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30. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, November 17, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. Secret. SUBJECT [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Helms mentioned Monday mainly wanted to pass on the substance of a long talk with two of Boumedienne's top advisors. Jernegan considers it significant. The main points: --Boumedienne is concerned about US-Algerian relations and feels US failure to help with wheat will set relations back years. --Both French and Soviets hope we won't come through so they can prove the US is Algeria's enemy. DeGaulle fears that American business will loosen France's economic hold. --Algeria can't change its Vietnam position but departure of Information Minister Boumaza will change "the form and expression." Besides that, he added little to the Embassy's argument: --Algeria is potentially a major African power, and our policy should be constructive, not punitive. --Algeria is not hurting us in Vietnam. Besides, we must demonstrate that we don't see the world only through Vietnamese lenses. Our Algerian policy has been on dead center since last February. The day after the President reluctantly approved a new PL 480 agreement, the Algerians released a letter to Ho Chi Minh. The President reacted sharply: "Don't send another thing to Algeria without checking with me." State's seventh floor (especially Mann) was so stunned that they've suggested nothing new for Algeria since. Now Algeria, suffering from drought, has asked for help. State is about to recommend a new Title IV deal. There's nothing for you to do until we get State's memo. But it would help greatly if we could settle our thoughts on whether or not we're going to conduct policy with a Vietnamese touchstone, or whether we're going to pursue local interests and put Vietnam "in the icebox." Hal
31. Memorandum by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman/1/ Washington, December 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65-11/68. Secret. Attached to a December 20 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President. MEMORANDUM ON ALGERIA My impressions gained in Algiers, even in a brief three-day period, are perhaps worth recording as the situation is so complex. My most extensive talks were with Foreign Minister Bouteflika, a three-hour discussion, and then lunch. I was more impressed with him than I expected to be. He looked me straight in the eye, made his statements quietly but definitely, and has an occasional smile. Ambassador Jernegan told me that he was more direct in his conversation with me than on previous occasions. Usually, Bouteflika appears to be devious. He has a forceful personality, young, confident, and with a good opinion of himself, but he showed willingness to listen attentively. He was critical of US policies on Vietnam, but accepted in return my criticisms of the Algerian Government's positions. He emphasized their policy of non-alignment, and claimed to oppose communism, but he considers Algeria has every right to express its opinions on international questions which concern them. We must recognize that he is part of a revolutionary group that has fought hard to win its battle. While he will not give in to pressure, he appeared to be open to reason on some questions. His experience has been largely with revolutionists. He sympathizes with revolutionary movements, although opposing communism. In Algeria, they put their communists in jail, and, in fact, any one else who threatens their one-party regime. I was unimpressed by Boumediene. He has not a forceful personality. In fact, he gives the impression of a man who has been picked as a figurehead, and used by activists in the background. However, he firmly states the Algerian Government position, but without fervor. I pressed him hard on Soviet arms shipments, to which he replied in a matter of fact manner. I finally got a reaction, however, when I compared Algerian shipments to the large Soviet shipments to Nasser, Iraq, and Syria. He responded vigorously, and took issue with my putting Algeria in the same category as those other Arab countries. Ambassador Jernegan said this was the first time he had seen such an emphatic reaction. He spoke frankly about Algerian policies, maintained throughout their independence of outside influences, and showed determination to get on with the development of their country, which he believes has vast potentialities. All in all, although the leaders of the Algerian Government are antagonistic to our policy on Vietnam as they see the conflict as a struggle similar to their own for the independence and unity of the country, I gained the impression that we might be able to work with them in some other fields. Although they consider themselves revolutionaries, they do not appear to have the Ben Bella aggressive designs, nor are they as yet committed to such extreme policies as Nasser. They obviously believe they must hold to their revolutionary posture to maintain control of the party and the country. They are ambitious for the development of their country, but their enthusiasms and confidence are not matched by adequate knowledge or experience. I feel the Algerian Government is worth while cultivating. Nothing is to be gained by accentuating our differences. They may be helpful in finding a peaceful solution to Vietnam. Considering our past policies of supplying food for relief under Ben Bella, I would recommend that we continue a moderate Title III program and watch developments with the view of increasing our aid if favorable developments occur. In addition, considering the unusually bad crop this year, I concur in AF's recommendation for an additional 275,000 ton sale of wheat under Title IV concessional terms. I am not familiar with the amount of grain we now have available, but I would give the Algerian request very much higher priority than UAR. If we refuse any requests, we should make it plain that our reasons for doing so were not political. W. Averell Harriman
32. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 22, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65-11/68. Secret. SUBJECT After much soul-searching, Secretary Rusk recommends a PL 480 Title IV dollar sale of 200,000 tons of wheat to Algeria (attached)./2/ Last February you approved a similar sale. But except for that and a little continuing technical assistance ($125,000), our program in Algeria has been on dead center ever since because of Algeria's vociferous opposition to our position in Viet Nam. /2/Attached but not printed. These political problems remain because the Algerians can't dissociate their own revolutionary experience from what is going on in Viet Nam today, no matter how often we point out the differences. The large buildup of Soviet weapons there also upsets our friends in Morocco and Tunisia. But if it were not for Viet Nam, we'd be on relatively good terms with this government. It has not caused trouble elsewhere in Africa, and its interests do not cross ours anywhere. Despite these political differences, we still face the fact that Algeria is potentially one of the half-dozen African powers of tomorrow. When its government becomes more effective, its oil revenues could underwrite substantial development from the already good French base. Its successful revolution gives it the credentials of leadership among the Afro-Asian nations. Its population and army will be among Africa's largest and strongest. The main question is whether we want to play for a continuing role there despite its unfriendly public attitude on Viet Nam. The Soviets and French are making a major play for Algeria and would be glad to see us drop out. So far our food has been our blue chip in this game. Now, we must decide whether we will ante up for another round. Secretary Rusk on balance thinks we should go ahead. Averell Harriman--just back from Algeria--says: "I feel the Algerian government is worth cultivating. Nothing is to be gained by accentuating our differences. They may be helpful in finding a peaceful solution to Vietnam." (His fuller report on his talks in Algeria is attached to Secretary Rusk's memo.)/3/ /3/See Document 31 and footnote 1 thereto. Apart from the politics, the North Africans suffered a severe drought this year, and Algeria estimated its need at slightly over 900,000 tons of grain. They've bought 500,000 tons (400,000 in the US) for cash, and the Soviet Union has offered 200,000. This leaves a gap of slightly over 200,000 which Secretary Rusk recommends we fill. He would like to go ahead in the next few days so we can negotiate a new agreement before 31 December. First, while Algerian supplies probably would carry the government into the early spring, we have CIA reports indicating that it feels it must make its own arrangements to cover the rest of the gap in the next few weeks for political reasons. Second, he would like to avoid your having to make a determination--which you've objected to but which will be required under the new legislation beginning 1 January--that it's in the national interest to aid Algeria despite its trade in non-strategic goods with Cuba. It will also be easier to negotiate an agreement with the Algerians under the present legislation than under the new because we are not in any position to discuss changes in its own agricultural practices unless we can expand our technical help. I have to admit I'm torn. I recognize the pain Algeria causes us on Viet Nam, but it's not in a position to do us much positive harm or good. I also know that rushing to beat the 31 December deadline may not square with your own strenuous effort to shift the food program to harder terms. However, the Algerians have suffered drought and have already bought almost half their requirements here for hard cash, and this concessional sale is repayable in dollars. Therefore, I recommend looking at this primarily in Algerian terms and lean toward keeping a foot in the door as long as we can do it with mostly dollar sales and a little technical aid./4/ /4/On February 4, 1967, Rusk sent a follow-up memorandum to the President, urging him to approve the recommendations in his December 20 memorandum. The Secretary said that U.S. lack of response to the Algerian request for P.L. 480 assistance in a year of serious drought was being interpreted by Algeria as an indication of systematic political hostility and might lead it to pursue more radical foreign policies. He argued that it was important that the United States maintain enough of a stake in Algeria to forestall complete Soviet domination. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 20) Walt Approve Title IV sale and current technical assistance level /5/None of these opinions is checked.
33. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 7, 1967, 10:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-9/67. Secret. SUBJECT Secretary Rusk wants to discuss with you at lunch the three attached North African decisions./2/ The two Moroccan decisions--one food and a $14 million military credit sale--are relatively easy and should be made before King Hassan arrives Thursday. The third is an Algerian PL 480 deal which the Secretary has added to the package because he would like to see us keep a foot in all North African doors. /2/Not attached. We have also scheduled an NSC discussion on North Africa tomorrow to give you a picture of all our interests there and the whole complex of problems we face. You may want to give us a preliminary OK on the Moroccan programs and then hold the Algerian decision until after the NSC meeting if you still have reservations after the lunch today. The attached bulky package boils down to this: [Here follow summaries of Tabs A and B concerning Morocco; for text, see Document 130.] Tab C: The Secretary recommends a dollar credit sale of 200,000 tons of wheat to Algeria. Politically, this is the toughest of the three because of Algeria's posture on Viet Nam. However, on balance, Secretary Rusk feels that our North African policy requires keeping a position in Algeria. The alternative is to let all food aid drift to a halt and maintain only minimal diplomatic representation. Our long-run goal is to knit North Africa into one of Africa's most prosperous regional units. To do so, we need some influence in Algeria, and it's hard to expect our oil companies to shoulder the whole load. We will discuss this policy more fully at the NSC tomorrow. A dollar credit sale of 200,000 tons does not seem out of line on pure self-help grounds. Algeria has already bought for cash in the U.S. more than 350,000 tons this year, and the U.S.S.R. has offered 200,000 tons from its own Canadian purchases./3/ /3/A handwritten note in the margin by Rostow reads: "President asked for proposal in which Algerians bought some as well." If you approve, you would have to sign the finding at the second signature tab. Algeria's trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic commodities for which you can make an exception. We have touched base with Budget Bureau. They feel these requests are reasonable, and they confirm that all are within approved budgets and plans./4/ /4/Later that day, in response to a question raised by the President during his lunch with Rusk, Rostow sent him a note stating that Algeria had bought 405,000 tons of U.S. wheat for cash so far that fiscal year and that, if the Secretary's recommendation for selling 200,000 tons was approved, Algeria would have bought about 40 percent of its requirements in the United States during the fiscal year. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21) Walt
34. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 13, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 21. Confidential. SUBJECT Following our NSC meeting Wednesday, Joe Palmer called in the Algerian Ambassador to discuss future Algerian purchases here. Ambassador Guellal said he is "confident that Algeria would continue to have every reason to look to the American commercial market for its future requirements." He felt that approval of the PL 480 request would make it easier for Algeria to continue buying here commercially. It's difficult to spell out a precise condition for making them continue their purchases here next year. Our 200,000 tons would complete their requirements for this year (500,000 tons or 50% already bought here for about $31 million cash), and next year's needs aren't clear yet. We feel sure Algeria will be in the market again, but Algiers may have to put up a more optimistic front. Katzenbach and Palmer believe circumstances will drive the Algerians to buy here again. Harriman has also talked with Guellal and feels going ahead with this deal is the best basis for keeping the door open for future purchases when they know what they need. I see the deal shaping up like this: We tell the Algerians we'll go ahead with this deal. At the same time, we'd explain the importance of their purchases here this year in enabling us to make this decision. If they come back into the market again, they'll be clear on what we have in mind. If you agree to go ahead on this basis with the 200,000 ton dollar credit sale Secretary Rusk recommends, we'll need your signature on the attached Findley amendment waiver./2/ Algeria's trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic commodities for which you can make an exception. Algeria does not have any current trade with North VietNam. I recommend we go ahead. /2/Not attached. President Johnson signed the waiver on March 2. (Ibid.) Walt
As a result of the Six-Day War which broke out on June 5, 1967, between Israel on one side and the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria on the other, Algeria announced on June 6 that it was breaking diplomatic relations with the United States, which it accused of aiding Israel. That same day, Assistant Secretary Palmer called in Ambassador Guellal and told him that the United States intended to deal with the break on a strictly reciprocal basis and expected full protection of U.S. nationals and property in Algeria. Palmer also categorically denied that the United States had committed any acts of aggression and declared that it had made every effort to deal with the Near Eastern question with the "greatest impartiality." (Telegram 208730 to Algiers, June 6; Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 US-ALG) Ambassador Jernegan left Algiers on June 10. A U.S. Interests Section, staffed by U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel, was subsequently established in the Swiss Embassy. Consular relations between the two countries continued, and the U.S. Interests Section retained the right to direct telegraphic communications with Washington. Telegrams continued to be tagged "AmEmbassy Algiers."
