are questioned by officials your capital, you should stick to this formulation regarding arms sales (but mention no figures) and emphasize that President and King talked about security in area solely in terms of Moroccan defense. Any assistance we furnish will be solely for defense, condition which King accepted without question. 6. Two leaders agreed moreover on overriding importance devoting resources in North African area to peaceful pursuits. King said his main interest was in economic development his country and in this connection two leaders agreed on importance regional cooperation. 7. For Embassy Algiers: We appreciate difficulties which newspaper focus on question military assistance may cause you, but trust you will exert best efforts with GOA place matters in true perspective. Any additional military sales to Morocco will be within very low figure (negligible fraction of what Algeria has already received from USSR), remain to be negotiated, will be related strictly to Morocco's minimum defensive needs and will take several years to deliver. There can thus be no question of contributing to "arms race". We strongly hope therefore that GOA can be convinced that such a marginal contribution to Morocco's defensive capabilities would in no way require or justify further Algerian acquisitions. King did not raise border problems with President (El Fassi and Minister Saharan Affairs never appeared in conversations) and there was no sign of bellicose, irredentist attitude. On contrary, Hassan seemed genuinely anxious live on good terms with his North African neighbors. In fact, discussions dealt largely with problems of food, agricultural development and regional economic cooperation. 8. FYI: Prospects for early decision on Title IV sale of 200,000 tons wheat to Algeria seem very good and it would be unfortunate if Algerian press complicates matters in any way at this point. End FYI. 9. For Madrid: Much foregoing guidance applies to your concerns. While King never raised Morocco's territorial claims with President, he subsequently referred to Spanish Sahara problem with Secretary. His comments were, however, within context peaceful resolution of problem in accordance principle self-determination. Further details on this discussion will follow. 10. For Paris: In addition to foregoing, you may find it useful reassure French officials that, whatever may be exaggerations of press, there was in fact nothing in visit that changed in any way past US policies limited assistance to Morocco and that King has been given no reason to think we have any desire, capability or intent of trying "replace French." On contrary, Moroccans have every reason to appreciate importance we continue to attach to Franco-Moroccan cooperation, and therefore to avoidance further difficulties in this relationship. Cultural agreement was added fillip during visit but in fact is standard text of its kind and signifies no more than expression of principle which appears on its face. Katzenbach
134. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 27, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21. Confidential. SUBJECT When King Hassan was here, you agreed to a PL 480 credit sale of 167,000 tons of wheat worth $11.3 million, repayment to be half in dollars and half in local currency. Before negotiation can start, we need your signature on the attached waiver to the Findley Amendment. The main reason for a waiver in Morocco's case is its barter of phosphates for Cuban sugar. The King has agreed to end trade in all items that PL 480 prohibits waiving. When he was here, he also assured Secretary Rusk that he would phase down his phosphate exports but he asked help in finding new markets. We believe his assurance is a fair basis for your waiver. Morocco's barter with Cuba has been a persistent problem--largely because it's clearly the best deal Morocco can make to buy badly needed sugar. We've tried for a couple of years to help them work out a good arrangement elsewhere. We've even tried three-way barters involving our own commodities. But so far we haven't hit on a good solution. Hassan understands the politics of our problem and obviously has no heart in helping Cuba. It's been pure economics, but even at that he's trying to work with us. Attached is a report from State indicating they have consulted with the Leadership of both Houses and of the appropriate committees on the above deal, and there are no objections./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. If you want to go ahead on this for Morocco as agreed with Hassan, the next step is to sign the attached so negotiations can legally begin./3/ /3/President Johnson signed the waiver on February 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21) Walt
