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70. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State/1/ Tripoli, March 30, 1965, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, USAFE, USCINCEUR, Baida, and Benghazi. 859. 1. During nearly two hour talk with King in Tobruq March 29 I had occasion ask for clarification certain questions relating to base negotiations. I reviewed (a) our last conversation this subject, in which he had stated objective was for US to maintain base through lifetime of agreement, (b) Muntasir's subsequent request for early announcement of date we prepared resume negotiations (within framework of objective as stated by King) and (c) Maaziq's indication no statement needed until Parliament meets and his desire review Muntasir's tactic with King before committing himself on specific request to US. I mentioned we of course welcomed Libyan objective have US remain at Wheelus long as possible and wished cooperate in whatever way best suited to obtain that objective. My govt had been studying Muntasir request in that light and in context of our mutual desire to maintain the independence and integrity of Libya and to preserve and strengthen its institutions including Senoussi Monarchy. 2. King said he very much appreciated last statement and he then reiterated that he and govt wanted US to stay at Wheelus during life of agreement and, if situation permitted, even after that date. He said he had informed Muntasir of our conversation (February 25) and Muntasir had reported to him conversation with me (March 4), including Muntasir's view that it would be necessary to do something to placate those who demanded our withdrawal from the base. King said he did not believe anything should be volunteered and that no public statement before Parliament convened should be contemplated. Even after Parliament met there would be no need to say anything about resuming negotiations unless question were asked. 3. I asked if he no longer believed in possibility taking public position explaining in full frankness his true position: that it was in Libyan national interest to keep the base at least through 1971. King said this was still possibility that would be considered at the time and he agreed that attitude and strength of public opinion must at all times be gauged with greatest care. 4. Upshot of this discussion was agreement along following lines: (a) that our objective was the same: for US to keep the base going at least through 1971; (b) that tactics he pursued following the convocation of the new Parliament May 22 might involve a forthright expression of the true intentions of the King and his govt or announcement of a date for resuming Libyan-American discussions, for example next Sept; (c) in light of (a), if discussions actually took place they would not deal with date of our withdrawal; (d) there was no present need for USG authorization for the GOL to announce a time for resumption of talks; (e) it was hoped any such statement, if required, could be deferred as long as possible, but it was recognized, that the GOL should be prepared to handle questions about Wheelus when Parliament met; and (f) further details as to what exactly the GOL wanted from US for this purpose should await discussions between King, the Prime Minister and new Foreign Minister. 5. The King said he understood Maaziq had been briefed on all aspects of situation as FonMin. He would now inform Maaziq as PriMin of our talk. King said that if I saw PriMin first I should feel free to tell him of this conversation. I thanked him for clarifying situation and we went on to discuss other subjects. 6. I asked about Mahmud Muntasir's new position, where he would be living and what his true role would be. I referred to increasingly heavy burdens King had assumed in recent months and wondered if Muntasir would not now be able lighten this load. King said that was exactly why he had appointed him as Diwan Chief. I asked if it was fair to compare Muntasir's position with that of King Hassan's Bellafrej. King Idris agreed this was correct. He went on to say that "Muntasir had agreed come and live with us here," where climate was good for his health especially his high blood pressure. Other subjects discussed reported separate messages. 7. Comment A. I consider Muntasir's recent proposal as definitely shelved for time being. Next move clearly up to GOL. B. This is no current plan for any GOL statement on base question but GOL must be ready to answer questions when Parliament convenes March 22. C. Neither Muntasir nor Buuri expected back in Libya until next week and no decision likely until they and Maaziq and King get together. Lightner
71. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the NSA." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except for the AEC representative and the Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction. NIE 36.5-65 Washington, April 22, 1965. LIBYA The Problem To assess the situation and probable trends in Libya over the next several years. Conclusions A. As long as King Idris remains active, his conservative regime will probably continue to be relatively stable and pro-Western in orientation. However, Idris will almost certainly make some concessions to the growing educated, reformist elements in Libyan society. In particular, if he came to feel that his throne was threatened by domestic pressures, perhaps stimulated by the UAR, he would be likely to demand fairly rapid withdrawal by the US from Wheelus Air Base. The chances are fairly good that the US can retain Wheelus for two or three years, but the likelihood will decrease over a longer period, and will be particularly dependent on the King's health and effective control. (Paras. 1-10) B. The chances are better than even that Crown Prince Hasan will succeed to the throne, though only as a constitutional figurehead. Indeed, the monarchy itself may not long survive, as nationalist army officers and civilians might seek to establish a republic in the post-Idris era. Such an Arab nationalist regime would be less friendly to the West. Even conservative leaders may see their interests served by setting up a republic. A growing sense of Libyan nationalism and a desire to keep control of the country's oil wealth will make appeals for UAR intervention progressively less likely. (Paras. 11-13, 21-26) C. Libya is now a major oil producer, and the massive inflow of oil revenues is creating serious domestic problems. Living standards are rising, but the gap between the rich and the poor will remain despite the government's efforts at economic development. The government's present oil policies are likely to continue for at least a few years, and nationalization of the oil industry is unlikely under any regime. (Paras. 14-20) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]
72. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/ Washington, June 25, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) LIBYA. Confidential. Drafted by McClanahan. SUBJECT You will recall that the Department and AID gave considerable attention last year to the possible establishment of an oil company foundation which would take over, at least to some degree, the activities of the AID Mission in Libya following the termination of the AID program in that country on June 30, 1965. Your personal interest in this matter did much to stimulate the oil company representatives to explore the subject and to send a survey team consisting of Dr. Alvin Eurich and Dr. Jesse Hobson to Libya in February. There is attached a Memorandum of Conversation/2/ describing the team's talk with representatives of AID and of State last April, following their return from Libya. /2/Not attached. You will note in the last paragraph of the Memorandum of Conversation, Dr. Eurich's statement that the survey team's report would be ready in a few weeks for submission to the oil industry committee in New York. So far as we know, the report has not yet been submitted to the industry representatives and no decision has therefore been made with respect to the foundation. The slowness with which the industry representatives have moved on this matter is a source of very real concern to us inasmuch as AID plans to close out in Libya on June 30, except for some twenty advisors on contract to the Libyan Government, who were AID-recruited and are partly AID supported out of previous fiscal year funds. Henry Heuser, the AID representative, may remain in Libya until July or August and will then depart. Thus we seem to be coming to a period soon when we will have neither the AID Mission nor the oil company foundation, and the latter is not even a certainty for some time in the future. Recommendation: That you telephone Mr. M.A. Wright of SONJ and express your concern that there has apparently not yet been a definite decision to follow up concretely on this excellent initiative of last year to establish a foundation to help maintain a U.S. advisory presence in Libya./3/ /3/Harriman initialed his approval on June 29.
73. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 31, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965-March 1966. Secret. Letter to King of Libya. Our Libyan affairs have taken a turn for the better and the pressure is off Wheelus Base for the moment, because King Idris fears Nasser so much he wants to keep the US and UK around. He's also worried by the talk that Britain may pull back various places for payments reasons, so has asked for reassurances we'd help defend him if attacked. The chances of such an open aggression are quite remote; far more likely that Nasser would try to trigger an internal upset, perhaps when King Idris (now 74) died. We also want to avoid any firm commitments and to keep the UK, which has a defense treaty with Libya, out in front. But with over a billion oil investment plus Wheelus in Libya, it pays to buck up the King's morale by some response to his request. Hence the attached letter,/2/ which is very carefully drafted. It says in effect only that we'd "consult immediately" if there were an unprovoked attack on Libya, but surrounds this with a lot of mood music. /2/A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Att Signed 9/1/65." For the letter, see Document 74. R.W. Komer/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
74. Letter From President Johnson to King Idris/1/ Washington, September 1, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 LIBYA. Secret. Circular airgram CA-2580, September 2, transmitted the text of the letter to the Embassy in Tripoli with instructions that it be delivered at an appropriate moment as soon as possible after the presentation of Ambassador Newsom's credentials. (Ibid., POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON) David D. Newsom, who replaced Ambassador Lightner, presented his credentials on October 16. He presented the letter to King Idris on November 8. Your Majesty: The United States is deeply conscious of the pressures on those who seek to maintain significant traditional relationships between Arab nations and their friends in the West. I am well aware of the steadfastness of the position of Your Majesty and of Libya in this situation. We in turn are determined to assist in the preservation of the sovereignty and dignity of the nations of the area and of the peace which, through so many critical years, has been generally maintained. We particularly value our long relationship with Libya and its friendship and cooperation during the years since independence. We hope with you for sustained freedom and progress in accordance with Libya's rich endowment, its traditions, and its constitution. Mindful of this valued association and common hope, the United States regards as highly important the political independence and territorial integrity of Libya under Your Majesty. Libya's first line of defense is, of course, its own forces, and we have informed Your Majesty's Government of our