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Libya 40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, February 4, 1964, 7:37 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 LIBYA-US. Secret. Drafted by McClanahan; cleared by Newsom, Ellis in AID, and Colonel Heffner in DOD; and approved by Williams. Repeated to CINCEUR and pouched to London. 264. Libyan Appointed Ambassador Abidia during initial call on Governor Williams February 4 raised question future US assistance. Emphasizing Libya had been loyal friend of US and was grateful for assistance since 1951, Abidia said currents of change in Libya's region were running against military bases, and Libya therefore could be increasingly subject to criticism by other governments in area. Certain African and Arab states might say they were receiving greater quantities of aid than Libya while not granting US Government comparable favors in return. Libya needed continued US assistance to counteract the effect of such troublesome allegations. Abidia acknowledged US might say Libya no longer needed assistance from US. This was not case, and as indicated in remarks prepared for presentation to President with letter of credence, Libya while pleased pay tribute to technical, economic and military assistance which US had made available also wished to express hope at same time for continuation of assistance particularly at present time. Abidia said oil revenues were not yet sufficient to support intended development projects. Abidia noted British, less wealthy than US, in 1963 agreed to continue commitment level of assistance for two more years. Abidia said US aid need not necessarily be in dollars but might be in form of technical assistance, machinery and military equipment. Later Abidia asked whether US Government in deciding close down military bases had any intention close Wheelus. In response Governor Williams while thanking Abidia for frankness of his statement said that in similar spirit of candor he must refer to position which had been taken by President Kennedy in conversation with Prime Minister Fekini last September. Both President Kennedy and President Johnson had taken a firm, public stand in favor of a level of foreign aid which was in keeping with necessity to maintain US responsibilities abroad. Congress had greatly reduced total amounts and some in Congress were particularly opposed to providing assistance to countries financially able to help themselves. Although in case of Libya and of other countries US willing take further look if requested, US had little room for maneuver. Governor said Ambassador should be aware we could not make a completely fresh study of a matter already weighed at considerable length. Matter, however, was not non-negotiable. As President Kennedy had clearly indicated we believe Libya has now reached point where it can pay for its own economic development and may in future be able to think of giving aid to less fortunate areas./2/ /2/On January 28, Assistant Secretary Williams sent a memorandum to Acting Secretary Ball noting that AID had proposed that no further economic aid funds be requested for Libya, which would mean closing out the AID mission in Libya and withdrawing 12 direct hire technicians by the end of FY 1964. Williams noted that the Bureau of African Affairs had reservations concerning the effects of the proposed termination, especially its effect on the future of the Wheelus Air Base in Tripoli, the only U.S. air base in Africa. (Ibid., AID (US) LIBYA) As for Wheelus Base, agreement with Libya for use of facilities runs through 1971 and we are hopeful that we may continue cooperate in accordance this agreement. Base in Libya is not, we understand, among those which US Government plans close in near future. Governor Williams emphasized that we believe that our relations with Libya rest on a firm foundation of mutual interest, sharing of common values and respect for each other's way of life. While we might argue with Libya on some points such as assistance or the presence of an air base, such a dialogue need not effect our more basic relationship. Libya could be assured our moral support and, if necessary, material support. He recalled frankness with which President Kennedy had explored these matters with Prime Minister Fekini and referred to eloquent manner in which President Kennedy had indicated that presence of Wheelus Air Base was in mutual interest of Libya and US. Abidia was apparently echoing familiar line taken repeatedly by Fekini. He said he hoped Department would take further look at aid problem. Dept Officer asked him whether views were shared by present government, and he affirmed they were. Embassy's comments requested. Has Muntasir government raised question of US assistance or Wheelus since January 22? Can we assume Abidia approach represents views new Government? Rusk
41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Baida, Libya/1/ Washington, March 8, 1964, 5:34 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Bronez in DOD, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Tripoli. Due to the distribution of Libyan Ministries between Baida and Tripoli, the Ambassador maintained residences at both locations. 18. Please convey following oral, personal message from President Johnson to King Idris: Your Majesty: The United States, since the days it fought beside the United Kingdom in furtherance of Libya's independence has been keenly interested in the future and welfare of Your Majesty's country. Your Majesty will, I know, agree that in the years since independence, our cooperation at the Wheelus Air Base has been beneficial to us both. I am now deeply concerned that this important element in our cooperation may be threatened. We believe the presence of this valuable installation helps to symbolize and demonstrate the substantial nature of our common efforts. We believe, in the years ahead, it will be of genuine benefit to the development of Libya's own air force. We would deeply regret moves which might unnecessarily disturb this cooperation and require negotiation under undue pressures or in the face of foregone conclusions./2/ /2/On February 22, UAR President Nasser made a speech declaring that no country could claim independence unless the military bases on its territory were liquidated. The Libyan Government subsequently announced that it did not intend to renew the treaties whereby the United States and the United Kingdom maintained bases in Libya. We are, of course, prepared fully to discuss this question at the request of your Government. I hope that a high level U.S. official who will be in the area within the next few weeks may have an opportunity quietly and in confidence and frankness review with Your Majesty and the Prime Minister this general question. Until then, we would strongly hope that such public statements as the Libyan Government may be obliged to make would not prejudice either the pace or the outcome of any discussions of this matter. I make this approach, Your Majesty, with full appreciation of the problems of the Libyan Government. As a good friend to Libya, however, I would urge that your Government not move too precipitously on a matter of great importance to us both. Lyndon B. Johnson. Rusk
42. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) Washington, March 10, 1964. [Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Subject Files, Komer, Robert W. Secret. Extract--1 page of source text not declassified.]
43. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 17, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64. Secret. There seems little alternative but to agree now to renegotiate our Libyan base agreement, in hopes this will defuse the issue. Our best friends in the Libyan Government (the King and PM) plead that we do so. They've panicked in the face of an outburst of Libyan nationalism, and face an aroused Parliament demanding prompt abrogation of the US/UK treaties. Nasser started off the parade by criticizing the bases, but clearly both his action and Libyan popular hysteria were stimulated by the Arab-Israeli issue. Our ability to resist is undermined by UK agreement to renegotiate its base rights. Actually, the UK treaty had a renegotiation clause, while ours is legally good till 1971. Yet if we stall now, we'll almost certainly face a Libyan parliamentary motion for abrogation which the regime will be unwilling to block. We want to save this regime (the best we could have), and also protect our oil investment, now $670 million. So State, our Embassy, and our Libyan friends recommend we be forthcoming now to sidetrack demands for abrogation. We would then hope to spin out negotiations, and finally agree to a reduced tenure which will buy us three-five more years. Much will depend on whether external factors affecting US-Arab relations set the Libyans off again. But it's worth the try. McG. Bundy
44. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 17, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64. Secret. SUBJECT Recommendation: If you concur, we plan to inform the Libyans that we are prepared fully to discuss the 1954 US-Libya agreement relating to the Wheelus Air Force Base/2/ without any limitation on the scope of the discussions, including the matter of tenure. Orally we will inform the Libyans that, if they wish, they may understand this as a willingness to negotiate in the sense of a review seeking a mutually agreed solution./3/ /2/For text of the U.S.-Libyan agreement relating to military bases in Libya signed at Benghazi on September 9, 1954, and entered into force on October 30, 1954, see 5 UST 2449. /3/McGeorge Bundy initialed approval of the recommendation. Below his initials he wrote: "per LBJ telecon." Discussion: 1. In a note of March 8, the Libyan Government of Prime Minister Muntassir requested that the United States enter into negotiations regarding the 1954 US-Libya agreement, now valid until 1971./4/ The Muntassir Government has been under significant pressure, both internally and externally, to seek the early abrogation of this agreement, as well as a base agreement with the United Kingdom. /4/Ambassador Lightner reported in telegram 71 from Baida, March 9, that the Acting Foreign Minister had handed him the note. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-4 LIBYA-US) 2. Hopefully, the proposed discussions might extend over a prolonged period of time resulting in a formula satisfactory to both parties, but the pace of internal Libyan political events might make this impossible. The alternative of rejecting the Libyan request would be to risk possible unilateral Libyan abrogation of the agreement and demands for an early evacuation. 3. The United Kingdom has already informed the Libyans of its willingness to discuss its base agreement. Dean Rusk
45. National Security Action Memorandum No. 291/1/ Washington, March 20, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 291. Secret. Copies were sent to AID Administrator David E. Bell and Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone. MEMORANDUM FOR The President is quite concerned over the prospect that we may very quickly lose our base rights in Libya. While fully recognizing that events may be moving so fast that we will be unable to hold on for much longer, he desires that we make every reasonable effort to prolong our stay, consistent with our longer-term objective of preserving the independence and stability of Libya. He asks that the Department of State, in conjunction with other interested agencies, prepare an action program to this end, which he would like to review by 10 April. McGeorge Bundy
46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya/1/ Washington, March 20, 1964, 7:33 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15-4 LIBYA-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Hinman of AID, George L. Warren of G/PM, NE Deputy Director Harrison M. Symmes, and Bronez; and approved by Fredericks. Also sent to the Embassy Office in Baida and repeated to Cairo, London, and USCINCEUR. 358. While events have moved most rapidly in Libya and Libyan opinion obviously aroused on base question, Department nevertheless desires do all possible, consistent with friendly Libyan-US relations, to create atmosphere and understanding among key elements in Libya which will permit useful discussion this question. In addition desiring continuing estimate of Libyan scene by Country Team based on widest possible contacts, we desire all elements take suitable occasion if and when you deliver note and GOL announces receipt stress following points as appropriate with GOL officials and key political figures. 1. US in agreeing discuss base question without conditions has made major concession to Libyan government and opinion. 2. US respects agreements and expects other nations to do same. We have never given up a base in Africa or Asia through renegotiation of agreement prior agreed expiration. Departures both Morocco and Saudi Arabia were at conclusion agreements with these countries. Thus agreement even discuss tenure represents major departure in desire friendly relations with Libya. 