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50. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 3, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memoranda of Meetings with the President, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by William H. Brubeck of the NSC Staff. The meeting was held at the White House. MEETING WITH PRESIDENT RE GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S REPORT ON TRIP TO GHANA, NIGERIA AND CONGO--APRIL 3, 1964 PRESENT 1. Libya Harriman reviewed his trip/2/ saying that Libya seemed to be most difficult and urgent immediate problem of the countries he had visited--both in terms of the Wheelus base and the future for US oil investment. He thinks both covert and open action programs are needed. /2/On a fact-finding trip to Africa, Harriman met for 3 hours on April 1 with the Ambassador and the Country Team in Libya to discuss the forthcoming Wheelus negotiations. A summary of this meeting was transmitted in airgram A-331, April 9. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-4 LIBYA-US) The President said that he is very much concerned about Libya and asked how soon Harriman estimates the Libyans will seriously demand we evacuate the base. He also asked for specifics on US oil investment in Libya. Harriman indicated we ought to be able to protract our tenancy and our negotiation on the base for several years if it is well handled and that the British will be trying to do the same. Beyond the short-range base problem, however, he is concerned with the security of the very large oil investment and plans to talk to Jersey Standard and the other major companies involved. On the base issue Harriman said the situation is now out of hand and the Ambassador and his staff show little ability to deal with the problem. He thinks it essential that a competent negotiator be appointed to handle the negotiations rather than leave them in the hands of the Embassy. He emphasized also the need to counter the heavy influence of the Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" radio. This is a particularly difficult problem because of the "super Arabism" and anti-Israeli sentiment in Libya. Harriman thinks a propaganda effort is required to create distrust of and opposition to Nasser in Libya. Governor Williams said he had warned Nasser on his visit to Cairo a year ago of the serious view the United States would take of UAR interference to jeopardize US oil investment in Libya. The President requested Governor Harriman to get Carl Rowan's personal attention to the propaganda problem./3/ /3/That afternoon, Harriman gave a brief report on his trip to Libya at an NSC meeting with Congressional leaders. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. I, Tab 7, April 3, 1964, Various topics (Panama, etc.)) [Here follows discussion of the Congo, Zanzibar, and Ghana.] William H. Brubeck/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
51. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 11, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I. Secret. We've bought some time in Libya by agreeing to begin base talks 29 April. Our strategy is to be forthcoming at the outset but then bargain hard. Meanwhile, Parliament has been in recess and press attacks have quieted down. Most important, the King is now making an effort to hold the line, and we're thinking of a message from you to stiffen his spine as negotiations begin. He tightened his grip on the government last month by threatening to abdicate and then giving in to pressure to stay on. He also told us Thursday that he expected elections early in the fall to produce a "more reasonable" Chamber--with the clear inference that he'd see to it (but we're not succumbing to overoptimism). Badeau on 5 April got Nasser to agree to lay off US bases. However, his attacks on the British for bombing the Yemeni fort at Harib can't help but spill over on us in Arab minds. And any signs of a major pro-Israeli move by us might call all bets off. We'll have a negotiating strategy to show you next weekend, and are developing an action program to get key Libyans to back whatever agreement we can get. With luck, we should be able to hold on to our most important Wheelus assets for 3-5 years (and some even longer), though much will depend on what happens elsewhere in the Arab world. R.W. Komer
52. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, undated [ca. April 20, 1964]. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 291, Libya Base Rights. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 291, Libya Base Rights. Secret. SUBJECT /2/Document 45. I enclose a proposed action program prepared in response to NSAM 291, dated March 19. The paper has the concurrence of the Department of Defense and AID./3/ /3/Attached but not printed. There follows a summary of the important points covered in the action program. The United States has agreed to a Libyan request to discuss in Libya on or about April 29 the agreement of 1954 on Wheelus Air Base, an installation considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be of primary importance to the security interests of the United States. The United States objective in the discussion is to preserve facilities at Wheelus for as long as possible, consistent with the preservation of the independence, stability, and friendship of Libya. The British are opening similar discussions to preserve the future of their Libyan base arrangements and treaty on April 20. We are coordinating closely with them. Pressures for the withdrawal of the United States from the Wheelus Air