135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, May 30, 1967, 12:32 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Bader in DOD/ISA and Spicer; cleared by Commander Peters in JS/SAMAA, Legner in DA/DCSLOG, McCall in AFR/NA, Shaw in PC/MAD, Colonel Hazam in OSD/I and L, Gardner of Treasury, Forman in OSD/GC, Rabida in G/PM, Allen in INR/RAF, Feigl in ISA/ILN, Goldstein in ODMA, Malmborg in L/E, Runyon in L/AF, and Nilsen in L/T; and approved by Root. Also sent to CHMUSLO Rabat and repeated to USCINCEUR. 204894. Joint State/Defense message. Subject: $14 million credit sales package. Ref (A) Rabat's 5204, (B) State 150173./2/ /2/Telegram 5204 from Rabat, May 23, reported that the King wished to present a revised list of military material that the Moroccan Government wished to purchase under the $14 million credit sale. (Ibid.) Telegram 150173 to Rabat, March 7, which provided guidance for discussions with the Moroccan military in developing a mutually acceptable credit sale, emphasized that the objective of the sale should be to provide the greatest relative defensive capability compatible with existing Moroccan logistical/maintenance systems. (Ibid.) 1. As Embassy aware decision approve $14 million credit sale was based on (a) King's specific request for "tank and anti-tank equipment," and (b) JCS concept of balanced improvement of GOM defensive forces. Point is that an increment of tanks was requested and was a basis for approving the $14 million level. We could not now agree to GOM proposal use all of the available $14 million for other items without having provided for its tank requirement. This would either leave the requirement neglected or lead to a request for a second sales package which we are not prepared to consider. 2. Guidance for conducting discussions with GOM provided in reference B still valid: (a) that the objective of the sales discussion is to provide, within $14 million available, greatest relative defensive capability compatible with existing Moroccan logistical/maintenance systems, (b) that we are not prepared provide equipment beyond Moroccan capacity to use and maintain for defense purposes, (c) that we are not prepared to approve Moroccan requests for equipment items and quantities substantially different or larger than JCS package, and (d) that follow-on support requirements for items in the credit package (as well as current inventory) should not be included in $14 million package. 3. The quantities of items proposed reference A are in excess GOM needs (particularly number C-119G aircraft) and would not provide greatest relative defensive capability. 4. At your discretion you may wish call upon above in explaining to GOM we cannot agree its proposal per reference A. While we believe M-48A1 tank would meet GOM requirement, we do not wish force it upon them and would, therefore, be willing set aside $5 million of $14 million total to accommodate tank and logistical support requirement at later time. Only feasible alternative we see on horizon is M-48A3 (diesel version M-48A1) which, depending SEA developments, could possibly be made available in 25 months (without radios and ancillary armament) at about $150,000 each basic cost vs $43,742 for M-48A1 (as indicated letter offer). None could be made available in less time. (We intend convey same General Driss during visit.) 5. In view of the difficulties experienced thus far in obtaining agreement on itemization and in view of fast approaching end fiscal year, every effort should be exerted obtain GOM agreement on basic memorandum of understanding regarding credit. Following (para 6) is text unclassified Memorandum of Understanding that should be signed by appropriate representatives Ministry of Defense and MUSLO. Terms offered are same as 1965 F-5 sale. Detailed credit arrangements and implementing sales orders will be entered into later pursuant to the classified military assistance agreement of June 29, 1960, which includes certain necessary undertakings and carries Circular 175 authority. End Secret Begin Unclassified. 6. "Memorandum of Understanding--In order to assist the Government of Morocco in financing the purchase from the Government of the United States during the United States fiscal years 1967 and 1968 of such defense articles and defense services as may during that period be mutually agreed, the total estimated cost of which will not exceed $14,000,000, the Government of the United States agrees, subject to the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and acts amendatory or supplementary thereto, to extend credit to the Government of Morocco of not to exceed $14,000,000 on terms of repayment over 10 years and interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum on the unpaid principal balance of each order. Detailed credit arrangements and implementing sales orders will be entered into from time to time during the aforesaid period by duly authorized representatives of the two Governments. (signed) Rusk
136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, June 17, 1967, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-MOR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Root and Palmer on June 16; cleared by Kitchen, Hoopes, Saunders, and Bundy; and approved by Eugene V. Rostow. 212261. Ref Rabat's 5531 and 5532./2/ /2/Telegrams 5531 and 5532 from Rabat, June 15, reported that Foreign Minister Laraki and General Oufkir informed the Embassy that recent intelligence reports indicated that Algeria planned to attack Morocco July 8. Laraki said that Morocco would have to obtain more arms very quickly, since its 3-4-day holding strategy was invalid after the Arab-Israeli war when Israel won in 3 hours. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ALG-MOR) 1. You should assure Laraki and Oufkir of our continuing deep concern for Moroccan security. We are giving urgent attention to specific problem raised reftel and, while you are not in position give specific response at this time, GOM can be sure that we are carefully examining situation in light of all prevailing circumstances in Maghreb and Near East. We will remain in closest contact at both military and governmental levels on this matter. 