3. Wheelus has provided benefits to Libya in employment, income, and security. It represents extensive complex which cannot be quickly abandoned without great loss both Libya and to US. Our desire make maximum use these facilities for benefit Libya would justify serious and possibly prolonged discussion. 4. Wheelus has never been used in any manner against Libya or any other country. US has been careful insure its uses are not embarrassing to Libya. Its use on contrary in such cases as Congo has been valuable to Africa. Its use as relief base has been valuable to Libya as well as to Africa generally on many occasions. 5. US very much concerned with future of US-Libyan relations after Wheelus matter settled. Therefore believe most important that GOL despite desire satisfy Parliamentary and public sentiment still bear in mind value which US friendship and support may have for Libya in future, particularly as growing Libyan oil revenues make country increasingly attractive target for subversion or aggression. While US desires continue closest friendship Libya as indicated by our willingness discuss Wheelus question including tenure of agreement, it is inevitable that relationship will change once this symbol our close cooperation goes. Re proposed US statement (Tripoli's 395)/2/ we do not intend initiate statement on note here, but intend reply questions along following lines: /2/Dated March 18. (Ibid., DEF 15 LIBYA-US) "US has informed Libyan Government in response to its request that we are prepared to discuss the 1954 agreement in the same spirit of friendship, cooperation and mutual interest which has traditionally characterized relations between the two governments. We have indicated to the Libyans that we are prepared to receive any suggestions they might have on when the discussions might start." Department has no objection if Embassy wishes emphasize in talking with press benefits US-Libyan relations, but on balance not inclined believe statement likely be useful in present situation. Rusk
47. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Confidential. McGB: We may have had a modest break in Libya. King Idris strengthened his hand by threatening abdication and allowing himself to be persuaded to stay on. However, it's not clear to what extent Idris balked on abrogating base rights. So we're far from out of the woods. We've sent a strong team out from State and Defense to take a reading before we try drawing up our negotiating position. UK will begin negotiating 20 April and is willing to pull out troops by September 1965 if it can save transit-staging rights through El Adem to East Africa. Our best tactic may be to let UK run in front so Libyans can show some progress in getting US/UK out. Meanwhile, we can try to spin out our tenure by gradually phasing Libyans into nominal control over Wheelus. We'll be lucky if we can get three years. Am following Wheelus closely, and am satisfied we're playing it smart./2/ Naturally DOD people talk of State softness (a la Moroccan bases) and act as if all we need do is beat up Nasser, but this sort of backflap is normal just now. /2/A handwritten note in the margin by Bundy reads: "Keep it up--it matters--McGB (and do P a sitrep when you think it ripe)." RWK
48. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-261-64 Washington, March 25, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Libya, 1964. Secret. SUBJECT 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted Ambassador Badeau's recent message (Cairo message 2136 to the Secretary of State, dated 18 March 1964) in which he requests further guidance prior to carrying out Department of State instructions (State message 4292 to Cairo, dated 17 March 1964)/2/ to conduct conversations with President Nasser relative to Wheelus Air Base. The Ambassador posed eight questions in his message, four of which concern the importance of Wheelus Air Base and properly require a judgment of military considerations. Specifically, the following are provided as suggested answers to the Ambassador's four questions: /2/Telegram 2136 from Cairo, March 18, and telegram 4292 to Cairo, March 17, are in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US. a. "What is US firm estimate of strategic value of Wheelus?" (1) Training. Wheelus Air Base is critical to the requirements of the Air Force for the maintenance of combat ready crew status for all fighter and fighter interceptor crews assigned in the European area. The base is the only facility in the area that provides important all year good weather, gunnery and bombing ranges, and other facilities capable of accommodating the large numbers of personnel to be trained. At any one time, there are approximately 100 fighters and fighter interceptors scheduled for training operations at the Weapons Training Center, Wheelus Air Base. Crews are rotated every thirty days. This schedule permits each crew member an opportunity to maintain his proficiency and to requalify himself every six months. These are minimum air training requirements for combat crews. The weather factor is important in that it permits dependable scheduling not only at the Weapons Training Center, but also for the return of these crews to their duty stations to assume their combat alert status. As long as combat ready air forces remain on the European continent, a training facility such as Wheelus will remain an essential requirement. (2) Contingencies. Beyond its significance as a training site, the strategic location of the base has even greater importance. It enhances the US capability to support over 50 contingency plans relating to the Middle East, North and South Africa, and the Indian Ocean area. The loss of Wheelus Air Base would undoubtedly require revision of these plans with the