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110. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and sent through Bell and Harriman. Concurred in by Lang (DOD), Kleine (AID), Barbour (WE), and Moses (G/PM). Washington, January 15, 1965. SUBJECT Discussion: The rapid build-up in military materiel in Algeria as the result of Soviet aid will, according to US intelligence estimates, place Morocco at a clear military disadvantage in terms of hardware, organization and training in both air and ground within six months to a year. Morocco is understandably apprehensive regarding its ability in the future to deter aggression and defend its territory. The Moroccans have presented the French and ourselves with requests for military assistance and Foreign Minister Benhima will understandably pursue the matter when he sees you January 18. The French have responded with a five-year program involving ground force equipment and propeller-driven support aircraft (Tab A)./2/ Although severely hampered in our response by the shortage of MAP funds, we are considering a program to supplement the French program through providing surplus equipment either by gift or by sale for local currency. We are now determining whether our program will in any way conflict with that of the French (Tab B). /2/Tabs A and B were not attached. Tab A was telegram 3774 from Paris; Tab B was telegram 3691 to Paris. The principal problem lies in meeting Morocco's concern over the Algerian air force which now includes MIG-21's and IL-18 bombers. The French have said they are not interested in helping Morocco in this field, a position that we are attempting to verify (Tab B). A ground to air missile defense would be both expensive and elaborate in terms of installations and training. (Nike installation, for example, would cost $13-15 million per battalion of 36.) The least expensive approach lies in providing more advanced aircraft equipped for air defense. Depending on the aircraft chosen, this could mean an outlay of between $5 and $15 million over a period of years. A list of the possible aircraft now under consideration, their cost, and their characteristics is attached at Tab C./3/ In view of the growing disadvantage vis-a-vis Algeria, Morocco will undoubtedly press for an early delivery. /3/Tab C was attached but is not printed. To provide such an early adequate response to the Moroccans would require additional MAP funds beginning in FY-1965 or FY-1966 and probably over the next two or three subsequent years. The Moroccan MAP program which has totalled $24.9 million over the past five years is now phasing out; the current FY 1965 figure is $800,000, largely for training and spare parts. Additional funds for aircraft are not now available and are not included in the transfer of surplus AID funds to DOD now planned for this fiscal year. A possible resolution would be for DOD to use the authority in the Foreign Assistance Act to provide aircraft from its inventories in this fiscal year; this would require reimbursement from MAP in subsequent fiscal years. Helping Morocco under present circumstances poses other problems as well. Morocco is currently experiencing serious financial difficulties and the addition of sophisticated military aircraft will place greater burdens on its budget. A decision on the type and phasing of an air defense program must take into account the financial implications for Morocco as well as the direct effect upon its economic development efforts. Morocco, over the longer term, suffers from problems of administrative disorganization and growing political restiveness. A military deterrent will be of little value without improvement in its internal political and economic health. Conspicuous Western assistance to Morocco runs a risk of additional polarization in North Africa. Nevertheless, it is important to the United States that Morocco maintain its basically pro-Western orientation. Morocco has been particularly helpful to the US in recent UN and African issues, regarding the Congo. How Morocco obtains a military deterrent to Algerian strength will be a major factor in determining how Morocco goes politically. The United States is today faced with three alternatives: 1. It can provide an assurance to Morocco that, if Morocco is clearly threatened with aggression by air from Algeria, the United States will send forces to defend the Kingdom. This would have the advantage (if accepted) of not involving us in a further MAP program; it would have the disadvantages of directly involving US forces, possibly before actual fighting had begun, in North Africa. 2. The United States can indicate it is not in a position to provide more advanced aircraft and encourage Morocco to look elsewhere. King Hassan, who already has MIG 17 aircraft and is scheduled to visit Moscow in May, would almost certainly seek additional parts for his present MIG's and additional aircraft from the Soviet Union and would undoubtedly be required to make political concessions to the USSR. Such action on his part, however, would avoid a military polarization in North Africa. 3. The United States could provide a minimum program of additional jet aircraft phased over three to four years and on condition that, because of shortage of support resources, Morocco retire its MIG squadron. To do this would require extraordinary Executive Branch measures to obtain additional funds. Recommendation: On balance we favor the third alternative. We recommend that you: 1. Authorize AF to examine with AID and DOD (a) the most appropriate type and number of aircraft to provide Morocco, taking into account Morocco's ability to operate and maintain, together with the impact of the program on the GOM's budgetary situation in relation to overall US objectives in Morocco and (b) the possible source and timing of funding for the program determined to be most appropriate in the light of US world wide priorities and requirements./4/ /4/Secretary Rusk initialed his approval of this recommendation on January 19. On January 26, Secretary of Defense McNamara approved an $11 million grant-credit arrangement ($5 million grant and $6 million credit) recommended by the Department of State to help Morocco develop a deterrent to the Algerian air threat by acquiring a squadron of 12 F-5s. (Memorandum from McNaughton to McNamara; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 091.3 Morocco) 2. Inform Benhima although the U.S. has still under consideration the possibility of ground force equipment from surplus and may be able to help on some items, the most appropriate area for a U.S. contribution to Moroccan military needs appears to be that of air defense. Morocco has, of course, other sources of ground force equipment. Our response on air defense must necessarily be limited by stringent fund restrictions, worldwide U.S. military requirements, the impact of alternative air defense possibilities on Morocco's budgetary situation, and the GOM's capability to operate and maintain such alternative programs. We would hope to be in further touch with the Government of Morocco as soon as our analysis of the problem is completed./5/ /5/Secretary Rusk initialed his approval of this recommendation on January 19.
111. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Robert W. Chase on January 28 and approved in S on February 12. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office at the Department of State. Washington, January 18, 1965, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary met privately with the Foreign Minister for over half an hour after which they were joined by Ambassador Bengelloun and Departmental officers. Mr. Benhima then outlined the Moroccan view of African affairs, particularly the Congo. He noted that the substance of this appreciation had been given to Mr. Sisco of IO earlier in the day. Returning to purely Moroccan problems, the Foreign Minister emphasized that in considering defense needs, "Morocco does not wish a Maginot line." Benhima said he knew Morocco's future depended on a sound economy, strong labor movement, and political freedom. He hoped to build new industry and prosperous communities along the Algerian border to act as a showcase to the Algerians as West Berlin does to East Germany. In response to a question by the Secretary regarding nonalignment, Mr. Benhima replied that the King believes nonalignment "of the Belgrade Conference type" is a dead issue. Africa is being split into two blocs, radical and moderate, with the former equating nonalignment with socialism. The Secretary asked Mr. Benhima which countries of Africa Morocco considered its best friends. The Foreign Minister mentioned Senegal and Nigeria. In discussing economic aid and the current Moroccan austerity campaign, the Secretary emphasized the importance of Morocco having IBRD support for its three-year plan and for its fiscal policies. He noted that such support does much to encourage world confidence in Morocco's economic activities. Mr. Benhima said his government works in close cooperation with the World Bank. The Foreign Minister spoke of Moroccan relations with West Germany, which he feared were often the victim of ups and downs of West German-French relations. He mentioned that most of Morocco's links with the West were "via Paris." He hoped to forge more direct and closer contacts and asked the Department's aid in persuading the Bonn Government to extend an invitation for a state visit by King Hassan. Mr. Benhima noted that the King had twice accepted, but subsequently had to cancel, earlier invitations. Now the Germans seemed reluctant to reply to Moroccan requests made two months ago suggesting an April visit. This would be just prior to the King's scheduled Moscow visit. Speaking again of Moroccan economic development, the Foreign Minister stressed the need for comprehension of Morocco's problems and the need for urgent action. He saw the next two years as crucial. The Secretary suggested that Europe, too, has a stake in Moroccan stability and urged Mr. Benhima to look toward Paris, Bonn, Rome, and The Hague. As the Foreign Minister prepared to leave, the Secretary assured him the Department would continue to remain in close contact with him on the several matters discussed during his visit.
112. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 21, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-7/67. Secret; No Distribution. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Assistant Secretary Williams. After luncheon on January 19th for the Moroccan Foreign Minister Benhima, he asked to have a private word with me. He explained that the Moroccan Government was coming more and more to realize the impracticability of nonalignment as it was being interpreted by the radical Africans. He said these countries were clearly following Communist policies. Under these circumstances Morocco, he said, was in the process of making a fundamental decision to align itself more closely with the West, that his government has confidence in the United States and its Western friends, but the King wanted to have a somewhat clearer understanding of the United States attitude. The King hoped to have an early opportunity to talk to the President. He realized that with all the claims on the President this could only be done in connection with some other visit. The King thought that the President might be going to Rome, in which event the King could come to Rome to meet the President, with the excuse of making a trip for his health. I asked whether Paris would be as convenient to the King. The Minister replied that he felt Rome would be more appropriate. Mr. Benhima concluded that if a meeting was to be arranged it would be well for someone to come to Morocco in advance to talk over the subjects for the meeting between the King and the President. He expressed the hope that as the King knew me of old, I might be selected. I made no comment except to say that I would undertake to explore the subject he had raised and would advise him through his Ambassador in Washington. Averell/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates Harriman signed the original.