Base result from a feeling of greater nationalism in Libya, crystallized by a February 22 speech of President Nasser of the UAR. Since then the Government of Libya and the King have assumed greater control of the situation and have helped create a better climate for reasonable discussions with both the United States and Britain. Current United States actions described in the enclosed paper are designed to: (1) create a suitable climate in Libya for reasonable discussions; (2) win support in Libya for a continued United States presence; (3) enlist the interest of friendly governments; (4) prepare in detail for actual discussions with the Libyans; and (5) insure that the United States and the United Kingdom are in harmony. Despite the current pressures in Libya, it is considered possible to work out arrangements in the discussions which will enable the United States to continue using facilities in Libya for a considerable period, perhaps until, and on a limited basis even beyond 1971. This prognosis could be upset, however, by renewed attacks from Nasser, further unrest in Libya, British policies against Yemen, or Arab reactions to United States policy toward Israel. Dean Rusk
54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, April 24, 1964, 5:38 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-4 LIBYA-US. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez, Tasca, Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Charles Runyon III, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration Thomas Stern, and Warren; and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Baida and repeated to London, CINCUSAFE, and CINCEUR. 448. Wheelus. Embassy may inform GOL Ambassador Lightner accompanied by a Special Representative, Ambassador G. Lewis Jones, who has been designated to represent the U.S. in base discussions, prepared meet with Foreign Minister Mazziq in Baida April 29 to open discussions on base question. Following are instructions for Ambassadors Lightner and Jones for April 29 meeting: Initial UK-GOL meeting on bases indicates opening session will be limited to formalities. U.S. objectives April 29 should be: (1) to make clear U.S. not prepared to agree to an abrogation of agreement or immediate liquidation of Wheelus Base and related areas; (2) assure GOL we are, nevertheless, prepared understand problems of GOL, changes which have taken place in Libya, and, in light these, examine all aspects of the problem on the basis of the existing agreement of 1954, believing that this framework will permit a thorough examination of the problem. Accordingly, on assumption Libyan side will again present request for abrogation and liquidation based on parliamentary resolution of March 16, Ambassador Lightner should reply: 1. U.S. believes Wheelus Base relationship is significant for Libya's own security as well as being of importance to the United States and other nations friendly to both. 2. U.S. has agreed to discuss this relationship on the basis of the existing agreement of 1954 and believes that this framework will permit a thorough examination of the problem. 3. Should the examination of the problem disclose areas where changes appear to be necessary, the United States is prepared to negotiate on these points to bring about a solution satisfactory to both parties. 4. As an indication of the desire of the United States to provide full opportunity for a thorough examination of the problem, the United States has, following the pattern of other recent negotiations, appointed the Honorable G. Lewis Jones as a Special Representative with the rank of Ambassador, to meet with the Libyan Government representatives on this question as desired. 5. The United States is ready to proceed with the discussions at such time as the Libyan Government may desire. While U.S. does not wish encourage Libyans believe current pressures on them necessitate changes in Wheelus relationship, we do not believe changed atmosphere and pressures on bases can be denied. If, therefore, question pressures and changes raised, Ambassador may state U.S. has followed recent events but believes base relationship remains matter to be resolved by countries directly involved. Additional detailed instructions are being prepared for use in later substantive discussions. Rusk
55. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 1, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64. Secret. McGB: We hit a stone wall in Libyan Foreign Minister Maaziq when Wheelus talks opened Wednesday./2/ In addition to ranting about ineffectiveness of US aid, he demanded we terminate the base agreement, negotiate terms of withdrawal and cancel MAP (about which he turned out to be totally uninformed). /2/A detailed account of the April 29 negotiations between the U.S. and Libyan delegations at Baida was transmitted in airgram A-47 from Baida, May 2. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-4 LIBYA-US) Maaziq's approach contrasted sharply with King's and PM Muntassir's. Just before talks started, Muntassir told Jones and Lightner he was sure we could find solution "even if by camouflage." Jones is having lunch tomorrow with Muntassir to express amazement and unhappiness at Maaziq's tack and to try to figure out what Muntassir-Maaziq are up to. State is cabling its support for his approach. If Muntassir can't or won't soften Maaziq's line, our getting to the King will be all the more important. Their tough opening may just be Arab bargaining, but Maaziq's tirade makes it sound more like Arab nationalism. Jones will be back here next week to report so we can get our next steps lined up. My sense is that Maaziq must go (and we could get rid of him by carrying tales to the King), but State will take its usual two weeks to come around to same conclusion. Lightner probably also needs to be replaced but the Old Crocodile can be depended on here. RWK
56. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 15, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret. Talks with the Libyans on Wheelus base started 29 April and recessed. Lewis Jones, our Minister in London, launched them as our special negotiator and ran into a stone wall. The Libyans insisted on talking only about ending our tenure, so he never got a chance to do more than hint at our plan for gradually transferring nominal control of Wheelus to them, while we stay on as a tenant. Now State and Defense are hammering out our position for the second round, probably in early June. Jones' formula is to agree in principle to talk about leaving Wheelus but to ask the Libyans for 6 months to study timing, alternatives and other complicated aspects of closing down. This would get us past the touchy period of the Eshkol visit's aftermath; the Arab summit (August), Organization for African Unity (July), and non-aligned (October) conferences; the current UK-Arab flare-up over South Arabia; and our own elections. However, Defense is still studying this idea, and State will probably end up treating it as a fallback position. Events have overtaken Rusk's action plan (Tab B),/2/ but it would be helpful for you to note it to show your continued concern. We also want to be sure the agencies don't lose sight of our long-run interests in Libya while concentrating on the base negotiations. NSAM at Tab A for your signature will keep the heat on./3/ /2/See Document 53. /3/Attached but not printed. The NSAM was never issued. R.W. Komer/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya/1/ Washington, May 21, 1964, 7:55 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 LIBYA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by McClanahan; cleared by Bronez, Hancock of USAF, Sol Polansky of SOV, and Tasca; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to London, Tripoli, Benghazi, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 79. Baida's 141./2/ During private conversation with King on May 23 you should convey to His Majesty following points: /2/Dated May 21. (Ibid., DEF 15 LIBYA-US) 1. We are studying results of opening session US-Libyan talks. 2. Insistence by Libyan side at that time on abrogation as basis for discussions naturally creates great difficulties for us because of the great importance of our Wheelus Base facilities to us and prevents useful discussion of other mutually advantageous possibilities. 3. We are sure that this matter can be worked out by means which will be satisfactory to both Libyans and ourselves although inevitably matters of this kind require time. We are certain that a full examination of the possibilities of cooperation at the base will reveal areas of activity which can be developed to the mutual advantage of both nations. 4. We have been approached by Libyan military concerning military assistance and possible purchases and are responding sympathetically in this field. FYI. We are not suggesting by foregoing initiation of substantive discussion or negotiation with King on base issue but propose language as talking points through which you and Col. Dregne may be able evoke some indication King's current thinking this problem. End FYI. We believe would also be useful to underline to King frequent Khrushchev references bases during Egyptian visit as indicative of common UAR and Soviet interest this matter and Khrushchev remarks concerning Arab unity which cannot but run counter general Arab sentiment./3/ /3/After having lunch with the King and Queen on May 23, Lightner reported that he was barely able to get in the main points in the Department's telegram and that the King obviously did not wish to discuss the negotiations. The main subject had been the many services provided by Wheelus to Libya, and the King had remarked that the public and government officials ought to know more about this. He also hinted strongly that the United States might be dealing with another more tractable government before long. (Telegram 570 from Tripoli, May 25; ibid.) Rusk
58. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, May 27, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Secret. Dear Averell: Thank you for your letter of May 13th/2/ in which you asked for our views concerning the position we should adopt at the next meeting with the Libyans on the problem of Wheelus Air Base. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this matter. We attach great importance to retaining effective use of Wheelus for as long as possible. We also want to avoid prejudicing our base rights in such other countries as Ethiopia by the premature loss of our facilities in Libya. /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) As we see it, the negotiating situation at this time presents a choice between two broad courses of action. One course is to accept the principle of abrogation now. Presumably this would mean, at least, agreeing now to settle for a shorter tenure at Wheelus than the 1954 Agreement provides. The other course is to attempt to deflect the Libyans from this issue of principle. We might, for example, propose that the tenure question be reserved for later discussion. Meanwhile, we would try to focus the talks on ways in which U.S. operation of Wheelus might assist Libya