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120. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 18, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 8 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Trimble, Chase, and Toumayan and approved in S on January 10, 1966. The source text is labeled "Part IV of VIII." The conversation was held in the Secretary's Dining Room. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS His Royal Highness Prince Moulay Abdullah The Secretary asked the Prince whether he thought his mission to interest American business in Morocco had been successful./2/ /2/King Hassan's brother, Prince Moulay Abdullah, and the Director General of the Royal Cabinet, Driss M'Hammedi, were on a private visit to New York and Washington December 10-18 with the stated purpose of making contact with U.S. business leaders and encouraging them to invest in Morocco. The Prince said he thought some useful contacts had been established. An agreement between Occidental Petroleum and the Phosphate Office had been worked out, and they had talked with International General Electric about an electric iron smelter for a proposed steel mill near Nador. The Prince pointed out that Morocco and Tunisia had hoped to get agreement from Algeria for an integrated steel mill within the concept of Maghrebian economic cooperation. However, the Algerians were going ahead with plans for a Soviet-financed mill of 800,000 tons annual capacity. Morocco feels if there is not to be a Maghreb mill, Morocco should have one of its own. The Secretary stated that private investment has an important role in economic development. It was his observation, during his years with the Rockefeller Foundation, that one of the most important factors in getting US businessmen interested was in the word of mouth exchange of information which went on informally at clubs and at luncheons, where business leaders might be discussing the investment climate and possibilities. It would be to Morocco's advantage to build personal contacts with these leaders, even as Ambassador Bengelloun and Ambassador Laraki have been able to on a limited scale here in Washington. The Secretary further noted that the great international bankers play a vital part in this process and asked what banks the GOM used. Mr. M'Hammedi named the Bank of America, National City, and Bankers' Trust. Also, he added, the ExIm Bank. The Secretary said the latter was, of course, of a different type. The private banks were the important ones, because what they had to say regarding a country, businessmen would listen to. They would not be as impressed by a government bank. He asked how the domestic situation looked in Morocco. Mr. M'Hammedi said that the Moroccan leaders saw the role of the state as a coordinator of the various cadres in the country. Unfortunately, Moroccans are poor businessmen and have few cadres. They do have a liberal investment code, however, which should encourage foreign businessmen to play a role. The GOM has close contact with the IBRD, and is following their advice. But Morocco needs US aid and private investment. It needs guidance and orientation from the US and similar countries, and advice on which companies to deal with and which schemes contribute most to the country's development. The Secretary agreed that some development projects contributed more than others, so priorities should be established. He suggested that it would be useful to have some talks together to establish priorities for investment and development. He asked whether some system of priorities was now in effect. Mr. M'Hammedi noted that the King and Parliament had set agriculture as a first priority, both in the modern and traditional sectors, since almost 80 per cent of the country lived off agriculture. He cited the example of the King's recent talk to the nation in which he asked the people to express their opinion as to whether reduced sugar prices on the current world market should be passed on to the consumer (Morocco has a very high per capita sugar consumption) or whether the savings Morocco expected to realize in the next year should be put into a special fund to build a flood control and irrigation dam benefitting the people and economy of the Tafilalet region where a disastrous flood had recently occurred. The King had just telephoned the Prince to tell him that the people had indicated by an overwhelming majority their wish to invest the savings in the dam project. The second priority is the formation of cadres; teachers, technicians, administrators, engineers. The third priority is tourism, which not only brings in foreign exchange but permits foreign people and the Moroccans to get to know each other. In establishing these priorities, the King had not overlooked education, industry, and public health. It is his belief, shared by his government, that the best defense against foreign subversion is prosperity. Better jobs, wages, education, and health form the basis. Mr. M'Hammedi welcomed the idea of bilateral discussions on priorities. He was sure the Prince would pass the suggestion on to his brother, the King, and he, M'Hammedi, would do the same. The King will undoubtedly instruct the Ambassador to pursue this matter. The Secretary said this would be fine, but pointed out that priorities should be established in the use of private investment, because there, too, some projects help a great deal more than others. He mentioned tourism which earns foreign exchange. He asked what numbers of tour-ists Morocco was getting. M'Hammedi said that last year there were 500,000 and that they expected the number to reach 800,000 in a few years. The main limitation at this time was insufficient hotels. The Secretary observed the trend is to visit countries and areas never seen before. Statistics show that the average visitor to France now spends only three days there. Spain, however, is up to 15,000,000 visitors a year. One third of those might go on to Morocco if the facilities were there. It would be a great boon to Morocco.