2. You should add that while we do not have any independent evidence suggesting that Algerians readying attack against Morocco, we are taking all steps available to us ascertain further information about Algerian intentions. We obviously do not know Boumediene's thoughts at this time, but seems most illogical to us that he would contemplate attack against Arab country at same moment he is trying to exert some leadership in reuniting Arabs against Israel. 3. We naturally hope to avoid new arms race throughout North Africa and Middle East. We are closely following Soviet actions and intend to probe their intentions in this respect. We consider it highly important in interest of countries of the area and of the world to bring arms deliveries to area under some kind of control. 4. However, we certainly recognize Morocco's right and desire to be in position to defend itself. This is why, in light this latest request, we are now urgently reexamining availability of resources, as well as how our resources and influence can be brought to bear to insure that eventuality GOM fears does not materialize. Timing of our response will have to take into consideration general situation in Middle East as well as Maghreb. 5. FYI. Apart from probable practical impossibility of providing any substantial amount of equipment that Moroccans could use effectively within time indicated, we are reluctant take risk of action which might excuse Soviet increases arms supply at this delicate juncture of Near East crisis. Moreover, we do not exclude possibility that Moroccan request is essentially ploy by Oufkir to get US to react in a hurry. In this connection we would be disturbed by possibility suggested in some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports that Oufkir might even be considering preemptive strike against Algeria. We would hope of course you could find means discourage any such possibility. 6. While unable for present to give Moroccan request clear answer in affirmative, we are also anxious that King does not take our reply as flat turndown. We want to retain GOM's confidence, especially in view of its potentially constructive role in Arab-Israeli settlement, and to reassure King that we continue to follow with close interest Morocco's relations with its Algerian neighbor and would be far from indifferent if there were serious danger of Algerian attack. Your response to Laraki and Oufkir should therefore be governed by various and to some degree conflicting considerations set out above./3/ /3/In telegram 5605 from Rabat, June 20, the Embassy responded that the Department's telegram did not answer the question posed by the Moroccan Government, which was primarily interested in how it could meet the serious security problem it faced on its eastern border. Morocco wanted to know if the United States was prepared to supply the arms it needed, so that, if necessary, it could make other provisions over the next few months. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-MOR) Rusk
137. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ /1/Source: Department of Defense, JCS Files, 9118.3 (17 Nov. 1966). Secret. The source text is attached as an Appendix to a "Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Arms Policy for Morocco" (JCS 2409/6). JCSM-361-67 Washington, June 21, 1967. SUBJECT 1. (S) The Government of Morocco has requested that the US Government affirm that it is prepared to supply arms which Morocco wants to purchase. In answer to this request, Morocco was informed that the US Government could not give a specific response but that the situation was being examined in light of all prevailing circumstances in North Africa and the Middle East. 2. (S) In view of the importance of maintaining US influence in the moderate Arab nation of Morocco and in the interests of avoiding a polarization which would align all Arab States with the USSR, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the US Government should be responsive to Morocco's request. Failure to be responsive at this time may reinforce the deep Arab suspicion about US exclusive support for Israel. Refusal of the Moroccan request may seriously jeopardize the continued use of the US Naval Communications Station and Voice of America facilities in Morocco. Loss of the cooperation of Morocco will have an adverse effect on the US strategic position on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean. 3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their recommendation in JCSM-780-66, dated 19 December 1966, subject: "Sales Package for Morocco (U),"/2/ that a sales package to the Government of Morocco be approved and recommend that an early decision be made to inform the Government of Morocco that: /2/Not printed. a. The outstanding grant Military Assistance Program and foreign military sales items will be delivered expeditiously. b. The US Government is prepared to deliver specific items as soon as possible and to discuss the specific composition of the remainder of the arms sale package with Morocco./3/ /3/On July 20, 1967, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William E. Lang sent a memorandum to the Director of the Joint Staff that reads: "The President has approved proceeding with the negotiation and programming of the $14 million credit agreement for Morocco. Delivery of items in the grant and sales program remains suspended." (Ibid.) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
138. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 29, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan and Spicer on July 10. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States: Alec Toumayan, Language Services After exchanging greetings with Mr. Palmer, Foreign Minister Laraki remarked that he had been distressed at the divergence between our appraisal of the ME situation and his own. He repeated that, as he had told the President yesterday,/2/ Morocco feels that an unconditional withdrawal is the indispensable preliminary step that can then be followed by other steps. He saw a dangerous parallel between the recent Israeli-Arab conflict whereby Israeli attitudes seem to imply that Israel can hold on to its conquests, that "might makes right", and the situation between Morocco and Algeria. Algeria would need only to attack Morocco, occupy one-third of Morocco's national territory, as far as the natural obstacles, and then negotiate from a position of strength. Morocco found itself therefore forced to revise its policies and to formulate a new appraisal regarding its security. Morocco was aware that the struggle was on two levels, the struggle between the Arabs and Israel which had been lost and the internal struggle between the so-called "progressive states" and the so-called "reactionaries". One already hears that the Arab lack of victory is due to the fact that the moderates failed the cause. This new appeal for what Morocco needs for its security leads to an appeal for U.S. aid, which the Minister called "completely inadequate". If Morocco translates $14 million into F-5 aircraft for example, Morocco has one squadron. In a time of lightning air strikes and essential air cover this is totally inadequate. The Minister stated that Morocco had applied to the Czechs for T-54 tanks and the Italians for G-91 jet aircraft for which NATO concurrence is required. Laraki had asked Ambassador Tasca to act on their behalf to obtain that concurrence. /2/No memorandum of conversation recording the President's meeting with Foreign Minister Laraki on June 28 has been found. In short, and speaking with great frankness as he had done in the past, the Minister said, everything centered on whether or not Morocco could count on our aid. Mr. Palmer remarked that perhaps it would not serve any useful purpose to go over the points which had been discussed yesterday; in particular our divergence on the prior and unconditional withdrawal. The President and Mr. Rostow both had stressed that, whatever our wishes are, in effect we have very little influence to exert on Israel. The problem is that Israel has been living for 20 years with a situation in which belligerence is exerted against it, its security is comprised and its existence is not recognized. Mr. Rostow said yesterday that the Israelis would insist on having prior assurances and prior arrangements regarding security and the exercise of the right of free international navigation before they would agree to any withdrawal. Mr. Palmer stated that he did not agree with the parallel the Minister had drawn between the present Middle East situation and the situation existing between Morocco and Algeria. Mr. Palmer said he did not deny the dangers of the situation confronting Morocco, for he was fully aware of the situation. There were differences in the two situations, however, in that Algeria recognized Morocco and Algeria had no territorial claims against Morocco, at least not officially. Mr. Palmer said that there was a split within the Arab world which was providing a false issue to the so-called "progressive" states in their efforts to undermine the activity of the moderate states; which he liked to call the "constructive" states. He was not, therefore, minimizing the problem. We have great concern for the security and independence of Morocco. The USG wanted Morocco, Tunisia, Libya to be able to maintain their political independence and their security. It was in this framework that we had agreed to the Moroccan request for $14 million worth of arms. As the President had said yesterday, we are going ahead with this and we are ready to implement this agreement. We had, however, not heard finally from Morocco about the types of equipment Morocco wished to procure. As to any additional procurement arrangements they wished to enter into, the GOM could be assured that we would give them our most earnest consideration, but Mr. Palmer said he, of course, could not prejudge the decision. Mr. Palmer reiterated, citing the President's statement of the day before, the sincerity of our commitment to the political independence of Morocco and our continuing concern for it. Mr. Palmer then said that it would be helpful for us to have some clarification as to the exact nature of the threat that Morocco feels to be directed against it by Algeria. Yesterday, he said, the Minister had outlined the "three-point strategy" of Nasser. Did the Minister still feel that an immediate threat exists, with a planned attack by Algeria in July, or has that been amended? In replying to Mr. Palmer's statement that Algeria has no claims against Morocco, Laraki pointed out that Algeria has no border with Israel. Algeria has absolutely no need for the intensive program of armament now being conducted there. This can be directed against no one but Morocco. Before the crisis the ratio of forces was 10-1 in favor of Algeria. Algeria has continued to import military equipment. True, although part of it goes to the UAR, this equipment is not intended for use against Israel, but for use against Morocco. Another sign is that 14 airports have been built in Algeria along the Moroccan border. The Minister said that long "lead-times" cause great problems for Morocco. He cited a delay of two years for communications equipment. Morocco is