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Algeria 6. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, January 10, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, 12/63-7/65. Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer on January 15. Copies were sent to Ralph Dungan, McGeorge Bundy, G. Mennen Williams, and David Newsom. Algerian Ambassador Guellal came in on 10 January before returning to Algeria for consultation (ostensibly on the formation of an Algerian national oil company). My theme was that I was a little discouraged when I took an overall look at US-Algerian relations. We had made every effort to achieve a good working relationship with the new GOA, but there didn't seem to be much reciprocation. Moreover 1964 was likely to be a hard year for the US in the Arab world. For example, the Jordan Waters problem would put us in the middle between the Arabs and Israelis, and the Arabs would undoubtedly say some nasty things about us. Guellal interrupted to assure me that Ben Bella is quite reasonable on this issue and has no strong personal feelings. So he didn't think this would cause trouble between us; Arab action would probably be confined to shouting. He confided that Ben Bella had taken a "very cautious" line with Nasser. To bring us back to US-Algerian relations, I said I'd cited the Jordan Waters problem simply as one factor promising to create a generally difficult atmosphere this year. Closer to home were Ben Bella's continued pro-Cuba comments and new cozying up to Communist China and North Vietnam. Though President Johnson is just as determined as President Kennedy to develop good relations with key nations like Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, etc., he naturally doesn't have the same long-standing personal feeling for Algeria. So bad atmospherics could hurt. Guellal explained that Ben Bella gets emotional, and sometimes in public goes embarrassingly beyond his real position. He had been sending back material on Cuba and explaining our sensitivities; he thought a time of greater moderation was coming. I said I understood but others didn't, and this makes life difficult for Algeria's friends here. In showing him several ticker reports of Ben Bella's recent blasts, I quoted his comment about Algeria following the example of the Yugoslav, Cuban and Chicom revolutions. My jocular comment was, "If you must follow the Yugoslav model so be it, but for pete's sake, not the Cubans or Chicoms. Their economic performance is pitiful." Guellal volunteered that life was difficult for Algerian political leaders too. Preparations for the party congress had caused Ben Bella's opponents to look for every opening to attack him. When I said we didn't see much of a threat from Abbas, Ben Khedda, etc. but what about Boumedienne? Guellal said he thought Boumedienne was quite content with his present position and had no further political ambitions. Boumedienne's political activity is simply a response to Khider's maneuvering against him. I returned to my theme of general concern over the way things are going, citing my earlier hope that Algerians would be farther along administratively and economically by now. Guellal agreed that Algeria faces difficult problems--a unique heritage from seven years of revolution and the loss of a million trained people--but countered, "Who could have done better?" He cited domestic stability and continuing relations with France despite the acrimony of revolution as major achievements. I conceded that perhaps we were hoping for too much too soon, but said I still wondered whether the Algerians are really making the most of present assets. When he asked what I would do, I said I'd take a more reasonable line on oil, for instance, deriving needed revenue from present arrangements while building goodwill. When Algeria was on surer footing and farther down the development track, it could then seek more advantageous arrangements. I cited the great success of Malaysian cooperation with the UK, as contrasted to the mess Sukarno has made of his economy by following a policy of belligerent nationalism. Guellal said he thought the Algerians were being pretty reasonable (though he thought the Algerian share of oil revenues was disgracefully small). He said the Investment Guaranty would soon be signed and he hoped that four American companies would participate in the new national petroleum company along with a couple of German firms and a French one. But he got my point. On economic development, I also emphasized how sorry I'd be to see Algeria waste its money on building a large military establishment. India was a case in point. Here was the same sharp swing from almost complete disregard for defense needs before the Chinese attack to current over-emphasis which might critically reduce India's development effort. He agreed with the general point but mentioned that Algeria would soon be getting some Soviet equipment needed for defense against the Moroccans. He made a crack about our arming Morocco. My reply was (a) the Soviets had probably given them more than we had; and (b) most of our aid went to them long before Morocco and Algeria became enemies. Despite his crack, he agreed that we had been quite fair during the Moroccan-Algerian clash. He said the Algerians are concerned not only about border "aggression" but also about treatment of Algerians in Morocco, who have been "arrested and tortured, one even killed." Then he asked what our attitude would be toward supplying Algeria with some military equipment. I was sure we wouldn't reject this idea out of hand provided (a) Algeria and Morocco composed their differences first so we wouldn't be arming one friend against another and (b) we wouldn't end up side by side with Cuba in the same aid effort. When he spoke of the problems of the Algerian bureaucracy--its tremendous task and lack of trained people--I told him I hoped he would jog his government on the Four Areas Project. This was ready to go and could employ 60,000 people before summer, but administrative roadblocks on their side appeared to be holding it up. He promised to look into this in Algiers. He went on to say how important he thought it was for Ambassador Porter to have a direct line to Ben Bella because things often got distorted or bogged down in the bureaucracy. He promised to set something up while he was in Algeria. I put in a plug for Porter; Guellal agreed that he knows the Arab world well and is a good source of advice. RWK
