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80. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)/1/ Washington, April 25, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 LIBYA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell. SUBJECT Ambassador Newsom has written you inviting your attention to the problem of providing technical and advisory assistance to Libya in the absence of an AID program. (Tab B)/2/ This is a longstanding question, with which Ambassador Newsom dealt during his assignment as Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs, which preceded his appointment as Ambassador to Libya. He continues to believe, after seven months at the post, that we should reverse the decline in American advisory and technical assistance to Libya (although not necessarily by reestablishing an AID program) on grounds of U.S. political, economic, commercial and strategic interests. /2/Attached but not printed. We are planning to take up this question in the IRG and are preparing our case. Accordingly, we recommend an interim reply to the Ambassador, expressing your continuing personal interest. We will provide you with copies of relevant documents as this proceeds toward resolution in the IRG or otherwise, as well as a follow-up letter for your signature if this is indicated. Recommendation That you sign the attached interim reply. (Tab A)/3/ /3/Attached but not printed. Mann signed the letter on April 28 and it was pouched to the Embassy in Tripoli on May 3.
81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, August 26, 1966, 6:13 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-UK. Secret. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Looram in AF and Shullaw in EUR/PMI, and approved by Kitchen. Also sent to Tripoli and repeated to Baida. 36265. Subj: British withdrawal of troops from Libya. 1. During recent Washington visit, Prime Minister Wilson alluded to possibility sustaining treaty commitment to Libya without necessity for British presence. In subsequent conversations in Dept., British Emboff asked whether follow-up of Primin's brief mention this subject would be sympathetically received. Following negative reaction from Dept., British stated to Dept. they recommended to London no follow-up. 2. Nevertheless, Dept. uneasy that British attempting pave way for virtually complete withdrawal from Libya (presumably excluding El Adem), perhaps based on low-key approaches mentioned above and such discussions as that of Sarell with Newsom (Tripoli A-47)./2/ Moreover, British may believe we would not object, view our lack of reaction to reductions in Malta and Gibraltar and our knowledge their serious economic problem. /2/Dated July 27. (Ibid.) 3. We suppose that British would justify further withdrawal from Libya on financial grounds (although insignificant foreign exchange savings result since Libya in sterling area), and minimal interpretation of British obligations under Libyan treaty (which in any event they believe they can sustain without presence in Libya). British may also believe that their substantial oil interests in Cyrenaica would receive same kind of protection they judge would be extended to American interests in Libya. It may well be that only factor still keeping British in Libya is personal attitude of King, who presumably regards British as his chief protector, and need for El Adem, which, however, evidently diminishing. 4. We consider that psychological aspects of British presence are of particular importance. Departure of additional British troops might reawaken latent pressure for corresponding U.S. moves, despite personal views of King, and other important Libyans might lose significant respect for value of British (therefore U.S.) military presence. We inclined believe that if British left Benghazi, their presence only in remote eastern reaches of Libya would be tantamount no presence at all on Libyan scene, but only satisfying personal wishes of King. We believe also that once departed, British could not easily move back into Libya. We hope we have made it sufficiently clear to British that U.S. could not fill the void their departure would leave, physically or psychologically. 5. In circumstances, and especially considering pattern discerned in British withdrawals elsewhere, Dept. considers it desirable go on record in London re Libya. Therefore suggest demarche limited to discussion of Libya, based on our common interests in stability and integrity of Libya and history of close consultations over past years. In expressing appreciation for frankness with which British have discussed their defense plans for Libya, and recognition of exigencies of British situation, we might say that we would wish be equally candid in stating that we continue to consider Libya as special case, that we would be alarmed at further indications British wish minimize or eliminate their presence (although we recognize that they have plainly said they will honor defense commitment), that our recognition of British difficulties and consequent reductions elsewhere in Mediterranean should not be misread as indicating we would be indifferent to further UK withdrawal from Libya. 6. Welcome comments of addressees, but believe approach in London should be made at early date. Rusk