concerned about what could happen in those years. The F-5 program has also been going ahead so slowly. It was started under Ambassador Benjelloun and should have been completed by the end of 1966. In mid-1967 only four had been delivered and without ordnance. Morocco could not defend itself with that, and Morocco knew that the U.S. would not act directly in Morocco's behalf because that act might bring in the Soviet Union on the other side. It was not a question of Morocco exerting pressure on us or trying to blackmail us. Morocco's choice and attitude were well known. Mr. Palmer said that we had absolutely no doubt as to Morocco's stand. We wanted to assure the Minister in the strongest terms possible of the importance we attach to the independence and security of Morocco. The Minister was aware of our difficulties. We are faced with demands on our resources which cause us many problems. We will have further talks with DOD in order to determine what needs to be done to speed up deliveries, and we shall also review the availabilities of equipment. We will give this matter the highest priority and we will report to the Minister as soon as possible. Within the framework of our general cooperation, Mr. Palmer said, a review was in order to determine what could be done to restore peace and stability to that region. We appreciated the efforts made by His Majesty to secure an agreement on the reduction of armaments in the Maghreb. Nothing had come of it, for reasons which were well known. We hoped that it would be possible, within the framework of the Middle East situation, to exert influence to stop the escalation. Mr. Palmer cautioned the Minister not to believe that the USG lacked realism or that we advised disarmament in circumstances of remote possibilities. However, one should not lose sight of the opportunities that are available in the world in which we live. The Minister replied that His Majesty intended to make a new approach to U Thant on disarmament. Once again, it was not expected that Algeria would even acknowledge the proposal. Morocco deplored the fact that it had to arm itself at the expense of economic development. What good was it to expend $60 million for the Lower Moulouya Dam and to develop 100 million hectares at a cost of $10-15 million if these works are on the border of Algeria? Mr. Palmer asked the Minister if the recent events in the Middle East had caused France to review some of its attitudes toward the Maghreb. It should be a cause for concern for France to see Soviet penetration into Algeria. The Minister said that he wished this were true. France's attention has been drawn to that situation. Unfortunately, De Gaulle's attitude was very clearly to oppose anything that Washington did. De Gaulle's attitude here is to attempt to "pull chestnuts out of the fire". De Gaulle had gone even beyond his Foreign Minister's speech at the UN. Mr. Palmer said that, in view of France's interest and concern in the Maghreb, and even more in view of the historic relations that France has had with the Maghreb, Soviet influence must be an object of French preoccupation. Should Algeria attack Morocco, this would surely place France in an impossible situation. The Minister said that, in his view, France would sacrifice its interests in Morocco. Morocco, on its side, had done everything to forestall a deterioration of relations. Witness, he said, Morocco's satisfaction at the outcome of the Ben Barka trial. Mr. Palmer said that if Algeria attacked Morocco, and occupied one-third of its territory, it would be very difficult for the French. World opinion would be against Algeria, and French support of Algeria would place France in an untenable position. The Minister replied that recent events had shown the ineffectiveness of world public opinion and its lack of importance. Mr. Palmer then asked the Minister if the information Morocco had on Algerian intentions was of a nature to be made public. The Minister replied publicity was unnecessary since every intelligence service in the world knew that an attack was planned. Mr. Palmer concluded by reiterating that we would give high priority to consideration of the Moroccan arms request. We would immediately look into what needed to be done to speed up deliveries and look into the availabilities. On future requests he could not now be more specific than he had been. He hoped the Minister would reassure His Majesty of our continued concern for the independence and political security of his country, as the President had stated the day before. Mr. Palmer informed the Minister of the resumption of economic aid programs to Morocco, saying that these programs had been affected by the general suspension at the outbreak of the crisis. He cited the recent signing of a loan agreement on Nouasseur. These acts, he said, were evidence of our continued desire to help. The Minister, referring to economic assistance, indicated that Morocco would suffer a shortfall of 800,000 tons of wheat. He hoped that our contribution would be at least equal to what it had been the year before. Mr. Palmer stated that we would do our best. He mentioned, in this connection, the continued difficulties, that Morocco's trade with Cuba would pose for us. The Minister stated that Morocco had already curtailed its sugar purchases at some cost. Morocco had purchased 160,000 tons of sugar from an American supplier at a higher price. His Majesty had pointed out that such a curtailment of activities could only be done in stages. It was in this constructive spirit that Morocco was acting.
139. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State/1/ Rabat, August 5, 1967, 0859Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 MOR-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR. /2/Beginning in Spring 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 453. Ref. Rabat 435./3/ /3/Telegram 435 from Rabat, August 4, reported Tasca's breakfast conversation with the King on August 3. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-MOR) 1. Further pursuant to my tel 435, during my breakfast with King he also mentioned in passing the fact that he had offered Asst Secy Palmer to enter into an alliance with the US in order to provide for reciprocity of interest between the two countries. As Dept will recall, Asst Secy Palmer pointed out difficulties involved with such a proposal. King mentioned this within the framework of endeavoring to demonstrate his continuing sincere interest in closer relations with the US in spite of his recent recourse to acquisition of limited quantities of Czech and Soviet arms and transport planes. PriMin Benhima during my conversation with him two days earlier also noted in reply to the various points I made regarding the danger of Soviet arms supply that Morocco had offered us an alliance which we had not seen fit to accept. I explained to him at the time the problems this kind of an approach to closer relations raised and the greater desirability of achieving his objective by building up our relations brick by brick based on concrete facts and achievements. 2. As indicated in Rabat 435, King's thinking is now apparently turned in direction of some security understanding, on a regional basis, among moderates in Mediterranean. 3. I hope the Dept will examine suggestions made in my comments reftel in the foregoing context. As I indicated, it is clear the King does wish closer relations with US and it would be a pity if we were not to make every effort possible within the framework of our world-wide responsibilities to strengthen our relations further along the lines indicated. Tasca
140. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 26, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Lloyd in AF/AFN on October 31. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Osman stated he had been instructed by his Government to ask for clarification of the October 24 announcement of the resumption of arms shipments to Israel and certain other Arab countries./2/ The Ambassador said the announcement covering deliveries of 6 F-5 aircraft on which agreement had been reached three (sic) years ago had caused some surprise in Rabat. /2/Telegram 58945 to Rabat, Tunis, and Tripoli, October 24, announced the U.S. decision to resume limited and selective arms shipments to Israel and moderate Arab states. The Embassy in Rabat was informed that the United States would move forward with delivery of six F-5 aircraft with ammunition in completion of the May 1965 grant/credit sales agreement and the resumption of existing military assistance and grant and sales programs. The telegram noted that implementation of the $14 million credit sales program agreed to with King Hassan awaited Congressional action on the Foreign Assistance legislation. (Ibid.) Mr. Palmer reviewed the imposition of the arms embargo in June, and explained that after considerable review the decision had been made to resume deliveries of previously planned items to certain countries. Mr. Palmer noted that in addition to the F-5s Morocco would be authorized to purchase $1.3 million worth of F-5 ammunition, and MAP shipments including spare parts and other items valued at $3 million would be resumed. Ambassador Osman said Morocco understands the necessity of maintaining balanced treatment for Israel and the Arab countries. Morocco was concerned, however, by the unexpected manner in which the announcement was made, linking the resumption of arms deliveries to Morocco to the Arab-Israel hostilities. Mr. Palmer expressed regret that time had not permitted prior consultation with Morocco. He added that the decision to resume shipments to both Israel and the Arab states was taken in the same context as the original imposition of the arms embargo. Mr. Root observed in this connection that Morocco clearly sought in June to associate itself with the Arab cause in the Middle East hostilities. Referring to King Hassan's October 25 conversation with Ambassador Tasca on the Middle East situation, Mr. Palmer expressed appreciation for the insights which the King's presentation provided, and reiterated our desire to discuss the subject with Morocco and other countries which approach the question from the same constructive standpoint. Referring to the Ambassador's conversation with the King, Mr. Palmer emphasized that the U.S. has in no way delayed or hesitated in the expectation of a change of leadership in Cairo. He made it clear that Nasser's departure was in no way a precondition to any U.S. action. Mr. Palmer noted welcome signs of re-thinking in Cairo, thanks in large measure to the efforts of Morocco and like-minded Arab governments.
141. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, November 22, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Visit of King Hassan, 2/9-10/67. Confidential. SUBJECT 1. On 9 February the President told King Hassan we'd go ahead with a $14 million military credit. The Moroccans leaked this and the President was mad, but he later signed the required determination anyway. 2. In early June we clamped a freeze on all military aid arrangements, including this. 3. On 30 June, the President approved resuming negotiations in order to allow last-minute FY 67 funding. 4. Immediately thereafter, however, State clamped its own freeze on because it ran into the prospect of a drastically reduced Congressional ceiling on military aid to Africa. State couldn't see committing ourselves further when existing commitments wouldn't even fit under the ceiling. 5. In a nutshell: The King is disturbed. State wants to go ahead just as soon as the aid appropriation settles how much it has to divide up around Africa. We haven't reneged. We just don't want to move until we see where Congress comes out./2/ /2/Telegram 78656 to Rabat, December 2, instructed the Embassy to inform the Moroccan Government "at the highest appropriate level" that the United States was prepared to move forward on the arms credit sale, and that details would be forwarded in a week, based on U.S. understanding of Moroccan desires as of June 1967. The Embassy was asked, if possible, to avoid mention of the specific $14 million figure, since the $40 million ceiling on grants and sales to Africa would place heavy limitations on U.S. ability to meet all African requirements. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-MOR) Hal
142. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State/1/ Rabat, February 3, 1968, 1258Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-MOR. Secret; Priority. 2723. For Katzenbach and Palmer. 1. I am deeply concerned at King's reaction to continued delay in US military assistance to Morocco. When I saw Prime Minister Benhima January 23 for first time since return from home leave, he asked me about delays in implementing 4 million dollar Presidential arms commitment. I explained limitations placed by Congress on military assistance and provided him with English texts of Conte-Long and Symington amendments. 2. Two days later after I had supplied Prime Minister with unofficial French translations of texts of amendments he called me back and expressed deep concern, asking whether US was turning its back on its friends. I sought to reassure him by stressing that priority of Morocco based on strategic location and traditional close ties of friendship made US confident of being able to come through on 4 million dollar commitment. Officials of Executive Branch USG now engaged in devising procedures for administering military assistance under new Congressional guidelines. I urged that Morocco think in terms of strategy rather than tactics, of long term relationships rather than temporary short term expedients. Benhima understood allusion to recent GOM purchases of Czech ground equipment. 3. When I saw Prime Minister again February 1 he told me King concerned that personal Presidential commitment might be negated by Conte-Long and Symington amendments. King had asked specifically what these limitations meant in terms of 14 million dollar arms package. Benhima left me in no doubt that King deeply disturbed and that only prompt implementation of Presidential arms commitment will allay his concern. 4. Foregoing illustrates deep concern of King which I described to you when I was in Washington. 5. My recommendation on 14 million dollar arms package which cites pertinent political, economic and military considerations follows by separate telegram. Urge prompt Presidential determination required to permit sale of arms to Morocco. Tasca
143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, March 1, 1968, 2359Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McCall in AID/AFR/NA and Root, cleared by Claus W. Ruser in U/SIG and Straus in AID/AA/AFR, and approved by Palmer. /2/Beginning in late 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 123593. Joint State/AID. Refs: Tasca/Palmer Telcon Feb. 26, Tasca/Straus Telcon Feb. 29, Rabat 3030./3/ /3/No record of these telcons has been found. In telegram 3030, February 26, Tasca reported that he was disappointed to learn the levels of FY 1969 aid for Morocco, and that he hoped the Department would reconsider them. (Ibid.) 1. Total aid levels for Morocco have been arrived at after most thorough consideration, in light Country Team recommendations and given reduced prospects for FY 1969. These levels reflect sustained and in some respects upward trend in US aid to Morocco; they also compare most favorably with programs elsewhere in Africa and clearly establish Morocco as one of primary countries of concentration. 