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60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, July 2, 1964, 7:13 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-4 LIBYA-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and Blake; cleared by Warren, Runyon, Frazier Meade of BNA, Hilbert of AIR, Eric E. Oulashin, and Bronez and Heffner of DOD/ISA; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Baida and repeated to London for Lewis Jones, to Benghazi, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 4. Joint State Defense message. Ref: Deptel 106 to Baida,/2/ Baida's 189,/3/ London's 6485 to State./4/ /2/Dated June 25. (Ibid.) /3/Dated June 27. (Ibid.) /4/Not found. Request Ambassador convey to Mazziq that: 1. US desires to proceed in accordance GOL acceptance US proposal with establishment US-Libyan subcommittee on Libyanization of base. 2. As Ambassador Jones indicated the US side will consist of both diplomatic and military personnel who will be named at a later date. 3. US suggests early meeting of subcommittee for which space and staff facilities at Wheelus would be made available. US would appreciate receiving indication from GOL of earliest date on which subcommittee might meet. 4. US views purpose subcommittee as development and implementation (after obtaining approval if necessary from their respective higher authorities) of measures agreed to by subcommittee affecting existing arrangements and operations at Wheelus which will more clearly identify its character, administration, and facilities with Libyan interests. The only dates subcommittee should be concerned with are dates of implementation of phased measures of Libyanization program being developed by subcommittee through joint action. FYI: Vital this point be made to distinguish between functions Libyan-US and Libyan-UK subcommittees in order preclude misunderstanding and confusion. End FYI. FYI: At an appropriate time after Libyanization effort has progressed we would propose that GOL representatives on subcommittee, and few key personnel of MOD and Foreign Office, accept US invitation which Ambassador would be authorized extend for visit by them along with US members subcommittee to other facilities outside Libya where arrangements satisfactory to host governments are in effect. Consider this trip should not be mentioned at outset because the obvious advantages are considered to be outweighed by the disadvantage of possibly confirming any suspicion in the Libyan mind that US objective with respect to Libyanization is continued use of Wheelus by US forces. End FYI. In drafting final instructions for US side subcommittee, State/Defense considering Lightner's and Jones' comments. In this connection also request Embassy forward recommended agenda, including description and problems if any raised for US by each item, for early sessions subcommittee in accordance Hancock conversation with Paolozzi and Moody at Wheelus. Embassy and Jones authorized to freely exchange info with British on role composition and activities of subcommittee. Ambassador should not raise other aspects Wheelus problem. If Mazziq tries to raise such matters as abrogation principle, dates, etc., he should be informed Ambassador under precise instructions to follow up on only one aspect 15 June discussion, namely Libyanization subcommittee, and has no instructions other subjects as yet. Rusk
61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya/1/ Washington, July 20, 1964, 9 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-4 LIBYA-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Blake; cleared by Warren, Runyon, Harriman, Judd, Tasca, Bronez, Lang in DOD, and Jones in NE; and approved by Newsom. Also sent to Tripoli and Cairo, and repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 22. Following constitutes line you should take with King during expected audience with him this week. In advancing these points you should do so in context your desire acquaint King with current status Wheelus negotiations as we see them. You should not associate your approach with Maaziq's remarks Cairo and should carefully avoid any appearance either of rebuttal Foreign Minister or criticism of him. Suggest you preface remarks by stating you desire bring HM up to date on base matters as US see them, stressing that high level elements USG have been continuously and deeply concerned with exploration ways of meeting major policy problem posed for US by wholly unexpected March 16 demand by Libyan Parliament for abrogation 1954 agreement and evacuation Wheelus base. Preoccupation USG with this problem result not only of suddenness of Libyan demand but also prompted by grave concern over impact any hasty US decisions this matter, particularly with respect abrogation agreement, would have on US base rights arrangements world-wide as well as local arrangements Libya. Important training function of Wheelus in relation to US regional responsibilities also factor US cannot afford lightly to dismiss. Successful maintenance political stability and peace in critical areas of world directly depend on awareness would-be aggressors of US presence and extent of US commitment to peace. Consequently, US has necessarily had to view Wheelus question in this wider context. At same time, US has endeavored see Wheelus situation in Libyan terms as well. This evidenced by fact US has: 1. Accepted Libyan statement of February 23 that Wheelus agreement will not be renewed on expiration 1971; 2. Declared that by terminal date 1954 agreement US presence will have been withdrawn except for such Americans as GOL may agree should remain; 3. Agreed examine possible alternatives to Wheelus and has already begun to do