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16. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 62-64 Washington, December 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 1962, Algeria. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on December 23, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. ALGERIA The Problem To assess the situation in Algeria, and to estimate its prospects over the next two years or so. Conclusions A. We think that Ben Bella's chances of remaining in power for the next two years or so are good. He will probably continue to keep a narrow but fairly solid power base, especially in the military establishment, where Vice President and Minister of Defense Boumedienne appears loyal. We do not believe that Boumedienne would use the army to oust Ben Bella, except under extraordinary conditions. (Paras. 13, 24-25) B. The economy will probably continue to decline for a time, and will probably stabilize at a lower level than at present. We do not believe that the economic situation will deteriorate so far as to generate extreme political discontent. The majority of the people will follow the traditional subsistence agricultural pattern, while the new society of politically important elements, including the army, bureaucracy, and workers on nationalized farms, is likely to continue to fare better than under the French. (Paras. 16, 24, 28) C. The 60,000 man Algerian military establishment has been largely re-equipped with Soviet weapons in the past year or so. It can maintain internal security and is improving vis-a-vis its most likely external rival, Morocco. In about a year it will probably be superior to the Moroccans. However, while Algerian-Moroccan relations are likely to remain uneasy, a recurrence of major hostilities is unlikely. (Paras. 11, 14-15, 41) D. Algeria will probably move away, albeit slowly and haphazardly, from its close linkage with France, and the latter's aid will almost certainly decline after 1965, when the nuclear test sites will no longer be needed. French interests, especially oil, as well as Algeria's need for financial aid, will militate against a complete break. The coming years are likely to be marked by continued frictions, however, as Algeria strives to reduce its dependence without losing the benefits of the association, but a major breach will probably be avoided at least as long as de Gaulle lives. (Paras. 31-32) E. Algeria's revolutionary convictions lead it to support virtually any movement bearing the anti-colonialist label. In Africa particularly, Ben Bella will provide moral support, as well as arms and training, to revolutionary movements, often in concert with Soviet and Chinese actions. This already conflicts with US policies in sub-Saharan Africa and would be especially serious if a rebel movement were to develop the staying power to wage a drawn-out guerrilla conflict. In any event, US-Algerian relations are likely to be marked by growing frictions. (Paras. 29, 36-39) F. Both Soviets and Chinese appear to regard the Ben Bella regime as promoting their respective interests by its predilection for supporting revolutionary movements. While this condition obtains and at least as long as French assistance and presence remain strong, the USSR and China will be content to play a background role, although continuing to provide economic aid. A major breach between France and Algeria could open the way for greatly increased Soviet influence. However, the Soviets would be faced with problems, as well as opportunities, especially since providing budget support would break a precedent and also be very costly. (Paras. 34-35) [Here follows the "Discussion" section of the Estimate.]
17. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 5, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Secret. The attached is one of the most interesting dispatches I have seen in recent months./2/ It shows our Ambassador, William Porter, in a straight out talk with Ben Bella. Bearing in mind that one man is a head of government and the other is a diplomat, I think you will agree that Porter did an astonishing job of stating his case while maintaining communication with his target. He also surprised Ben Bella into unusual frankness about his attitudes. /2/Not attached. Finally, in his concluding section, Porter shows that he is not a bit taken in by Ben Bella and understands precisely how B.B. is playing into the hands of the Soviets--not because he is a Communist, but because of his own fanatical emotions. The policy question we face, of course, is whether it helps to cut off PL-480 to a man like this. My own estimate, which the intelligence community shares, is that as a matter of cold national interest it would do us no good--in the sense that it would not bring Ben Bella "to his senses" and would only confirm him in his fundamental emotional convictions. Cutting off Algeria would also play right into Soviet hands. It's precisely what Moscow would like us to do. On the other hand, food does not buy his friendship, and if it is politically very unpopular here, it should be cut back gradually in ways that are not visibly connected to his foreign policy. Ben Bella, unlike Nasser, has done us no injury within his own territories--at least so far. What we currently have is a freeze on discussion of new projects with Ben Bella, and I think this is right for the present. One more point about this message is that it does show Porter's own quality. He has been under something of a cloud at the State Department for reasons which I do not understand, and unless you disagree I plan to put in a plug for him over there. McG. B./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
18. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, January 8, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963-March 1966. Confidential. RWK: It turns out that Porter and Lennon on their own hook are doing what we've been recommending right along but what AID has been saying is too hard. Part of the stimulus was need to prepare phase-down in case we invoked 620(e), but part is Porter's political sense. They've knocked off further January-February food shipments to Algeria (fortuitously but secretly we're diverting them to Morocco to tide us over a crisis there). This will reduce stocks so we'll be in a realistic position in April to manipulate the program instead of continuing to pile up a backlog. Just another example of the problems of getting things done in USG. You thought Bell was all for slowing shipments and cutting stocks. I found AID/State working levels not even thinking about it. Today I asked them about attached cables,/2/ and they sheepishly admitted the embassy started this all by itself./3/ /2/Telegram Toaid 177 from Algiers, December 31, 1964, and telegram Toaid 180 from Algiers, January 4, 1965, are attached but not printed. /3/Komer's handwritten note in the margin reads: "Good--keep an eye on it." H.