willingness to cooperate with Libya and other friends of Libya in the continued strengthening and modernization of these forces. Libya's own expanding resources will provide a base for the strengthening of these defenses. But a nation's strength lies also in its friends. I can assure you that the United States could not remain indifferent to an unprovoked and aggressive attack on Libya. We would in such an event consult immediately with the Government of Libya and other interested governments on the necessary and appropriate steps to meet the situation within the framework of the international obligations and constitutional procedures of all concerned. Of course, the presence of friendly military facilities within Libya provides a further deterrent to such aggression and would be a significant factor in our ability to lend assistance in such circumstances. I look forward, Your Majesty, to continued close and friendly relations between the United States and Libya over the years to come. Sincerely,
75. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 19, 1965, 7:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret. You scored with your letter to Libya's King Idris. He was quite pleased and assured Ambassador Newsom we could stay at Wheelus Airbase through our present agreement (1971) and maybe even beyond. So without promising to do any more than "consult" if Libya is attacked, we've successfully parried the King's request for a security guarantee yet still kept his backing. This is the capstone of our effort to end the threat to our tenure triggered by Nasser's February 1964 anti-base speech (a good example of how he can hurt us without spending a cent). However, this is just a battle won. While the politicians have knuckled under to the King for the moment, we can never tell when they'll stir up the base issue again. We're also vulnerable when occasional plane crashes draw attention to the base, especially if they harm Libyan lives or property. The other crucial variable is whether Nasser continues to lay off. We've come back better than we thought possible, but we're still holding our breath. Harold H. Saunders/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
76. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 27, 1966, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965-March 1966. Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary for European Affairs John M. Leddy and approved in S on February 18. The source text is labeled "Part II of IV." The conversation was held during a luncheon in the Madison Room at the Department of State. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US UK The Secretary asked whether the British had in mind that the US should assume a commitment in Libya going beyond the President's letter of September 1, 1965. The Foreign Secretary explained that British adjustments resulting from the UK defense review would eliminate the British stockpile in Cyprus, which meant that they could no longer draw reinforcements from this source for Libya. (The UK would stay in Cyrenaica.) They could if necessary transfer men from the UK, but not equipment. He asked whether the UK might understand the US letter to mean that the US would be prepared to provide reinforcements for Libya with equipment in the first instance and also with some men. He felt it was important to have a US card to play if the whole arrangement were to be considered credible. The Secretary stated that the US could not undertake any commitment going beyond the President's letter and he was reluctant to interpret the application of the letter to future circumstances. He pointed out that the letter had been written at a time when the UK position was entirely different from that now envisaged in the UK defense review. In any event, the US commitment must be regarded as junior to that of the UK./2/ /2/Telegram 3888 to London, January 7, noted that the U.S. Government had reservations about assuming primary responsibility for the defense of Libya as the British had recently requested, and asked the Embassy to express these reservations to the British Foreign Office. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-1 LIBYA) Telegram 3261 from London, January 13, reported that Embassy officials had made U.S. reservations clear to the British Foreign Office, but noted that the British had indicated they felt that the United Kingdom lacked adequate forces in the area for a meaningful intervention and that the United States was better equipped. (Ibid.)
77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, February 25, 1966, 6:18 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-1 LIBYA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Campbell in AF/AFN; cleared by Root, Lang, Meyers, and Judd; and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Tripoli and Monrovia for Kitchen. 4968. Ref: Deptel 4836./2/ Subj: US-UK Talks. /2/Dated February 18. (Ibid.) 1. Please inform Fonoff verbally of following. Dept will do same with British Embassy here: A. US is willing to have talks on Libya as soon as this can be arranged. US participants would be Kitchen, Asst Secy for Politico-Military Affairs, and Root, Director Office of Northern African Affairs. US members of the Joint UK/US Planning Group in London could be on call for military advice if required. FYI--Consideration being given to participation from DOD/ISA--End FYI. B. We propose following agenda: 1. Consider arrangements for continuing diplomatic and intelligence exchanges concerning the circumstances in which aggression against Libya might occur and a range of political and political/military courses of action to deter or counter aggression. 2. To undertake preliminary exploration of these subjects, including identification in light of UK Defense Review, of UK capabilities to support the Libyan commitment. C. Referring to discussions of the British Defense Review, the US recalls the understanding reached between principals that objective of discussions now being proposed would be to study the problem and narrow it down, with understanding that US is unable to consider further commitments. In the circumstances, we would wish to limit the forthcoming discussions to an exchange of views under the above agenda. 