so with promise to make available results of study in 1965; 4. Undertaken study to determine equipment and personnel that can be moved out of Wheelus, preliminary results of which indicate initial reductions can be made this year; 5. Sponsored proposal for closer identification Wheelus with Libyan national interests and for training of Libyans to operate base when US withdraws through Libyanization program and has recommended to GOL that measures to that end be developed soonest. US attaches substantial importance to cooperative efforts both governments this regard which it hopes will begin soon after GOL names its members Libyanization subcommittee; 6. Negotiated and is willing continue negotiate in good faith with GOL through intermediary of Special Representative designated by President for that purpose as evidence of importance US attaches to development mutually satisfactory solution to problem and longer term relations between both governments; 7. Agreed to military sales agreement to GOL on concessional basis with view strengthening Libyan defense establishment. In concluding your remarks, you should recall the even and friendly course of US-Libyan relations since independence Libya and US desire preserve those relations in interest both countries over longer term. Essential element any such preservation must be determination not exaggerate differences which from time to time will inevitably arise between US and GOL. US has had major differences with other friendly governments in past. In all cases their resolution has depended upon recognition both sides that much more to be gained by mutual comprehension and acceptance each other's basic good faith than by indifference to each other's sensitivities and interest. For Cairo: View our continued desire keep Wheelus discussions in low key, and particularly avoid involvement UAR, suggest Embassy generally avoid any comments on Maaziq remarks if queried by local sources. However, no objection if Embassy wishes to draw on foregoing information in providing background to any sources friendly to US which might be interested US side of question. Rusk
62. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 30, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret. McGB: Time may be running out on our effort to stall for time in negotiations over Wheelus. The King told Lightner Tuesday/2/ the Libyan parliament will be reconvened in August just to hear a report on the base negotiations. /2/July 26. The Libyans want a definite agreement that we'll get out before 1971. They'll wait till early next year to talk dates. RWK and I have argued for this right along because it makes more sense to bargain for as much as we can get than to be thrown out standing on our treaty right to stay till 1971. So far we've only said we can't talk about abrogating the agreement but we'll talk about a departure date next year after we've studied alternatives. So the Libyans think we're sticking to 1971. We've tried to hint that the date will be sooner, but Air Force hasn't let us come out and say so because it still hasn't faced the fact that we'll have to get out early. State sees the realities as we do, but is doing its best to buy as much time as possible for the Air Force. Part of our problem is that bases have become a football in Libyan infighting. The PM never explained our position to the King, so we've lacked the help of a traditional ally. The King needs British troops more than American planes, so now he's inclined to split the difference with the anti-base group--be tough on us and soft on the UK. The King recently got wind of Defense Ministry plotting and put the kibosh on an arms deal we'd negotiated to get the military on our side. (Fortunately, he's relented on the jets we'll sell to keep working with the new Libyan Air Force at Wheelus, though he sacked the Defense Minister.) We're considering sending Lewis Jones back next month to reassure the Libyans we're not trying to stall indefinitely, though a note from him may be enough. The big question Air Force faces now is whether to risk further stalling or to make the best of an early out. If we keep stalling, parliament may abrogate the treaty unilaterally. When we move, we face the political and other problems of relocating the huge Wheelus operation (probably in Spain)./3/ /3/A handwritten note by Bundy in the margin reads: "Thanks for memo. Keep me informed. DOD can help with AF if need be." Hal
63. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 8, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret. Libyan base issue. Under pressure from the Libyans we've agreed to let Libya announce that the US accepts the "principle of withdrawal" from Wheelus air base (with no dates mentioned) when Libyan parliament meets, probably in late August. We've done pretty well stalling the Libyans since the crisis over Wheelus base broke last February. We've asked them to set aside the question of abrogation (this would set a bad precedent for base agreements around the world) and to concentrate on gradual Libyanization of the base. We've promised we'd talk date of withdrawal early next year, after we've had time to figure out where to relocate Wheelus operations. But Libyans have been insisting we give them something more to say to their parliament indicating we're responsive to their desire to end the base agreement. Now the Prime Minister (under some prodding from the King) has backed off a bit. He thinks he can satisfy his parliament for the moment if we simply agree to "withdrawal" in principle. Libyans will read this as US agreement to get out well before 1971, but we think it's the minimum concession we can make to avoid risk that we'll be told to get out now. It buys us time to bargain hard next year on the actual date for withdrawal. In turn for our accepting this compromise, we hope to get Libyans to keep their press and parliament from heating up the base issue again. While this deal may not stick, it's worth the try. If we give a little we may be able to hold on to Wheelus for 3-4 years. The Air Force and some in DOD favored a stiffer line, but this was asking for trouble. R.W. Komer