82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, January 11, 1967, 3:40 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-UK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Judd and Major Pinckney in G/PM, and approved by Root. Repeated to London, Baida, and Benghazi. 116386. Ref: Tripoli's 2228./2/ /2/In telegram 2228 from Tripoli, January 6, Ambassador Newsom commented on his report earlier that day that the British Ambassador had informed him that the British Cabinet had taken an "irrevocable" decision to withdraw British troops from Benghazi by December 1967. (Ibid.) 1. DeptOff reiterated to British EmbOff on January 10 our concern that Benghazi withdrawal might cause Libyans question British commitment and might expose Wheelus to additional pressure. Said we wished reinforce points made by Newsom in London and hope way can be paved to assure no adverse Libyan reaction. 2. Brit EmbOff, speaking personally, said he understands matter being presented as no weakening British commitment, in fact redispositions British forces make entry points more secure. Said no doubt British intention informing King and PriMin well in advance. Execution withdrawal needs to be "faultless" so as to cast no doubt on British intentions. Matter of Libyan offset had been considered but rejected. British PriMin message considered sufficient, since higher-level effort might result in alarming Libyans. Rusk
83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, June 2, 1967, 5:54 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Hilbert of USAF, Wolf in G/PM, Root, Bergus in NEA/UAR, Colonel Kennedy in DOD/ISA, Neuman in L/AF, and the NE Task Force; and approved by Trimble. Also sent to Baida and repeated to Benghazi, Cairo, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 207217. Ref: Tripoli 4108;/2/ Cairo 8365;/3/ Baida 567;/4/ Tripoli 4105./5/ In further conversations with Ghannai and senior GOL officials, you may draw on following with respect current concern over Wheelus: /2/Telegram 4108 from Tripoli, June 1, reported that Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Al-Ghannai had told the Embassy that he had received information that Hercules 130 planes had been observed departing from Wheelus, and had pointed out that such movements were subject to misinterpretation by the Libyan public and "other non-Libyans who are watching Wheelus movements very closely." (Ibid.)" /3/Dated June 2. (Ibid., POL ARAB-ISR) /4/Dated June 1. (Ibid., DEF 15 LIBYA-US) /5/Telegram 4105 from Tripoli, June 1, commented that Ghannai's request that officials at Wheelus exercise discretion and avoid activities that might be used as proof that the base was being used to supply Israel reinforced the need for an increase in the effort that Embassy and base authorities had been making to decrease the visibility of the base and its operations. (Ibid.) 1. USG appreciates cooperation GOL officials in present tense circumstances and desires to cooperate to fullest in reassuring Libyans that US facility in no way being utilized against Arab interest. 2. Ambassador Newsom has brought to attention senior Air Force officials in Washington Ghannai's concern over night transit and exercises. Air Force has assured Ambassador that in accordance our normal practice GOL will be advised of any unusual activities and night activity will be reduced to minimum. Some night activity necessary in view regular schedules of military transport planes in accordance normal procedures and necessary exercises and night flying training. 3. Embassy has in past indicated willingness arrange visits Ghannai or others to Wheelus at any time. This invitation remains open. 4. US continues stand by Article XII of Base Agreement. 5. USAF sending separate messages USAFE re above. Rusk
84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, June 7, 1967, 6:19 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Tron and Root, cleared by Cooper in S/AH and Bader in DOD/ISA, and approved by Trimble. 209026. Ref Tripoli 4204, 4216; Baida 579./2/ /2/Telegram 4204 from Tripoli, June 6; telegram 4216 from Tripoli, June 6; telegram 579 from Baida, June 4. (All ibid.) 1. Appreciate your efforts persuade GOL place RLAF officers at Wheelus Base Ops Center. You should continue to urge GOL to accept this offer, emphasizing we anxious Libyan representatives maintain 24-hour observation Wheelus activities in order satisfy themselves Cairo allegations totally false. 2. We consider Cairo charges about 6th Fleet and Wheelus complicity on side of Israel highly dangerous and as having directly served stir up mob action against Americans in various parts Arab world. 3. We would like be informed soon as GOL assigns any observation and liaison personnel to Wheelus so we may include this information in our publicity refuting Cairo allegations. 4. Per your suggestion we are taking steps include denial Wheelus being used in support of Israel in general denials relating to 6th Fleet activity. Rusk