7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria/1/ Washington, January 13, 1964, 8:52 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 ALG. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Valdes of SOV, Dean of FE, Follestad of ARA, and McCloskey of P; and approved and initialed by Tasca. Repeated to Paris and pouched to Rabat and Tunis. 1455. Dept concurs your proposal see Ben Bella following return from summit. While appreciating tense atmosphere resulting Oran problem, we hope such meeting might offer opportunity express growing concern here over espousal anti-American causes by Algerian press, radio, FLN and other semi-governmental political groups and some evidence Algerians may be encouraging closer relations other African states with Bloc and Bloc-oriented nations. (Report Algerians sought encourage Moroccan restoration relations with Cuba [Rabat's 947];/2/ Tunisian relations with China [Tunis 434])./3/ While GOA continues stress interest in close ties with U.S., espousal, often in anti-American context, of Viet Cong, Cuba, Korea, and other causes sheds doubt on real interest Algerian leadership in close relations with us. /2/Not found. All brackets are in the source text. /3/Dated January 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 16 CHICOM) Department realizes there is genuine strength in Algerian public attitudes related to Bloc and Arab support for social change; opposition to colonialism; support for militant nationalism. We realize GOA attitudes affected by need for external economic assistance and consequent pragmatic desire receive aid all quarters, by internal pressures, by difficulties with Morocco, and by ambitions for African leadership. Nevertheless, Algerian quasi-official support continues for issues far removed from North Africa and of apparent significance only in general support reflected for anti-Western causes. FLN entertainment Italian Communist Party one example. Dept welcomed Ambassador's initiative in protesting to GOA on pro-Viet Cong demonstration (Embtel 1309)./4/ Dept raised this and more general question with Ambassador Guellal January 10 and suggests these points be made in call on Ben Bella: /4/Dated December 24, 1963. (Ibid., POL 25 ALG) 1. USG seriously concerned by increasing reports of events in Algeria which suggest accelerated effort by quasi-official organs and groups espouse Communist side East-West issues such as Viet Cong, Cuba, and Korea. 2. We would regard most seriously any endorsement by GOA such activities or any indication GOA was seeking further these causes among other African nations. 3. We do not have in mind so much spotlight on Soviets and Communist Chinese which came as result recent visits; we do have in mind demonstrations, press accounts, radio broadcasts, and FLN party actions which support causes friendly to East. 4. We cannot, in one party state in which press and radio controlled by government and party, consider what these organs say as something independent of government policy. 5. Policy of Algerian press, radio, and party organs these issues seems to U.S. markedly inconsistent with normal non-alignment. 6. U.S. has brought specific incidents to attention Embassy Washington and Foreign Office from time to time. In spirit desire for promoting close relations, USG desires President be aware our concern these matters and inevitable effect on relations of continuing exploitation by institutions considered quasi-official of anti-American causes, essentially taking aligned position in Cold War on these issues./5/ /5/In telegram 1516 from Algiers, January 24, Ambassador Porter reported that he had not taken up the matter of Algeria's pro-Communist propaganda activities directly with Ben Bella, but had asked Algerian Ambassador Cherif Guellal to convey to Ben Bella the message that the United States was watching this carefully. (Ibid., POL ALG-US) Rusk
8. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, May 14, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG-US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and cleared by Jones in NE, Kleine in AID, Imhof in EUR, and Fine in AFP. SUBJECT Current Basis of Action: U.S. policies toward Algeria were set for FY 1963 and FY 1964 by the response to NSAM 211 forwarded to the White House on January 31, 1963. A copy is attached (Tab A)./2/ /2/None of the tabs is attached. For NSAM No. 211, December 14, 1962, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXI, p. 113. The January 31, 1963, response to NSAM No. 211 is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 211. Purpose of Current Plan: The purpose of the current plan is to bring home to President Ben Bella personally and to officials of the Algerian Government the risks of departure from non-alignment and the importance of the support the United States is giving to Algeria without directly challenging the present regime in a manner which Ben Bella is likely to exploit. (An inventory of statements and actions by Ben Bella and the Algerian Government inimical to the U.S. is attached at Tab B.) Premises of Action Plan: 1. Algeria, by size, potential, and location is of sufficient importance to the United States to justify efforts to retain a position of influence in the country, even in the face of current Algerian attitudes. We cannot abandon Algeria. 