64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya/1/ Washington, August 8, 1964, 11:25 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-4 LIBYA-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez, Strong in NEA, and with BNA and CIA; and approved by Tasca. Also sent to Tripoli, Cairo, and London, and repeated to Benghazi, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 39. Refs: Deptels 37 and 38 to Baida./2/ Acceptance principle withdrawal from Wheelus and agreement report on timing in 1965 represents U.S. decision designed maintain satisfactory relations with Libya and create best possible atmosphere for reasonable discussions on modalities of withdrawal. Department does not exclude possibility, however, that, despite previous assurances, Prime Minister Muntassir or Foreign Minister Maaziq may now find U.S. position has not gone far enough and that, either independently or under GOL stimulation, parliament may still order abrogation of 1954 agreement and establishment early date for evacuation Wheelus. /2/Telegram 37 to Baida, August 7, transmitted the text of a letter from Lightner to Prime Minister Muntasir stating that the United States accepted the principle of withdrawal from Wheelus. (Ibid.) Telegram 38 to Baida, August 7, instructed the Ambassador to tell Muntasir that the United States was reiterating in writing its acceptance of the principle of withdrawal, provided that he would confirm that the Libyan Government would not press for further discussion of this matter until 1965 when the U.S. study of the problem was completed, that it would make every effort to maintain a satisfactory climate for discussions, and that it would be reasonable in discussing terms for withdrawal. (Ibid.) We believe, therefore, it most important make greatest possible effort, as appropriate, assure key figures that: (1) this had been difficult decision for U.S. but we intend carry out our part in good faith and in manner designed maintain best possible relations with Libya; (2) given this step on part U.S., we would regard any unilateral action by Libyans as most serious matter, reflecting not only on good faith Libyan Government, but casting doubt, as well, on Libyan good faith in other matters involving international agreements; (3) additional pressure on U.S. at this time will not make early resolution this matter any more likely and could seriously complicate it. For Baida: Accordingly, we suggest, after presentation note to Muntassir: 1. Informing King in most suitable manner, transmitting, if possible, copy of letter to Prime Minister to King through Khoja. 2. To extent we can do so without antagonizing GOL, informing friends of U.S. who may have influence on government or in parliament. 3. Coordinating closely with CAS which being separately alerted this problem. For Cairo: (Reftels being repeated separately) Once you receive word GOL has been informed of substance reftels, desire you inform GUAR in manner best designed reach Nasser of U.S. decision accept principle withdrawal and discuss details in good faith in 1965, expressing at same time hope nothing will be done by GUAR disturb atmosphere for reasonable resolution this matter. For London: Desire you inform HMG of U.S. decision this matter and request such assistance as UK feels it may appropriately give through its influence in Libya to insure smooth acceptance U.S. step. We know UK appreciates this step on our part more difficult in many ways than their own recent decision. When GOL has been informed Baida, we intend call in Libyan Ambassador Washington and stress our desire this decision be accepted in manner consistent with friendship two countries. Rusk
65. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 12, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret. McGB: Libyan PM Muntassir has bought the deal we offered on Wheelus (Baida 55)./2/ In return for our accepting the "principle of withdrawal" he's agreed to wait till next year to talk dates and to set aside the question of terminating the base agreement. He also said he'll try to calm public opinion and be reasonable in talks on Libyanizing the base (and later on withdrawal date). /2/Attached but not printed. In telegram 55 from Baida, August 10, Lightner reported that he had called on the Prime Minister, who had readily given reassurances on the three points the Ambassador had been instructed to raise. Muntasir had said, however, that he hoped the United States was also agreeing to take steps before the end of the year to lay the groundwork for future talks concerning dates of withdrawal. Muntassir has proved more reasonable than Foreign Minister Maaziq, so we're not entirely out of the woods. There will probably be a press flurry when Muntassir reports our acceptance (possibly later this week), and Maaziq could stir up trouble at the Arab Summit conference beginning the end of the month. However, we've come off about as well as we could hope so far. We'll start talking Libyanization as soon as the Libyans name some people to talk with us, and we're ready to talk dates early next year. Hal