19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 15, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret. I hear that Secretary Rusk plans to call you next week about our aid program in Algeria. The State and AID people have been thoroughly shaken up by your tough attitude on aid (which has both advantages and disadvantages). As to the facts, our Algerian aid has been almost all surplus food. From $53 million in PL 480 for FY 64 we went down this year to $24 million, though unemployment is still high. We've also provided tools and supplies (we pay wages in food) for three small model land rehabilitation projects and a CARE-MEDICO effort to keep one of the big Algiers hospitals going. We have to decide now whether to continue these programs or let them lapse by default over the next six months. We don't kid ourselves that we're buying much short-term political cooperation with our help. Ben Bella is a radical who's taken outspoken left-neutralist stands on Cuba, Vietnam, Congo, Dominican Republic. He's also hosting both the Commie-line World Youth Festival and the Afro-Asian Conference this summer. As with the UAR, however, we want to keep giving Ben Bella an alternative to Moscow (and Paris) because Algeria is one of the half-dozen key African powers. We also want to keep a foot in the door with friendlier second-echelon figures who might run the show if anything happens to the current regime. Finally, we have about $100 million invested in the booming Algerian oil industry. For these reasons, Rusk and AID favor cutting back to about $20 million (again mostly food) in FY 66, but continuing a reduced needy feeding program and our CARE-MEDICO project. Ambassador Porter also wants to go in and force Ben Bella to say yes or no on all our programs. He knows he couldn't extract much in return for continuing, but feels that a clear affirmative from Ben Bella would be a useful reminder of our help. Also, a negative would put the blame squarely on Ben Bella so he couldn't charge us with playing politics with food for hungry people. Here's another case where the lack of short-term return argues with longer range potential. My own instinct would be to side State in cutting back gradually but staying in the ballgame, unless the Congressional heat mounts. Algeria hasn't been a big Hill issue so far and it seems unwise to make BB sore at us just before he hosts the big Afro-Asian Conference. The other side of the coin is that letting aid lapse might demonstrate to a lot of other people like Nasser and even Ayub that we do expect something in return for our help. All in all, however, I'd argue for postponing another minor flap here at a time when we're under the gun in many other places. R.W. Komer
20. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, June 14, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963-March 1966, Economic. Secret. RWK: State and AID have begun clearing a cable to plot the phase-out of our Algerian aid. Rusk told Guellal several weeks ago that much of our aid would lapse if we receive no GOA request, and Root has made the same comment to one of Ben Bella's assistants, so although the Algerians could still present us with a request, there seems no alternative now to this kind of planning. This action would leave two activities in operation--the Care-Medico project which the Algerians have asked for and continuing participant training for six people. Other programs would stop when the food stocks supporting them run out. The Four-Areas Project would probably run into the early fall while the mass feeding program would run out some time in the summer. We would tell the voluntary agencies and the Soil Conservation Service not to recruit replacements for their people and we would plan to have most of the AID staff out by the end of the calendar year. The one procedural aspect still open for discussion is whether we should give the Algerians a note on this just to keep the record clear. We want to be sure they realize we are quitting because they haven't asked us to stay on, not for some political reason. State will ask the Embassy what it thinks of a note to the technical level of the Algerian Government requesting cooperation in smoothing out an alternative termination. I hate to see this happen but I can't see where we have any alternative. I am pushing State to be sure everyone has a good story on our rationale against the time when news of this move breaks. HHS/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
21. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ OCI No. 1781/65 Washington, June 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-7/65. Secret. SUBJECT 1. The apparently bloodless coup which early on the morning of 19 June brought the Algerian military, and more particularly Vice Premier and Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne, to power will probably not produce any abrupt changes in either Algeria's domestic or foreign policy. So far there appears to have been no general shakeup of the ministers, and Foreign Minister Bouteflika has stressed that Algeria will continue to recognize all international commitments. He has indicated that the Afro-Asian Conference will open in Algiers on 29 June as scheduled. 2. Boumedienne's government is likely to pay more attention to the badly faltering Algerian economy than to foreign ventures and entanglements--especially in Black Africa. He is likely to orient Algeria more toward the Arab East, and may well ultimately establish a regime similar to Nasir's Egypt. He is an avid nationalist and socialist, and has long felt that the army had a political mission to lead the people of Algeria. In fact, in many areas of Algeria the army has probably already provided sounder leadership and administration than Ben Bella's government or the FLN party. 3. Boumedienne will probably lead Algeria on a more genuinely non-aligned course than did Ben Bella. He is realistic enough to appreciate that French assistance--some $200 million a year in direct financial aid, plus many hundreds of millions more in indirect benefits and the salaries of nearly 20,000 French technicians and school teachers--is not likely to be forthcoming from any other source. He is also aware that US surplus food feeds nearly one-third of Algeria's 11.5 million people, although he still probably thinks of the Western world in imperialistic terms. He has been warm, open, and attentive with US officials. At the same time, he knows that the Soviet Union's some $85 million in military aid has transformed his once ragtag forces into a well equipped army, with a respectable air arm of modern jet fighters and bombers. The Soviet Union has also extended some $250 million in economic credits, for long-range projects. Only a small portion of this has been utilized, and Boumedienne probably does not intend to sacrifice this. Algeria also has a $50 million credit from Communist China. Boumedienne will probably attempt, however, to deal warily with the Communists, and to preserve Algeria's independent status. He is said to have become disillusioned with Castro's Cuba, following a visit there in 1963, largely because it was so patently a Soviet satellite. 4. Algeria's neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia, will not be pleased by Boumedienne's coming to power. During the border fighting with Morocco in the fall of 1963, the Algerian army fared badly. It was largely as a consequence of this humiliating treatment that the Soviet-backed build-up of the Algerian forces was begun. King Hassan has watched this build-up with deep misgiving, and recently went out of his way to effect a reconciliation with Ben Bella. Hassan will regard a military regime in Algeria as a dagger pointing straight at Morocco. Tunisian President Bourguiba, always distrustful of Ben Bella, will be even more so of Boumedienne toward whom he was at best coolly polite during the years Boumedienne spent in Tunisia during the Algerian revolution.
22. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret. McGB: It's still early to tell how the new Algerian government will pan out. It doesn't look like there'll be a sharp lurch to the left. In fact, there's a good chance it will try to be more businesslike in attacking its chronic economic troubles, less concerned with foreign adventures. However, Boumedienne is not popular, and he hasn't seen the last of the pro-Ben Bella demonstrations. So his first job will be to put together a leadership that will command some popular support. State may skirt the whole recognition problem by saying there's no need for a formal act since most members of the previous government are still at their posts. The one thing we're sure about is that the coup has put both Moroccans and Tunisians on edge. Both have border troubles with Algeria and view Boumedienne as the architect of the 1963 Moroccan-Algerian border spat. Although the well-connected Tunisian ambassador in Algiers thinks the coup could well net out as a gain, Bourguiba, Jr. has already said the US military aid he asked the President for is now "emergency rather than precautionary." Tactically, we're in an excellent position to move either way. After a winter of cutting food stocks to the bare minimum needed to keep food-for-work and feeding programs going, we had just decided to let stocks run out and programs expire over the summer. Rusk and Porter have both told Algerian officials this would happen since current agreements are running out and they haven't asked us to continue. So we can easily coast for a month or two and still pick up momentum if the situation warrants. If the new government asks for help, I'd argue for making self-help the chief criterion for whatever we do. The small model rural rehabilitation projects we're running there now are technically impressive. But because we've never fully engaged the political level of the government, our aid hasn't had the catalytic effect we'd hoped for. What we want this time--if we start up again--is something they'll put their own resources behind. Our line ought to be that we're ready to help with their nation-building but we're not going to waste our time if they're not interested in their own problems. I wouldn't argue for a big dollar program (though the new French oil-aid agreement will cut French aid and maybe trigger requests to us) because we can do a lot to tackle unemployment and some reconstruction through food-for-work. Hal