On January 25, 1966, Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News at the Department of State, telephoned Under Secretary Ball to inform him that news stories were alleging CIA involvement in the October 1965 kidnapping of Moroccan opposition leader Ahmed Ben Barka in Paris. Noting that he had checked with the CIA and was satisfied, McCloskey said that he planned to deny U.S. Government involvement. The Under Secretary suggested that McCloskey telephone Bundy at the White House and tell him that Ball was "reasonably satisfied" that there was nothing to this. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Algeria [6/18/65-1/25/66]) On January 28, Ambassador Bohlen reported from Paris that during an off-the-record meeting with journalists, French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou had stated categorically that there was not the slightest indication of involvement of any U.S. intelligence service in the Ben Barka affair. When asked why he did not say this publicly, Pompidou said that it would be inappropriate for him to raise the subject without any official reason. (Telegram 4435 from Paris; Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 MOR)
122. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 12, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Chase on February 11 and cleared by Barbour. SUBJECT You have agreed to meet briefly with His Excellency Driss M'Hammedi, Director General of the Royal Cabinet of the King of Morocco. He will be accompanied by Governor Williams, Ambassador of Morocco Laraki, and an interpreter. Mr. M'Hammedi will probably carry a personal message from the King to you. His visit is to explain the Moroccan side of the "Ben Barka Affair". We have asked that he not go into detail with you but reserve his exposition for a meeting with me. The issue arose from the kidnapping in Paris last October of Mehdi Ben Barka, self-exiled leader of the leftist opposition in Morocco. He is feared dead. French police and secret agents are reportedly involved, but the French Government claims that the kidnapping was organized by the Moroccans, and have issued international warrants for the arrest of the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, General Oufkir. King Hassan claims the General is innocent and that the French are blaming Morocco in an attempt to whitewash their own Government's guilt. Both governments have withdrawn their respective ambassadors. However, while French-Moroccan relations are at their lowest ebb since pre-independence Resistance days, French technical and economic assistance continues. It is still not known just what the true story is, and we do not wish to get involved, much less take sides. Talking points are enclosed./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. Dean Rusk/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, February 16, 1966, 4:37 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Chase; cleared by Root in AF/AFN, Beigel, Roberts in FE/VN, Burati in AID/AFR/NS, Symmes in NEA/NE, and Komer; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, Algiers, Nouakchott, Tripoli, Tunis, Cairo, and by pouch to Saigon. 438. Following based on uncleared memcons and is FYI, Noforn, and subject to change upon review: 1. Driss M'Hammedi met with President for thirty minutes and with Secretary for ninety minutes on February 14. Atmosphere both talks most cordial and M'Hammedi seemed very pleased with reception. 2. He reviewed Ben Barka case but added nothing to what already known. He did say GOM sure allegations of any US involvement are completely untrue. Said GOM seeks only that justice pursue its course and full truth be made known. Morocco had every desire to limit damage to French-Moroccan relations. It was GOF diversion of matter from legal to political context and inadmissible demand that King dismiss his Minister that had forced GOM break silence and defend its good name. If France refrained from repetition unwise pronouncements, Morocco would certainly do nothing to aggravate situation. 3. Viet Nam situation discussed at length, with both President and Secretary expressing USG appreciation for GOM stand. Secretary expressed hope GOM and other moderates would take stronger lead in AF where he feared voice of moderation had been diminished by recent coups. 4. When M'Hammedi asked what pertinence Southeast Asia situation has for AF countries, Secretary replied Communist world sees AF as major target. AF countries can meet threat through forceful political action, in OAU and other meetings, by making it clear all rpt all outsiders must not interfere in Africa. 