attendant likelihood of degradation of effective response. During our increase of readiness for operations in the Lebanon crisis in 1958, Greece denied the United States certain landing and overflight privileges. In these circumstances, the availability of Wheelus was--and could again be--of major importance. (3) Cold War. As the location of the base is significant to the support of US contingency plans, its location is equally important in support of cold war activities. The air support furnished the United Nations during the Congo emergency could not have been as effective and timely had Wheelus Air Base not been available. US efforts would certainly have been more costly. Were we called upon to provide support for the UN Peacekeeping Force now active in Cyprus, Wheelus would be an important facility in assuring such support. The emerging, volatile nations of Africa South of the Sahara are potential trouble areas in which US interests may require involvement. Wheelus Air Base remains the last US foothold of significance on the Continent of Africa. The combination of US withdrawals elsewhere, the high likelihood of continuing disturbances throughout the area, the strategic interests of the United States, and the role we assume in UN operations increase its strategic importance. (4) Other Significant Uses. Other activities are conducted at Wheelus Air Base. The storage of War Reserve matriel is directly related to the ability of US forces to respond to contingencies since they make possible support of continued operations in remote areas. In addition, the base, again because of its location, serves effectively for strategic aircraft recovery. Military Air Transport Service aircraft operate through Wheelus Air Base and service areas in the Middle East and Africa. The base also includes an important communications station of the Defense Communications System. In addition, a number of important electronic detection devices to monitor nuclear activities of the USSR and France are located and operated on the base. b. "Is US now convinced that retention of Wheelus rights is a top defense priority?" Yes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff attach high importance to the retention of the base. In addition to its importance to US security interests, the base has helped to forestall covetous external interests and has provided the Libyan Government security during its national emergence and development. This has unquestionably contributed to the maintenance of the stability of the Mediterranean area. Just as our departure could very well encourage United Arab Republic subversion or aggression, our removal would make more difficult effective response to preserve Libyan independence. c. "Is retention of Wheelus Air Base such a vital US interest that we prepared to go all the way in its protection?" The United States should be prepared to take all necessary actions consistent with our longer-term objectives of preserving the independence and stability of Libya. A Wheelus Working Group has been organized by the Department of State to assist all action agencies to achieve maximum effectiveness in dealing with the problem. The United States should be prepared to take such necessary steps as would serve to eliminate or reduce the pressures being brought to bear on the Libyan Government. Pressures emanating externally should be dealt with at the source. d. "Does the US in fact see no alternative between complete possession and complete relinquishment of Wheelus rights?" The United States does not now enjoy complete possession of the base. The Royal Libyan Air Force is in possession of a portion of the base and has the utilization of many other areas and facilities. As the space requirements for the Libyan Air Force increase, additional space will be provided. The United States would be willing to discuss additional sharing of base space should the Government of Libya raise the issue. Libyan flags are prominently displayed in designated areas and there exists no dispute over the arrangement under which the Libyan Air Force and the US Air Force work and live side by side. The United States is not rigid in the question of extremes in the exercise of base rights, and the existing agreement does not preclude conversations toward the alteration or adjustment of base space, usage, possession, or command relationships. 2. Beyond the factors outlined above, it should be recognized that Wheelus Air Base has become a symbol of world-wide deployments, the loss of which could serve to reinforce pressures on the United States to evacuate bases and installations in such additional places as Ethiopia, Morocco, the Azores, Spain, Cuba, Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Panama. In this context, the loss of Wheelus could only be viewed as an extremely serious setback to the overseas posture of the United States. Whereas a single base may be of signal importance, the world-wide US system of bases is of vital importance to national security. 3. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the retention of Wheelus Air Base is of primary importance to the security interests of the United States. They recommend that steps be taken to relieve pressures on the Libyan Government and that their views be forwarded to the Secretary of State for use in the formulation of positions regarding Wheelus Air Base. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /3/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
49. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, April 1, 1964. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Libya, Vol. I. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
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