85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, June 13, 1967, 4:44 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Root and Campbell of AFN; cleared by Kitchen, Lang of DOD/ISA, General Sibley of the Joint Staff, General Martin of USAF, Neuman, Judd, and NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger P. Davies; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE. 210639. State/Defense message. 1. This message requests your views on immediate future Wheelus. 2. Part I--Main elements of situation as of June 11: (a) 38 F-100, plus a few air-sea rescue and transport aircraft still on base. Flying operations limited to supply and evacuation. (b) 6300 Americans evacuated from Libya, 3305 civilians remain in country, of which 530 employees and dependents still at Wheelus. 3346 US military still on base. Unknown number third-country nationals may use base for evacuation./2/ /2/Angry demonstrations and attacks against U.S. offices in Libya occurred immediately following the outbreak of the Six-Day War on June 5. (c) Stages for defense of base, if necessary, outlined Tripoli's unnumbered telegram June 9./3/ /3/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US) (d) Security situation Tripoli area seems to be improving but presumably still subject sudden change for worse. (e) Attitude and intentions of King and GOL in aftermath of Sinai debacle still unclear. 3. Part II--Fundamental assumptions or issues: (a) Context of our base rights at Wheelus may have changed radically with events of past week. Even if lie about use of Wheelus is not perpetuated, we may find it difficult resume useful operations for some time. Question to be reviewed in both field and Washington is extent to which continued importance Wheelus function to US strategy would justify determined effort remain there in face of hostile mob actions. (b) Immediate future of country depends heavily on extent to which King and GOA reassert authority, particularly if Cairo propaganda blasts continue and local mood remains inflammatory. Presumably in own self-interest, regime will want to recover control and provide adequate protection for Wheelus, but ability to do so uncertain. (c) There is at least possibility breakdown in order leading to threat of mob action against Wheelus. Alternatively, GOL to placate local or general Arab sentiment, may demand control or even evacuation of Wheelus. (d) If King should abdicate responsibility or prove ineffectual in present circumstances, present government might be overthrown or Prime Minister Maziq simply concentrate on preserving his position in Cyrenaica. If government overthrown or effective authority reverts to provinces, successor leadership we would have to deal with in Tripolitania likely be more radical and Cairo-oriented. (e) On other hand, suggestion that US giving in to Cairo propaganda in preparing to give up Wheelus could pull rug from under King and present govt. (f) Mob action against Wheelus which Libyan security forces unable to contain would present us with serious dilemma. Use of US force justified in last analysis in protecting American lives, but physical injury or deaths among Libyans would again inflame emotions against US throughout Arab world. Resulting loss effective use of Wheelus might be only one of adverse consequences for US policy. (g) This in turn leads to two further questions: (1) whether non-lethal crowd control equipment at Wheelus (fire hoses, etc.) should be augmented, and (2) whether remaining military complement at Wheelus should be reduced to essential minimum. (h) If Wheelus becomes political and physical target, this may seriously prejudice any prospects early resumption oil flow by companies Libya. We may then have to weigh our interest in Wheelus against interest in Libyan oil. Conversely, continued US presence Wheelus may support our interest in Libyan oil. (i) If internal security breaks down or country threatened from without (e.g., by Algerians), King and GOL may appeal to us for protection. We would then have to decide whether to intervene with force in their behalf. British would presumably be faced with such request before US, given their defense treaty with Libya and presence of UK troops in Cyrenaica. (j) Assumption underlying Wheelus/Embassy defense plan (reftel) seems to be that all Americans would be evacuated and base abandoned if mob action could not be controlled. We recognize that total withdrawal from Wheelus will make it extremely difficult if not impossible ever to return to Wheelus. (k) We would contemplate intervening unilaterally with additional force only to protect American lives, and contemplate intervening with force to protect American interests (base and oil installations, or stake in survival of friendly government) only at express request recognized Libyan governmental authorities. Political implications could be far-reaching. (l) Because of British interests in Libya (including El Adem airbase) and responsibilities under UK-Libyan treaty, closest possible consultation with UK desirable but not until US has carefully considered situation and you are then so instructed. Embassy London's 10292 does not provide much reassurance that UKG has thought out its own reactions to various contingencies. 