5. M'Hammedi then mentioned Moroccan fears in Libyan situation where aging king and oil revenues might prove temptation for UAR. He said GOM also much concerned at potential for trouble in Spanish Sahara. Concerned lest Spanish for sake of own prestige and pride might move to give territory autonomy. This would be grave mistake, since region lacks sufficient population, trained personnel, and infrastructure to handle own affairs. Might easily fall prey, through Mauritania and UAR, to forces of agitation, giving Communists chance to realize old dream of "window on Atlantic." 6. Secretary hoped Morocco and Spain would not let matter become agitated but would somehow work out on bilateral basis, keeping in mind fundamental importance of good Spanish-Moroccan relations. Said he sure Spain attaches great importance to maintenance of such good relations. M'Hammedi replied this certainly King's intention, to settle bilaterally, and he hoped US might put in good word. 7. M'Hammedi then recalled Secretary's comments to Prince Moulay Abdullah last December suggesting US-Moroccan consultations on priorities for investment and development in Morocco. King had been most interested this proposal and would now like formally suggest both US and Morocco designate delegations to undertake talks in Washington or Rabat relative to improvement economic relations and formal structuring of continuing consultations in this field. He suggested such bilateral discussions might also embrace political subjects. 8. M'Hammedi extended formal invitation for US to send "high-ranking personage" to celebration of tenth anniversary Moroccan independence at Fez March 2 and 3. In leaving he mentioned GOM concern on manganese and phosphates, but noted Ambassador Laraki would take up with Department. He asked that Secretary receive Laraki to discuss if any major problems arose. Ball
124. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 19, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-7/67. Secret. Moroccan King Hassan plans to come to the UN General Assembly in late November or early December and has asked whether he could drop down to see you. The normal procedure if you see a head of state visiting the UN is just to have him for lunch and an hour's talk. We have told our ambassadors to discourage these visitors from expecting to see you, and we do not have any reason to expect any heavy influx this fall. I think this would be a good way to handle Hassan since we are not ready to invite him for another official visit. He has angled for a meeting ever since you took office, and we have stalled him off each time. During his 1963 state visit, President Kennedy made a special effort to get close to him because we wanted him to let us stay on in our communications [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] base after closing our SAC bases. Hassan wants to feel equally close to you. My first inclination was to discourage this because you tentatively have two visitors each in November and December. He might not even come to the UN if he were not sure of seeing you at the same time. However, an hour's talk and a lunch might save you a more formal visit next year. He is one of the moderate Arab-Africans we want to support. He has been good on Vietnam and moderate on Israel. He has kept his word on our communications base. He has closed out Soviet military aid (though he probably will make a long-deferred Moscow visit early this fall). A larger reason for seeing him is that this, coupled with Bourguiba's visit early next year, will give you a good crack at troublesome North Africa. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya are a natural grouping for economic cooperation. Oil, natural gas and minerals in the Sahara are ripe for common exploitation. One thing holds them back--Algeria. While Boumedienne is less menacing than Ben Bella was, neither Bourguiba nor Hassan trust him with his Soviet-equipped army, and we are fighting to keep out of an arms race there. We want to encourage these countries to work together, and Ambassador Korry will be giving you some suggestions in a couple of days in reporting on your African program. This would give you a chance to weigh in. I recommend you authorize Ambassador Tasca to tell the King you would hope to see him if he comes to the UN. But we would tell Tasca to explain your especially heavy schedule this fall and ask to defer making definite plans until later./2/ /2/Telegram 14058 to Rabat, July 23, instructed Tasca to tell King Hassan that if he came to the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly in late November or early December, the President would be happy to entertain him at luncheon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 MOR) Following the President's operation in early November, King Hassan canceled his trip to the United Nations, and his visit to the United States was tentatively postponed until January or February 1967. W.W. Rostow/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Approve having Hassan, schedule permitting/4/ /4/This option is checked.
125. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 30, 1966, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-7/67. Confidential. Attached is a subtle letter from Moroccan King Hassan,/2/ which his Finance Minister delivered to me yesterday. The FM is here to discuss his economic program and to talk to potential private investors. /2/Attached but not printed. Hassan is reinforcing his request for help against his drought--Morocco has lost about 50% of its cereals production this year. However, he does not come right out and ask. He relates his own agricultural program to your Food for Freedom message and your efforts to focus world-wide attention on the food problem. Only at the end of his letter does he describe briefly his own shortages. We have already responded in several ways. On the emergency front, we sent Dick Reuter to Morocco (he was in Europe anyway) as your personal representative to look at the problem, both long and short range. We agreed to send 200,000 tons of wheat and to review the situation again in the fall when requirements are clearer. Our own tight supply will keep us from coming close to the 1.2 million tons the Moroccans think they need. But the Canadians and French are also helping, and we may be able to get close to 500,000 tons as the year goes on. On the development front, we have two research teams there now--one from TVA--to lay out longer term projects to improve Morocco's land and fertilizer use. The IBRD and the Germans are helping too. The Moroccan program is not quite so well-defined as Hassan suggests, but there's a good chance to do a sound job there. These efforts are in line with Korry's recommendations. The Moroccans are reasonably satisfied with our response. I think Hassan just wanted to break the ice with you by highlighting a mutual interest in the food problem and showing he is a serious-minded fellow ready to help himself. He is looking forward to seeing you when he comes to the UN late this fall. We will use your reply to let you weigh in on the substance of our program. I have asked State for a draft and for suggestions on timing. Walt
126. Letter From President Johnson to King Hassan/1/ Washington, August 12, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 MOR. Limited Official Use. Telegram 28094 to Rabat, August 15, transmitted the text of the President's letter to the Embassy with instructions that it be delivered to King Hassan. (Ibid.) Your Majesty: I was heartened to receive your letter describing views so similar to my own on the importance of increasing world food production, and I especially appreciated your kind words about our Food for Freedom Program. Mr. Rostow had a good talk with Finance Minister Tahiri, and Mr. Reuter returned from his visit to Morocco optimistic about your country's potential in agriculture. It is particularly encouraging to learn of the high priority which you are giving to agriculture in Morocco's economic development plans. I am convinced that by intensive efforts in this direction Your Majesty's Government can bring to the rural population of Morocco a higher income and to the consumers in the cities the necessities of life at prices they can afford. A sustained effort to make Morocco more self-sufficient would be the most important contribution you could make in attacking the world food problem. We are especially gratified to see countries like your own striving to meet their own food requirements at a time when our exportable surpluses are diminishing. One of the most striking revelations to me in my study of the food problem is the prospect that even my country, with its rich blessing of agricultural abundance, will not be able to meet much longer the shortages that could develop around the world in the short space of a decade. In the end, your nation's own agricultural programs and policies will determine the degree of its success. We intend to help wherever we appropriately can, and I have asked my own experts to press ahead in determining how the United States can work with Your Majesty's Government to improve Morocco's productivity in food grains. I am pleased that we are currently financing two studies in Morocco which we expect will help Your Majesty's Government reach important decisions on the degree of food self-sufficiency that is most economic for Morocco. These studies should also clarify alternative paths to accelerated agricultural development over the long term. I hope you will find them useful. The World Bank, I understand, has offered to make available to you its professional advice and services, and I hope you can make full use of its great resources. I have been impressed with the Bank's acute analysis in other situations and know its guidance will become increasingly important to us all. Regarding the grain shortage that last season's bad weather has inflicted on you, I can assure you that the United States will help as much as possible, taking into account heavy demands on our limited supplies. As Ambassador Tasca has told you, we have already allotted to Morocco 100,000 metric tons of wheat under the sales provisions of our Public Law 480 to meet the present emergency. Shipments will begin in the near future. In addition, our officials are examining possibilities for further assistance. Ambassador Tasca has kept us carefully informed of your needs, and Ambassador Laraki is in close touch with our officials here. I assume that other friendly countries are also cooperating in meeting Morocco's needs. Your letter has given me a useful opportunity to exchange views on a subject which is of special concern to me. I shall follow Morocco's program with great interest. Should you come to the United Nations later this fall, I hope we can discuss these and other issues of common interest in greater detail. Sincerely,
127. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret. This paper is part of a larger "Report of Post-Manila Trip," dated November 22, transmitted by Harriman to the President and Rusk on November 28, following his trip to 10 countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa after the Manila Conference. It included a general report and separate reports on each country he visited. Harriman's conversation with the King on November 9 was recorded in a memorandum of conversation which is ibid. MOROCCO At Ambassador Tasca's urging and to fulfill an old promise to the King, I stopped off at Rabat on my way home. The King is understanding of and has sympathy with our policies in Vietnam. There is not much he can do. He has sent one cargo of phosphate fertilizer and I encouraged him to do more. He was just back from a visit to the Soviet Union and had obtained agreements for economic assistance. Whether these will materialize in actual deliveries is still to be seen. They do involve, however, sending a number of Russian technicians promptly and his Ministers were anxious to get from us our experience with subversive action in other parts of the world. I think it is much to our interest to encourage this. In spite of his hospitable reception, the King is under no illusions that the Soviets would like to unseat him and supplant him with a leftist government. In fact, he told me they had been frank in telling him that although they wanted to be friendly, he must understand that if he got into difficulties with any of the countries that were in the "socialist family," the Soviet Union would be on their side. He told me they mentioned the following countries: UAR, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania, Somalia, Syria and Iraq. The King is concerned over the extremely heavy shipments of arms to Algeria. They are so large that our own military officers in Rabat are at a loss to understand just what the Russians have in mind. The King shares the Shah's and the Ethiopian Emperor's concern over Nasser's aggressive intentions. They are all worried over what will happen when the British leave Aden. They look upon Nasser as a Soviet tool and watch with concern the military build-up with Russian weapons in UAR, Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, and now Syria. The King is unhappy that we have refused to sell him ten to fifteen million dollars in tank and anti-tank weapons which he feels is necessary to enable Morocco to hold out against Algerian attack for the few days necessary to take the issue to the Security Council. Without more modern weapons, he feels an Algerian attack might penetrate so deeply in Moroccan territory that he would be unseated. The King expressed concern about the defense of Saudi Arabia against possible Nasser attack and hopes we will give King Faysal full support. For my part I have been and am now increasingly concerned about what the Soviets are up to in the Middle East and feel there should be a strategic study of the military, political, and economic implications of the entire area from Morocco to Iran. The threat to the oil resources is as much in Libya as in the Arabian Peninsula. Morocco is on the right flank of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The use of facilities in Morocco are vital to its operation. I hope by the time the King arrives in February, there can be at least a preliminary estimate which will make possible some decision on his problems.
128. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 25, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-8 US-MOR. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs R. Peter Spicer and Porson and approved in S on February 9. The source text is labeled "Part II of II." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Laraki said that the King had talked with Mr. Palmer about the organization of Africa./2/ On the continent there are the so-called "moderate" states and those termed "revolutionary" or "progressive." Morocco, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Tunisia have been moderate, but have not received assistance in their endeavors. On the other hand, there are massive arms buildups in Algeria, Tanzania, Guinea, the UAR and Somalia. This concerns the King and all the moderate heads of state who are counting on Morocco to deal with the problem, because if it cannot be solved, then there will be a split in Africa along horizontal or vertical poles, i.e., Algeria-Congo (Brazzaville) or Guinea, UAR, and Algeria. /2/Telegram 3394 from Rabat, January 23, reported Palmer's conversation with the King. (Ibid., ORG 7 AF) Three weeks ago, the King received personally a MUSLO (MAAG) mission. The conversation lasted for four hours and revealed that U.S. and Moroccan data on weapons agree. When the King talked with Mr. Palmer, the latter stated that it is the policy of the United States to avoid an arms race. The King replied that Morocco too wishes to avoid an arms race, preferring a race for prosperity. But how is this possible when Morocco's neighbor has 450 tanks and Morocco only 100; when Morocco's neighbor has 800 heavy artillery pieces and Morocco only 80; when Morocco's neighbor has 120 bombers and fighters and Morocco only 10? According to Ambassador Laraki, the King asked Mr. Palmer whether the United States would agree to try and work out a "table of organization" to deal with the situation, and Mr. Palmer said no. [4 lines of source text not declassified]/3/ /3/In telegram 3504 from Rabat, January 27, Palmer commented that Laraki's demarche had embroidered some aspects of his conversation with the King beyond recognition. [text not declassified] (Ibid., POL MOR-US) Ambassador Laraki continued by saying that the King wants to talk to the President and Secretary Rusk but believes that if this is the thinking of the Department of State and the Executive Branch of the United States Government, it would be better to avoid a reception here which would offer only platonic discussions, no concrete results. In the light of the frankness in U.S.