36. Memorandum From John Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, December 15, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65-11/68. Secret. SUBJECT You may have seen a number of reports that a military rebellion is underway in Algeria. The most recent government announcements claim that Boumedienne has completely crushed the attempted coup, but we're not sure yet that we've heard the last of it. The best information we have comes from the French Embassy in Algiers (attached)./2/ Just before Boumedienne's victory announcements, they thought the situation was still serious, but even they weren't sure what was going on. Perhaps the most relevant indicator is that Boumedienne himself acted as if he took the threat seriously. /2/Not attached. It will make little difference to us in the short run whether Boumedienne stays in power, or whether Col. Z'Biri--the coup leader--has more strength than it now appears he has. The rivalry grows out of an internal power struggle, basically without ideological connotations. In the longer run Z'Biri might be worse than Boumedienne since he's even more vociferous about Israel and resents the technocrats who are trying to put Algeria on its feet. Today's events will increase uncertainty around the country and could, over time, lead to a breakup of the army and a situation where groups now quiet--both pro-Soviet and pro-West--could emerge. But it's much too soon even to speculate seriously, although one expert says it "looks more and more like Syria every week." We have no evidence of which way Soviet preferences lie. We assume they'd like the army to stay intact under leadership they can influence (unlike Syria's), but beyond that we don't have any indication that today's events can be linked to other Soviet activities in the area. John
37. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Intelligence Note 456 Washington, June 12, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23 ALG. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. SUBJECT In the course of the last several weeks the statements and acts of Algerian officials have shown an aggressiveness that borders at times on paranoia. After attempting to bring about a rapprochement with the US during March and April,/2/ they have over the past two weeks adopted a stance of increasing aloofness. In the meantime their relations with France have gone from bad to worse as they have adopted a bull-in-the-China-shop approach to the solution of very delicate problems. They have been both arrogant and pugnacious in their recent tiff with the Tunisians./3/ Underlying much of their behavior is undoubtedly the fear that their internal security problems may be getting out of hand and the suspicion that internal and external enemies may be conspiring to overthrow Boumediene. For the US the effect has been to put our relations once again into the familiar framework of suspicion and hostility. Even more disturbing is the possibility the Soviets may be able to move into a position to establish themselves as the dominant foreign power in Algeria. /2/Beginning in late February, the Italian Ambassador in Algiers reported several conversations with Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika indicating that Algeria was interested in restoring diplomatic relations with the United States as soon as an appropriate atmosphere could be created for such an action. Bouteflika also indicated that he needed to be able to present tangible evidence of U.S. goodwill, such as resumption of U.S. aid, before he approached higher levels for a favorable decision on resumption of relations. (Telegram 119688 to Algiers, February 23; telegram 1367 from Algiers, March 11; telegram 1376 from Algiers, March 13; telegram 1496 from Algiers, April 15; telegram 1521 from Algiers, April 21; all ibid., POL 17 US-ALG) The general U.S. response to such unofficial feelers was that the United States was prepared to give prompt and sympathetic consideration to an authoritative Algerian Government invitation to resume relations. (Telegram 1336 from Algiers, March 2; telegram 158286 to Algiers, May 3; telegram 1642 from Algiers, May 16; all ibid.) /3/See Intelligence Note 437, "Algerian-Tunisian Relations Deteriorating: A Return to Maghrebian Cold War?," June 7, 1968 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem) [Footnote in the source text.] [Here follows the body of the paper.]
38. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Algiers, July 15, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG-US. Confidential. Drafted by Root and Galanto on July 31. The meeting was held at the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS I. U.S.-Algerian Relations Mr. Yaker welcomed Mr. Root to Algiers, noting that they had known each other for some time, which enabled both sides to talk on a personal as well as on an official basis. Yaker said there were two main sets of problems having a bearing on U.S.-Algerian relations: international--Vietnam and the Middle East--and bilateral. He would be willing to inform the Foreign Minister of the talks, particularly any comments Mr. Root might care to make on new U.S. approaches to these problems. Mr. Root expressed his pleasure that the GOA had agreed to receive him. He said the U.S. was ready to respect whatever procedure Algeria wished in carrying out talks. We appreciated the initiative which Foreign Minister Bouteflika had undertaken in March 1968 with Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani and had respected the Algerian wish to keep subsequent talks in the Italian channel. Sooner or later, perhaps the intermediary could be dispensed with. Mr. Root emphasized that the fundamental desire of the U.S. remained the same--for a restoration of normal relations. The break had come on Algerian initiative, not ours. The premise on which the break had been made had been proven false, but this was all behind us now. Any decision would be up to the GOA. The U.S. would wait for a signal. Resumption itself could be a relatively simple process--just agree to resume. As for new U.S. approaches on Vietnam and the Middle East, our attitude towards these problems would be determined by our overall interests, commitments, and considerations. Our views and policies on these questions were not a function of U.S.-Algerian relations. Mr. Root said he liked to think, however, that on both questions the U.S. was following policies which were farsighted and aimed at the achievement of lasting, peaceful solutions. On the immediate question of bilateral relations, Mr. Root said he did not feel a new approach was needed. The U.S. approach to Algeria had always been one of friendship and cooperation. Mr. Aberkhan could give witness to the friendliness which the Algerian Embassy found in Washington and its great success on the Washington scene. In North Africa the U.S. looked for good relations with all countries. We felt pained that the U.S. had good relations with three countries but not with the fourth--Algeria. We were not pursuing selfish interests in Algeria, but were interested in stability and progress. We hoped, for example, that the presence of U.S. business interests in Algeria would provide a basis for strengthened cooperation. We appreciated the fact that Algeria had not allowed the break to affect American business and that Algeria had been generous and hospitable to the small U.S. staff in Algiers. We had also noted the improvement in direct contacts with Algerian officials. We did not ignore these various signs of good will, including the Algerian willingness to receive Mr. Root. If the GOA was interested in improving relations, and we thought it was, the U.S. would certainly reciprocate. Replying, Mr. Yaker noted, somewhat icily, that there seemed to be no new important elements in the American attitude towards Vietnam and the Middle East. At independence, America enjoyed a large capital of good will in Algeria. This had been dissipated, mostly because of Algerian feeling on Vietnam, the reasons for which were well known to Mr. Root. The GOA was unhappy with the situation, and disconsolate that external matters have hindered the development of harmonious relations with the U.S. Algeria had been made to pay a heavy price in the rupture of food aid for work programs, needy feeding and other activities. The GOA had been penalized by the stopping of shipments to the benevolent agencies (VOLAGs), an action which had a strongly negative influence on Algerian leadership and public opinion. The GOA had no new elements to report. Perhaps it should just close the "dossiers" and wait for better days. But, on the other hand, it was encouraging that an old friend and acquaintance of Algeria like Mr. Root should be making this visit to Algiers now. Perhaps this was a good sign. Mr. Root said he liked Mr. Yaker's conclusion about personal friendship. As a former member of the American Embassy in Algiers, and considering all the years he had been associated with Algerian affairs, it was difficult for him to keep a detached attitude. Relations with Algeria were like an investment. He had become attached to it and wanted to see it pay off. It was a real challenge to seek the improvement of relations. It was not a source of great satisfaction to the U.S. to know that of all the influences--Arab, African, European-French, and Soviet--acting on Algeria, that of the U.S. was the smallest. Addressing himself to bilateral relations, Mr. Root noted that the break in food aid through the voluntary agencies did not occur as a result of the break in relations. The PL 480 assistance was yet another matter--an impasse had been reached in May 1967 for reasons familiar to Mr. Yaker. It was decided in Washington after June 1967 that VOLAG aid should not be affected but that its fulfillment should be based on factors such as: --the country should be willing to receive and distribute it; --it could be carried on U.S. ships which could call freely; --and the freight would be paid by the recipient or the VOLAGs. As a result of the failure to meet these technical qualifications, VOLAG shipments had stopped. Hence, it was not a political consequence. In the follow-on to the Bouteflika-Fanfani talks, the Algerian Foreign Minister had said that gestures from the U.S. on Vietnam, the Middle East, and food aid would help. Washington replied it could not make gestures for restoration because Algeria was the one which broke. The U.S. could not pay a price for resumption. Without calling these things gestures, however, the U.S. had tried to signal Algeria that it had an open disposition. Governor Harriman in particular, who retained an excellent souvenir of his December 1966 stay in Algeria and his talks with President Boumediene and Minister Bouteflika, had been struck by Algeria's very recent willingness to help find a suitable site for the Vietnam talks. As for the VOLAGs, the U.S. was prepared in principle to respond to a request from the agencies themselves for a continuation of activities at the level of the past year. Mr. Root was chagrined that there had been a communications breakdown. The decision was made some weeks ago, and he thought the VOLAGs would have responded immediately with proposals, but they had not. Perhaps Mr. Yaker could look into the matter and facilitate the VOLAG dealings with the GOA organizations. In all events, Mr. Root expressed the hope that this act, more than words, would show the U.S. interest in the welfare of the Algerian people. Mr. Yaker appeared genuinely and visibly pleased at this news. He said this was the first clear indication he had heard. Mr. Root explained it had been our intention in making this manifestation of good will that the GOA be informed through the agencies which were carrying on the humanitarian program. He was sorry the message had not come through clearly. Mr. Root asked Mr. Yaker to convey to Minister Bouteflika our feeling that broken relations was not a normal situation. The break, and the lack of an ambassador always implied that things were not going well. Mr. Root reiterated that restoration could be a simple procedure. In this connection (in an allusion to the UAR) he supposed that Algerian policy on resumption would be decided by Algeria. Yaker bristled briefly but then stated with a smile that Mr. Root knew the Algerians well. They were known for their independence and would make up their own minds. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam and the Middle East.]