4. Part III--US interests: (a) We are in Wheelus under valid base agreement. We would want to hold on to base and retain at least essential American military complement, preserving our base rights and resuming normal operations when possible, because (1) military importance Wheelus; (2) abandonment of Wheelus might bring new risks to other Americans and other American interests in Libya and elsewhere in Arab world; (3) we do not wish to appear to be responding to and confirming false Cairo propaganda; (4) our withdrawal would probably weaken Libyan Government and Libyan security; and (5) US withdrawal except under clear and present danger could have unfavorable implications affecting US base rights in other countries. (b) We want to cooperate closely with present GOL in reducing vulnerability of Wheelus to minimum. For this we need fullest possible cooperation GOL, first, in reestablishing public order, and second, by encouraging GOL to take most effective stand to limit damages Cairo propaganda. (c) We think it tactically unwise to take any initiative to change status of base. If GOL considers some alterations, at least in appearance, are necessary, we would give any appropriate suggestions to this end our urgent consideration. (d) We think F-100's should remain on ground for time being but prepared to leave on short notice. (e) We want to avoid all actions that would further arouse Libyan and Arab passions against US or would further prejudice US stake in Libyan oil. (f) For present, therefore, we intend stand fast at Wheelus with minimum activity and hope to rely on GOL to protect base from mobs. Request Embassy Tripoli views on need and desirability reducing size Wheelus complement. (g) Meanwhile future prospects with regard to Wheelus, in light of all current factors, will be undergoing urgent review. 5. We urgently need your comments and recommendations addressees in light foregoing considerations. We especially need continuing assessment of capability GOL to maintain law and order and survive politically, and of what is likely to happen within country if GOL fails in this mission. We also anxious to have your recommendation of actions that could be taken to preserve acceptability of Wheelus to GOL and also Libyan populace in general./4/ /4/In telegram 114 from Tripoli, June 15, Newsom reported that the Embassy agreed generally with the Department's assessment. The U.S. approach should be to assume that the Libyan Government would be able to restore order and follow through on its expressed desire to resume normal relations with the United States and normal base activity at Wheelus. Newsom noted that the Libyan officials with whom he had been in contact had given no indication that they expected U.S. withdrawal from Wheelus. He believed that Libyan security officials had the situation under control and the Embassy was working with the government to keep base activities subdued. (Ibid.) Katzenbach
86. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State/1/ Tripoli, June 15, 1967, 1500Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, CINCUSAFE, and CINCEUR and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 136. Ref: Tripoli's 135./2/ /2/Dated June 15. (Ibid.) 1. Foreign Minister Bishti, with tone of deep regret, told me today of King's decision request implementation withdrawal from Wheelus. He had made similar request re British bases earlier to Amb. Sarrell. 2. In acknowledging demarche, I made these points: (A) I would report approach immediately to Washington. (B) I regretted I had not had opportunity discuss matter with King prior his decision. King had frequently shown great concern over Libyan security and dependence on U.S. role that security. He knew degree to which our military facilities represented symbol our interest in Libya. (C) While base was only one facet of U.S.-Libyan relations, Libyan request for implementation of withdrawal at this time will be interpreted by Cairo as victory for its tactics of untruth. This was time for Libya to demonstrate its independence. One cannot avoid interpreting recent events primarily as effort by Cairo with Soviet support liquidate U.S.