2. Ben Bella's endorsement of Communist-line positions on world affairs, with the notable exception of Germany, during his recent trip to the Soviet Union results both from an emotional attachment to situations he considers revolutionary and anti-imperialist and from the desire to find aid in sufficient quantities from other sources to reduce his dependence on France. While the United States can, perhaps, moderate his expression of these views and persuade him to avoid further attacks on U.S. programs, there is little likelihood of a basic change in his militantly revolutionary outlook. 3. Soviet interest in Algeria is primarily in terms of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the lavish treatment given Ben Bella in the USSR was primarily a response to the Chou En-lai trip to Algeria. It was a response to the new challenge to the Soviets from the Chinese for influence in the third world. There are certain limitations on Soviet intentions towards Algeria, in that they are probably hopeful of obtaining Algerian support for their world positions, rather than acquiring a new satellite, which, like Cuba, would be an expensive drain on their resources and which, like Cuba, would not be under their control. 4. Ben Bella, after the successful FLN conference in April, appears to be in firm control in Algeria, although he may face some opposition from Army and Muslim elements to his closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Other opposition to him is weak and divided. 5. The French are probably at least as concerned as we are about the prospect of increased Soviet influence in Algeria. They also have been the primary targets of Ben Bella's revolutionary activities with the result that except for military bases and the petroleum industries, little remains of the Evian Accords under which Algeria obtained independence. Despite this situation the French have continued their assistance to Algeria at the rate of over 200 million dollars per annum, and they have neither found it possible, nor advisable, to put heavy pressure on the regime. Once the need for nuclear testing in the Sahara disappears (presumably in 1966) and if Ben Bella eliminates French petroleum interests, the French will undoubtedly take a harder look at Algeria and cut their aid, although for reasons of proximity they will remain concerned with developments in Algeria. Meanwhile Algerian dependence on French aid and technicians may have exerted some restraint on Ben Bella, although not on matters of less interest to France such as Cuba or Vietnam. French development aid, in any case, is likely to decline from its present $200,000,000 annual figure but would still be significant even if reduced by half. Conceivably, upon sufficient provocation, direct French aid might be canceled abruptly as was the case in Tunisia this month. An even more serious consequence of clean break in the French-Algerian relationship would be the disruption of the total trade pattern including the sudden loss of vital French markets for Algerian exports staples, petroleum, wines, citrus, vegetables, etc. 6. The U.S. policy has been to maintain some influence through substantial food distribution activities, work relief and demonstration programs in the rural areas, and a small medical presence, while leaving to France the primary role. The United States is not in a position to match either the French ($200,000,000 annually) or Soviet ($228,000,000 in credits plus substantial military assistance) aid. We can find ways to bring home to Ben Bella more forcefully the importance of our food program and of his relationship to the United States; we would find great difficulty in supplanting either of the present major donors. 7. Directly and indirectly, we can bring home to Ben Bella the risk to his non-aligned role in Africa and Asia and to his other relationships of his growing political support of the Soviet Union and its world-wide policies. Other Arabs and Africans do not favor so close an alignment nor so close an involvement in the Cold War. To be effective, this must be done without any direct public challenge of a type he can exploit to strengthen his own position. 8. Through widening our contacts in Algeria, we can seek to influence Ben Bella through his associates and can possibly identify and become acquainted with potential future Algerian leadership more friendly to the West. At the moment, with the opposition in disarray, there is little likelihood of our being able to effect any immediate change and few possibilities for other U.S. political action. Proposed Courses of Action: 1. Explore fully with the French the current situation in Algeria and the possibilities of influencing the course of events. France remains the key to the Western position in Algeria and her actions will have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of our approach. 2. Strong demarche to Ben Bella on his recent statements in the Soviet Union (telegram already sent). Prior to such demarche recall Ambassador Porter to Washington for consultations, thereby lending the full weight of the U.S. to this demarche. Make similar demarche to the Algerian Ambassador here. 3. Make known to selected African governments our concern over Ben Bella's increasing alignment with Communist cause, having in mind the attitude these governments may take at OAU meeting in July and toward proposed and planned non-alignment conferences. We have in mind particularly: a. United Arab Republic. Nasser cannot be too pleased at this development. b. Tunisia. c. Morocco. d. Guinea. e. Nigeria. f. Senegal. 