3. FYI--Recent discussions with UK suggest British are now seeking a firm US commitment on the forces the US would be willing to make available to assist UK forces in carrying out UK's treaty commitments. British seemed to be working on assumption that there would be little or no backup forces available from UK resources outside of Libya. We are not willing to concede this point. Only as actions under UK defense review begin to take shape will they (and we) be in position to consider various sources (BAOR or forces in UK) from which British could draw backup forces and necessary airlift. It may eventually turn out that under circumstances British will need our help, but burden would be on UK to prove necessary forces are not available from her resources. In meantime, we are prepared to continue exchanging information through political and intelligence channels on situation in Libya, and through UK/US Study Group on the size and type of forces likely to be required to meet various contingencies. Study Group would not identify, however, which country would provide specific forces--End FYI. 4. For Kitchen: Please inform London and Dept if you will be available March 7. S/S amending orders to London. We have informally told British March 7 looks suitable, subject to your schedule. Rusk
78. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, March 9, 1966, 1835Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1-1 LIBYA. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, Tripoli, CINCSTRIKE, and EUCOM. /2/Beginning in Spring 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in 6-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 4252. Subj: US/UK talks on Libya. A. Opening Session, March 7 1. Leading for Brit side, Geoffrey Arthur of FonOff stated he believed there might be some misunderstanding of effect of defense review on British intentions and military capability to honor UK treaty commitment to Libya. UK intended to honor its commitment, but, as information British intended to provide during course of talks would indicate, implementation of defense review decisions would make this task more difficult. After mentioning that withdrawal of all British ships from Mediterranean would markedly reduce deterrent insofar as treaty was concerned, he stressed that Canberra strike force at Akrotiri was retained as a deterrent for contingencies involving Libya as well as CENTO and Kuwait. He hoped this US/UK group could identify problems and (a) agree on nature threat and circumstances in which Libyan Govt might need help from outside and (b) consider current military plans and effect of defense review thereon. 2. Kitchen for US side accepted British approach to problem and ascertained that UK would not use force on purely internal threat, although British observed it was hard to separate internal from external. Kitchen stressed that US letter to King Idris/3/ commits US only to consult Libya and other interested govts in case of threat to Libya. /3/Document 74. 3. Speares circulated draft paper entitled "Libya: The Threat," conclusions of which were (A) internal situation is likely to remain stable so long as King reigns; (B) prospects of internal stability are improving; (C) threat we are concerned with is an external attack by UAR rather than by internal subversion alone; (D) UAR military intervention is likely only in circumstances in which Libyan revolution already underway and British willingness to assist legitimate govt was in doubt; (E) Egyptians would be anxious to avoid direct confrontation with British troops and any Egyptian decision to intervene would be greatly influenced by presence or otherwise of British troops in Libya and their assessment of reenforcement capability. 4. Root observed that US estimate of threat to Libya was very close to that of British and while UAR threat now seems more hypothetical than real we should remember UAR involvement in Yemen, Congo, and Algerian-Moroccan conflict. Root emphasized that US considers UK treaty with Libya very important as a deterrent because it provides framework within which military action can be taken. 5. Both sides agreed it was difficult to assess internal threat to regime but that continued, full exchanges of information were essential. 6. Speares for UK reviewed capabilities Cyrenaica defense force as being sufficient to deal with internal problems in their area of operations. Less is known about loyalty of army which British do not consider capable of opposing UAR invasion. 7. Arthur said he suspected Nasser was waiting for King's death before making moves, sequence of which might be attempt to bring off coup and establish new govt which would denounce UK treaty and permit UAR military to move in. He added that we must watch Libyan army and police like a hawk. 8. Root agreed that Nasser might proceed as Arthur had indicated. He added that UAR had been reminded of our interest in Libyan integrity. It was agreed that US would take British paper back to Washington for further comment. B. Second Session, March 7 9. UK element of US/UK planning group outlined Brit unilateral contingency plan in detail, covering three phases of steps to meet possible UAR threat in Cyrenaica. Notable that post-UK defense review revision of this plan calls for full augmentation previously contemplated, although degraded in time, and with unresolved problems of airlift and naval support. Arthur emphasized all permanent UK naval deployments in Mediterranean will be removed by mid-1968. 