39. Information Memorandum From the Country Director of the Office of Northern Africa Affairs (Root) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore)/1/ Washington, October 3, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 ALG. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Hume A. Horan in AF/N. SUBJECT Mr. Michel Leroy, the representative of Algerian exile leader Belkacem Krim, called on me at 10:00 this morning./2/ We had previously heard from our Embassy in Paris that Leroy was coming to the United States and might approach us on Krim's behalf. /2/The memorandum of conversation is ibid. Leroy explained that Belkacem Krim was presently disturbed by Algeria's leftist policies and the extent of Russian influence in the country. To combat this he had founded the MDRA (Democratic Movement of Algerian Renovation) which was well entrenched throughout the country and even represented in Boumediene's immediate entourage. Leroy saw Krim's return to power as inevitable but stated that some slight U.S. financial assistance over the next few months would enable Krim to perfect his organization and return to Algeria that much sooner. In exchange for this help, Krim would be prepared to conclude political and economic accords of various sorts whenever he should assume power. Leroy denied that Krim's organization had been weakened by last summer's arrests of MDRA militants and gave me a list of names that purportedly represented the hard core of Krim's organization. If the State Department could not help him, Leroy wondered if it could put him in touch with some American service that could be of assistance. "Such as," he said, "the CIA." I replied that the United States was not in a position to be helpful in this matter. We did not see the Algerian situation in as gloomy colors as Mr. Leroy did and felt we had to stand by our guiding principle of non-interference in another country's affairs. I told Leroy, furthermore, that many specious charges had been leveled against CIA but that he should remember that Algeria was not an area of major American concern. Finally, I conveyed to Leroy the substance of our reply to Krim's request for a visit (Department's 248231, attached)/3/ and added that I doubted if the results of any trip Krim might make to the United States would be worth his while. /3/Not attached. As I excused myself for another appointment, Leroy said he would remain in town for several more days in case I had further word for him. I replied that he was, of course, free to do so but should not expect to hear again from us. I did not object, however, when Leroy asked if he might call me on Monday morning. He assured me on leaving that he was fully aware of the delicacy of his mission and that even within the Krim entourage only one other person knew of this approach to the United States. Comments: (1) I feel we should avoid giving Leroy any encouragement, especially since we consider Krim's political prospects to be unfavorable. (2) CIA showed no interest in the matter one way or the other when the prospect of Krim's visit first came up. I am informing CIA of my morning conversation and will let you know what position they take./4/ /4/A handwritten note initialed by Moore in the margin reads: "JR--should CIA be tempted, please let me know." On October 7, Root wrote a memorandum to the files stating that he had spoken that morning with [name not declassified] of the CIA, who had said that not only was there no disposition to provide such assistance to Krim, the CIA thought it was unwise to give him any encouragement. When Leroy subsequently telephoned, Root told him that there was no change in the U.S. position. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 ALG) (3) We can expect Leroy to try to interest private American firms in his principal's future. The security arrangements surrounding this visit will, hence, be more porous than ever--which is another reason why we should keep our distance. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