113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, January 26, 1965, 7:16 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Chase in AF/AFN and Kling in AF/AFI, cleared by Hinman and Nelson in AID/AFR, and approved by Blake in AF/AFN. 386. Joint State/AID message. Department and AID have conducted review current African AID programs for purpose determining those projects for which US approval could be conveyed to governments concerned immediately or favorable approval probable within next 60 days. Purpose of so informing governments would be to achieve political impact by accelerating timing of notification. Review identified those projects which were sufficiently far along in AID processing to accelerate notification. The projects for Morocco follow: A. Immediate Announcement 1. Nouasseur Air Base Conversion.--Advise GOM that AID is willing to increase the $2.3 million loan authorization for Nouasseur Air Base conversion (amount to be determined) as soon as cost estimates, plans and specifications for an expanded project have been submitted by the GOM and expeditiously reviewed by AID. 2. Port of Casablanca.--Advise the GOM that we are prepared to finance a feasibility study to determine the requirements for expansion of the facilities of Casablanca Port. B. Announcement within 60 Days 1. Phosphate Mining Equipment (provided, question of competition with domestic producers is resolved favorably) 2. Action on P.L. 480, Title I sale request (wheat and oil) 3. Approval of Title II Food for Work and Livestock Grain grants. Intention of this review is that government concerned be informed at a time considered politically desirable by our Missions and Department (presumably soon in most cases). As appropriate, announcement of US approval of these projects could be timed, or used indirectly to gain support (or to show appreciation for past support) for the US position re current political problems. Your views requested on how and when this information could be transmitted to GOM with maximum advantage to US. Department/AID is also continuing to examine new projects or projects that can be accelerated in order to gain political benefits in future. Rusk
114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, January 28, 1965, 12:40 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-MOR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Chase and Blake; cleared by Williams, Barbour in EUR/WE, Sisco, Lang in DOD/ISA, Hutchinson in AID, Moses in G/PM, and Komer; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Rabat, Paris, Algiers, and Madrid. 1894. Depcirtel 1309 and USUN 2899./2/ In response Benhima request for definitive answer on US intentions with respect military assistance to Morocco prior his departure from New York January 29, you may convey following (Dept. also informing Moroccan Amb.): /2/Circular telegram 1309, January 22, and telegram 2899 from USUN, January 26. (Ibid., POL AFR and DEF 19 US-MOR, respectively) 1. US agreeable provide Morocco with squadron (12) F-5 aircraft on combined grant-credit basis dollar repayable designed minimize burden on Moroccan economy. Dollar repayable portion essential if Morocco to obtain latest high performance aircraft. 2. Aircraft deliveries will be worked out on basis factory production schedule and RMAF ability absorb. Hopefully delivery this advanced aircraft could begin within 12-18 months. In addition to air package, Benhima may be informed US agreeable make available for sale for local currency or, possibly in part, as outright gift, certain surplus stocks for ground forces, including Scorpions, trucks, and ammunition. However, Benhima should not be left with impression US will be able to provide all items on Moroccan surplus list. Embassy Paris should await further instructions prior informing GOF./3/ /3/Telegram 396 to Rabat, January 29, informed the Embassy that Fredericks had conveyed the substance of telegram 1894 to Bengelloun that morning, but that the Ambassador had showed no enthusiasm or appreciation. (Ibid.) In telegram 705 from Rabat, February 2, Brown reported that he discussed its contents with M'Hammedi, who was immediately enthusiastic. (Ibid.) Ball
115. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-67-65 Washington, January 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963-March 1966. Secret. SUBJECT 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed recent developments in North Africa and consider that the military imbalance being created in Algeria, vis-a-vis Morocco, can become a positive threat to the peace of the area. If current trends continue, it is estimated that the Algerian military establishment will probably be superior to that of Morocco in about a year. The Algerian military buildup has reached the point that the Government of Morocco feels it is again seriously threatened and, accordingly, has requested the United States to provide additional military assistance, including fighter aircraft. The US Ambassador to Morocco has recommended that the United States plan a five-year military assistance program for the Moroccan armed forces, coordinated with, but separate from, French and Spanish aid programs. 