4. Encourage those African and Latin American states friendly to the West which do not have diplomatic missions in Algeria to establish them. 5. Pay occasional conspicuous attention to Tunisia and Morocco, avoiding actions which would suggest we are favoring Morocco in the Moroccan-Algerian dispute. Consider the possibility of visits to both countries by a high-ranking U.S. official in the near future, bearing in mind that timing should take into account, in addition to the reaction of Algeria to our demarche, both Tunisian and Moroccan difficulties with France over land. 6. Maintain our aid programs, but leave to the Algerians the initiative on particular actions required to continue the individual projects. Because of Algerian administrative shortcomings, we have generally pressed them to sign the necessary documents. Letting them come to us when the programs appear to be faltering might be one way of demonstrating to them more dramatically the value of the programs while, at the same time, demonstrating our lessened interest. 7. Discourage Algerian delegations to the United States of high-level officials or ranking political figures. We wish to avoid giving Ben Bella opportunities to point to his balanced attitude as demonstrated by good will delegations. At the same time, increase visits of lower level technical and administrative personnel and non-governmental Algerians to the United States and contacts with such persons in Algeria. 8. Offer limited opportunities to Algerian Army officers for special training in the United States. 9. Examine the U.S.I.S. program in Algeria (already assigned a high priority) to determine where it might be strengthened. We are forwarding the foregoing courses of action for consideration. We are not making specific recommendations on other than steps 1 and 2 at this time, pending the results of our conversations with the French. Recommendation: That you approve steps 1 and 2 above as immediate courses of action./3/ /3/The source text is a copy bearing no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.
9. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State/1/ Algiers, May 28, 1964, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. I, 12/63-7/65. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris and Moscow. 2374. Reference: Embassy telegrams 2356, 2358, 2360, 2364./2/ Following are general reactions to conversation with Ben Bella reported reference telegrams. /2/These telegrams report on Ambassador Porter's May 26 conversation with Ben Bella. Telegram 2356, May 26, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG-US; telegram 2358, May 27, is ibid.; telegram 2360, May 27, is ibid., DEF 18-9 MEDIT; and telegram 2364, May 27, is ibid., POL ALG-US. Department aware I have been observing Ben Bella for ten years and have been in close contact with him since his arrival in Algiers during summer of 1962. I doubt there is much he has said or done publicly in that period which has not been given my careful attention, as has considerable additional information about his private utterances and actions. Access to him has been easy and conversation with him frank and at times sharp. This has not affected our personal relationship which remains good. It was with particular interest that I looked forward to seeing him after his return from the Soviet Union. While there he has created [omission] of type to evoke from him through word or manner enough signs to permit judgment as to degree Communist adulation and contact may have affected his outlook. Like most observers, I originally looked on him as a nationalist with a messianic complex who was determined to lead Algeria and Africa upward and onward toward an ill-defined but nevertheless anxiously desired socialism which would secure his own stature as a great African revolutionary. But developments in recent months, and now the trip to Moscow, raise doubts that this analysis goes far enough. Our latest conversation permitted me put him under some pressure, and I was not reassured by what I observed. At present, I suspect that his relationship to Soviet Union probably goes beyond what he has admitted, or what was revealed by Moscow communique. His demeanor and statements since his return indicate that he may feel he has some kind of blank check or other assurance of support from Soviet Union in event of difficulty with France or US. Utterances such as "Soviet Union is our shield" and "French aid is important but not indispensable" and the surly confidence that he displayed to me that "now" nobody can prevent Algeria from pursuing its socialist experience, all contribute to my impression. His evasiveness in most matters discussed was in sharp contrast to his earlier frankness, and while he has always been most difficult to budge from political concepts once adopted, he at least discussed his positions frankly. On this occasion he clearly refused to consider any evidence which might lead to refute ideas he expressed. Thus, when he complained that the American press constantly attacks him and I at once showed him several recent articles of entirely different tenor, he looked away and would not examine them. When I remarked, in connection with our aid, that I assumed I could appeal to his sense of justice, he said nothing. His was a closed mind, a rigid determination to look nowhere and consider nothing which might contradict