10. Subsequent discussion indicated Benghazi area reductions from two armored reconnaissance squadrons and two companies to one of each had been initiated by previous conservative govt by agreement with Libyan Govt, well before defense review, but would not be complete until end 1967. UK plan not operative in absence some element of external aggression, since this rather than internal coup is contingency UK committed to deal with. Moreover, it could only be implemented in response to request by GOL. 11. Kitchen and US element of planning group summarized US deployments in Tripolitania, training and staging roles of Wheelus AFB and arrangements for its protection. Stated no special planning had been undertaken as result of President's letter to King. However, also noted USG had no formal commitment to Korea or, except under protocol to SEATO, to Vietnam. 12. Arthur observed that apart from defense treaty US and UK interests in Libya essentially similar, politically and militarily, without any strong emotional involvement by either. Said consideration had been given during defense review to Brit withdrawal from treaty. Kitchen pointed out US would view such step with utmost gravity, since treaty of major importance, most fortuitous to defense of West and accepted by other Arab states. Finkelstein noted value of close and continuous US/UK consultation. 13. Arthur said HMG had admitted to Brit press that Dhekelia stockpile being cut, and Egyptians bound realize this to some extent. However, he hoped UAR would notice that a British Canberra bomber force was remaining in Cyprus, since it provided "real deterrent" to any UAR aggression against Libya. C. Final Session, March 8 14. Arthur reemphasized degradation of UK deterrent in Libya that would result from reduced UK presence in Mediterranean area, particularly removal of Brit Fleet. Since this situation only tolerable because of US Sixth Fleet, he asked whether there were any actions, political or military, which US could take to fill in gaps in UK planning, recognizing they must be without commitment to US side. 15. Kitchen expressed appreciation for continued undertaking by UK to dispose its forces in support of Libyan treaty. Noted US response necessarily limited by heavy Far East operational requirements, demands on our European airlift and other resources which might be further strained by De Gaulle's initiative against NATO, as well as US unwillingness to commit itself to a joint plan. Nevertheless, the US team was willing look into possibilities for complementary US planning which would enable fulfillment of British plan, such as airlift augmentation or more definitive utilization of presence of Sixth Fleet. Arthur observed that without some US assistance the Brit units in Libya would be very much out on limb, with sea reinforcements from UK five or more sailing days away. 16. In response Root's question, Arthur stated for record that HMG has no intention try get out of treaty obligations. Although UK plan as such not known to Libyans, may be necessary discuss matters with King if his confidence appears shaken when Brit ships removed from Mediterranean. Agreed to consult with US in normal course, and particularly in that event. 17. Discussions of possible courses of action to enhance deterrent vis-a-vis UAR included US ship visits, training exercises, firepower demonstration off Egypt to which Nasser's senior officers might be invited, and training of additional US security force personnel in Libya. Kitchen noted need not to overload Wheelus and requirement to work contemplated measures in with other Sixth Fleet requirements. 18. Root noted US less optimistic than UK over lack of trouble during King's lifetime. Again observed UK threat assessment pointed exclusively eastward, and desirability of consulting on other contingencies, such as those arising from Algeria or even Tunisia. Arthur accepted theses, and also need to consult on Libyan internal situation. Was agreed one method for refining joint threat assessment would be to exchange views on current UK paper (JIC 6615) after it had been circulated through intelligence channels. 19. In light foregoing discussion, US side undertook to raise matter in Washington with view to seeking modification of instructions to US element of US/UK planning group so that coordinated military planning could take into account problems which will arise in Brit plans as result of decisions taken during defense review and which were explained at meeting on March 7. 20. Possibility of contributions by other NATO nations to Libya also considered; although no specifics emerged, was agreed to keep matter under review. Timing of future meetings will be left to pace of developments. Bruce
79. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer)/1/ Washington, March 15, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965-March 1966. Secret. RWK: Kitchen at lunch may talk Libya. Report on his London talks attached./2/ /2/Not attached. My reading is that, while the Brits may not be trying to ditch their formal treaty commitment to Libya, they're clearly drawing a narrow circle around it. It's OK to plan how we'd deal with Nasser's army coming across the border. But we can't stop at "external aggression" as the Brits seem to. So I'd say the London talks were OK as far as they went. The Brits are worried about two things: (a) They fear Nasser will see the real weakness of their new position, thus degrading the deterrent value of their force. (b) If they actually have to put their force in the field, they'll need help lifting reinforcements. They'd like us to increase 6th Fleet visits and training exercises geared to Libya and also at least to promise we'd help them bring up their reinforcements if Nasser attacked. Washington's next bureaucratic step is to decide (a) how much we'll do to bolster the deterrent's tarnished image and (b) whether this is enough. I don't mind moving a few ships around, but I think we ought to let the Brits know the planning doesn't stop there. (I realize the Four Square planning goes on in other channels, but I think we ought to keep the focus straight.) H. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