66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, October 15, 1964, 5:35 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Lee of USIA, Hilbert of Air Force, Chapin in M, Warren, and Bronez; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to London, CINCUSAFE for General Disoway, and to CINCEUR. 236. Ref: Tripoli's 253./2/ Audience with King October 6 most helpful in providing further elaboration King's view on base issue. /2/In telegram 253 from Tripoli, October 7, Ambassador Lightner described a meeting with King Idris on October 6, during which the King said that the United States should not take the Libyan Government's demands for evacuation of Wheelus or early agreement on dates of withdrawal seriously. Such demands were necessary because of pressure from the Arab League states. The King noted that the negotiations in 1965 could lead to agreement to defer discussions for 2 years. If there were no agreement in 1971, he might ask for an extension, especially if there were a mutual defense pact between the two countries. (Ibid.) We naturally take most seriously what King has said as indication his probable feelings this matter and will take views into account in our planning. Against background King's statement and with objective of retaining Wheelus for longest time possible consistent with US objectives we believe following should be broad strategy: 1. Complete study and obtain early approval of CINCUSAFE Action Plan. Implement those portions which are acceptable and can be implemented within current resources and capabilities, all in coordination with general strategy. 2. Seek through sub-committee to impress Libyans with complexity costs and technical requirements to maintain and operate base and offer closer association on base with Libyans. 3. Be prepared for Libyan pressures to make statement to new Parliament; hopefully, only new element any such statement if required would be based on subcommittee progress. 4. Plan for opening negotiations during first half 1965 which will offer increasing Libyan involvement at base and to extent possible and necessary reduce less important US activities while preserving basic US training activities against possible ultimate reversal pressures for complete withdrawal. These negotiations should seek basis for phased arrangements acceptable to King and GOL while preserving US presence and avoiding specific commitment on withdrawal dates. 5. Keep King informed directly of approaches and results of meetings. 6. Avoid mention in any manner to Libyan officials King's intentions as expressed to us. Such strategy takes note of fact King does not intend reveal his thoughts to GOL. As Ambassador has noted, matter remains in hands Libyan Government and pressures continue for early agreement on withdrawal, as evidenced by statement Libyan Crown Prince October 8 at Non-Aligned Conference that negotiations are now in progress in order to fix a final date for withdrawal. Comments thus do not alter significantly practical negotiating problem US will have to face in sub-committee meetings and in 1965 negotiations based on acceptance of principle of withdrawal. Although King does not intend disclose his views, we can expect enlist his support at critical moments to moderate Libyan position even though we find little basis for expectation he will take any action now reverse present pressures. Re King's suggestion of Mutual Defense Pact: We have serious doubts any GOL government in present situation would be prepared seek parliamentary approval and sign such pact in face recent demands for abrogation existing agreements. From US viewpoint, while we are prepared reiterate our interest in independence Libya, formal pact raises numerous problems regarding post requests for similar guarantees from other Mediterranean powers as well as Congressional considerations. Rusk
67. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)/1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret. Copies were sent to Harriman, Rostow, Bundy, Hutchinson, and Polk. Washington, November 10, 1964. May I urge that the time has come to gin up an action program on Libya. In four years I haven't met a single optimist on this non-country; there are only varying degrees of pessimism. True, Libya is no more fragile than many other African or Arab states, but we have a very special interest in it--not only because of Wheelus Base but oil investments approaching $1 billion. We've spent a lot of time and energy devising a good strategy to prolong our hold on Wheelus. But we've been rather passive about the larger problem--preserving Libya's independence by helping it toward a higher degree of internal stability and growth. From where I sit, we don't seem to be worrying enough about Libya--not State, AID, DOD, CIA, or above all the British, who seem either unduly complacent or increasingly prepared to write Libya off. A more active policy wouldn't necessarily cost us much, because Libya's own oil revenue (if halfway efficiently used) would more than suffice. What we mostly need are some ideas, energy and preventive diplomacy. With luck, we may have a few years yet before a succession crisis calls Libya's future into doubt, but it could happen any time. So I see merit in mounting a preventive effort right now. Inter-agency task forces seem a bit passe these days, but why couldn't an informal action program be drawn up under State's leadership? An NPP might be in order, but this would take too long. As an initial stop, Dave Newsom when in London Thursday could be instructed to probe hard for both the UK's own sense of the situation and what concrete measures they might propose. Given our still substantial joint interest in Libya, there might be merit in developing a joint program. Second, why not tell Dave that, when he gets to Libya, he should ask the Embassy on your behalf to come up pronto with its own version