in some of its military activities, and on formal changes at Wheelus which might make our activities there politically more presentable for Libya. Between these two alternatives, we recommend using the second at this time. Following our recent discussion with you, we have well under way the study of progressive reductions in the scale of operations at Wheelus for possible use at an appropriate time in the negotiations. The hard core requirement for a fair-weather training base is not easily separable into two or more operations, each with its own facilities. However, we hope to have the broadest possible range of options available for consideration in the near future./3/ /3/On June 4, Harriman replied to Vance saying that although the Department fully endorsed the negotiating tactic Vance had suggested, he thought that U.S. negotiators ought to be aware of the possibility that in order to meet the U.S. objective of retaining Wheelus for as long as possible, they might be required to agree to discuss tenure in some form. On June 10, Harriman sent Vance a follow-up letter noting that in considering the tenure question, U.S. negotiators needed to take into account the certainty that the Libyans would not under any circumstances consent to an extension of U.S. base rights beyond their scheduled expiration date of December 24, 1971. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 680.1 Libya) Sincerely,
59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, June 11, 1964, 7:26 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-4 LIBYA-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Blake; cleared by Bronez, Howard Myers in G/PM, Jones in NE, Tasca, Judd in BNA, Newsom, Hinman and Hirschburg in AID, and Runyon; and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Baida and repeated to London, Cairo, Addis Ababa, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. 530. For Ambassador Jones. Following constitute instructions for second round Wheelus discussions: A. Objectives 1. Primary purpose US continues to be that of retaining for as long as possible US access to Wheelus facilities under 1954 Agreement. 2. Additional objective is to maintain contact with Libyans on Wheelus problem; avoid deadlock which would jeopardize US retention Wheelus or security other US interests in Wheelus; and preserve for the longer term cordial relations between the two Governments. B. Position concerning 1954 Base Agreement 1. You should indicate USG has given most careful attention GOL proposal abrogation 1954 Agreement. In our view, such action would not merely affect the important activities at Wheelus which we have been conducting on the expectation agreement would continue indefinitely but also be serious precedent endangering other essential base arrangements. US has never been confronted with or agreed to abrogation similar agreements with other countries. We therefore urge that abrogation issue be set aside. 2. You authorized, however, make following statement: a. By terminal date 1954 agreement (December 24, 1971) the US military presence will have been withdrawn from Wheelus, except for such personnel as GOL may agree should remain. b. There are presently no alternative facilities for training activities we conduct at Wheelus. Selection alternative location, planning and development new facilities, relocation equipment would require very considerable study and time. FYI--If pressed by Libyans as to how much study and time are required, you should point out that these are immensely complicated problems for us, and that we trust the GOL will not press us for response now to question whose answer US cannot have before completion of planning well into 1965. End FYI. c. Study has already begun regarding equipment and personnel that can be moved out of Wheelus. This study shows initial reductions could begin this year. First reductions would be items least needed. Libyan side will appreciate US will wish retain until last moment before departure full use training facilities now possessed under 1954 Agreement. FYI--Article X of Agreement covers removal of property. End FYI. d. We hope that even before our withdrawal is completed Wheelus will be in full operation as the center of a well-equipped RLAF which we endeavoring assist GOL bring into existence as effective force. e. To this end we wish propose program for increased participation Libyan military personnel in use of base. We have in mind a broad range of items. Perhaps most important is appointment Libyan officer to act first as a co-commander and eventually as full commander of the base. Other items include enlarged program for training Libyans in base operations, greater Libyan participation in base security. Orderly and effective development of this program will require time. We like to suggest joint Libyan-US subcommittee be established in coming weeks to examine all details of Libyanization. f. Wheelus has already begun serve Libyan Air Force and is capable making significant contribution that would relieve your defense budget of substantial expenditures. We visualize broad expansion this support for your forces at Wheelus. Current talks on military sales and assistance will disclose specific needs of the Libyan Air Force that we can meet at Wheelus. 3. You authorized at your discretion to provide any or all of the foregoing in writing to Maaziq./2/ /2/A detailed account of the second round of U.S.-Libyan negotiations on Wheelus on June 15 was transmitted in airgram A-63 from Baida, June 20. (Ibid.) Rusk [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
