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Morocco
99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, January 4, 1964, 4:49 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom in AF/AFN; cleared by Colonel Heffner in OSD/ISA, Hinman in AID, Beigel in EUR/WE, Valdes in EUR/SOV, and Kitchen; and approved by Williams. Repeated to London, Madrid, Paris, Algiers, and by pouch to Moscow. 1260. Embtel 947--King's request for arms./2/ FYI. Most careful consideration has been given to King's demarche to you of December 21 re possibility increased military assistance. Request has been viewed against following background: (a) Continuing importance U.S. relations both countries and Africa generally. (b) Continuing OAU efforts to establish demilitarized zone to which GOM has not yet given its support. (c) Possible further Algerian buildup in materiel which would tip present military advantage in favor Algeria once GOA overcame present training and organizational problems. (d) U.S. desire avoid arms race in Africa and restrictions on U.S. ability provide significant military assistance GOM view foreign aid limitations. (e) Desire avoid, if possible, creation new area cold war confrontation. (f) U.S. interest Kenitra. (g) Recent French military assistance to Morocco which presumably will be added to as necessary. End FYI. /2/Telegram 947 from Rabat, December 21, 1963, reported on King Hassan's December 20 meeting with the U.S., British, French, and Spanish Chiefs of Mission in Rabat, during which he expressed his concern over the growing strength of Algerian forces and noted that the Soviet Union had indicated its willingness to provide Morocco with arms. The King emphasized that he had to protect his national territory and said that he would deal with the devil himself if necessary for the defense of his country. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ALG-MOR) Following U.S. response should be conveyed Foreign Offices U.K., France, and Spain. Ambassador Ferguson should inform respective Ambassadors Rabat. In absence of significant objection Ambassador Ferguson should seek audience with King January 7 or as soon thereafter as his presence in Morocco permits: 1. U.S. is following and fully supports King's efforts to maintain and strengthen independence of Morocco and feels it has continually demonstrated its interest in Moroccan independence, unity, and progress. 2. U.S. recognizes legitimate GOM concern over shipments of military equipment to Algeria. On basis our intelligence, however, GOA still faces formidable task in attempts overcome training and organizational difficulties. In our judgment Moroccan equipment and its recent mobilization of 30,000 troops seems an adequate response. We would not wish dissuade GOM from improving its own security situation, but we believe substantial arms acquisition from whatever source requires close evaluation political and economic consequences. In our view, such acquisition, beyond that normally being supplied from French and U.S. sources not justified by assessment of Algerian forces nor by present possibilities for political settlement. 3. U.S. has noted with satisfaction considerable success King has had in recent weeks in redressing admittedly dangerous situation of last October. Constructive attitude Morocco demonstrated at Bamako, Addis, and Abidjan have reflected favorably on King's statesmanship and sense of African responsibility. Restraint practiced by GOM since cease-fire and GOM willingness resume diplomatic representation with GOA have considerably strengthened Moroccan position vis-a-vis GOA not only with Bamako conferees whose prestige involved in successful outcome their efforts but with other African states as well. 4. U.S. recognizes that problem of this kind poses difficulties in terms of compromises that may be necessary in any final solution. However, we believe progress already made by King on African scene justifies his continuing support OAU effort both by reaching such agreement as is possible on withdrawal and by considering sympathetically ultimate proposals of OAU. 5. U.S. is not aware that Algeria has placed restrictions on exchange diplomatic relations to extent indicated by King and is seeking clarification in matter. We would hope problem could be worked out in coming meeting at Cairo. We would not consider Algerian conditions unreasonable if it relates solely implementation work OAU commission. 6. In pursuing political solution, we believe keen interest both Haile Selassie and Mobito Keita is important element. We would propose King might wish make known to them his concern over arms acquisition in Algeria and Algerian response his overtures on diplomatic relations. U.S. prepared lend support their consideration of problem if King desires. 7. One important factor in establishing African sympathy for Morocco has been adverse African reaction to Algerian acceptance of UAR, Cuban, and Soviet arms in initial period of conflict. We understand arms flow to Algeria has diminished. GOM acceptance now of substantial quantities of arms from Soviets would completely undercut one aspect of support from African and, in frankness it must be added, Western sources. 8. U.S. has situation under continuing review and should it change materially we would be prepared to reexamine our position in consultation with other interested governments./3/ /3/In telegram 1019, January 11, Ambassador Ferguson reported that he had communicated the substance of telegram 1260 to Acting Foreign Minister Driss Slaoui. (Ibid., DEF 19 US-MOR) Rusk
100. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, January 24, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-10 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Stephen H. McClintic. The source text was transmitted to McGeorge Bundy on February 4 under cover of a memorandum from Benjamin Read which reads: "Transmitted herewith is a final report under NSAM 232 of the action taken with respect to U.S. bases in Morocco agreed upon between King Hassan II and President Kennedy last March." For text of NSAM No. 232, April 5, 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, pp. 231-232. SUBJECT Summary This represents a final report under NSAM 232 of the virtual completion of actions with respect to U.S. bases in Morocco agreed upon between King Hassan II and President Kennedy in March 1963. The three SAC bases were evacuated in December. U.S. naval personnel continue to operate the Naval Communications Facility in Kenitra, but as of December 16, 1963, under the Moroccan flag with their function ostensibly as a training mission to enable Moroccans to operate the base. The withdrawals were carried out smoothly and on schedule. The U.S. Air Force was able to remove that equipment not excess to its needs. The Moroccan Government, despite repeated urgings, did not come forward with projects which could justify the retention of non-excess material in Morocco, except in one instance--the decision to convert Nouasseur into an international airport. Arrangements have been made to consider a Moroccan loan application for this purpose. [Here follow Sections 1-7 of the paper.] 8. Conclusions: Despite some unresolved details and possible problems ahead we believe that the situation surrounding our withdrawal and our chances of attaining the objectives we seek are generally favorable. Transfers of authority were smooth; there was minimal attendant publicity. The fact that our departure was on schedule is in itself likely to stifle criticism of those aspects of our withdrawal which may run counter to some Moroccan expectations. Morocco's own troubles with Algeria make it unlikely it would stir up additional problems which would undermine sympathy for their cause. Our principal objective, retention of the U.S. Naval forces in Kenitra to operate the communications facilities beyond the end of 1963, has been so far agreed to without challenge. Several recent and significant expressions of interest in continued cooperation with us have also come forward. Foreign Minister Guedira declared at Kenitra, "We are making by this ceremony the beginning of an era of cooperation, active friendship and dynamic work for the cause of peace and security." Earlier in the day the King told our Ambassador the turnover ceremony would not mark the end of our relationship but a new phase and said he was sure we could work together in friendship. Thus, on balance we are inclined to believe that the U.S. withdrawal from these installations in Morocco and the transfer of command at Kenitra were effected in good order. On a broader plane, base conversion to civilian use in an underdeveloped country proved extremely difficult. Both our own procedures as well as Moroccan created problems. No commitments of like character should be made in the future without clear plans and agreed to sources of funding for property involved.
101. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, February 12, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963-March 1966. Secret. Mac-- Under the pertinent section of the new aid law the lawyers say we must cut off any new aid to Morocco on 14 February because two Moroccan ships are still in Cuba trade. We've raised this with the Moroccans innumerable times, they've promised they'd do something, but they never have. State concurs and reportedly DOD. Chief worry is whether this might cloud our title to Kenitra, which as you know rests wholly on private oral agreement. I see no valid reason to hold off. But I told State this should be strictly without publicity for as long as possible, in hopes that it might shock our lethargic Moroccan friends into doing something./2/ /2/Telegram 1338 to Rabat, February 14, instructed the Embassy to inform the Moroccan Government that in the absence of a reply to previous U.S. communications stating that Section 620 (a) (3) of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 107 (b) of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act prohibited continued U.S. aid to countries trading with Cuba, the United States had no choice but to end economic and military assistance to Morocco effective February 14. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR) In telegram 1123 from Rabat, February 21, Ferguson reported that Foreign Minister Ahmed Reda Guedira had said that Morocco did not want to violate U.S. laws but that its sovereignty and traditional policy of non-alignment were in question. (Ibid.) RWK/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco/1/ Washington, March 27, 1964, 6:35 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) 15 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by McClintic in AF/AFN; cleared by Blake in AFN, Burati in AID, and Reed in E/ISM; and approved by Tasca. 1420. Ambassador Bengelloun returning Morocco for approximately two weeks consultation on March 30. Called at Dept to convey message thanks (copy pouched)/2/ from Guedira in response Gov. Williams' message (Deptel 1361)./3/ /2/A memorandum of conversation, March 26, is ibid., POL 32-1 ALG-MOR. /3/Telegram 1361 to Rabat, February 25, transmitted a message of congratulations from Assistant Secretary Williams on the preliminary peace accord between Morocco and Algeria. (Ibid., POL 15-1 MOR) Also sought info on removal AID suspension and was told by Dept (Tasca) that problem, which complicated administratively by question cobalt, is receiving our urgent attention but would take time. Ambassador also pressed strongly for acceptance by Dept proposal he claims being advanced by Phillips Bros. to import for US stockpile Moroccan manganese, in return for US agricultural commodities to Brazil which would provide sugar to Morocco. Such stockpiling he stated now permitted for other countries, is of vital importance to Morocco, of humanitarian advantage to both Brazil and Morocco and would lessen latter's dependence on Cuba for sugar. Was told question had long been under consideration, manganese excess to our needs and of insufficient value to cover significant amounts sugar, but a further examination matter would be made on basis of which more definitive reply would be furnished./4/ /4/Telegram 1440 to Rabat, April 16, informed the Embassy that the President had determined that it was in the national interest to continue aid to Morocco despite the Battle Act finding occasioned by Morocco's shipment of cobalt ore to Communist China. (Ibid., STR 6-3 MOR) Rusk
103. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 19, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Heads of State Correspondence File, Morocco--King Hassan Correspondence. Secret. We suggest the attached brief note to Moroccan King Hassan to reassure him of our support./2/ He went home from his March 1963 visit here thinking he had found a real friend in JFK. Then we had to turn down his request for military help during the Moroccan-Algerian border war last fall. We've since heard from several sources that he thinks we've lost interest in Morocco and in him. /2/An attached note from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson reads: "Secretary of State and I strongly concur." For text of the President's letter to King Hassan, see Document 104. Ambassador Ferguson will take this letter back, which will incidentally establish the fact that he's your man. We've also drafted the letter to impress on Hassan, as we have with the Shah, the importance of internal reform. He faces a full-blown financial crisis (chiefly due to rotten fiscal planning but also nudged along by declining US aid and the cutback in US base expenditures). He may come to us again for loans which we can't give (we're already committed to $20 million to keep access to our commo facility at Kenitra). So we want to urge him to take the necessary domestic measures before stormy weather sets in./3/ /3/Bundy wrote a note on the source text that reads: "This also saves a request from Ferguson for a call on you. McGB" Bob Komer
104. Letter From President Johnson to King Hassan/1/ Washington, May 20, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Heads of State Correspondence File, Morocco--King Hassan Correspondence. Secret. Your Majesty, Let me take advantage of Ambassador Ferguson's presence in Washington to send my personal greetings and best wishes. We recall with pleasure your visit last year, and I want to assure you that I have the same friendly interest in Morocco's progress under your leadership that you found in President Kennedy during your talks with him. In fact, we Americans have closely followed your personal role in creating institutions designed to modernize Morocco. It is gratifying to see that Morocco has chosen a moderate course--that it is a country where political parties can operate and where massive efforts are being made to educate the people to play an ever more productive role in the development of their country. Your steps to improve the management of your government's resources and to strengthen the economy are of special interest to me. I realize that neither the political nor the economic path before you is an easy one. As you know, I too am engaged in a major effort here to stimulate adequate economic growth and meet growing popular needs while pursuing sound fiscal policies. We both realize what a difficult task this is, but I think we both share the conviction that the internal strength we are trying to build is the very foundation of freedom and political stability. I will count on Ambassador Ferguson to keep me informed of your continued progress, and trust that you will not hesitate to convey to me through him or directly your thoughts on ways in which we can strengthen the close and historic ties between our two countries./2/ /2/In telegram 1495 from Rabat, June 29, Charge L. Dean Brown reported that, at the King's request, he delivered the President's message that morning to Driss M'Hammedi, Director of the Royal Cabinet. (Department of State, Central Files, POL MOR-US) With all good wishes,
105. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, September 4, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Morocco, December 1963-March 1966. Confidential. RWK: Ferguson's MAP proposals for Morocco have run into heavy sledding. The big problem is that OSD has to absorb a $170 million shortage in MAP funds. (Initially counted on $1.215 billion, but recoupments are lower than expected, Congress will cut some, requirements are going up in Vietnam, Laos, Congo, Ethiopia, etc. Congress imposed a $25 million ceiling on Africa; Ethiopia takes $10 m., Congo already claims $8 m. and may go another $10 m.) So DOD hasn't yet found the money for the $2 million program Ferguson initially proposed (half training, half equipment), not to mention jets. They figure the best they can say to Hassan's request for planes and tanks is to promise a survey. DOD is also thinking of some sort of guarantee that we'd rush in MAP jets if Algeria attacks, but that doesn't look very good to me since the need would pass before Moroccans could learn to use them. The objections are strictly financial. Everyone agrees the military balance is tipping toward Algeria. Everyone agrees it would be good to help Hassan. But we just don't have the money. I think our position ought to be that it's ridiculous to say we aren't going to have any MAP at all if the Navy is still interested in Kenitra and if we're interested in a Moroccan counter to Algeria. It may be we'll have to stall on jets this year. (Nobody is even willing to think about that right now.) But we should keep the bureaucracy thinking in terms of continuing MAP for Morocco. (I've talked to AFN, ISA, Bronez, and will drop a hint to the Navy next week.) This is just a preliminary note on where we stand. State (To Rabat 95 attached)/2/ has asked Rabat, Algiers, Paris, and Madrid for some more dope on how serious the Algerian threat and Moroccan vulnerability are. When replies are in, we can push our line further. /2/Not attached. H.
106. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, October 6, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-7/67. Secret. Prepared by Komer. Amb. Bengelloun, just back from Rabat, came in this morning to make a pitch for help in the current Moroccan financial crisis. His line is that a new situation now exists, different from that envisioned when the Kennedy-Hassan aide-memoire for 1964-5 was formulated. Morocco faces a serious financial crisis brought about by problems common to less developed countries trying to invest heavily enough to launch a serious development program while coping with poverty, unemployment, vast educational needs and the other serious problems of underdevelopment. Hassan has instructed him personally to talk with Morocco's friends here, including President Johnson, and to seek aid. I dissuaded him from trying to see the President now. I told him that the President has had Moroccan problems much in mind recently, was pleased the exchange of intelligence views had gone so well, and was relieved that the immediate threat from Algeria seemed less serious than GOM had originally feared. I went on with a little speech on our interest in Morocco. There was no question about our support for Morocco's independence and progress. In fact, we had already given more aid to Morocco than to any other country in Africa except the UAR (where actual dollar aid has been relatively small). However, even that sizeable contribution was secondary to what the Moroccans could do for themselves and to assistance from France. These facts don't rule out further US help, but put our help in proper perspective. Regretting frankly that past aid has not been as effectively used as it might have been, I stressed that the biggest pre-requisite to Moroccan progress was for the GOM to put its own financial house in order. Morocco could learn a bit from Tunisia in this respect. I underscored that to do so would be the best possible insurance for Moroccan security, too. The real threat from Algeria was not the threat of an overt attack across the border; in that event, the UN, the OAU, and the Western powers would all intervene to halt the fighting as they had last year. What really made Morocco vulnerable to the Algerian brand of radicalism was internal economic weakness. Subversion, not attack, was the greatest threat. The best way to cope with this, I said, was financial reform and a serious development effort. Citing the Shah's "white revolution," I suggested, for instance, that the King himself might launch an austerity program--perhaps announcing a cut in palace expenditures as an example. Then he might get 100% behind the new development plan and make this his own political instrument, much as the Shah had done in attempting to ride the crest of change. Bengelloun probably missed the point and got bogged down defending palace expenditures and explaining the differences between the Shah (who held vast lands to give away) and King Hassan (who doesn't). Bengelloun got down to arguing that the decrease in US dollar aid is partly responsible for the current crisis. When I commented that this was the natural result of the agreed evacuation of our bases, he expressed regret that Morocco had moved in this direction. But he had to find out whether Morocco could count on US help. I replied that the important thing was to work out a solid stabilization plan with the IMF. He said the GOM would meet IMF conditions (though he probably overestimates the value of measures GOM is taking and may be seeking US aid so GOM won't have to swallow the IMF prescription). He asked specifically that we turn the $10 million we've set aside for projects under the aide-memoire into a general program loan. I promised to ask Mr. Hutchinson about the problem. (B. is seeing him 8 October), but could offer no encouragement just now. The PL 480 outlook might be more hopeful. Mr. Saunders reiterated that AID's response would depend heavily on what measures the GOM takes to remedy permanently the situation which has led to the current deficit and financial crisis. So the Ambassador should be prepared to state what his government will do to shore up its own structure. Before leaving Bengelloun mentioned that he had an Arabic letter from King Hassan thanking the President for sending the intelligence team. He would have given it to me, but was having it translated. Could he get just a minute's interview to deliver it? I talked him out of this. But I agreed to ask his friend, Mr. Bundy; he assured me he'd only take five minutes./2/ /2/Attached to the source text is an October 7 transmittal memorandum from Komer to McGeorge Bundy that reads: "Mac--Your Moroccan friend Bengelloun promises he'll only take 'five minutes' Friday at 4 pm simply to deliver King Hassan's letter of thanks for our intelligence team (this gambit worked). Even so, I'd see merit in your reinforcing my pitch to him about importance of Morocco putting its own financial house in order. We want to be helpful but our aid is marginal at best, compared to what Moroccans can do themselves. They should follow Tunisian model, and meet IMF terms for austerity program. US is not drawing away from Morocco--US is merely anxious that Moroccans use their own resources wisely, plus the really massive aid they get from French." R.W. Komer/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
107. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ Washington, October 8, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Morocco, December 1964-March 1966. Confidential. Copies were sent to Harriman and Hutchinson. The Moroccan picture seems worrisome and might be worth a look. While we seem to have turned aside for the moment Moroccan fears of an Algerian attack, their Ambassador is just back from Rabat with instructions from King Hassan to persuade us to help bail him out of his financial crisis. Moroccan exchange reserves have fallen off sharply, and the government budget is running a $70 million deficit. Though Morocco's long-range economic prospects are reasonably bright, the short-run picture is a mess. Bengelloun will undoubtedly be making a strong pitch to State and AID. Specifically, he's suggesting that we unblock the $10 million set aside for project loans in the 1963 Kennedy-Hassan aide-memoire in favor of a program loan. I'm flatly against the Moroccans using us to escape the stabilization medicine the IMF is trying to get them to swallow. However, given Ben Bella's tendencies next door, we should make some effort to keep Hassan afloat. AID will naturally be reluctant to come up with anything that looks like weakening of our resolve to get out of the budget support business, but there may still be ways to help. Perhaps if we required the Moroccans first to work out a sound program with the IMF, it might then be worth considering another program loan. But the big thing is to get these impecunious Moroccans to start helping themselves. We must be able to sell Hassan on amassing political capital by assuming personal leadership in carrying out a stabilization program and then by making the new development program (to be announced next month based on an IBRD study) his own political instrument. Only by getting him really committed can we hope to avoid future cries for bail-outs and get Morocco headed the right way. After all, it's economic not military weakness that makes Morocco most vulnerable to the Algerian brand of radicalism. A confluence of events--request for our military help against the Algerian threat, plea for a loan, new development plan, IMF negotiations--makes the time ripe for such advice. Shouldn't we gin up something here? R.W. Komer/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
108. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 16, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 330, October 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Toumayan and Chase. The conversation was held in Under Secretary Ball's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Ali Bengelloun, Moroccan Ambassador The Ambassador informed the Under Secretary of the present financial difficulties of his country, and outlined a number of measures of fiscal reform which had been taken or would be taken. He said that the King had asked him to seek increased assistance from the United States. Mr. Ball said that he had reviewed the situation, and was aware of the difficulties presently besetting Morocco. However, there seem to be substantial amounts of US aid which remained available. These unused resources might go a long way toward solving Morocco's problems. Mr. Ball stressed also the importance of a Moroccan/IMF agreement to permit a drawdown of funds to help in the foreign exchange problem. Mr. Tasca also noted the aid available which had not yet been used, and suggested a Moroccan/US review of these figures in Rabat. Mr. Ball said that this would be arranged. The Ambassador commented on the growing threat posed by Algeria's military program. Mr. Ball referred to the intelligence estimate recently concluded, and suggested that the estimate shows no imminent threat.
109. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Tasca) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, November 6, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) MOR. Secret. Drafted by Blake. SUBJECT Background: On October 16 you suggested to Ambassador Bengelloun that we send representatives of the Department and of AID to Rabat to discuss with the GOM the financial and economic problems that had prompted the GOM's request for increased US financial aid. You noted to the Ambassador our understanding that the GOM already had substantial credits which were available for utilization, including $68 million of credits from the US. The Ambassador and subsequently the GOM indicated that the latter would be pleased to discuss the problem with two representatives from the Department and AID. The talks were held in Rabat during October 23-28. As a result, the GOM is apparently convinced that it does not need increased financial help but must, instead, practice greater austerity, improve its operating procedures, and explore ways in which it may expedite utilization of the credits already available to it. For our part, we have promised to take certain steps to facilitate expenditure of over $30 million of Supporting Assistance funds in the US. The attached telegram informs the Embassy and the AID Mission of our understanding of the steps which the GOM will now take and of these which we have told the GOM we will take. We are forwarding the attached telegram for your signature to indicate the success of your suggestion and to obtain your endorsement of the need for prompt and effective follow-up. Recommendation: That you sign the attached cable./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. Telegram 231 to Rabat, November 8, stated that in view of the political importance the United States attached to Morocco, it was highly desirable that the momentum generated by the Rabat discussions be strengthened by joint U.S.-Moroccan efforts. (Ibid.) [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