of an action program, aimed at complementing our Wheelus negotiating strategy by focussing on a broader target. Third, why not ask the Agency to come up with some political action suggestions aimed at strengthening Libya's independence and fortifying the position of friendly elements. None of us have any brilliant ideas as yet, but we're never going to get any unless we start worrying the problem. Fourth, we might think again about discreet ways of warning off Nasser, for whatever these are worth. Fifth, are we or the British doing enough to encourage the Libyans to spend their own money wisely? I fear we have concluded that our aid phase-out deprives us of much leverage. I'm not sure this is valid, given Libya's continuing dependence on US/UK support for its very security. But at any rate, I'd rather make an effort and fail than not make one. The above ideas by no means exhaust the possibilities; others may have wiser thoughts. But the real need is to anticipate the problem while there's yet time. I'm sure you agree with me--the important thing now is to bell the cat. R.W. Komer/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
68. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, December 9, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret. RWK: Pending any new ideas Dave Newsom may have brought back, here's where we stand on Wheelus. State is waiting for Defense's response to draft negotiating instructions for the next round of talks (possibly February-March). Defense hasn't formulated a position yet, although it has launched OP Plan 2, a program to make Wheelus more palatable to the Libyans. However, Defense admits we have to start thinking seriously about the next round. Newsom plans to get things going this week. Defense has not made any massive study of alternatives such as we told the Libyans we'd have to make before we could talk about a departure date. The only other possible locations Defense sees are: (1) relocation of training activities at Moron AFB, Spain, at a construction cost of about $40 million plus whatever we have to pay Franco in MAP or political concessions (present agreement ends 1968) or fragmentation of training activities among several bases, including rotation to US (no price tag for this). Defense figures it could move in 2-3 years if necessary. These are DOD conclusions, but there isn't any big "study." However, Defense doesn't see this "study" as the real prerequisite for the next round of talks. They see the "study" as a fiction Lewis Jones invented to stall the Libyans. DOD doesn't want to set a date for getting out if they can avoid it, though obviously they could pick one out of the air as easily as they could set one through any massive study. They want to try stalling for another round. Defense would go back at the Libyans--not with a date but with a new package for joint use of Wheelus. The big new enticement would be moving the Libyan civil international airport to Wheelus. The Libyans want this, and USAFE has now reversed field and decided it could tolerate this. DOD hopes the base could then be designated as a Libyan airport and joint USAF-Libyan air force training center with our training activity as tenant. I'd recommend asking DOD (perhaps Bill Lang) to do a short memo listing the possible bases where Wheelus activities could be moved and explaining what's good or bad about each. At least this would clear the air between State and DOD. As long as Defense won't document its reasons for wanting to stay at Wheelus, State will suspect that the "reasons" are typical Pentagon overstatement. A concrete list could at least get us talking about the real issues--Defense wants to stall and stay as long as possible while State doubts we can put GOL off much longer. HHS/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
69. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1965-March 1966. Secret. Washington, March 19, 1965. RWK: Wheelus roundup for London. We've just been through another three weeks of Muntasir's maneuvering to get some political mileage from Wheelus. On 25 February Idris told Lightner he wanted Wheelus to stay. He suggested we just let "negotiations" drift while he'd contain opposition. He even said the government might support our staying through 1971. Then Muntasir got to him and persuaded him that such blunt tactics wouldn't work. Presumably with the King's OK, Muntasir has now proposed we convene one showcase negotiating session in May and then step up the work of the committee on Libyanizing Wheelus. He wants a note from Lightner to this effect. State has agreed generally with this scenario provided Lightner reaffirms our understanding of Libyan interest (as stated by Idris) in our staying on. Everybody realizes Muntasir may further undercut the King's position. However, we've gained a year by our stalling and May would be 3 months after we thought we'd have to talk again anyway, so we're not doing badly. Idris accepted the British plan for pulling their garrison out of Tripolitania by March 1966 while staying on in Cyrenaica for another 3-4 years. Muntasir has asked for a UK note too. The attached paper/2/ (which Newsom gave the British several weeks ago) will be the framework for London discussion of broader Libyan problems. It's the best description of the problem I've seen, but it's still far from an action program. It still banks (probably rightly) on trying to put the CP on the throne. But I think you ought to come down hard on plans for a military government or republic if the CP flops. That's where we ought to be putting our effort. We ought to press for a concrete plan within 3 months. /2/Not attached. HHS/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