his existing impressions. Of interest in this connection was brush-off he gave to my comments, with examples in hand, about anti-American tone of press just after he had informed the French Ambassador, who also complained about anti-French campaign, that latter had no cause for complaint on this score as French are not "the Americans" (see Embassy telegram 2346)./3/ /3/Not found. His accusation that French are stirring up Touaregs had its counterpart in alleged American activities in Kabylie and there was clear allusion also to alleged American involvement in Algerian-Moroccan frontier dispute last autumn. Ben Bella has always been inclined to seek scapegoats as his problems become acute, and I consider these accusations along with his refusal or inability to produce evidence an ominous sign of line he may take publicly if and when pressures on him increase. Contrary to his practice with some other Ambassadors, he usually receives me without anyone else present, as was case this time. Whether this due to frank nature of our conversations, I cannot say, but I would have been pleased had someone else, the Foreign Minister for example, been present to hear recent discussion. If Department is so inclined, I see no objection to telling Guellal exactly what occurred, adding that all this raises doubts in our minds which cannot be resolved by continuing innuendo without supporting evidence. I took care before leaving him to talk for few minutes about other less controversial matters as it unwise to depart immediately after sharp discussion. He inquired about our rural program, offered to assist me in several minor matters locally, and escorted me with usual courtesy to door of his residence. We will of course report any signs of his reaction to our representations. Only one so far was complete lack of mention of interview in French language press, contrary to usual practice, though Arabic newspaper carried photo of two of us without comment./4/ /4/On June 2, Komer sent a copy of this telegram to McGeorge Bundy attached to a transmittal memorandum noting that the telegram underlined the desirability of a review of U.S. policy toward Algeria, and stating that the first step had to be to consult with the French, who were the only ones with enough assets in Algeria to force a change in policy or personalities. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Algeria, Vol. 1, 12/63-7/65) Porter
10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria/1/ Washington, June 17, 1964, 5:36 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG-US. Secret. Drafted by Stoltzfus in AFN, cleared by Blake, and approved by Tasca. Repeated to Paris. 2461. Following is based on uncleared memcon of Secretary's talk with Ambassador Guellal June 16,/2/ subject to revision on review, and not to be discussed with foreign nationals: /2/The memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL ALG-US. In answer Secretary's request, Amb Guellal outlined present GOA viewpoint on Algeria and US-Algerian relations. He maintained Algerian problems and attitudes had to be viewed in light history of struggle since 1954 and political leadership crisis of 1962. Algeria still suffering from political vacuum caused by refusal opposition leaders join GOA despite fact Ben Bella not "rigid" toward them. Internally, Ben Bella had taken necessary steps such as expropriation of foreign-held land and movement toward greater state control industrial sector but admittedly had not been entirely successful to date. Economic situation remained serious, unemployment high, Algerian emigration to France had assumed alarming proportions, and country hampered by lack of trained personnel. Problem now uppermost in minds of regime was trouble in Kabylia fomented and nurtured by opposition. Turning to external relations, Guellal said Algeria's policy was one of non-alignment. Difficulties with Morocco appeared on way to resolution, Algerian-Tunisian relations quite good, relations proceeding well with France which understood Algeria's problems including need for greater oil revenues. Re other Arab states, Algerian policy was try to be helpful in narrowing differences among them. Guellal said GOA aware of US concern re Ben Bella's visit to USSR. Visit was, however, normal outgrowth of long-standing Russian invitation. Algerians had prepared thoroughly for it including consultations with other visitors to USSR and recipients of Russian aid. Algeria made clear its intention remain aloof from Soviet-Chicom dispute and its identification with neutral outlook of OAU. Guellal added unfortunately US-Algerian relations were not what GOA had hoped for. GOA felt US had not taken sufficient account of Algeria's social, economic and political problems resulting from revolution. Wheat program useful but did not contribute to Algeria's great need for development projects without which country could not progress. Soviets on other hand promptly selected and studied projects they were interested in and six months later had agreed to begin program. Guellal said "on top of everything else" there had emerged, rightly or wrongly, suspicion in minds Algerians that CIA engaged in anti-regime activities in Kabylia and had contacted opposition in Zurich last August. As result Ben Bella had developed feeling US was hostile to Algeria as well as unsympathetic with its problems. This feeling given further substance by Fascell report. Guellal said Algiers had become scene of free-for-all among pro-Soviets, pro-Chinese, pro-Westerners, etc. In these circumstances, those like himself attempting "balance" political climate in Algiers by representing US point of view having very difficult time of it. Secretary