23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria/1/ Washington, June 23, 1965, 9:43 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 ALG. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Stoltzfus and Blake; cleared by White of S/AH, Fine of AFP, Phillips of P, Manhard of FE, Nelson of AID, Kearney of L, and Williams; and approved and initialed by both Rusk and Ball. Also sent to Rabat, Tunis, Addis Ababa, Tripoli, Paris, and London, and repeated to Cairo, Saigon, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok, and Djakarta. 3147. For Algiers. Embtel 3294./2/ /2/Dated June 23. (Ibid.) 1) Dept concurs your recommendation that you inform Bouteflika USG prepared examine possibilities for "fruitful cooperation" referred to by Fonmin at mutually convenient time. If asked, Dept will take line here that question of need for recognition of new regime is under study and in meantime USG is continuing normal contacts with Algerian officials. 2) From all indications we have from Embassy Algiers and other sources, Boumedienne Government making as good progress as can be expected under circumstances toward consolidation its control. While there is some evidence internal discontent exists and may continue, regime has shown signs of determination and ability to deal with it, at least on its current scale. We therefore proceeding on assumption new regime is achieving reasonable measure of stability and that it would be politically disadvantageous for us to postpone indefinitely our giving assurance to GOA of USG desire for maintenance of relations between two governments./3/ /3/Telegram 3216 to Algiers, June 28, instructed Porter to see Bouteflika as soon as possible to affirm that the U.S. Government looked forward to continuing friendly relations with the Algerian Government and to confirm its desire to explore fruitful avenues of cooperation at a mutually convenient time. Porter was informed that the Department intended to say, if asked, that the U.S. Government recognized the Government of Algeria and considered that there had been no interruption in diplomatic relations. (Ibid.) 3) Re Bandung II, you should take opportunity during call on Bouteflika to state that, contrary some reports, USG has made no effort discourage Afro-Asian states from attending Algiers conference. Moreover, USG naturally interested in conference and in this connection wishes GOA to know we believe all Afro-Asian states having right to participate, such as South Korea, South Viet Nam and Malaysia, should be permitted to attend. US hopes that GOA assurances of non-alignment in foreign affairs will be reflected in support for attendance at conference of these states and support for constructive resolutions in Afro-Asian interest rather than anti-US and anti-Western polemics. In discussing foregoing with Bouteflika you should avoid any implication US endorsement of Conference or that US position is contrary to that of Afro-Asian Commonwealth countries or strong moderates. For Other Action Addressees. Please convey to host government our views regarding recognition, (numbered para.2), indicating we would welcome any comments. In this connection we note GOT view (Tunis's 683)/4/ that for Tunisia question of recognizing new regime does not arise. /4/Dated June 23. (Ibid.) Rusk
24. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 26, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/63-7/65. Secret. Meeting with Algerian Ambassador, 11:30 July 27. He carries an "oral message" from Boumedienne, but we suspect it merely says Algeria wants good relations with us. State's brief is attached/2/ and the following talking points might be of use: /2/Not printed. 1. Your regards to Boumedienne, and Ambassador should assure him we too hope for better relations. 2. We've long felt that first priority of any new government is to provide better life for its own people. We've tried to be helpful to Algeria in this respect. 3. US is fully aware of differences between itself and Algeria on issues like Vietnam. But we hope that Algerians will at least be truly non-aligned on such issues. Vietnam is not a matter of US preventing independence of small nations; on the contrary, we see ourselves as fighting for South Vietnam's independence from Chicom domination. 4. All we ask is mutual respect, which has not always been forthcoming in the past. R.W. Komer /3/The source text bears Komer's typed signature but was initialed by Bundy.
25. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 27, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation, 1965, July-December. Confidential. Drafted by Williams and approved by Komer in the White House on July 30. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Guellal, Algeria" Mr. Komer" G. Mennen Williams The President asked Guellal how he liked 4040 referring to the number of his old house. They exchanged a few pleasantries. Guellal then responded to the President's question as to the effect of the change in government in Algeria. Guellal said it was for the good, and in the national interest, of Algeria. He said it was not a result of a military coup for power alone. Rather it was the product of political and economic forces, particularly the concentration of power in the administration. Guellal said there was speculation as to the origins of the coup. Some said it was China because of the earlier messages sent. Some said it was the Soviet Union seeking postponement of the Bandung II Conference. Notably the CIA was never mentioned. At this point, the President interjected that the role of the CIA was tremendously overstated. If it did even half the things it was credited with doing, it would be quite an outfit. Guellal continued that the fact of the matter was that the coup was internal against the concentration of power. Ben Bella, he said, had sought all offices: Secretary-General of the party, Minister of Planning, Interior, etc., etc. He indicated that the second problem was the systematic elimination of political opposition. The President then asked what was the effect of this on the United States. Guellal said it was for the better. The President then turned to me and asked if it had been better. I replied that there were some improvements, and we were hoping for more but that just recently, as the Ambassador knew, the press had brutally attacked the United States on Vietnam. The President then spoke with great vigor on Vietnam. He asked rhetorically why people who didn't understand the situation talked so much about it. He said it is a pure question of defending the South Vietnamese. He said that he wants actually to help the North Vietnamese and has provided for a regional over-all AID program. But he was not going to let North Vietnam gobble up South Vietnam. He wasn't going to let them do it even if China and Russia intervened. Then the President said if they quit attacking us, we'll quit tomorrow. On the other hand, the President said if they bomb us we have to continue. What's more, as far as foreign public opinion goes it seems that if the opposition bomb us as they are doing all around in Saigon, that's all right, but if we bomb them, we are criticized. The President then said that we are all for peace, that we would go to Cambodia, to Geneva, to the United Nations; we would talk to anybody anywhere; that we are ready for unconditional talks. The President then referred to the fact that this had been the policy of President Eisenhower, of Kennedy, and of himself. The President then changed his tone and manner completely and said in an earnest and kindly voice: we do hope for better understanding. If we have better understanding, there is much that we could do. Guellal then took up the conversation by saying that Algeria wished for an improvement in relations with the United States. Guellal, before continuing with what Boumedienne had authorized, said that in the past our relations had never been very very good but neither had they been very very bad. He said that he had met with Boumedienne and that Boumedienne had authorized him to convey the message to the President that he wanted to see relations between the two countries improve. Guellal then said that, as a matter of fact, certain measures had already been taken to clear up misunderstandings of US policy where there were differences. However, he said, one must realize that Algeria can't do it completely all at once. But the indications were there that they were going to do something. Actually, actions had been taken to put relationships that had been extreme before into regular form, namely measures had been taken to normalize relationships with the UAR, Cuba, the USSR, and even small Bulgaria. Guellal said that there were important developments which would effect a reorientation of policy. Guellal then expressed the appreciation of Boumedienne for the July 5 message from the President./2/ He also thanked us for the continuation of assistance and said that they would like to see assistance increased even as it had been increased by France. /2/President Johnson's message of congratulations on the anniversary of Algerian independence was transmitted in telegram 47 to Algiers, July 5. (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential Files, CO 13 Algeria) Guellal then said that Boumedienne wanted the President to know that if there were any problems, he would be happy to have an exchange of direct messages between heads of state, and that President Johnson's views would always be carefully taken into consideration. Guellal continued that Algeria had good relations with most of the Afro-Asian countries. If we felt that there was anything that we wished to convey to them, Algeria would be ready to develop a procedure to do so. At this point, the President broke in to say that if people can't get along with Komer and Williams they can't get along with anybody. But if the Ambassador had problems he couldn't work out with us, he would be happy to see the Ambassador. The President then said that he would follow up on Boumedienne's invitation to communicate. He realized that everyone couldn't agree on everything but that we weren't going around trying to sell everybody on our idea of things. He then made reference to the fact that Chou En-lai had been three times in Africa to exercise his influence. The President then said that it was his ambition to work with the countries of the world to raise their standards of living, to provide more education, and to fight against the ancient enemies of mankind, poverty, ignorance and disease. The President said international relations should not be conducted by international name-calling. If Algeria has any problems with us, don't talk to others about it but come directly to us. He hoped that Algeria would not from time to time say ugly things about the United States. He had never said a critical thing about any country since he had been President--not even about Russia or China. He said the place to handle diplomatic matters was in the office. The President terminated the meeting by saying he was happy to see Ambassador Guellal but that he was already fifteen minutes overdue for a Cabinet meeting. Note: After leaving the President, I pointed out to Ambassador Guellal that he had asked the President for aid but that we had never received an official request from his Government and that we wouldn't respond until they had done so. He said never worry they were working on it.
26. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 13, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II (2). Confidential. Title III programs for the UAR and Algeria. These can be separated from India and Pakistan, and reduce the risk of voluntary agency and other plaints that we're holding up "humanitarian" programs for political reasons. The best case for going ahead is Algeria. Here CARE (doing 65%), Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Service cooperating with Lutheran World Relief have been operating since 1962. Their proposed FY'66 program is $14 million to reach 2.5 million recipients--mostly through family feeding centers geared to people displaced by the rebellion and unable to provide for themselves. This amounts to 328 million pounds of powdered milk, wheat, flour, corn meal, and vegetable oil. Supplies are almost exhausted, and we'd have to divert a ship to Algiers in the next few days to keep programs going. CARE lacks the customary 2-3 months stock to work from, because we purposely put Algeria on a hand-to-mouth basis last winter when we thought Ben Bella might well not ask us to continue. But now the new Boumedienne government has formally asked us to continue Title III and for an overall review of our aid program. The case for going ahead is that Boumedienne seems at least marginally better than Ben Bella, so it would be better not to lump him with our more irksome clients until he proves himself one. Moreover, we don't want to get him sore at us just before the potentially quite important Afro-Asian summit conference on 5 November in Algiers. One report says that he'll try to keep the conference from becoming an anti-US platform, if he thinks there's a chance of improving relations with us. We can't turn off all the invective, but it may make a difference to have the guy in charge interested in keeping the lid on./2/ /2/There is no indication of President Johnson's approval or disapproval. [Here follows discussion of the United Arab Republic.] R.W. Komer/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria/1/ Washington, December 23, 1965, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG-US. Secret. Drafted by Root and Tron of AFN, cleared by Nelson of AID, and approved by Williams. 1806. Ref: (A) Algiers 1336;/2/ (B) Algiers 1337./3/ For Ambassador from Governor Williams. /2/In telegram 1336 from Algiers, December 20, Ambassador John D. Jernegan reported that he had met with Layachi Yaker, Director of the Economic, Social, and Cultural Affairs Division of the Algerian Foreign Office, to discuss the state of the U.S.-Algerian aid negotiations, and had told him "bluntly" that the joint communique issued at the end of Boumedienne's trip to Moscow with its long list of grievances against the United States did not make his efforts to improve relations between the two countries easier. (Ibid., AID (US) 15-4 ALG) /3/Dated December 20. (Ibid., POL 7 ALG) 1. Department appreciates line you took with Yaker as described Ref A. I intend call in Guellal to express our equally strong reaction to Moscow communique and to request explanation of how Algerian positions therein can be reconciled with earlier Algerian assurances to us of desire improved relations on basis mutual respect. 2. We do not wish at this time link aid negotiations with recent Algerian performance on Vietnam. However, we hope soon be able assess meaning of Moscow visit and acquire further information on any aid or other arrangements that might have been concluded in Moscow. We also wish gauge Algerian reaction to concern we expect to take with Guellal. Embassy need not break off discussions pending this review but they should be kept in low key. 3. We would appreciate as much light as you can shed on Algerian intentions on future relations with the U.S. following Moscow trip. You authorized in your discretion see Boumedienne, or anyone else in government, for this purpose./4/ /4/In telegram 1368 from Algiers, December 24, Jernegan reported that he did not think he should seek a special appointment with Boumedienne or Bouteflika to discuss this, since the essential point had already been made to Yaker who had promised to convey it to Bouteflika. He noted that there was nothing to indicate that any significant new arrangements for aid had been concluded in Moscow, and argued that it would be a mistake for the United States to break off its own aid negotiations unless there was some evidence that the communique would be followed by unacceptable Algerian actions. (Ibid., POL ALG-US) Rusk
28. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 17, 1966, noon. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. II, Memos & Miscellaneous, 7/65-11/68. Secret. A few weeks ago we asked your OK of our proposed new food deal with Algeria--a relatively tight one for $12.6 million in Title IV dollar sales with provision for phasing out Title II and III./2/ I haven't pressed further because of Boumedienne's bad public performance on Vietnam (indeed I purposely delayed this agreement a little myself). /2/On January 4, Komer sent a memorandum to the President asking for approval of a modest new P.L. 480 program on the grounds of Algeria's strategic importance. (Ibid.) But I want to keep you abreast of the play, since Tom Mann may call you. We're about two weeks beyond when negotiations would normally have led to signing, and the Algerians need food in February. So we're at the point where they'll begin reading further delay as our backing out. The issue is whether we want to bid for a working relationship with the Boumedienne regime as it sorts itself out. Mann, Soapy, our Ambassador, and I feel it's worth this small food sale (mostly dollars anyway). I doubt that we'll ever see eye-to-eye with Algeria on Vietnam, but it has little influence on this issue, Boumedienne still looks more hopeful than Ben Bella, and we have a stake in Algerian oil./3/ /3/On January 20, Komer sent a third memorandum to the President, again asking for approval of the Title IV food sale to Algeria and again receiving no response. On January 22, Saunders notified McGeorge Bundy that a definite answer had to be given to the Algerians, since they needed the food in February and would have to buy it elsewhere. Later that day, Saunders sent Bundy another note, saying that the President had seen the "third Algerian memo" and laid it aside. (Ibid.) R.W. Komer /4/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature. Go ahead /5/None of these options is checked.
29. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, January 26, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963-March 1966. Confidential. Prepared by Komer. Algerian Ambassador Guellal came in this afternoon to make a discreet inquiry about the pending PL 480 deal. State was telling him the matter was already over in the White House. I said we just hadn't gotten to this matter yet, and explained the heavy pressures of White House business in January--all the usual presidential messages at the beginning of the congressional session with momentous Vietnam decisions on top of them. He accepted that in good grace and didn't press further, though he had apparently been instructed to find out the score./2/ /2/The P.L. 480 agreement with Algeria was signed on February 23. When I added that after all we had no special cause to give priority to Algeria these days, that led him into a discussion of Vietnam which I quickly dropped. I explained our current sensitivities and preoccupations, leaving the implication that Algerian public statements have left us without any inclination to take time out from more important matters for "secondary problems." Guellal turned that into a discussion of how others could help on Vietnam concluding that there was nothing others could do as long as our position and (as a polite afterthought) the other side's remain the same. I chided him about our still-delayed Investment Guaranty Agreement. He said it was very complex and the Finance Ministry was studying its implications for relations with French and other foreign companies but expected it to be ready soon. When I jokingly reminded him that he'd been telling me that ever since he arrived, he replied that now at least he gets reports of action. That concluded the day's business. To get onto less touchy ground, I asked his view of the Ben Barka case. He felt Hassan had clearly started the whole thing in an effort to broaden his own political base to the left. This worried Oufkir who was far right. Oufkir, as Guellal pictured it, had intended only to bring Ben Barka back to Morocco but had gotten into a fight with him and killed him. (Guellal painted a very black picture of Oufkir.) On the French side, De Gaulle was furious because close advisers hadn't been candid with him, and Hassan (his fair-haired boy) had bucked him. Guellal hoped Hassan would sack Oufkir. If Hassan chose Oufkir over De Gaulle, Guellal saw the French cutting off aid a la Guinea and Tunisia and tough times ahead for Morocco. Guellal asked about developments in the Middle East. I told him things were generally quiet, with the exception of two bothersome problems--the Iran-Iraq border squabble and the dragging Yemen settlement. I told him nothing he couldn't have figured out from the newspapers (though he took it in as if for the first time) and steered clear of the issues we worry about most. I promised to let him know if I learned anything about P.L. 480. I reminded him with a smile that last July the President had told him to "talk to Komer and Williams" if he had any problems and said I might just tell the President that Guellal had a problem and had talked to me. R.W. Komer /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