-U.K. presence and gain domination in Middle East and North Africa. While it might be Libyan hope base withdrawal would remove irritant in relations with Cairo, Cairo almost certain to find other means attacking present regime and Libya's wealth. (D) Request coming at this time cannot but further shake confidence of Americans to Libya and in possibilities investing Libya. It would seem confirm malicious charges of U.S.-U.K. involvement. (E) In 1964, Libya had requested U.S. liquidate base and had immediately begun public and Parliamentary pressure apparently on assumption U.S. not prepared discuss issue. This did not help its resolution. I strongly hoped that Libya would give U.S. adequate time for reply and that whatever results could be handled in manner which has as its objective preservation close U.S.-Libyan ties. 3. Bishti, who obviously not happy with decision, acknowledged truth these statements, but said government under intense pressures and believed those essential steps in its program of restoring order. In response my question regarding public announcement, he said one might come today or, at latest, during Kuwait meeting Foreign Ministers on 16th. He said he hoped accompany any statement in Kuwait repeating Libyan denial of any use Wheelus for aggression against Arabs. 4. Comment and recommendation: This not unexpected, although GOL had given impression it was seeking preserve bases. Pressures for satisfactory posture at Kuwait and possible summit meeting undoubtedly weighed in balance. We should also keep in mind that U.K., given pressures for withdrawals, may well welcome opportunity to reduce presence here. In such situation we have at least these alternatives: (A) Reply that we have an agreement until 1970 and state that we believe this agreement should be respected. We should, if take this approach, be prepared for harassment and, perhaps, violence. This would require a determination of the cost we wish to pay. (B) Make further argumentation with GOL and King against decision. I attempted, before this demarche, see King on general situation, was told he was indisposed and audience could not be at least for week. I believe we should assume GOL will make statement and commit itself this policy before we can make further arguments. (C) Delay reply until situation cools. Despite my statement to Bishti. I am almost certain GOL will commence public pressure against base in belief we are stalling. This, in my view, not desirable. (D) Inform the GOL that the USG as a result of its regular review of overseas base requirements had already reached the decision to liquidate the base and would therefore be prepared to begin discussion to that end. (E) Make immediate reply that, in accordance request GOL and our position in 1964 we are prepared resume discussions leading to withdrawal and will make best effort present time table within one month. GOL will in meantime wish organize committee meet with us. I favor this approach since it will serve hopefully delay further discussion until heat of present crisis subsides, we can take further soundings locally and with UK and can then judge whether time table we present will propose long or short period withdrawal. 5. While appreciating how short time is, I believe there is value in my replying to GOL along foregoing lines prior Kuwait meeting Saturday. Newsom
87. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State/1/ Tripoli, June 16, 1967, 0905Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Secret; Flash. Repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE and passed to the White House, CIA, USIA, DOD, NSA, COMAC for POLAD, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 165. Ref: Flash State 211609./2/ /2/Dated June 15. (Ibid.) 1. Informed Foreign Minister Bishti June 16 that in accordance request GOL and our position 1964, we are prepared resume discussions leading to withdrawal. I told him that, given brief time available for reply we were not able say when we would be ready for discussions, but that GOL might wish organize committee its side. Suggested that Department might wish me return for consultation prior discussions. 2. I stressed to Bishti our hope matter could be viewed in context continuation 1964 discussions rather than in context present crisis. I read him proposed Departmental contingency statement. 3. Bishti expressed appreciation for prompt reply. He said Departmental approach thoroughly acceptable to GOL which did not plan further statements. His own statement at Foreign Ministers' meeting would mention favorable response both US and UK Governments. Newsom
88. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State/1/ Tripoli, June 22, 1967, 0945Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, and London and passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 297. Reference: Tripoli 175./2/ Wheelus. /2/Dated June 16. (Ibid.) 1. During audience with King June 21, I said I wished be certain he was aware our reply to government on base issue. He asked what "agreement" we had with government. I explained we had discussed approach with PM and planned have preliminary talk with GOL soon after which I might return for consultation. He commented, "The more delay the better". 2. In this context, I stressed need get base operating again. I stressed also my disappointment at lack confidence in US on part RLAF. He said he was shocked by conduct RLAF, including informing Egyptians regarding movements at Wheelus. He had not told government yet, but he intended move RLAF away from Wheelus to base which would be near neither Tripoli nor Benghazi. When I asked about further development RLAF, he said it would be slow. We will give them a few advisors, he added. 3. My efforts suggest to him we might find common basis for cooperation with RLAF if they remained at Wheelus were unavailing, at least for moment. 4. Comment: Throughout audience, of which foregoing was part, King displayed relaxed relief that tough problems currently facing country were, under constitution, government's responsibility, not his. Newsom
89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, June 30, 1967, 3:58 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Campbell on June 29; cleared by Eugene V. Rostow, Jones in AF, Root, Neuman, Wolf, Judd, Kohler, General Sibley of JCS, Bronez and Bader in DOD/ISA, and Hilbert; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 219716. Ref: Tripoli 332./2/ Joint State/Defense. /2/In telegram 332 from Tripoli, June 26, Newsom said that he thought the primary U.S. purpose during the first meeting on Wheelus should be to request Libyan advice and assistance on early restoration of normal base operations without prejudice to the final outcome of the discussions. (Ibid.) 1. Concur generally with your ideas for initial session re Wheelus with FonMin Bishti (reftel) and offer following comments and guidance. 2. We understand Bishti likely remain in New York at least through June 30, when Libya inscribed to speak at special UNGA. 3. We do not want to leave Wheelus at this stage and therefore should play it cool. FYI: Recent Soviet activities in Eastern Mediterranean and rumors USSR may be seeking bases in Arab countries are disquieting and further developments along this line might have effect on both US and Libyan negotiating attitude. End FYI. 4. We do not know for sure what Libyan Government actually wants us to do, and first session should probe to ascertain this. Therefore we should not be so forthcoming as to invite Libyan demands (in GOL effort to get itself off Cairo hook) that we take early action toward reducing US presence. Possible that internal situation will improve or Arabs will split, reducing pressure on Wheelus. Moreover, King has expressed desire we spin out negotiations. 5. Nevertheless, odds are that discussions will be held with GOL which is running scared. Atmosphere will be affected by (a) UNGA outcome and (b) degree of GOL success in restoring oil production, latter being test of Libyan determination and ability to lead public and control adherence to GOL policy. While USAF is under substantial handicap due to suspension of training, and there is some danger that long hiatus in training operations may make it harder for GOL to authorize resumption, the controlling aspect should be to retain US rights and presence and resume training, over longer time frame if need be, when political climate permits rather than press for immediate answer which might well invite a "no". Unstable and delicate internal situation in Libya, even under new government, may well be an additional limiting factor. We therefore leave your discretion how you play this softly and let training aspect arise without unnecessary pressure for quick decision. 6. In negotiating session you should if possible touch on content of public statements GOL may wish to issue. We assume that anything you say during negotiations will be grist for Libyan publicity mill. We hope avoid kind of publicity which might serve interests inimical to both GOL and USG. Of course we recognize desirability show forward progress. If helpful to GOL, we willing issue agreed statement (ad referendum to Dept) from Washington. 8. Re para 7 reftel, we see advantages to future negotiating sessions taking place in less formal atmosphere than 1964 meetings. USG has accepted "principle of withdrawal" at end of Wheelus agreement; discussions re means or timing, and provision for orderly return to normal operations at Wheelus, will take place in established diplomatic framework. 9. Hope that dimensions of any necessary RIF of local staff at Wheelus will not give unhelpful impression Wheelus closedown imminent. There should be no repeat no withdrawals even of surplus supplies from Wheelus that could give rise to public impression we were withdrawing now. 10. Following first session and provided local situation quiet, you will be expected proceed Washington via Germany and UK. London inform FonOff of foregoing, except FYI portion. Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