observed US found Algerian accusations against CIA frustrating. There was no truth whatever to them/3/ and no evidence forthcoming from GOA despite our declared willingness look into matter. /3/Telegram 21 to Algiers, July 2, stated that Secretary Rusk had instructed that, in view of the assurances he had given to Ambassador Guellal that U.S. officials were not in contact with Algerian opposition elements, there be no contact by State, CIA, Service attaches, or other members of the U.S. establishment with Colonel Chabaani. (Ibid., POL 9 ALG-US) Secretary said he would soon be going before Senate Foreign Relations Committee re foreign aid bill and might well be asked two questions. First was, what does Algeria mean by non-alignment? Algerian official press had only that morning spoken of US "policy of aggression" in SE Asia, and Ben Bella still seemed curiously fascinated by Castro. US had much experience with and was sympathetic to non-alignment and knew what it meant. Did Algeria? Guellal replied that to Algeria non-alignment did not mean remaining exactly equidistant between two points. It had to be admitted differences of viewpoints between US and Algeria substantial on many issues. Current Algerian views on Korea and Vietnam (where, incidentally, many Algerians still residing following their service with French army in Indo-China) were same as those Algerian leaders had defended since 1954. It was unrealistic expect that two years after independence Algeria would alter its views these matters and recast its position on non-alignment. Algeria still in state of flux, and process of maturing could be expected last many years. Guellal said he felt it was not constructive make issues of such questions although he could understand US sensitivities regarding them. Secretary said he readily understood nation could in principle oppose stationing of troops in foreign countries. However, he could not subscribe to view that in Vietnam, for example, presence of foreign Communist troops acceptable but presence American troops was not. Secretary said problems such as Vietnam were issues of war and peace and thus obviously not only sensitive but of great importance to US. Secretary said second question Senators could ask him related to Ben Bella's reference to American wheat aid as "poisoned bread". Secretary asked Guellal how he thought average American paying taxes, part of which supported this program, would react to such as insulting description of our aid. Guellal said he agreed words were unjustified and that he had reported US reaction this matter to Ben Bella. Secretary observed US-Algerian relations now in descending spiral. Question was could both sides cooperate to reverse trend or not? Most he would be able to say in answer to Senators, in absence any explanation from GOA, was that in his opinion it did not make any real difference what Algeria thought. Of course such remark would not be appreciated by Ben Bella but there appeared to be little else that could be said. Guellal said he could assure Secretary that Ben Bella harbored good intentions toward US and France. It would have been easy cut Algeria off from both countries at time of independence when feeling against them running high. Ben Bella had, however, wanted start new page in these relations. Secretary said US had entertained high hopes for understanding relations with Algeria during time of President Kennedy, but unfortunately it had not proved possible build on these hopes. Although US wheat program was one of largest in world, it apparently not helpful in our relations. Guellal asserted food program had helped Algerian people. Nevertheless it was not of economic reconstruction type that would help put Algeria on its feet. Guellal said Ben Bella, he and others had been obliged intervene with certain GOA ministries which opposed US work projects. Ben Bella had finally agreed intervene in favor of projects in interest maintaining good relations with US. Guellal said he agreed US-Algerian relations heading downhill and there was no doubt GOA had developed suspicions re US intentions toward Algeria. Secretary said he believed it was important in interest better US-Algerian relations to clear up matter of allegations against CIA. He wondered whether US and Algerian Governments might each select person in whom it had utmost confidence to conduct quietly and discreetly joint investigation of true origin and facts concerning these reports. Guellal promised convey this thought to Ben Bella. Mr. Tasca emphasized US concern over denuclearization conference and especially indications conference had official GOA support. Guellal said he would again report US concern to Algiers. Rusk
11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria/1/ Washington, June 23, 1964, 5:04 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ALG-US. Secret. Drafted by Blake on June 22; cleared by Tasca, Harriman, and Hughes; and approved and initialed by Secretary Rusk. 2512. For Ambassador. Deptel 2461./2/ Aberkane of Algerian Embassy today informed Department Ben Bella had responded favorably to Secretary's suggestion re possible desirability quiet and discreet joint inquiry into source allegations CIA activities Kabylie. /2/Document 10. Unless you perceive objection, request you contact appropriate level Algerian Government and say DCM prepared to discuss matter of meeting of representatives suggested during Washington conversation Secretary-Guellal. DCM should take line (1) US desires any new information Algeria has; (2) repeat in detail previous position; and, (3) unless Algerians indicate they can provide new data, endeavor to close matter by reiterating fact US not supporting opposition to Ben Bella./3/ /3/Telegram 47 to Algiers, July 7, reported that the Department of State informed Ambassador Guellal on July 6 that Norris Haselton had been appointed to meet with a designated Algerian representative in Washington for a joint examination of these allegations. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 9 ALG-US) On July 13, Assistant Secretary Williams sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk reporting that Guellal had referred the matter to his government, which had hoped the examination could take place in Algeria. (Ibid.) Rusk