2. Among nine development emphasis countries in Africa Morocco only emphasis country with 1968 aid increase over 1967, one of two emphasis countries with '69 increase over '67. DLs in '68 more than four times '67 level, '69 proposal nearly three times '67 level. TC/DG in 1968 nearly twice 1967, '69 more than twice '67. 3. There will naturally be fluctuation from year to year in level components, e.g. development loans, of over-all program any country, and we agree it is unfortunate if these appear out of context to give false impression magnitude of US effort. Nevertheless, what remains important is total contribution and trend, and in this sense Morocco need envy no other country in Africa or in Arab world. At time when we are having great difficulty making equitable aid cuts elsewhere because of reduced Congressional appropriations, this is notable evidence of importance US attaches to Morocco's development efforts. 4. We have given fullest consideration to Rabat's 3030. You will in due course be receiving report of SIG policy discussion February 15 on Morocco and other North African countries. You will see among other things that SIG carefully noted unusual significance of major 5-year development program on which Morocco about to embark, approving for this reason continued high level of US support. Agricultural sector loan, increased emphasis food program, contemplated regional wheat productivity scheme are particular manifestations of US forward-looking interest in Moroccan economic development. 5. PL 480 authorization documents are in the process of clearance by BOB./4/ We have reached finding under Symington Amendment that Morocco not unduly diverting resources from economic development to military procurement. This finding will enable early clearance cereals project. /4/On March 26, the President approved a $16.2 million P.L. 480 agreement for Morocco. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Visit of King Hassan, 2/9-10/67) 6. We can understand your concern about declassification AID figures, but pros and cons declassification issue for all countries led to agency-wide decision that declassification necessary for purposes Congressional presentation. No exception can be made. Rusk
144. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 5, 1968, 4:50 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 80. Secret. SUBJECT Nick Katzenbach recommends you sign the two attached determinations on military assistance to Morocco. The purpose is to enable us to sell jet fighters without cutting economic aid. In February 1967, you promised King Hassan $14 million in arms and approved a credit sale. Unfortunately, the Conte-Long amendments apply. In signing the waiver at Tab A,/2/ you will essentially be saying that it is in our interest to preserve a firm relationship with Morocco and helping Hassan meet his legitimate defense needs is an important part of that relationship. Even if we didn't have a promise to keep, we would have to recognize that Morocco faces a military threat from Algeria which is well supplied by the USSR, and King Hassan will have to get arms somewhere. We know the Russians are ready to step in with MIG-21s if we don't sell the F-5s, and we have persistently tried to help Hassan maintain his Western ties. His is a friendly and moderate voice in a part of the world where we must take special care to keep our friends. As you know, we still have our communications intelligence station there. /2/Attached but not printed. President Johnson signed the determination on June 6. Telegram 177949 to Rabat, June 6, instructed the Embassy to negotiate the $14 million credit package. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-MOR) The second determination (Tab B)/3/ is a purely technical matter, similar to ones you have signed for Morocco for the last three years. It permits the use of $1.5 million in grant assistance under a 1960 agreement rather than negotiating a new one that would authorize us to review their use of the equipment and require them to return it to us when they no longer need it. In practice, our people in Morocco have full access to the equipment. It would also waive the requirement that this money be used exclusively for internal security and civic action rather than self-defense. We want to use the grant for such things as F-5 pilot training. /3/Attached but not printed. President Johnson signed the determination on June 6. Attached two determinations for your signature if you approve. Nick Katzenbach, on the basis of consultations, foresees no adverse Congressional reaction. Signing these determinations will pave the way for your approving an agricultural loan which is at the bottom of this package./4/ /4/Attached but not printed. President Johnson approved an $8 million agricultural loan for Morocco on June 6. W. W. Rostow /5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