-Moroccan relations, the King wished that Secretary Rusk be asked if this is the thinking of the United States Government. If it is, it would be better, in the King's estimation, for a mutually acceptable formula to be found to cancel the King's trip. Ambassador Laraki stated that this does not mean that Morocco is changing its orientation. After all, Morocco is an established monarchy, the King being the seventeenth in his line, and the country is stable and will never turn socialist. In his conversation with Ambassador Laraki, the King said that during his trip to the USSR seven weeks ago, the Russians had made a number of offers which the King turned down because of the former's ulterior motives and because he did not wish to receive instructions from them in his own country. But on the other hand, the King does not want to come to the United States and go home empty-handed. It would be difficult for him to have refused the Russian offers and then not achieve anything in the United States. Ambassador Laraki again assured the Secretary that this did not represent a change in the centuries-old friendship which links our two countries. The Ambassador added that the King had asked him to remind Secretary Rusk of his statement made at the train station here in 1963 during the King's visit, in which the Secretary spoke of the King's role in Africa. But, asks the King, how can he play that role without the understanding of his friends? Ambassador Laraki concluded with the statement that he had simply summarized the issues, knowing that Mr. Palmer had no doubt sent detailed reports to the State Department. In reply the Secretary stated that he could not reply immediately, because the question is too serious. We have not yet received full reports from Mr. Palmer, and the Secretary would have to contact Mr. Palmer and obtain a detailed report of the conversation. The Secretary then said that there are some matters that cannot be dealt with by means of a short question and a short response. The Secretary did not think that he had enough information to judge. He added that he would never comment, even informally, on the relations between the King and President Johnson without consulting the President. Therefore, he needed to have more information because the question raised is very serious. The Secretary then asked the Ambassador to convey his personal greetings to the King and to assure him of the friendship and interest of the United States in Morocco's safety and prosperity. He added that one would have to look very hard to find a better friend of Morocco, since independence, than the United States. In conclusion, the Secretary said that he wished to examine the questions presented and, in view of their nature, could not reply at this time. Ambassador Laraki said he would transmit the Secretary's comments to the King and would keep the Secretary informed of all developments.
129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, January 30, 1967, 6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-MOR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Spicer and Deputy Executive Secretary John P. Walsh, cleared by Katzenbach and Saunders, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Monrovia for Palmer. 127945. For Ambassador. 1. IRG agreed January 28 King should be told soonest and you should so inform him: (a) apparently some misunderstanding in conversation with Asst. Secretary Palmer, if King interpreted Palmer's response to be lack of sympathy with or understanding of Moroccan problems. Palmer's negative response confined to possibility obtaining security guarantee. We have military sales question under urgent consideration with decision expected shortly; (b) President expects hear first hand King's opinions Morocco's security situation. 2. FYI: While IRG reached agreement in principle on credit sales arms within range $5 million to $14 million,/2/ this is subject to independent review by SIG with meeting scheduled tomorrow afternoon. If decision made to proceed with sales program, details re equipment and terms to be worked out after visit probably with country team in Morocco. We expect include in any agreement limitation to defensive uses equipment and Moroccan concurrence that sales will not detract from economic development of Morocco or Morocco's advancement Maghreb economic cooperation. /2/On January 28, the African Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) met to consider the Moroccan request for additional military assistance, and decided there should be a favorable U.S. response. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Morocco 1967) 3. FYI: If the decision is made to proceed with the sales program, we would take Spanish concerns into account at appropriate time by emphasizing the defensive character of the assistance and its relatively modest dimension. We would also reaffirm US commitment to peaceful solution Sahara question based on self-determination, acceptable all interested parties. End FYI. Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