12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea/1/ Washington, October 23, 1964, 6:57 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ALG-US. Confidential. Drafted by Stoltzfus, cleared by Newsom and Pelletreau, and approved by Trimble. Repeated to Algiers. 398. Embtel 274./2/ In response repeated expressions of concern by Ben Bella during past eight months that US in contact with Algerian opposition elements to detriment his regime, Dept has assured Ben Bella at highest level Department that US in no way involved with opposition. We have stated our willingness to look into matter if GOA will submit specific evidence that can properly be investigated. In late August Algerian Ambassador brought back to Washington impression that Ben Bella finally satisfied with USG assurances and considered matter closed, at least for time being. /2/Dated October 22. (Ibid., POL 1 THE CONGO-US) As reftel makes clear, Ben Bella does not in fact consider matter closed. You might therefore take appropriate opportunity to give substance of foregoing to Toure to emphasize US concern and our efforts to allay Ben Bella's suspicions, which are totally without foundation. You may also suggest US would welcome his help or advice on what else we might do to achieve this end. Rusk
13. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, November 19, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I (2). Secret. Prepared by Robert W. Komer. Copies were sent to Williams and Newsom. Algerian Ambassador Guellal came in today for a rambling discussion, but I believe mainly to sound me out on a Ben Bella visit here. Midway in our chat he said he presumed I'd seen the Algerian press reports that Ben Bella might be coming to the UNGA. He had no information himself but what did I think about a visit "to New York and Washington?" I told him this was a matter on which I didn't feel able to offer much advice; it was after all a matter for Ben Bella to decide. However, I gathered that relatively few chiefs of state would be coming to the GA this year. This might change of course, but none of the key world leaders now seemed to be planning to attend. It was also possible that the Article 19 issue might lead to further delay in the UN session after 1 December. I then asked if Ben Bella would plan to go on directly from the US to Peking, reminding Guellal of the unfortunate impression made here on his first visit here by his trip to Cuba right after. What issues might Ben Bella want to raise while here? When Guellal mentioned Palestine, the Congo, and perhaps Cuba and Vietnam, I doubted that it would be possible to have much in the way of productive talk on these issues. These were all sensitive issues in US public opinion, and our different viewpoints on them were well-known. For Ben Bella to come and bell the cat on such matters might be a cause of embarrassment to him and to us. Finally, I pointed out that the President probably would be away in Texas for a considerable part of the time between now and the end of the year; he wanted to do some thinking about major new programs without being subjected to constant Washington pressure. I granted that all of these points seemed to add up to throwing a bit of cold water on a Ben Bella visit at this time. I did not wish to give the impression that anyone here would be opposed to such a visit. We had simply not focused on the problem, and I was merely giving him my own horseback thinking that perhaps the timing was not optimum. Guellal took all of this in very good part, and I had the impression that it coincided with his own feelings. Earlier Guellal had asked me about the current state of US-Algerian relations. I opined that there did not seem to be many bilateral problems between us, but it was discouraging to see that we and Algeria seemed to be on different sides of the fence on so many external issues. While we fully respected Algeria's independence and non-aligned policy, it did seem to us that Algeria almost invariably tended to lean toward the opposite side of the fence on most problems. The friends of Algeria in the US had a tough time explaining that this was mostly growing pains. Guellal bridled a bit at this. He argued that Algerian policy wasn't as one-sided as I suggested. The only concrete case he brought out, though, was relations with West instead of East Germany. We read the Algerian press too closely, and niggled at every little thing. We should take a longer view. Above all, we should understand why Algeria felt so strongly on anti-colonial issues, and particularly those in Africa. So I asked him about what I described as strictly a non-colonial issue but one involving the very right of majority rule in the UNGA--Article 19. Guellal insisted that Algeria took a firm position in principle in favor of Article 19. Being unfamiliar on where Algeria stood, I simply complimented him on his courage. We hoped the majority of UN members would feel the same way. I slipped in the Nuncie case; here was one peanut bilateral issue which we both ought to clear out of the way lest it eventually cause problems because of the Congressional