2. The Moroccans are justifiably concerned with events taking place in Algeria, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the situation which is developing could have important implications for US security interests, not only in the Mediterranean area, but in all of Africa. Soviet and Chinese communist influence throughout Africa is increasing, and Algerian policies, such as the aid she is providing the Congolese rebels, parallel communist interests. It is important that the United States remain responsive to the legitimate security requirements of friendly African states, particularly those, such as Morocco, which occupy strategic locations on the continent. 3. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff must reserve their position on Ambassador Ferguson's estimate of Moroccan military requirements pending further study, they concur with his recommendation that the United States should undertake an increased military assistance program to Morocco in order to counter the growing Algerian threat. Such a program should take into consideration Morocco's economic limitations and must be closely coordinated with the Spanish and French, on whom the Moroccans must remain primarily dependent for military aid. This action could be significant, not only in thwarting communist infiltration and in retaining US influence in a strategic area of the world, but also as a means of obtaining overflight privileges and perhaps eventually regaining the use of one of the US-constructed air bases in Morocco. The availability of an alternate air base in Morocco which could provide landing, refueling, minor maintenance, and limited war readiness materiel (WRM) storage facilities in support of USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA contingency requirements would be most desirable. Such a base would provide direct access to the West Coast of Africa from the Azores and Europe and would provide additional and/or back-up facilities to those available in Spain, the Canary Islands, and Libya. 4. It is recognized that, despite possible Moroccan receptivity to such a proposal, anticipation of political and propaganda pressures, such as those brought to bear on the Government of Libya relative to Wheelus, will probably militate against Morocco openly granting unrestricted base rights to the United States. It may be feasible, however, to obtain more limited use of a base in Morocco as a storage/staging facility, possibly under the cover of a US military mission, similar to the recent CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA proposal regarding the use of Dhahran Airfield. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States must, in its own security interests, become more responsive and more committed to selected nations on the African continent. Toward this end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. Early favorable consideration be given to an increased military assistance program for Morocco, consistent with her requirements and resources, and the transfer of additional AID funds to MAP. b. As recommended by Ambassador Ferguson, joint discussions be undertaken with the Moroccans, and with the French and Spanish as appropriate, to determine specific Moroccan military requirements and ways and means of satisfying those requirements. c. During such discussions, the Department of State attempt to ascertain Moroccan receptivity to a proposal for the reactivation of one of the relinquished air bases as a US base or, at a minimum, as a storage/staging facility in support of USCINCEUR and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA contingency requirements. However, these discussions should not prejudice the establishment of the program as recommended in subparagraph 5 a, above. d. A memorandum substantially as contained in the Appendix hereto,/2/ be forwarded to the Secretary of State. /2/Attached but not printed. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
116. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/ Washington, February 13, 1965. /1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Subject Files, Ball, George W. Secret. Drafted by Komer and Assistant Secretary Williams. I have seen a certain amount of traffic about the advisability and inadvisability of the possible meeting of the President with the King of Morocco. I want to underline my personal reaction that it would be important to arrange such a meeting, if at all possible, either most informally in Rome (where the King would coincidentally be on a health check-up) or during a "refueling stop" in Morocco on the way home. Foreign Minister Benhima made it plain to me that the King was considering very seriously the future posture of his country. He was becoming more and more disillusioned with so-called African nonalignment as practiced by the radical group, Ben Bella, Nkrumah et al and wanted to disassociate himself with that group; but before taking a definite position, he was anxious to talk to the President to see whether the President understood his position and whether he could feel confidence in United States continued friendship and support. I do not believe it is the King's intention to ask for any specific military or economic assistance as some suggest. In any event, we could see to it in advance that no such request was made. I believe that it would be worthwhile for the President to have a brief talk with the King, as the meeting might well affect the future position of his country with its influence in Africa and the Arab world. He places an unusual reliance on personal contact. If the meeting becomes impractical, I think it would be a good idea for me to stop by to see him with an appropriate message from the President. W.A.H./2/ /2/Printed from a copy with Harriman's initials in an unidentified hand, indicating Harriman signed the original.
117. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Lang) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ I-22,538/65 Washington, April 16, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-MOR. Secret. Dear Governor: I am writing about a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have raised concerning the use of an airfield in Morocco as a standby facility that could be available, if needed, to support contingency operations in Africa and the Middle East. The Chiefs do not envisage establishing a US base per se in Morocco. Rather, they propose to prestock relatively small amounts of ammunition and equipment on an existing Moroccan facility. This prestockage would provide a basis for supporting US units on short notice and thus provide us with an alternative to the facilities in Spain, in the event the latter are denied to us in time of need because of political or other factors. The Chiefs' first choice as a contingency facility would be Nouasseur since, if the Moroccans go through with their plans for Nouasseur's development, it would have ample parking space, POL storage and other physical attributes that would be important to the support of a contingency operation. If Nouasseur were not available, the Chiefs consider Rabat-Sale, Kenitra and Meknes as alternatives worth exploring further. Whatever field is chosen by the Moroccans to support their F-5 squadron would probably do the trick, and the US training team accompanying the F-5s would provide a good cover for the storage and maintenance of the US stocks. I would very much like your views on whether our improved relations with Morocco offer the opportunity to work out the type of arrangement that the Chiefs have in mind. In this regard, the thought occurs that the Moroccans may find in such an arrangement a certain degree of assurance that the United States would come to their aid in the event of an Algerian attack, even in the absence of a formal defense commitment on our part. What may be a more difficult question to assess is the type of contingency, other than an attack against Morocco, where we could be fairly well assured that the Moroccans would permit us to use the prestocked facility. Sincerely,
118. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ I-22, 888/65 Washington, May 10, 1965. /1/Source: Department of Defense, JCS Files, 9118.3 (25 Jan. 65). Secret. SUBJECT I am enclosing a letter from Assistant Secretary Williams regarding the proposal to approach the Moroccan Government on the establishment of contingency facilities in Morocco (JCSM-255-65)./2/ In his judgment, the Moroccan Government either would not respond favorably because of domestic and external political considerations or, in the unlikely event of a favorable response, would demand a sizeable quid pro quo. In the circumstances, I propose that we defer action until the F-5 training program for the Moroccan Air Force is well underway. At that time, we could assess whether this program, which could provide a cover for the contingency stocks, and the then existing political factors would favor our chances of moving forward successfully with the proposed contingency arrangements. /2/Enclosure A to JCS 2409/4-1. [Footnote in the source text. The enclosure was attached but is not printed.] Peter Solbert
119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, June 12, 1965, 3:50 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 MOR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Chase, cleared by Barbour and Williams in EUR/WE and Sterner in NEA/NE, and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Algiers, Bonn, and Paris and pouched to Cairo and Tunis. 745. Deptel 735./2/ Following is FYI and Noforn, based on uncleared memo of conversation and subject to possible later revision. /2/Dated June 9. (Ibid.) Ambassador Bengelloun told Secretary morning June 12 King had asked him explain recent political decisions Morocco/3/ in view close and friendly relations our two countries. Outlined genesis crisis and impossibility find solution in face unreasonable demands of political parities and lack of clear parliamentary majority. Emphasized King's decision suspend parliament and assume control was entirely within constitutional framework and in no way resembled coup d'etat some French papers pictured. /3/On June 7, King Hassan declared a state of emergency under Article 35 of the Moroccan Constitution of 1962, suspended the Parliament, and assumed direct control of all legislative and executive functions. On June 8, he announced the appointment of a 20-man Cabinet (including 13 members of the previous Cabinet), with himself as Prime Minister. In response Secretary's question, Ambassador said initial reaction masses was favorable, because parliament "had not projected good image." It argued endlessly over petty matters and failed act on country's crucial problems. When Secretary queried regarding internal or externally-inspired resistance, Ambassador said UNFP, in person Bouabid, accepts decision, though without much enthusiasm. Istiqlal is "resolutely opposed" and challenges right of King to invoke Article 35 in situation. Mass of people want strong and stable government, however. Abroad, Bengelloun said no real reaction yet. Algeria quiet but UAR might "tend not facilitate." Secretary in reply noted USG much interested in security and prosperity of Morocco. He hoped King's pledge protect freedom of individual and rights of political parties and unions would prevent atmosphere from becoming strained, tense, or explosive. In search for economic progress, he hoped King would consult often with leaders of various sectors of community in order mobilize them and enlist their aid. Secretary offered best wishes to King during this trying time as he worked to bring Morocco back to kind of system of government he had envisaged for his people in promulgating constitution. Ambassador emphasized again this is provisional situation as King sought "return of calm." Said "King's authority is at stake." Upon preparing to leave, Bengelloun said Foreign Minister Benhima had telephoned to say King suggests Benhima visit Washington again soon to review general situation with Secretary and exchange views on current problems. In noting identity of views on many subjects, he mentioned specifically Moroccan stance on FRG relations and plans for moderating role at Bandung II. Said Benhima planning visit Bonn June 17, "which amounts to direct challenge to Arab opinion." Called Moroccan policy on FRG issue "courageous." On Bandung II, said King felt it unwise not have Afn Chief of State there so plans attend at least on day, probably June 29. Bengelloun was told Dept would establish when Secretary might be able see Benhima, possibly early July. Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