bar in the Foreign Assistance Act. He got my point in a hurry, but said he'd done all he could. He'd gotten his Finance Ministry to write a letter along the lines State wanted but this was held up in the Foreign Ministry. He'd give them another nudge to break it loose. Guellal asked me about our China policy, which I explained as not being as rigid as some people seemed to think. All we asked was a halt to China's aggressive behavior, which even the Soviets seemed to find rather a problem. We ended up talking a bit about the Sudan. He had known in Delhi two of the ministers in the new government. They were fine people and certainly not communist. Guellal commented that he commiserated with the Sudanese Ambassador who was going to Cairo. Guellal also argued that the Ben Bella regime was doing a pretty effective job in Algeria. It now had a secure hold on power. He deplored Moroccan fears of Algeria and said that the Algerians hoped for nothing more than good relations with both their neighbors in the Maghreb. He thought the Moroccan-Algerian problem was well on the way to being worked out. RWK
14. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)/1/ Washington, December 5, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963-March 1966. Secret. I can well understand our mounting disillusionment over Algeria. Ben Bella has been hard to swallow in the past, but his antics in the Congo will be the last straw for a lot of people. The Nuncie expropriation case may force us to suspend aid anyway. But if we get over that hurdle, we'll still have a choice. The real issue is not so much whether we can get more for our money in terms of political leverage (I'm pessimistic here though we ought to try); it is essentially whether things wouldn't get a lot worse if we cut Algeria off. I'd hate to see us abandon the field to the French, Soviets, and Chicoms. We wouldn't save much since most of our aid is PL 480 (around $25 million per annum); dollar aid has run only $1-2 million annually. More important, cutting off aid punitively would only magnify the damage BB could do us in spite. He could send more aid to the Congo, Cuba, Guiana; he could start trouble with Morocco again. He could nationalize our oil. Even the oil companies are now worrying about getting caught in the fall-out. So to keep our hand in at modest cost still makes sense, even though public and congressional criticism will be painful. What we ought to do is figure out how to get some leverage from what we give. We don't have much now (even though we feed 1/3 of BB's people), because BB has never faced up to what loss of our food would cost him. He doesn't rate it highly because he thinks we're happy to dump our surplus, and he doesn't grasp the real economic (and indirect political) contribution it makes. I'd argue we should try to realize the potential leverage our present program gives us by two possible approaches: 1. Try to make BB face up to what losing our food would mean to him by (a) cutting back slightly (without fanfare which would give BB a moral issue) until the shoe pinches; (b) letting him come to us for renewal of the program in 1965. Then bargain hard for restoring cuts. If we're right in assuming our food staves off starvation for 3 million Algerians, a food scarcity should drive them to the streets. If we're wrong, we've already started phasing out anyway. 2. A longer range corollary might be to insinuate ourselves further into school milk and other feeding programs, increase the numbers employed in our food-for-work projects and move into training in important areas to increase BB's dependence. We can't stop BB from bucking us in the Congo, though we might be able to calm him down a bit. But rather than throwing up our hands and making matters worse, the long view would be to keep trying to build some Algerian stake in rational relations with us. R.W. Komer/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
15. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Algeria, December 1963-March 1966. Secret. Mac-- I think we now have the question of cutting off aid to the UAR and Algeria on the right track./2/ Harriman, Bell, and I agreed yesterday (with pale acquiescence of Talbot and Soapy) that we'd stop for now any new aid projects or programs to UAR or Algeria, except for one $3000 eye clinic to Algiers. This means UAR can cool its heels waiting for $35 million PL 480 amendment (which we'd cut to $14 million anyway), and will find a blank wall when it wants to talk about other aid projects. In Algeria we will go for an administrative slow-down of wheat shipments to draw down their existing 4-6 month stock so that if we do more later, the pipeline will be less full. /2/On December 18, Komer sent a memorandum to Bundy opposing CIA Director John McCone's argument that the United States should cut off aid to countries supporting the rebels in the Congo. Komer pointed out that cutting off aid to any radical African country and using it as a political weapon would lead to a violent reaction in Asia and Africa, and probably increased aid to the rebels. Instead, he argued for "a skillful effort to shake our radical friends by quietly getting across that if they raise the ante in the Congo they'll jeopardize US aid." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administration, Subject Files, Komer, Robert W.) Harriman and co. will try this out on Rusk this afternoon, and it should satisfy him. This is the smart way to do it, avoiding a flat confrontation which would lead to a repetition of Aswan but at the same time getting the word across. [Here follows discussion of another subject.] RWK/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
